SOCIAL OBJECTIVITY AND ENTREPRENEURIAL OPPORTUNITIES

社会客观性与创业机会

RUSS MCBRIDE University of California, Merced RUSS MCBRIDE 加利福尼亚大学默塞德分校

ROBERT WUEBKER University of Utah 罗伯特·韦布克（ROBERT WUEBKER） 犹他大学（University of Utah）

An important conversation in entrepreneurship focuses on the question of whether entrepreneurial opportunities are objective or subjective. The discovery view suggests that they are objective. The creation view suggests they are subjective. Resolving the debate requires first understanding what objectivity is for any social phenomenon. The debate can then be disaggregated into two questions: Are entrepreneurial opportunities ontologically subjective, and can they be epistemologically objective? The answer to both questions is “yes.” Transforming a completely subjective opportunity into an epistemologically objective opportunity requires changing beliefs—of consumers, employees, governments, and other stakeholders—along with the rights and responsibilities of these stakeholders vis-à-vis the entity created to exploit an opportunity. This view of opportunities has important implications for social science research more broadly, as well as management and entrepreneurship, specifically. 创业领域中一个重要的讨论聚焦于创业机会究竟是客观的还是主观的这一问题。发现视角认为机会是客观的，而创造视角则认为机会是主观的。要解决这一争论，首先需要理解任何社会现象的客观性究竟为何。随后，这场争论可被分解为两个问题：创业机会在本体论层面是否主观，以及它们在认识论层面是否可以客观？对这两个问题的答案都是“是”。将一个完全主观的机会转变为认识论层面的客观机会，需要改变消费者、员工、政府及其他利益相关者的信念，同时还要改变这些利益相关者相对于为利用机会而创立的实体所拥有的权利和责任。这种关于机会的观点对更广泛的社会科学研究，以及对管理和创业学（这两个领域）都具有重要意义。

If there is any moral .…. this may be it: facts in the social sciences are grounded differently than are those of the natural sciences. Compared to the social sciences, the ontology of natural science is a walk in the park. (Epstein, 2015: 163) 如果说有什么道德准则……或许就是这个：社会科学中的事实与自然科学中的事实有着不同的根基。与社会科学相比，自然科学的本体论简直是小菜一碟。（Epstein, 2015: 163）

In addition to the field editor, Sharon Alvarez, and various anonymous referees, the authors are grateful for the following people who provided detailed feedback and engaged in extensive discussions on previous versions of this manuscript: Jay Barney, Paul Godfrey, Brian Gordon, Joep Cornelissen, Todd Zenger, and Randy Westgren. Versions of this paper were presented at the Academy of Management social ontology professional development workshops; the Entrepreneurship Exemplars Conference at the Ohio State University; the Entrepreneurship Exemplars Conference in Keystone, CO; University of California Berkeley Social Ontology Research Group; the University of Utah Entrepreneurship & Strategy Department; the Utah Social Ontology Research Group; the University of Oslo; University College, Bergen; China Europe International Business School; Ernest & Julio Gallo Management Program at the University of California, Merced; the University of Eindhoven; Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management; SKEMA Knowledge and Technology Organization Group; the University of St. Gallen; IESE Business School; SASIN Management School; the University of Klagenfurt; Vienna University; and Anglia Ruskin University. 除了领域编辑莎伦·阿尔瓦雷斯（Sharon Alvarez）和多位匿名审稿人外，作者还感谢以下人员提供了详细反馈并就本手稿的先前版本进行了广泛讨论：杰伊·巴尼（Jay Barney）、保罗·戈弗雷（Paul Godfrey）、布莱恩·戈登（Brian Gordon）、乔普·科内利森（Joep Cornelissen）、托德·赞格（Todd Zenger）和兰迪·韦斯特格伦（Randy Westgren）。本文的版本曾在以下场合进行展示：管理学会社会本体论专业发展研讨会；俄亥俄州立大学创业典范会议；科罗拉多州基斯通的创业典范会议；加州大学伯克利分校社会本体论研究小组；犹他大学创业与战略系；犹他社会本体论研究小组；奥斯陆大学；卑尔根大学学院；中欧国际工商学院；加州大学默塞德分校欧内斯特与胡利奥·加洛管理项目；埃因霍温大学；清华大学经济管理学院；SKEMA知识与技术组织集团；圣加仑大学；IESE商学院；SASIN管理学院；克拉根福大学；维也纳大学；以及安格利亚鲁斯金大学。

How entrepreneurial opportunities are formed and exploited has attracted interest from researchers (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2019; Braver & Danneels, 2018; Davidsson, 2015; Dimov, 2007, 2011; Ramoglou & Tsang, 2016, 2017, 2018; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), and two approaches to analyzing opportunities have emerged in the literature. The first, building on the work of Kirzner (1973) on entrepreneurial arbitrage, has argued that opportunities are formed by exogenous shocks to established markets or industries and are discovered by individuals with unusual alertness operating under conditions of risk (Kirzner, 1973, 1979; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). The second has suggested that opportunities are created endogenously by the actions of entrepreneurs themselves operating under conditions of Knightian uncertainty (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Knight, 1921). Some have argued that these two ways of thinking about opportunity formation and exploitation are complementary (Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2010; Dimov, 2011; F0ss & Klein, 2017; Kirzner, 2009), and others have argued that they are mutually exclusive (Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Ramoglou & Tsang, 2016; Shane, 2003; Shane & Eckhardt, 2003); thus, one or the other must logically dominate research in the field of entrepreneurship. 创业机会的形成与利用方式已引起研究者的兴趣（Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2019; Braver & Danneels, 2018; Davidsson, 2015; Dimov, 2007, 2011; Ramoglou & Tsang, 2016, 2017, 2018; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000），且文献中出现了两种分析机会的方法。第一种基于Kirzner（1973）关于创业套利的研究，认为机会由既有市场或行业的外生冲击形成，并由具备异常警觉性的个体在风险条件下发现（Kirzner, 1973, 1979; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000）。第二种则认为创业机会由创业者自身在奈特不确定性条件下的行动内生创造（Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Knight, 1921）。一些学者认为这两种关于机会形成与利用的思维方式是互补的（Alvarez & Barney, 2007, 2010; Dimov, 2011; F0ss & Klein, 2017; Kirzner, 2009），而另一些学者则认为它们是相互排斥的（Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Ramoglou & Tsang, 2016; Shane, 2003; Shane & Eckhardt, 2003）；因此，在创业研究领域中，其中一种方法必须在逻辑上占据主导地位。

Debates over the importance of these two models have continued for some time (Alvarez, Barney, McBride, & Wuebker, 2014, 2017; Braver & Danneels, 关于这两种模型重要性的争论已经持续了一段时间（Alvarez, Barney, McBride, & Wuebker, 2014, 2017; Braver & Danneels,

2018; Cornelissen & Clarke, 2010; Davidsson, 2015; Eckhardt & Shane, 2012, 2013; Foss & Klein, 2017, 2018; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Ramoglou & Tsang, 2016, 2017, 2018; Shane, 2012; Venkataraman, Sarasvathy, Dew, & Forster, 2012; Wood & McKinley, 2010, 2017, 2018). However, these debates are unlikely to be resolved until a more fundamental issue about entrepreneurial opportunities has been addressed—are opportunities objective or subjective? If they are objective (or mostly objective), then the older discovery approach that recommends searching for preexisting opportunities is more appropriate; if they are subjective (or mostly subjective), then the creation approach is more appropriate. 2018；Cornelissen & Clarke，2010；Davidsson，2015；Eckhardt & Shane，2012、2013；Foss & Klein，2017、2018；McMullen & Shepherd，2006；Ramoglou & Tsang，2016、2017、2018；Shane，2012；Venkataraman，Sarasvathy，Dew，& Forster，2012；Wood & McKinley，2010、2017、2018）。然而，这些争论不太可能得到解决，除非关于创业机会的一个更根本的问题得到解决——机会是客观的还是主观的？如果它们是客观的（或主要是客观的），那么建议寻找预先存在的机会的较旧发现方法更为合适；如果它们是主观的（或主要是主观的），那么创造方法更为合适。

The purpose of this paper is to address the question regarding whether entrepreneurial opportunities are objective. Answering this question requires first determining criteria for what counts as objective or subjective for any socioeconomic phenomena, and this requires taking a deeper look at the structure of social reality. We find that entrepreneurial opportunities are ontologically subjective, like all social phenomena, but can be epistemologically objective if the criteria are met. These two different dimensions of objectivity have often been overlooked. 本文旨在探讨创业机会是否具有客观性这一问题。回答这一问题首先需要确定任何社会经济现象中何为客观、何为主观的评判标准，而这又需要深入考察社会现实的结构。我们发现，与所有社会现象一样，创业机会在本体论层面具有主观性，但在认识论层面若满足相应标准则可具有客观性。这两个不同的客观性维度常被忽视。

The paper then addresses an important follow-up question: What implications does the answer to the debate about the objectivity of entrepreneurial opportunities and an understanding of the nature of social reality have for the evolution of the fields of entrepreneurship, management, and the broader social sciences? First, everything we study, reflect upon, and theorize about in entrepreneurship and management involves social entities, so it is critically important to understand what constitutes a social entity to make it real and objective. Second, social phenomena are distinct from physical phenomena, and what makes a social phenomenon objective is different from what makes a physical object objective. Conflating the two has historically led to confusion in the social sciences, and eliminating this confusion will clear the way for significant progress to be made. Third, a clear understanding of social entities offers a new lens through which to view a diverse range of activities within firms and ventures—activities that fundamentally involve the difficult labor of forging beliefs and duties among those who can help advance the organization to become increasingly real and objective. This lens serves as a tool that scholars can use to analyze the objects of their work from this novel perspective. 该论文随后提出一个重要的后续问题：关于创业机会客观性的辩论答案以及对社会现实本质的理解，对创业学、管理学以及更广泛的社会科学领域的发展有何影响？首先，我们在创业学和管理学中研究、反思和构建理论的一切都涉及社会实体，因此理解什么构成社会实体以使其具有现实性和客观性至关重要。其次，社会现象与物理现象不同，使社会现象具有客观性的因素与使物理对象具有客观性的因素不同。历史上，将两者混淆导致了社会科学中的混乱，消除这种混乱将为重大进展扫清道路。第三，对社会实体的清晰理解提供了一个新的视角，使我们能够审视企业和创业项目内的各种活动——这些活动从根本上涉及在那些能够帮助组织变得越来越真实和客观的人们之间构建信念和职责的艰难工作。这个视角作为一种工具，学者们可以用它从这个新颖的角度分析其研究对象。

DEFINING KEY TERMS

定义关键术语

There are several terms that are central to the arguments developed in this paper. These terms are defined in this section. 本文论证中涉及几个核心术语，本节将对这些术语进行定义。

Entrepreneurial Opportunity

创业机会

There have been many definitions of the concept of opportunity, but among the core participants in the debate there has been broad agreement about what exactly constitutes an entrepreneurial opportunity. An opportunity is a situation “in which new goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at greater than their cost of production” (Shane & Venkataraman, 2000: 220) or a situation “in which new goods, services, raw materials, markets and organizing methods can be introduced through the formation of new means, ends, or means-ends relationships” (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003: 336) and sold for more than their cost of production. 关于机会的概念已有诸多定义，但在这场辩论的核心参与者中，对于究竟何为创业机会已达成广泛共识。创业机会是一种“能够以高于生产成本的价格引入并销售新商品、服务、原材料及组织方法”的情境（Shane & Venkataraman, 2000: 220），或是一种“通过形成新的手段、目的或手段-目的关系来引入新商品、服务、原材料、市场及组织方法，并以高于其生产成本的价格进行销售”的情境（Eckhardt & Shane, 2003: 336）。

Alvarez and Barney (2010) have agreed, noting that there is “growing consensus about the definition of what constitutes an opportunity in the entrepreneurship literature: ‘An opportunity exists whenever there are competitive imperfections in a factor or product market’” (Alvarez & Barney, 2010: 559). Since they consider an “imperfection” to just be situation in which goods and services can be introduced and sold for more than their cost of production, these definitions are effectively equivalent. Interestingly, though, consensus about the definition has not resolved the debate about whether opportunities are objective. Alvarez和Barney（2010）对此表示认同，并指出创业文献中对“机会”的定义存在“日益增长的共识：‘当要素或产品市场存在竞争性缺陷时，机会便存在’”（Alvarez & Barney，2010：559）。由于他们认为“缺陷”只是指商品和服务可以以高于生产成本的价格推出和销售的情况，因此这些定义实际上是等效的。然而，有趣的是，关于定义的共识并未解决关于机会是否客观的争论。

Subjectivity versus Objectivity

主观性与客观性

Discussions of criteria for determining objectivity are longstanding, but one straightforward approach (Searle, 1995, 2010) has grounded the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity as the difference between that which is observer independent (i.e., mind independent) and that which is observer relative (i.e., mind dependent). Mind-independent objects or facts do not depend upon any observer for their existence and are thus objective, while minddependent objects or facts do, and so they are subjective. For example, a hydrogen atom exists regardless of what anyone thinks about it. It is mind independent. Similarly, the fact that a hydrogen atom has one proton is true regardless of whether any humans are alive to confirm it or what they think about it, and so it is an objective fact. Although the discovery of that fact required human minds, the atom itself still exists independently of such minds and the discovery process. 关于确定客观性标准的讨论由来已久，但一种直接的方法（塞尔，1995，2010）将主观性和客观性的区别建立在独立于观察者（即独立于意识）的事物与依赖于观察者（即依赖于意识）的事物之间。独立于意识的对象或事实不依赖任何观察者而存在，因此具有客观性；而依赖于意识的对象或事实则依赖于观察者存在，因此具有主观性。例如，一个氢原子的存在不取决于任何人对它的想法，它是独立于意识的。同样，氢原子有一个质子这一事实，无论是否有人类活着去证实它，或者他们对它有什么想法，都是真实的，因此这是一个客观事实。尽管发现这个事实需要人类的意识，但原子本身仍然独立于这些意识和发现过程而存在。

In contrast, a corporation (e.g., IBM) only exists because a diverse collection of people believe that it does (federal and state governments, the department of corporations, shareholders, customers, employees, partners, contractors, media pundits, etc.). If no one believed that IBM existed then it would no longer exist, which makes it mind dependent and therefore subjective.1 Similarly, the fact that Paris is the capital of France is only a fact because some people decided at some point in history that Paris would be the capital of France. If everyone awoke with the new belief that Marseilles was the capital, then it would become the capital of France. It is a mind-dependent fact and therefore subjective. 相比之下，一家公司（例如IBM）的存在仅仅是因为一群不同背景的人相信它存在（联邦和州政府、公司部门、股东、客户、员工、合作伙伴、承包商、媒体评论员等）。如果没有人相信IBM存在，那么它就不再存在，这使得它依赖于意识，因此具有主观性。1 同样，巴黎是法国首都这一事实之所以成为事实，仅仅是因为在历史上某个时期，一些人决定巴黎将成为法国的首都。如果每个人醒来后都相信马赛是首都，那么马赛就会成为法国的首都。这是一个依赖于意识的事实，因此具有主观性。

The Physical and Social Worlds

物理世界与社会世界

There are then two types of objects: physical objects and social objects. Examples of physical objects include a tree, Mt. Everest, and a hydrogen atom. Examples of social objects include a corporation, a capital city, and product or factor markets. This difference between physical and social objects highlights a critical distinction between those fields that study mind-independent phenomena (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) and those that study minddependent phenomena (management, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, economics, legal studies, strategy, political science, etc.). The objects of study in the physical sciences, like hydrogen atoms, are mind independent and therefore objective. On the other hand, the core objects of study in the social sciences, like governments or IBM, are mind dependent and therefore subjective.2 然后有两类对象：物理对象和社会对象。物理对象的例子包括一棵树、珠穆朗玛峰和一个氢原子。社会对象的例子包括一家公司、一个首都城市以及产品或要素市场。物理对象与社会对象之间的这种差异凸显了两类领域之间的关键区别：一类研究不依赖于意识的现象（物理学、化学、生物学等），另一类研究依赖于意识的现象（管理学、社会学、人类学、社会心理学、经济学、法律研究、战略学、政治学等）。物理科学的研究对象（如氢原子）不依赖于意识，因此具有客观性。另一方面，社会科学的核心研究对象（如政府或IBM）依赖于意识，因此具有主观性。

Ontology and Epistemology

本体论与认识论

Ontology is the study of what something is, whereas epistemology is the study of what we think or believe about that something. The physical sciences study ontologically objective physical objects. Psychology, cognitive science, and the social sciences study people’s thoughts and beliefs about things—in other words, people’s epistemic states (and the behavior and effects driven by those epistemic states). Physical objects and facts are essentially ontological and objective because they are mind independent, while social objects and facts are essentially epistemological and subjective because they are dependent upon what people think and believe. 本体论是对事物本质的研究，而认识论是对我们对该事物的认知或信念的研究。自然科学从本体论的角度研究客观物理对象。心理学、认知科学和社会科学研究人们对事物的思想和信念——换句话说，研究人们的认知状态（以及由这些认知状态驱动的行为和影响）。物理对象和事实本质上是本体论的和客观的，因为它们独立于意识；而社会对象和事实本质上是认识论的和主观的，因为它们依赖于人们的思想和信念。

Ontological Objectivity and Epistemological Objectivity

本体论客观性与认识论客观性

This leads to an important question. Similar to physical objects, some social objects are independent of us and relatively stable (like IBM, the capital of France, or the Canadian government), yet they are obviously not ontologically objective physical objects. Where, then, does the objectivity of such social objects come from? Social objects and facts are epistemological, and so their objectivity comes from epistemological objectivity. Where does epistemological objectivity come from? It comes from stable cognitive states (Boghossian, 2007; Bratman, 1987, 2014; Gilbert, 1992, 2015; Hart, 1961; Hume, 1740/ 1978; Lawson, Latsis, & Martins, 2013; Ludwig, 2016, 2017; Searle, 1995, 2010; Tuomela, 2002, 2007, 2013), specifically beliefs and rights and obligations—which are referred to as “deontics”—as well as the behaviors that flow from them, upon which social objects depend for their existence. 这就引出了一个重要的问题。与物理对象类似，一些社会对象独立于我们且相对稳定（例如IBM、法国的首都或加拿大政府），但它们显然不是本体论意义上客观的物理对象。那么，这类社会对象的客观性来自何处？社会对象和事实具有认识论属性，因此它们的客观性来自认识论客观性。认识论客观性又来自何处？它来自稳定的认知状态（Boghossian，2007；Bratman，1987、2014；Gilbert，1992、2015；Hart，1961；Hume，1740/1978；Lawson、Latsis与Martins，2013；Ludwig，2016、2017；Searle，1995、2010；Tuomela，2002、2007、2013），具体而言是信念、权利与义务——即所谓的“道义性”（deontics）——以及由它们衍生的行为，社会对象的存在则依赖于这些行为。

Thus, there are two kinds of objectivity. A physical object is ontologically objective because it is independent of every human mind. A social object is ontologically subjective but can be epistemologically objective precisely because of the stable beliefs and stable deontics of human minds. These are completely distinct dimensions of objectivity. These two dimensions have often been conflated. 因此，存在两种客观性。物理对象在本体论上是客观的，因为它独立于每个人的心智。社会对象在本体论上是主观的，但在认识论上可以是客观的，这恰恰是因为人类心智的稳定信念和稳定道义规范。这些是完全不同的客观性维度。这两个维度常常被混淆。

THE DEBATE

辩论

With these definitions in place, it is now possible to address the question of whether entrepreneurial opportunities are objective. 有了这些定义，现在就可以探讨创业机会是否具有客观性的问题了。

Positions in the Debate

辩论中的立场

According to Shane and Venkataraman (2000: 219), entrepreneurial opportunities are objective: “To have entrepreneurship, you must first have entrepreneurial opportunities … the opportunities themselves are objective phenomena.“3 In this view, opportunities are formed by exogenous shocks that disrupt market equilibrium. These shocks can be caused by (among other things) technological advances, changes in the political or regulatory environment, evolving consumer tastes, and social and demographic trends (Shane, 2003). A straightforward program of research has followed from this perspective. How does one search for and identify shocks to the socioeconomic landscape, and how and why do some individuals and not others identify and exploit them? 根据Shane和Venkataraman（2000：219）的观点，创业机会是客观存在的：“要进行创业，首先必须存在创业机会……机会本身是客观现象。”3 在此视角下，机会由扰乱市场均衡的外生冲击形成。这些冲击可能由（除其他因素外）技术进步、政治或监管环境变化、消费者口味演变以及社会和人口趋势（Shane，2003）引起。从这一角度出发，已形成了一个直接的研究方案。人们如何寻找和识别社会经济格局中的冲击？为何有些人能识别并利用这些冲击，而另一些人不能？

In contrast to the opportunity objectivists, the subjectivists have asserted that opportunities are socially constructed (e.g., Alvarez, Barney, & Anderson, 2013; Baker & Nelson, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2001; Wood & McKinley, 2010, 2017, 2018). This perspective proposes that opportunities are formed through entrepreneurial action rather than discovered and that the creation process often involves utilizing resources in unexpected ways and integrating them into existing institutions in unpredictable (i.e., nonobjective) ways (Baker & Nelson, 2005; Dimov, 2007; Luksha, 2008; Sarasvathy, 2001; Wood & McKinley, 2010, 2017). Because the agent subjectively conceives and acts to create a new product or service, and creation itself is a subjective process, proponents have argued that opportunity is subjective as well. In this view, entrepreneurs create the imperfections in product or factor markets and then exploit the very imperfection they create.4 与机会客观主义者不同，主观主义者主张机会是社会建构的（例如，Alvarez, Barney, & Anderson, 2013；Baker & Nelson, 2005；Sarasvathy, 2001；Wood & McKinley, 2010, 2017, 2018）。这一视角认为，机会是通过创业行动形成的，而非被发现的，并且创造过程往往涉及以意想不到的方式利用资源，并以不可预测（即非客观）的方式将其整合到现有制度中（Baker & Nelson, 2005；Dimov, 2007；Luksha, 2008；Sarasvathy, 2001；Wood & McKinley, 2010, 2017）。由于行动者主观地构想并采取行动创造新产品或服务，而创造本身是一个主观过程，支持者认为机会本身也是主观的。在这一观点中，企业家会在产品或要素市场中制造缺陷，然后利用他们自己创造的这些缺陷。4

4 Another branch of subjectivism based on the “judgment approach” (Casson, 1982; Foss, Klein, Kor, & Mahoney, 2008; Klein, 2008) has also found that opportunities are subjective but has emphasized the role of thought and imagination to arrive at this position. Advocates of the judgment approach have viewed opportunities as subjective because they are judgments in the minds of 4 另一种基于“判断方法”的主观主义分支（Casson，1982；Foss、Klein、Kor & Mahoney，2008；Klein，2008）也发现机会具有主观性，但强调了思维和想象力在得出这一立场中的作用。“判断方法”的倡导者将机会视为主观性的，因为它们是人们头脑中的判断。

The First Argument for the Objectivity of Opportunities

机会客观性的首要论证

The first argument for the objectivity of entrepreneurial opportunities is as follows: Opportunities are physical objects, and physical objects are objective; therefore, opportunities are objective. Ramoglou and Tsang (2016: 410) have made this argument, suggesting that opportunities are “propensities,” and (quoting Popper): “we live in a world of propensities .. [propensities] are not mere possibilities but are physical realities.” 创业机会客观性的第一个论据如下：机会是物理对象，而物理对象是客观的；因此，机会是客观的。Ramoglou和Tsang（2016：410）提出了这一论点，认为机会是“倾向性”，并且（引用波普尔的话）：“我们生活在一个倾向性的世界中……[倾向性]不仅仅是可能性，而是物理现实。”

Limitations to the first argument for the objectivity of opportunities. Physical objects (like a hydrogen atom or a mountain) are objective since their existence does not depend on human minds, but it is difficult to see how an opportunity could be a kind of physical object. Indeed, to hold this position, Ramoglou and Tsang (2016) relied upon an abstruse construct from Popper: “propensity” (a concept that never gained much traction in the philosophy of science). 对机会客观性的第一个论点的局限性。物理对象（如氢原子或山脉）是客观的，因为它们的存在不依赖于人类的意识，但很难看出机会如何能成为一种物理对象。事实上，为了支持这一立场，Ramoglou和Tsang（2016）依赖于波普尔的一个深奥概念：“倾向性”（一个在科学哲学中从未获得广泛关注的概念）。

Suggesting that opportunities are physical is even more problematic because it conflates the socioeconomic world with the physical world. This is a century-old mistake made by some of the most respected social theorists. This idea that the physical and the social are similar underpins many foundational theories of social structure and many theories of entrepreneurial opportunity that draw from them. Durkheim (1901/2013: 146) sometimes suggested that social phenomena “must be treated as natural [i.e., physical] phenomena, subject to necessary laws,” and that social phenomena are physical phenomena, “only distinguishable from other phenomena by virtue of their greater complexity” (102). Scott (2014) and others (e.g., Alexander, 1983) have held positions that emphasize “the fundamental similarity of the social and physical sciences” (Scott, 2014: 76). 认为机会是物质性的这一观点更成问题，因为它将社会经济世界与物理世界混为一谈。这是一个百年错误，由一些最受尊敬的社会理论家犯下。认为物理世界和社会世界相似的这一观点，是许多社会结构基础理论以及许多借鉴这些理论的创业机会理论的核心。涂尔干（1901/2013：146）有时认为社会现象“必须被视为自然（即物理）现象，受必然规律支配”，并且社会现象是物理现象，“只是因其复杂性更高而与其他现象有所区别”（102）。斯科特（2014）及其他人（例如，亚历山大，1983）持有强调“社会科学与物理科学根本相似性”的观点（斯科特，2014：76）。

In contrast, the claim advanced in this paper is that the social world and the physical world are fundamentally dissimilar. If this is correct, then Durkheim’s “similarity thesis,” repeated by Ramoglou and Tsang, Scott, Alexander, and others is precisely the wrong conceptual foundation upon which to build any theory of the social world or understand any component of that world, including entrepreneurial opportunity. It fails to discriminate mind-independent physical phenomena from mind-dependent social phenomena. 相比之下，本文提出的观点是，社会世界和物理世界在根本上是不同的。如果这一观点正确，那么拉莫格卢（Ramoglou）和曾（Tsang）、斯科特（Scott）、亚历山大（Alexander）等人重复的涂尔干（Durkheim）“相似性论点”，恰恰是构建任何关于社会世界的理论或理解该世界任何组成部分（包括创业机会）的错误概念基础。它未能区分独立于意识的物理现象和依赖于意识的社会现象。

Most social scientists are sensitive to the fact that the laws of physics are categorically distinct from the “laws” of their field. Economists typically recognize that their laws are not “inexorable laws” (Taylor, 1929: 20), but they tend to “compare their field to physics” (Thaler, 2015: 5), and some even think of them as inexorable, immutable, and identical to the natural laws of physics (e.g., Mueller, 2016).5 Yet the social sciences are not the physical sciences, and social “laws” are not physical laws. 大多数社会科学家都意识到，物理学定律与他们领域内的“定律”存在本质区别。经济学家通常认识到，他们的定律并非“不可改变的定律”（Taylor，1929：20），但他们往往会“将自己的领域与物理学进行比较”（Thaler，2015：5），甚至有人认为这些定律是不可改变、永恒不变的，并且与物理学的自然定律完全相同（例如，Mueller，2016）。5然而，社会科学并非物理科学，社会“定律”也并非物理定律。

The Second Argument for the Objectivity of Opportunities

机会客观性的第二个论证

The second argument for the objectivity of opportunities states that the market imperfection that defines the opportunity exists independently of the actor that exploits it; therefore, the opportunity is objective. A technical revolution (e.g., the invention of 3D printing, as in Shane, 2000) can offer opportunities that did not previously exist, and an entrepreneurial agent can take advantage of the objective changes in the external, objective, socioeconomic, and technological landscape. 关于机会客观性的第二个论点指出，界定机会的市场不完善性独立于利用该机会的行为主体而存在；因此，机会是客观的。一场技术革命（例如，3D打印的发明，如Shane, 2000所述）可以创造出此前不存在的机会，而创业主体能够利用外部客观的社会经济和技术环境中的客观变化。

Limitations to the second argument for the objectivity of opportunities. The argument most often advanced by discovery theorists (Eckhardt & Ciuchta, 2008; Shane, 2003; Shane & Eckhardt, 2003; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) contains an important insight—that the market conditions within which an agent operates are often independent and outside of the control of that agent. But true ontological objective independence—that which a hydrogen atom or Mt. Everest possesses—is objective because its existence is independent of every human mind. A market imperfection is only independent of the mind of the entrepreneurial agent (and even then, it is not if the agent happens to be the one who caused the imperfection—Schumpeter, 1942). The thoughts and behaviors of many people are what cause shocks to the market or lead to the technological advancement. Neither event is independent of them—rather, the opposite is true: they are only independent of some other actor reacting to that shock that they created. This is an example of socioeconomic epistemic objectivity, not physical ontological objectivity. 对作为机会客观性第二个论证的局限性。发现理论学者（Eckhardt & Ciuchta, 2008；Shane, 2003；Shane & Eckhardt, 2003；Shane & Venkataraman, 2000）最常提出的论证包含一个重要洞见——即行动者所处的市场条件往往独立于且不受该行动者控制。但真正的本体论客观独立性——如氢原子或珠穆朗玛峰所具有的——之所以是客观的，是因为其存在独立于每一个人类心智。市场不完善性仅在独立于创业行动者的心智时才成立（即便如此，如果该行动者恰好是造成不完善性的主体——Schumpeter, 1942——则也不成立）。许多人的思想和行为会导致市场冲击或推动技术进步。这两个事件都并非独立于他们——相反，事实恰恰相反：它们仅独立于某些其他行动者对他们所制造的冲击的反应。这是社会经济认知客观性的一个例子，而非物理本体论客观性。

The Argument Against the Creation Account of Opportunity

关于机会创造说的反对论证

A frequent refrain among those who have argued for the objectivity of opportunities is that the creation approach is a kind of postmodern relativism where “anything goes.” Accepting that opportunities are endogenously formed, they have argued, results in a state of affairs where no objectivity of any kind is possible. But social constructionism need not entail extreme “anything goes” relativism (Baghramian & Carter, 2015; Montuschi, 2007). This unwarranted linkage is often a critical part of the argument against accounts of entrepreneurial creation. Fleetwood and Ackroyd (2004: 1), for example, impugned the “social constructionist ontology [from] which postmodernist or poststructuralist oriented analysis is rooted.” Ramoglou and Tsang (2016) have also hitched postmodern relativism to social constructionism, arguing that for social constructivists: 那些主张机会具有客观性的人常重复的一个说法是，创造论是一种“任何事情都行”的后现代相对主义。他们认为，接受机会是内生形成的，会导致任何形式的客观性都不可能存在的局面。但社会建构主义不一定意味着极端的“任何事情都行”的相对主义（Baghramian & Carter, 2015; Montuschi, 2007）。这种无端的关联往往是反对创业创造论解释的关键部分。例如，Fleetwood和Ackroyd（2004: 1）抨击“社会建构主义本体论——后现代主义或后结构主义导向的分析正是植根于此”。Ramoglou和Tsang（2016）也将后现代相对主义与社会建构主义捆绑，认为对于社会建构主义者而言：

the idea of an objective world is an illusion. Reality is ultimately reducible to social constructions. There is no single way the world is or can be. Agents can willingly create their own realities so long as they regard them as real. (p. 413) 客观世界的概念是一种错觉。现实最终可归结为社会建构。世界不存在单一的存在方式或可能的存在方式。只要行动者将其视为真实，他们就可以自愿创造自己的现实。（第413页）

This is one reasonable definition of postmodern relativism, but agents cannot willingly create their own reality at will; we are subject to the “iron cage” of both ontologically objective physical reality and epistemologically objective social reality. As Durkheim (1895: 70) argued, “a [social] thing is principally recognizable by virtue of not being capable of modification through a mere act of will … . Far from being a product of our will [social facts] determine it from without.“6 这是后现代相对主义的一个合理定义，但主体无法随意创造自己的现实；我们受制于本体论上客观的物理现实和认识论上客观的社会现实的“铁笼”。正如涂尔干（1895：70）所论证的，“[社会]事物主要可通过其无法仅通过意志行为加以改变这一特征来识别……。社会事实远非我们意志的产物，而是从外部对我们产生决定作用。”6

These kinds of “anything goes” attacks (e.g., Fleetwood, 2005; Reed, 2005) are common, justified complaints against postmodern relativism, but they do not apply to the many institutional theorists, social ontologists (Boghossian, 2007; Ludwig, 2016, 2017; Tuomela, 2007, 2013), social constructivists (Alvarez & Barney, 2010, 2013; Alvarez et al., 2014, 2017; Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Wood & McKinley, 2010, 2017, 2018), or even critical realists, like Sayer (2000)—all of whom have acknowledged the socially constructed nature of social phenomena. 这类“一切皆有可能”的攻击（例如，Fleetwood，2005；Reed，2005）很常见，是对后现代相对主义的合理批评，但它们并不适用于许多制度理论家、社会本体论学者（Boghossian，2007；Ludwig，2016、2017；Tuomela，2007、2013）、社会建构主义者（Alvarez & Barney，2010、2013；Alvarez等人，2014、2017；Berger & Luckmann，1967；Wood & McKinley，2010、2017、2018），甚至像Sayer（2000）这样的批判实在论者——所有这些人都承认社会现象的社会建构性质。

Why then does constructivism so often get lumped together with postmodern relativism? The root of the problem, correctly identified by the objectivists, is that there is a glaring lack of explanation for social objectivity within traditional social constructionism. This makes it difficult to understand how scholars can objectively study phenomena that are inherently socially constructed. Sayer (2000: 32), for example, observed that “if the social world is socially constructed .. how can it be treated as independent of the researcher’s knowledge?” Klein (2008) has also suggested that constructivism does not allow for such objectivity: 那么，建构主义为何常常与后现代相对主义混为一谈？客观主义者正确指出的问题根源在于，传统社会建构主义对社会客观性的解释存在明显缺失。这使得学者难以客观地研究那些本质上具有社会建构性的现象。例如，塞耶（2000：32）指出：“如果社会世界是社会建构的……那么它怎么能被视为独立于研究者的知识之外呢？”克莱因（2008）也认为，建构主义不允许这种客观性：

The creation approach is grounded in a social constructivist view of action … . It holds that the market itself is a social construction, and that realized gains and losses are, in part, subjective. [In my] . . approach described here … realized gains and losses are objective and quantifiable. (p. 183) 这种创造方法基于对行动的社会建构主义视角……它认为市场本身是一种社会建构，而实现的收益和损失在一定程度上是主观的。[在我]……此处描述的方法中……实现的收益和损失是客观且可量化的。（第183页）

The motivation for the conflation of constructivism with postmodern relativism is understandable since constructivists do not have an explanation for socioeconomic objectivity. Objectivists do proffer an answer to this problem—any objective socioeconomic phenomenon, like money, is objective because it is physical, and physical objects are objective. Therefore, one side (social constructivism) has no explanation for objectivity.’ The other side (objectivism) mistakenly concludes that social phenomena are objective in the same way as a hydrogen atom or a rock. 将建构主义与后现代相对主义混为一谈的动机是可以理解的，因为建构主义者无法解释社会经济客观性。客观主义者确实对这个问题给出了解答——任何客观的社会经济现象，比如货币，之所以是客观的，是因为它是物质的，而物质对象本身就是客观的。因此，一方（社会建构主义）无法解释客观性。另一方（客观主义）错误地认为社会现象与氢原子或岩石一样具有客观性。

Some social facts and objects are objective. A bank account balance is an objective fact that can be tested by attempting to convince a bank manager that the account’s balance should be ten times larger than the one reflected on the statement. But money is not only physical coins or paper, as credit cards and Bitcoin demonstrate. The physical electrons in a computer representing a bank balance are also not money. Entire village economies run perfectly well with shopkeepers who keep nothing more than mental tallies of debits and credits (which are just quantified duties and rights) without any physical tokens (Graeber, 2014; Martin, 2015). Money is ontologically subjective, like all socioeconomic phenomena (Searle, 1995, 2010), yet like many social institutions, money is also objective because it exists independently of the sole control of any individual—just like markets, bank account balances, organizations, and regulatory agencies. How does this work? It works because real socioeconomic phenomena are epistemologically objective. 一些社会事实和事物是客观存在的。银行账户余额就是一个客观事实，你可以尝试说服银行经理，称该账户的余额应该是对账单上显示的余额的十倍。但正如信用卡和比特币所表明的，货币不仅仅是实体的硬币或纸币。计算机中代表银行余额的物理电子也不是货币。整个村庄的经济可以在店主仅通过记录借贷的心理账目（这些不过是量化的义务和权利）运行得很好，而无需任何实体代币（格雷伯，2014；马丁，2015）。货币在本体论上是主观的，就像所有社会经济现象一样（塞尔，1995，2010），然而，与许多社会机构一样，货币也是客观的，因为它的存在独立于任何个人的单独控制——就像市场、银行账户余额、组织和监管机构一样。这是如何实现的呢？这是因为真实的社会经济现象在认识论上是客观的。

The Dual Problems of Objectivity and Postmodernism

客观性与后现代主义的双重问题

We have demonstrated that the argument that opportunities are objective because they are physical objects does not make sense; it commits the age-old error of conflating mind-dependent social phenomena with mind-independent physical phenomena. Neither does it work to say that market conditions are objective because they are independent of all humans. Humans create such market conditions. 我们已经证明，认为机会是客观的（因为它们是物理对象）这一论点是站不住脚的；它犯了一个由来已久的错误，即把依赖于意识的社会现象与独立于意识的物理现象混为一谈。同样，声称市场条件是客观的（因为它们独立于所有人）也不成立。人类创造了这些市场条件。

We have also presented two sides of the same error. The first is committed by objectivists who suggest that everything—even socioeconomic phenomena—is really physical, and so everything is objective and mind independent. The second error is committed by postmodern relativists who suggest that everything—even a physical object—is really social, and thus socially constructed, subjective, and mind dependent. These are just different ways of conflating the social world with the physical world. These are the flip sides of the same mistake—a duality (Awodey, 2010). 我们还指出了同一错误的两个方面。第一个是由客观主义者犯下的，他们认为一切事物——甚至社会经济现象——本质上都是物理的，因此一切都是客观的、独立于意识的。第二个错误是由后现代相对主义者犯下的，他们认为一切事物——甚至一个物理物体——本质上都是社会的，因此是社会建构的、主观的、依赖于意识的。这只是将社会世界与物理世界混为一谈的不同方式。这是同一个错误的正反两面——一种二元论（Awodey，2010）。

The objectivists have offered a critically important insight, however, by pointing to an important gap in constructivist theory and asking how one explains social and socioeconomic objectivity, like bank account balances and corporations. Where could such objective phenomena come from if not from the objectivity of the physical world? If advocates of opportunity creation agree that some socioeconomic phenomena are as real as a “brick wall” (Alvarez & Barney, 2013), then an explanation of how objectivity works in the mind-dependent social world is needed. This is what we will try to do next. 然而，客观主义者通过指出建构主义理论中的一个重要缺陷，并询问如何解释社会和社会经济客观性（如银行账户余额和公司），提供了一个至关重要的见解。如果这些客观现象不是来自物理世界的客观性，那它们又能来自哪里呢？如果机会创造的倡导者同意某些社会经济现象和“砖墙”一样真实（Alvarez & Barney, 2013），那么就需要解释在依赖心智的社会世界中客观性是如何运作的。这正是我们接下来要尝试做的事情。

THE OBJECTIVITY OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

社会现象的客观性

If Santa Claus and IBM are both socially constructed objects that exist only because we believe that they exist, but only IBM is objectively real, what is the difference? How can any social phenomenon be objective if it is not physically objective? The similarity across physical and social things when they are both “real” is that they are both independent of us and often orthogonal to our desires and wishes. But therein ends the similarity. 如果圣诞老人和IBM都是仅因我们的信仰而存在的社会建构物，但只有IBM是客观真实的，那么两者的区别是什么？如果一个社会现象不是物理上客观的，它又怎能是客观的呢？当物理事物和社会事物都被认为是“真实”时，它们的相似之处在于两者都独立于我们，并且往往与我们的欲望和愿望无关。但相似之处也仅限于此。

The answer to the puzzle is that Paris is the capital of France because we believe and act as if it is. It is epistemologically objective. IBM exists because we believe and act as if it is. If no one believed that IBM existed, it would no longer exist. And if social entities constitute cognitive states and the decisions, behaviors, habits, and routines dependent upon such states, then the only possible source for the independent objectivity of any social entity must be grounded in those same cognitive states. The reality of any social phenomenon stems from the very structure that constitutes it—the stable beliefs of people; in other words, its epistemology. This view is coherent with social constructionism, which is the majority view in philosophy and arguably the most common position found across a diverse set of perspectives in social theory (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Boghossian, 2007; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Sayer, 2000; Searle, 1995, 2010; Weick, 1979). 这个谜题的答案是，巴黎是法国的首都，因为我们相信并如此行动。从认识论角度看，这是客观的。IBM的存在也是因为我们相信并如此行动。如果没有人相信IBM存在，它就不会存在。而且，如果社会实体构成认知状态以及依赖于这些状态的决策、行为、习惯和常规，那么任何社会实体独立客观性的唯一可能来源必须建立在这些相同的认知状态之上。任何社会现象的现实都源于构成它的结构——人们的稳定信念；换句话说，就是它的认识论。这种观点与社会建构主义一致，社会建构主义是哲学界的主流观点，并且可以说是社会理论中各种不同视角下最常见的立场（例如，Berger & Luckmann, 1967；Boghossian, 2007；DiMaggio & Powell, 1983；Meyer & Rowan, 1977；Sayer, 2000；Searle, 1995, 2010；Weick, 1979）。

The problem of how to explain social (epistemological) objectivity is explored in the fields of social ontology and collective intentionality (e.g., Bratman, 1987, 2014; Epstein, 2015; Gilbert, 1992, 2015; Searle, 1995, 2010; Tuomela, 2002, 2007, 2013). How can a social entity be both constituted by people’s cognitive states but at the same time objective and independent of them? Because not every belief matters equally, and not every belief matters all the time, a social entity is real when there is some consensus about its reality by those that implicitly or explicitly behave in ways that assume it exists or enable its existence. This is true of a game, an exchange relationship, a market, a contract, a firm, or an entrepreneurial venture. A social entity is objectively real precisely because people (in the relevant positions) believe it is real and treat it as such. By contrast, a physical object is real because it exists independently of how anyone treats it or what anyone believes. These are two different and distinct sources of objectivity. 如何解释社会（认识论）客观性的问题在社会本体论和集体意向性领域得到了探讨（例如，Bratman，1987，2014；Epstein，2015；Gilbert，1992，2015；Searle，1995，2010；Tuomela，2002，2007，2013）。一个社会实体如何既能由人们的认知状态构成，又能同时具有客观性并独立于这些认知状态？由于并非所有信念都同等重要，也并非所有信念都始终重要，当相关人员（那些以隐含或明确的方式行事，假定其存在或促成其存在的人）就其现实性达成某种共识时，一个社会实体才是真实的。游戏、交换关系、市场、合同、公司或创业项目都是如此。一个社会实体之所以具有客观实在性，正是因为人们（处于相关位置的人）相信它是真实的并以此对待它。相比之下，物理对象之所以是真实的，是因为它的存在独立于任何人的对待方式或任何人的信念。这是两种不同且独立的客观性来源。

Though distinct, it is important to note that the physical world and the social world are not mutually exclusive. The human imagination is capable of fluidly integrating the invented social world and the physical world. Just as we might imagine that Thor is the source of real thunder and lightning, so too can we imagine that a nation state has boundaries on real geography, that a university owns real buildings and chalkboards (Epstein, 2015), and that a company can own and mine a real copper mountain. If we are collectively committed to the belief that a social entity, like a town, contains a forest, then a fire that decimates the forest has decimated part of the town. A social entity can own, interact with, cause, and be affected by objective, physical entities. But, again, this is only possible because we are committed to the beliefs that Thor, the university, and the town are related in those ways to those physical phenomena. 尽管有所区别，但重要的是要注意，物理世界和社会世界并非相互排斥。人类的想象力能够流畅地整合虚构的社会世界与物理世界。正如我们可能会想象雷神是真实雷电的来源一样，我们也可以想象一个民族国家在真实地理上有边界，一所大学拥有真实的建筑物和黑板（Epstein，2015），以及一家公司可以拥有并开采一座真实的铜山。如果我们集体坚信某个社会实体（比如一个城镇）包含一片森林，那么一场摧毁森林的火灾就相当于摧毁了城镇的一部分。一个社会实体可以拥有、与客观物理实体互动、对其产生影响并受其影响。但同样，这只有在我们坚信雷神、大学和城镇以这些方式与这些物理现象相关联的情况下才有可能。

IF OPPORTUNITIES ARE ONTOLOGICALLY SUBJECTIVE, CAN WE STILL DO SCIENCE?

如果机会在本体论上是主观的，我们还能做科学吗？

If opportunities are subjective and only made possible by mind-dependent cognitive states, how can they be studied scientifically? Of course, epistemological fields already exist that study ontologically subjective phenomena. The trick is focusing more precisely on the critical components that make possible socioeconomic phenomena, and opportunities, specifically. 如果机会是主观的，并且只有通过依赖于心智的认知状态才成为可能，那么它们如何才能被科学地研究呢？当然，认识论领域已经存在，用于研究本体论上主观的现象。关键在于更精确地聚焦于使社会经济现象（尤其是机会）成为可能的关键组成部分。

The Core of Social Objectivity

社会客观性的核心

Though there is much that has been said, and can be debated, about the specific mechanics of social objectivity, there is a “center of gravity” of such efforts. Hume (1740/1978) and Berger and Luckmann (1967) emphasized the habits and behaviors that establish social reality. March and Simon (1993) emphasized rules (duties) and routines. Bratman (1987, 2014) emphasized the intentions of individuals in small teams that determine team behavior. Searle (1995, 2010) emphasized beliefs about what he called “status functions”—meaning rights and duties—established through a declarative speech act. Gilbert (1992, 2015) highlighted the commitments and the obligations (duties) necessary. Although there are a diversity of approaches and definitions, there is broad agreement about the crucial importance of cognitive states (broadly construed) and the behaviors, habits, routines, and dispositions that flow from those cognitive states. It therefore seems reasonable to focus on the cognitive states first and foremost since they determine the downstream behavioral effects. Within the various discussions of specific cognitive mechanics, and sometimes using different terminology, work has orbited around two cognitive phenomena specifically—beliefs on the one hand, and deontics (rights and duties) on the other—and almost every scholar that has studied the structure of social reality has relied upon both. A reasonable generalization then, suggests that beliefs and deontics are the core cognitive features that make social phenomena objective. This is taken to be “the standard model” in social ontology (Epstein, 2015; Guala, 2007). 尽管关于社会客观性的具体机制已有诸多论述且可加以探讨，但这类研究存在一个“重心”。休谟（1740/1978）、伯杰与卢克曼（1967）强调了构建社会现实的习惯与行为；马奇与西蒙（1993）强调规则（义务）与常规；布拉特曼（1987，2014）强调小团队中个体的意图决定团队行为；塞尔（1995，2010）强调关于他所谓“地位功能”（即权利与义务）的信念，这些信念通过宣告性言语行为确立；吉尔伯特（1992，2015）则突出了必要的承诺与义务（责任）。尽管存在多种方法与定义，但学界普遍认同认知状态（广义上）及其衍生的行为、习惯、常规和倾向至关重要。因此，首先聚焦认知状态似乎合情合理，因为它们决定了后续的行为影响。在对具体认知机制的各种讨论中，有时术语不同，但研究几乎都围绕两类认知现象展开——一方面是信念，另一方面是道义论（权利与义务）——几乎所有研究社会现实结构的学者都同时依赖这两者。因此，一个合理的概括是，信念和道义论是使社会现象具有客观性的核心认知特征，这被视为社会本体论中的“标准模型”（Epstein，2015；Guala，2007）。

Beliefs are cognitive representations that depict some state of the world. Deontics are duties and rights. Duties are the obligations that some individual or party has; rights are the permissible actions that some individual or party can perform. Deontics have often been described as a particular set of cognitive beliefs (Gilbert, 1992, 2015; Ludwig, 2016, 2017; Searle, 1995, 2010) or cognitive-behavioral phenomena (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Wood & McKinley, 2017). In what is arguably the dominant view (Gilbert, 1992, 2015; Ludwig, 2016, 2017; Searle, 1995, 2010), just as physical particles are the fundamental building blocks of physical objects, beliefs and deontics are the fundamental building blocks of social entities. When a social entity like a marriage or a role in an organization is created, these actions bring duties and rights into existence. For example, a married couple in the United States has rights to certain tax deductions with both the state and federal governments, and they have the duty to make medical decisions for one another. They have the right to one another’s joint assets and a range of less explicit, culturally determined rights and duties. Similarly, a member of a board of directors might have the duty to provide advice at board meetings and the right to compensation as part of that position. 信念是描绘世界某种状态的认知表征。道义学涉及义务和权利。义务是某些个人或团体所承担的责任；权利是某些个人或团体可以实施的允许性行为。道义学常被描述为一组特定的认知信念（Gilbert, 1992, 2015; Ludwig, 2016, 2017; Searle, 1995, 2010）或认知行为现象（Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Wood & McKinley, 2017）。在一种可说是占主导地位的观点中（Gilbert, 1992, 2015; Ludwig, 2016, 2017; Searle, 1995, 2010），正如物理粒子是物理物体的基本构成单元，信念和道义学是社会实体的基本构成单元。当像婚姻或组织中的角色这样的社会实体被创建时，这些行为会带来义务和权利的产生。例如，一对美国已婚夫妇有权获得州和联邦政府的某些税收减免，并且有义务为对方做出医疗决策。他们有权享有彼此的共同资产，以及一系列不太明确、由文化决定的权利和义务。同样，董事会成员可能有义务在董事会会议上提供建议，并有权作为该职位的一部分获得报酬。

Duties and rights exist when enough people (in the right positions) believe and act as if they exist. This is what brings a marriage, a board position, a cofounder relationship, or a Delaware C-corporation into existence. The stability and continuation of those beliefs and deontics establish and maintain this epistemological objectivity (i.e., the reality of that social entity). Beliefs and deontics are the fundamental pieces that constitute and shape the objectivity of any social entity (Gilbert, 1992, 2015; Gordon & McBride, 2018; Ludwig, 2016, 2017; Searle, 1995, 2010), and focusing on their roles allows us to comment on how exactly this works. 当足够多的人（处于合适的位置）相信并采取行动仿佛它们存在时，职责和权利便存在了。这正是婚姻、董事会职位、联合创始人关系或特拉华州C类公司得以成立的原因。这些信念和道义规范的稳定性与延续性确立并维持了这种认识论客观性（即该社会实体的现实性）。信念和道义规范是构成并塑造任何社会实体客观性的基本要素（Gilbert, 1992, 2015; Gordon & McBride, 2018; Ludwig, 2016, 2017; Searle, 1995, 2010），关注它们的作用能让我们了解这一过程究竟是如何运作的。

Beliefs

信仰

We are almost always interested in collections (i.e., aggregations) of beliefs. If we think of the kinds of beliefs agents can entertain about a corporation, for example, they might all possess the same belief, such as “Apple makes the iPhone.” This implies the belief that Apple exists and reinforces Apple’s existence. These are aggregative convergent beliefs— beliefs where people converge on the same thought. There are also aggregative coherent beliefs. For example, Person A believes that “Apple makes the iPhone,” Person B believes that “Apple has the largest market capitalization,” and Person C believes something else about Apple. These too imply that Apple, as a social entity, exists, and so these too reinforce its existence to some degree. Finally, there are aggregative divergent beliefs. These are diverse but contradictory. For example, Person A believes that " Apple is secretly working on a smart car” while Person B believes that “Apple is not secretly working on a smart car.” Both sides of the contradiction make the same presupposition about Apple’s existence. We can refer to these categories more simply as convergent beliefs, coherent beliefs, and divergent beliefs. 我们几乎总是对信念的集合（即聚合）感兴趣。例如，如果我们考虑主体（agents）能够对一家公司持有的各类信念，他们可能都持有相同的信念，比如“苹果公司生产 iPhone”。这意味着存在苹果公司的信念，并强化了苹果公司的存在。这些是聚合性趋同信念——人们在同一想法上趋同的信念。还有聚合性连贯信念。例如，A 认为“苹果公司生产 iPhone”，B 认为“苹果公司拥有最大的市值”，C 对苹果公司有其他看法。这些也暗示苹果作为一个社会实体存在，因此也在一定程度上强化了它的存在。最后，还有聚合性分歧信念。这些是多样但相互矛盾的。例如，A 认为“苹果公司正在秘密研发智能汽车”，而 B 认为“苹果公司没有在秘密研发智能汽车”。矛盾的双方都对苹果公司的存在做出了相同的预设。我们可以将这些类别更简单地称为趋同信念、连贯信念和分歧信念。

However, it should be noted that aggregations of beliefs are not equally weighted. For example, determining the winner of a gymnastics event in the Olympics depends on the beliefs of the judges more than the spectators. The beliefs of Apple’s board of directors that Steve Jobs should have been fired (and eventually rehired) counted more than the shareholders’ (or anyone else’s) beliefs. And Google’s founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page’s beliefs about their nascent search engine technology counted for more than their Stanford advisor’s beliefs about the project. Why do some people’s beliefs count more than others? Typically, because some people hold deontic roles that establish their right to influence an associated social phenomenon more than others. 然而，需要注意的是，信念的集合并非具有同等权重。例如，确定奥运会体操项目的获胜者，更多取决于裁判的信念而非观众的信念。苹果董事会认为史蒂夫·乔布斯本应被解雇（并最终被重新聘请）的信念，比股东（或其他任何人）的信念更具分量。谷歌的创始人谢尔盖·布林（Sergey Brin）和拉里·佩奇（Larry Page）关于其初创搜索引擎技术的信念，比他们的斯坦福大学顾问对该项目的信念更有影响力。为什么有些人的信念比其他人更有分量？通常是因为有些人拥有道义性角色，这种角色赋予他们比其他人更大的影响相关社会现象的权利。

Deontics

道义逻辑

Deontics are necessary to shape and establish the epistemic objective existence of a social entity. It’s not just that we believe money can be used for transactions, we also believe that it confers upon the possessor certain rights and duties. You have the right to use it as “legal tender for all debts, public and private.” You also (at least in the United States) have the duty not to burn or otherwise destroy it. You might believe that the son of the tribal chief is the rightful successor to the throne, but you also have the right to complain if he is not chosen and the duty to obey him. The cornerstone of civilization, the agreement, and the formal version—the contract—is simply the enumeration of rights and duties that describe the permissible behavior of each party. A founder that files articles of incorporation with the 道义论对于塑造和确立社会实体的认知客观存在是必要的。这不仅仅是因为我们相信货币可以用于交易，还因为我们认为货币赋予持有者某些权利和义务。你有权将其用作“所有公私债务的法定货币”。你（至少在美国）还有义务不烧毁或以其他方式损毁它。你可能认为部落首领的儿子是王位的合法继承人，但如果他未被选中，你也有权抱怨，并且有义务服从他。文明的基石——协议及其正式版本——合同，不过是对各方允许行为的权利和义务的列举。一位提交公司章程的创始人

Department of Corporations is establishing their legal right to operate, establishing both beliefs and rights from the department, the state, and the federal government. The incorporated entity now has the duty to pay taxes as a legal entity, the right to open bank accounts in the entity’s name, sign contracts on behalf of the firm, and so on. 公司部正在确立其合法经营的权利，同时从该部门、州和联邦政府那里确立了相关的权利和信念。该法人实体现在有义务作为法律实体缴纳税款，有权以实体名义开设银行账户、代表公司签订合同等。

Although deontic relationships can be divided into several types, the most relevant to consider for our purposes here are whether the deontics exist in the service of a common goal, a transactive goal, or are imposed. Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, and Ronald Wayne came together and formed agreements among themselves as the founders of Apple Computer Company (now Apple). These deontics were established under the broader common goal of building a successful firm (after they failed to sell their startup). Apple has an agreement with Samsung to manufacture touchscreens for Apple’s products. The contractual agreement operates under a transactive relationship, a situation where each derives benefits from the exchange and enters into the agreement to achieve different goals—for Samsung, the goal is to receive capital, and for Apple, the goal is to receive the needed parts. Common goal and transactive goal agreements are voluntary agreements, but many of the deontics within which we are entangled are instead imposed upon people without their voluntary acceptance. As individuals, we are subject to an enormous collection of duties, like civil and criminal codes that govern the part of the world we happen to be in, regardless of whether we want these imposed obligations (see McBride, 2021, for a more extensive discussion about the three core types of deontics— imposed, voluntary, and autogenic/entrepreneurial). 虽然道义关系可以分为几种类型，但就我们此处的目的而言，最相关的考虑是道义是否为了共同目标、交易型目标而存在，或者是被强加的。史蒂夫·乔布斯（Steve Jobs）、史蒂夫·沃兹尼亚克（Steve Wozniak）和 Ronald Wayne 共同合作，并作为苹果电脑公司（现苹果公司）的创始人达成了彼此间的协议。这些道义是在建立一家成功企业这一更广泛的共同目标下确立的（在他们未能售出初创公司之后）。苹果与三星达成协议，为苹果产品制造触摸屏。这种合同协议在交易型关系下运作，即双方都能从交换中获益，并为实现不同目标而达成协议——对三星而言，目标是获得资金；对苹果而言，目标是获得所需的零部件。共同目标和交易型目标的协议是自愿协议，但我们所卷入的许多道义关系却是在未经自愿接受的情况下强加给人们的。作为个体，我们要遵守大量的义务，比如管辖我们所处世界部分地区的民事和刑事法典，无论我们是否希望这些强加的义务（关于道义的三种核心类型——强加的、自愿的以及自生/创业型，更多详细讨论见 McBride, 2021）。

Determining the Objectivity of Social Entities

确定社会实体的客观性

The epistemic objectivity of any specific social entity can be determined by looking at whether there are aggregative (convergent, coherent, or divergent) beliefs about it and whether there are deontics (common, transactive, or imposed). The application of these principles can be abbreviated to a process where, for any given social entity, we simply look for a broad collection of beliefs and deontics. Apple is an objective social entity because there are an extraordinary number of diverse beliefs about it from both inside and outside the organization, ranging from beliefs held by governments, partners, employees, customers, suppliers, and more (Padgett & Powell, 2012). Many of these are identical beliefs and convergent, many are different but coherent, and some are contradictory and divergent. On the deontic side, Apple has a wide variety of relationships with diverse agents and other social entities in the form of software license agreements and supplier and employee contracts. Although deontics are often structured under some kind of transactive goal, many deontic relationships, especially those internal to the firm, have extensive common goal structures (firm objectives) under the background of expected compensation (transactive relationships). 任何特定社会实体的认知客观性可以通过考察是否存在关于它的聚合性（趋同、连贯或发散）信念，以及是否存在道义性（共同、交易性或强制性）来确定。这些原则的应用可以简化为一个过程：对于任何给定的社会实体，我们只需寻找广泛的信念和道义性集合。苹果公司是一个客观的社会实体，因为来自组织内外（包括政府、合作伙伴、员工、客户、供应商等）的关于它的信念数量极其庞大且多样（Padgett & Powell, 2012）。其中许多是相同的且趋同的，许多不同但连贯，还有一些相互矛盾且发散。在道义性方面，苹果公司与各种代理方和其他社会实体存在广泛的关系，形式包括软件许可协议以及供应商和员工合同。尽管道义性通常在某种交易性目标下构建，但许多道义性关系（尤其是公司内部的那些）在预期补偿（交易性关系）的背景下，具有广泛的共同目标结构（公司目标）。

However, there are many different social entities and few are so extremely objective. Imagine a “Bird of the Week Bird-watching Club” that meets once and might in the future conduct a bird-watching field trip. Is the club an objective social entity? Unless there are a wide variety of beliefs and deontics associated with the club, the answer is no. Only the organizer and a few people have even thought about it, and the organizer has only one vague self-imposed duty (to perhaps organize the field trip). No one else has formed any belief, much less a deontic agreement with the organizer or the club. Many early startups are much closer to this bird-watching club than to Apple. 然而，存在许多不同的社会实体，其中很少有如此极端客观的。试想一个“每周一鸟观鸟俱乐部”，它仅聚会一次，未来或许会组织一次观鸟实地考察。这个俱乐部是否是一个客观的社会实体？除非该俱乐部与各种不同的信仰和道义规范相关联，否则答案是否定的。只有组织者和少数几个人甚至考虑过它，而组织者也只有一个模糊的自我强加的职责（或许是组织实地考察）。其他人没有形成任何信仰，更不用说与组织者或俱乐部达成道义上的共识了。许多早期初创企业与这个观鸟俱乐部的距离，远比与苹果公司的距离要近得多。

The Spectrum of Social Objectivity in Opportunities

机会中社会客观性的光谱

It is clear then that the objectivity of social entities spans a spectrum, from nonexistent and utterly subjective (like the barely existing bird-watching club) all the way up to a fully objective social entity like Apple or the Canadian government. The greater the number and the more diverse the beliefs and deontics, the further toward the objective end of the scale the social entity sits. 那么很明显，社会实体的客观性是一个连续体，从几乎不存在且完全主观的（比如几乎不存在的观鸟俱乐部），一直到像苹果公司或加拿大政府这样完全客观的社会实体。信念和道义规范的数量越多、种类越多样，该社会实体在这个连续体上就越偏向客观一端。

How do we assess the objectivity of an opportunity? The same way that all social phenomena are assessed—we examine whether the beliefs that constitute the opportunity are widespread and diverse and whether the deontics necessary for that opportunity are widespread and exist among diverse parties. If both hold, then it is an epistemically objective opportunity. If both fail to hold, then it is an epistemically subjective opportunity. If both exist to some moderate degree, then the opportunity falls somewhere along the spectrum. 我们如何评估一个机会的客观性？与评估所有社会现象的方式相同——我们考察构成该机会的信念是否广泛且多样，以及实现该机会所需的道义是否广泛且在不同主体间存在。如果两者都成立，那么这就是一个认识论上客观的机会；如果两者都不成立，那么它就是一个认识论上主观的机会；如果两者都在某种程度上存在，那么该机会就处于这个连续谱的某个位置。

Opportunities differ in how much agreement there is about their viability, as noted by Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri, and Venkataraman (2003) and others. They differ in how much objective data exists in support of them, they differ in how far along the entrepreneurs are in their effort to acquire such data, they differ in how many objective market conditions exist to facilitate the realization of the opportunity, and they differ in how “realized” (i.e., how integrated) the opportunity already is into other deontic facets of the socioeconomic environment. For example, a profitable, stable 30-year-old franchise for sale affords an opportunity of a sort. The knowledge that comprises the purchase, running, and sale of the franchise is well-known. There are 30 years of existing sales data and a well-established operational infrastructure. There is an extensive and well-established collection of beliefs that comprise that vetted knowledge and an extensive and well-established collection of deontic relationships including the franchise owner, the franchisee, customers, and suppliers. The opportunity is, in other words, an objective opportunity. Contrast that with the origins of many technology startups that often begin as nothing more than a few beliefs about which there is often no wider consensus and none of the deontic relationships necessary to exercise the opportunity. 正如Sarasvathy、Dew、Velamuri和Venkataraman（2003）等人所指出的，机会在其可行性的共识程度上存在差异。它们在支持其存在的客观数据数量上不同，在企业家获取此类数据的努力进展程度上不同，在有利于机会实现的客观市场条件数量上不同，以及在机会已融入社会经济环境的其他道义层面的“实现程度”（即整合程度）上不同。例如，一个有30年历史、盈利且稳定的待售特许经营店提供了一种机会。构成特许经营店购买、运营和销售的知识是广为人知的。有30年的现有销售数据和完善的运营基础设施。存在一个广泛且完善的信念集合，构成了这些经过验证的知识，以及一个广泛且完善的道义关系集合，包括特许经营所有者、加盟商、客户和供应商。换句话说，这种机会是一种客观机会。与之形成对比的是许多科技初创企业的起源，这些企业往往最初只是一些信念，而这些信念通常没有更广泛的共识，也缺乏行使该机会所需的必要道义关系。

The fact that social phenomena, including opportunities, fall on an epistemic spectrum is an important point. It implies that there is no categorical answer to the question about an opportunity’s epistemological objectivity. The epistemic question, unlike the ontological version, does not have a simple “yes” or “no” categorical answer. All entrepreneurial opportunities, like all social phenomena, are ontologically subjective, but we must look at each specific case and examine whether there is a significant aggregation of beliefs (convergent, coherent, and divergent) and deontics (common goal, transactive goal, or imposed) to determine its degree of epistemic objectivity. 社会现象（包括机会）落在认知光谱上这一事实是一个重要观点。这意味着关于机会的认识论客观性问题没有绝对的答案。与本体论版本不同，认识论问题没有简单的“是”或“否”的绝对答案。所有创业机会与所有社会现象一样，在本体论上是主观的，但我们必须考察每个具体案例，检查是否存在显著的信念聚合（收敛、连贯和发散）以及道义论（共同目标、交易目标或强加的目标），以确定其认识论客观性的程度。

IMPLICATIONS FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

对创业与管理的启示

These arguments have a variety of implications for entrepreneurship and management and for the social sciences more broadly. Some of these implications are discussed in this section. 这些论点对创业和管理以及更广泛的社会科学都有各种影响。本节将讨论其中一些影响。

Broader Implications

更广泛的影响

This paper offers an answer to the question: What is social objectivity? The answer has three implications. It untangles the opportunity debate because there are now criteria for what makes an opportunity (or any social phenomena) objective, it clarifies a critical divide between the physical sciences and the social sciences, and it describes the “atomic particles” of any social phenomena. 本文对“什么是社会客观性”这一问题给出了答案。该答案有三个含义：它厘清了机会争议，因为现在有了判断什么是机会（或任何社会现象）具有客观性的标准；它明确了自然科学与社会科学之间的关键区别；并且它描述了任何社会现象的“基本粒子”。

The ontology-epistemology distinction decomposed the question “Are opportunities objective?” into two separate questions, the first of which was answered quickly: “No.” Opportunities are always ontologically subjective. The more interesting question was the second, epistemological one. But social (epistemological) objectivity cannot be derived from its physical objectivity. It is derived from the stable, consistent beliefs and deontics in the minds of people. 本体论-认识论的区分将“机会是否具有客观性？”这一问题分解为两个独立的问题，其中第一个问题很快得到了回答：“否。”机会在本体论层面始终是主观的。更有趣的问题是第二个认识论问题。但社会（认识论的）客观性无法从物理客观性中推导出来。它来自于人们头脑中稳定、一致的信念和道义规范。

Part of what motivated the constructionist view that opportunities are subjective was the belief that the entire socioeconomic environment is socially constructed. It is because it is mind dependent and thereby ontologically subjective. What motivated the discovery theorists was the fact that some opportunities are the result of real, objective imperfections of the socioeconomic environment. This is also correct, but there is no contradiction. The socioeconomic environment is both objective and subjective in the sense that it is ontologically subjective but often epistemologically objective. These are different dimensions of objectivity, ones that are often conflated. 促使建构主义观点（认为机会具有主观性）形成的部分动机，是相信整个社会经济环境是社会建构的。这是因为它依赖于意识，从而在本体论上具有主观性。促使发现理论者产生这一观点的，是某些机会源于社会经济环境中真实、客观的不完善这一事实。这同样正确，但二者并不矛盾。从本体论上看，社会经济环境是主观的，但从认识论角度看，它又常常是客观的。这是客观性的不同维度，二者常常被混淆。

Other than an interesting diversion into a question about entrepreneurial opportunity, a tough-minded management scholar might ask: “Who cares?” We care because the fundamental structure that shapes an opportunity shapes the entire socioeconomic world and all the social phenomena that we study. It is no exaggeration to say that finding the answer to the question about what makes any social phenomena objective might be the single most important piece of the foundation for the future success of the social sciences. Neither is it an exaggeration to say that the failure to definitively answer this question has caused innumerable problems and confusions, including hindering advances in entrepreneurship theory. 除了对创业机会问题的有趣探讨外，一位思维敏锐的管理学学者可能会问：“谁在乎呢？”我们在乎，因为塑造机会的基本结构塑造了整个社会经济世界以及我们所研究的所有社会现象。可以毫不夸张地说，找到关于是什么使任何社会现象具有客观性这一问题的答案，可能是社会科学未来成功的最核心基础。同样，也可以毫不夸张地说，未能明确回答这个问题已经造成了无数的问题和困惑，包括阻碍了创业理论的发展。

The opportunity debate is merely one instance of the much larger question of how to understand objectivity. Unfortunately, past attempts have often privileged the physical world over the social world, to suggest that everything is objectively real, physical, and mind independent (which must be false), or they have made the postmodern error of privileging the social world over the physical world, making everything social, subjective, and mind dependent (which must also be false). Physical objects are mind independent. Social entities are mind dependent. The physical is frequently conflated with the social, and physical objectivity is frequently conflated with social objectivity. The temptation to lump everything under one of these two extremes is the central hazard of social theorizing. 机会辩论只是如何理解客观性这一更大问题的一个例子。不幸的是，过去的尝试往往优先考虑物理世界而非社会世界，暗示一切都是客观真实、物理性且独立于意识的（这一定是错误的），或者他们犯了后现代的错误，优先考虑社会世界而非物理世界，将一切都视为社会的、主观的且依赖于意识的（这也一定是错误的）。物理对象是独立于意识的。社会实体是依赖于意识的。物理性常与社会性混淆，物理客观性常与社会客观性混淆。将一切归为这两个极端之一的诱惑是社会理论化的核心危险。

Pedagogical Implications

教学意义

Taking the endogenous formation of opportunity seriously implies that we should not instruct budding entrepreneurs to search for an opportunity like they are searching for a hidden treasure, as discovery theory suggests. Training students to search for a “hidden” opportunity is less useful than coaching them to develop the skills required to evaluate the beliefs that form the opportunity idea and calibrating those beliefs against estimates about the specific deontics needed to execute that idea. It is critical to learn how to propagate the beliefs that define the idea and how to craft the relevant beliefs and deontics among stakeholders that lead them to assume obligations on behalf of the organization and lead customers to engage in (deontic) transactions to purchase goods or services from it. 认真对待机会的内生形成意味着，我们不应像发现理论所暗示的那样，指导初出茅庐的企业家像寻找隐藏宝藏一样去搜寻机会。培训学生寻找“隐藏”机会，不如指导他们培养评估构成机会想法的信念的技能，并根据执行该想法所需的特定道义规范的估计来校准这些信念。学习如何传播定义该想法的信念，以及如何在利益相关者中精心构建相关信念和道义规范，从而引导他们代表组织承担义务，并引导客户进行（道义性）交易以从该组织购买商品或服务，这一点至关重要。

Unfortunately, years of inculcating students in the practice of information acquisition and assimilation and years of suggesting that any budding entrepreneur should be able to answer profit projection questions ex ante (questions that are often unanswerable) has taken the focus away from more important training involving hands-on practice in creating and shaping social entities. Taking the implications of social ontology seriously implies that the generation of artifacts (such as plans, business model specifications, and pitch decks) and even some entrepreneurial actions (like experimentation) are not always ends but can also be the means with which to shape the social world (Shelef, Wuebker, & Barney, 2019). Early lived experience (and university courses) tends to subtly reinforce the lesson that the social world is fixed and that altering it is incredibly difficult, even dangerous. Entrepreneurship requires unlearning this. Until a student experiences the social world as malleable, learns exactly what the levers of malleability are, and then accumulates practice creating and altering social reality, there is little hope that he will magically do so while building a large organization, dexterously assembling all the deontics necessary to design a social vehicle that exercises the opportunity. 不幸的是，多年来向学生灌输信息获取和吸收的实践，以及多年来暗示任何崭露头角的企业家都应该能够事先回答利润预测问题（这些问题往往无法回答），已经将重点从更重要的培训上转移开了，而这些培训涉及到在创建和塑造社会实体方面的实践操作。认真对待社会本体论的含义意味着，人工制品（如计划、商业模式规范和融资路演）的生成，甚至一些创业行动（如实验），并不总是目的，也可以是塑造社会世界的手段（Shelef, Wuebker, & Barney, 2019）。早期的生活经验（以及大学课程）往往会潜移默化地强化这样一个教训：社会世界是固定的，改变它极其困难，甚至危险。创业需要摒弃这种观念。除非学生将社会世界体验为可塑的，确切地了解可塑性的杠杆是什么，然后积累创造和改变社会现实的实践，否则他几乎没有希望在建立大型组织的同时神奇地做到这一点，也无法熟练地整合所有必要的道义规范，以设计一个能够把握机会的社会载体。

The Goal of Transforming Subjective Into Objective Opportunities

将主观转化为客观机会的目标

An opportunity and the entity that exploits it are distinct but intertwined. Both start somewhere along the spectrum between epistemically subjective and epistemically objective, but they do not remain there. Typically, the goal of a team that exploits the opportunity is to become, like any successful business, tied into a network of collective beliefs and deontics that promote its existence and persistence. In other words, the goal is to turn a subjective opportunity into an objective opportunity. 机会与利用该机会的实体是不同的，但又相互交织。两者都始于认知主观与认知客观之间的某个点，但不会停留在那里。通常，一个利用该机会的团队的目标是像任何成功的企业一样，融入一个促进其存在和持续的集体信念与道义网络中。换句话说，目标是将主观机会转化为客观机会。

To accomplish this goal, one must construct deontic relationships (Dimov, 2011) which entails building production or distribution partnerships, forming relationships with suppliers, attracting customers, opening bank accounts, hiring attorneys to write agreements, complying with local and federal regulations, paying taxes to government entities, entering agreements to get electricity in offices, and so on. Each action is an additional deontic line tethering that organization more firmly into an existing web of social structures. The revealed core task of the entrepreneur is to push an idea, theory, or plan from something that might be merely epistemically subjective into the realm of epistemic objectivity. 为实现这一目标，必须构建道义关系（Dimov，2011），这需要建立生产或分销合作伙伴关系、与供应商建立关系、吸引客户、开设银行账户、聘请律师起草协议、遵守地方和联邦法规、向政府实体纳税、签订办公室用电协议等等。每一项行动都是一条额外的道义线，将该组织更牢固地绑定到现有的社会结构网络中。企业家揭示的核心任务是将一个想法、理论或计划从可能仅仅具有认知主观性的状态推向认知客观性的领域。

But the early-stage opportunity is often delicate, with few beliefs about its viability and few deontic agreements in place to establish the initial strands of objectivity. As noted by Wood and McKinley (2017), these small strands must be continually reproduced through consensus among stakeholders about the opportunity’s viability. The loss of these beliefs and deontics leads to a dissolution and loss of the opportunity itself. 但早期阶段的机会往往很脆弱，人们对其可行性的信念很少，也缺乏建立初始客观性线索的道义共识。正如伍德和麦金利（2017）所指出的，这些微小的线索必须通过利益相关者就机会的可行性达成共识来不断复制。这些信念和道义的丧失会导致机会本身的瓦解和消失。

A Different View of the Entrepreneurial Firm

创业企业的另一种视角

Several strands of conceptual and empirical work offer explanations as to why firms exist. Two rationales for the firm common to these explanations are (a) establishing who has the right to make what kinds of decisions and (b) how to determine the various claims for the residual cash flows for the value the firm creates and captures (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Barney, 2018; Gibbons, 2005). Entrepreneurship has historically had an uneasy relationship with traditional theories of the firm, in part because entrepreneurs often must make choices about decision rights and residual claims long before the economic value of those choices can be known, even probabilistically (Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Garrouste & Saussier, 2005). When these traditional explanations of economic organization are extended to innovative or entrepreneurial settings, their utility becomes much less clear. 一些概念性和实证性的研究为企业存在的原因提供了解释。这些解释中常见的两种企业存在的理由是（a）确定谁有权做出何种决策，以及（b）如何根据企业创造和获取的价值来确定对剩余现金流的各种主张（Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Barney, 2018; Gibbons, 2005）。创业精神与传统企业理论的关系历来较为紧张，部分原因在于企业家往往必须在这些选择的经济价值（即使是概率性的）被知晓之前，就对决策权和剩余索取权做出选择（Alvarez & Barney, 2005; Garrouste & Saussier, 2005）。当这些对经济组织的传统解释被延伸到创新或创业环境中时，其效用就变得不那么明确了。

While this paper connects and contributes to other theories of the entrepreneurial firm that focus on asset ownership (Foss & Klein, 2012), resource coordination (Alvarez & Barney, 2004; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004), contracting and residual control (Van Den Steen, 2010), and charismatic authority (Langlois, 2007), it offers an alternative view of entrepreneurial organization grounded in the identification, generation, and eventual distribution of beliefs and deontic structures (Dimov, 2011). 虽然本文将创业企业的其他理论（如关注资产所有权（Foss & Klein，2012）、资源协调（Alvarez & Barney，2004；Nickerson & Zenger，2004）、契约与剩余控制权（Van Den Steen，2010）以及魅力型权威（Langlois，2007）的理论）进行了整合并有所贡献，但它提出了一种基于信念和道义结构（Dimov，2011）的识别、生成及最终分配的创业组织替代视角。

In this view, organization building involves building a web of deontics (often in the form of agreements) with cofounders, employees, customers, investors, partners, stakeholders, regulatory agencies, and others that establish the rights and duties of the participants in those relationships (Barney, 2018). This view is coherent with, and provides an expansion of, the nexus of contracts view (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), in that any organization can be seen as a web of agreements, but those agreements can be analyzed in more precise detail in terms of their deontics—the rights and duties that comprise them. 在这种观点中，组织构建涉及与联合创始人、员工、客户、投资者、合作伙伴、利益相关者、监管机构及其他方建立一系列道义规范（通常以协议形式呈现），这些规范明确了参与者在这些关系中的权利和义务（Barney, 2018）。这种观点与契约关系网视角（Jensen & Meckling, 1976）一致，并对其进行了扩展——即任何组织都可被视为一个协议网络，但这些协议可以借助道义规范（构成协议的权利和义务）进行更精确的细节分析。

Establishing Beliefs, Rights, and Duties

确立信仰、权利与义务

Entrepreneurial action, then, is not necessarily about manifesting the cognitive biases “appropriate for an entrepreneur” (Baron, 2004; Mitchell, Busenitz, Lant, McDougall, Morse, & Smith, 2004; Sarasvathy, 2001), discovering customers (Blank, 2012), validating a business model (Zott, Amit, & Massa, 2011), catalyzing passion (Cardon, Wincent, Singh, & Drnovsek, 2009), crafting a compelling narrative (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001), leveraging one’s network of prior relationships (Stuart & Sorenson, 2007), writing a business plan, or filing a legal entity—though all of those are relevant tools in the right circumstances. It is, at a deeper level, about establishing beliefs and crafting the deontics that escalate the entrepreneurial team toward epistemic objectivity and success. 因此，创业行动不一定是指表现出“适合创业者”的认知偏差（Baron, 2004；Mitchell, Busenitz, Lant, McDougall, Morse, & Smith, 2004；Sarasvathy, 2001）、发现客户（Blank, 2012）、验证商业模式（Zott, Amit, & Massa, 2011）、激发热情（Cardon, Wincent, Singh, & Drnovsek, 2009）、构建引人入胜的叙事（Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001）、利用先前关系网络（Stuart & Sorenson, 2007）、撰写商业计划或注册法律实体——尽管在适当情况下所有这些都是相关工具。从更深层次来看，它关乎建立信念并构建道义论，推动创业团队走向认知客观性和成功。

Telling a compelling story, for example, is only useful and relevant if that story succeeds in establishing a belief and compelling a stakeholder to assume an obligation that benefits the effort (e.g., compels an investor to part with needed capital or a manufacturer to extend advantageous credit terms, or the customers to buy the product). Inexpensive experimentation and learning by doing is only useful if the results of that experiment calibrate the founders’ beliefs so that they can more effectively find a model for economic profit. 例如，讲述一个有说服力的故事只有在成功建立一种信念并促使利益相关者承担对项目有利的义务时才有用且相关（例如，促使投资者投入必要资金、制造商延长优惠信贷条款，或让客户购买产品）。廉价的实验和边做边学只有在实验结果能够校准创始人的信念，使他们能更有效地找到盈利模型时才有用。

If entrepreneurial opportunities are essentially social, and social phenomena are dependent on the beliefs of others for their existence, then the critical task of the entrepreneur is crafting beliefs and deontics. Marketing is about shaping beliefs in potential customers that might change deontic behavior. Pitching is about shaping the beliefs of potential stakeholders. Recruiting is about persuading the most qualified candidates that accepting a position is in their best interest. The fundamental activity of any opportunity exploitation, which continues as the opportunity matures into a durable and sustainable economic entity, is the (endless) work of shaping the beliefs and deontics both within the organization and in those individuals and social entities within the socioeconomic context that the opportunity-exploiting vehicles need to grow. 如果创业机会本质上是社会性的，而社会现象的存在又依赖于他人的信念，那么创业者的关键任务就是塑造信念和道义规范。营销是为了影响潜在客户的信念，从而改变其道义行为。推介是为了影响潜在利益相关者的信念。招聘则是说服最合格的候选人，使其相信接受职位符合自身最佳利益。任何机会开发的基本活动——随着机会成熟为持久且可持续的经济实体而持续进行——是（无休止的）塑造信念和道义规范的工作，既包括组织内部，也包括机会开发载体成长所需的社会经济环境中的个人和社会实体。

Of course, the importance of shaping beliefs in entrepreneurial settings is not a new idea (e.g., Gartner, 1985). What is new here is the suggestion that doing so is what establishes the reality of the entrepreneurial effort and as such is the core entrepreneurial task. At first, entrepreneurs envision those structures, and each action they take—building production or distribution partnerships, forming relationships with suppliers, transacting with customers, complying with local and federal regulations, paying taxes to government entities—tether their nascent social structure more firmly into the web of extant social structures. In this view, the core task of the entrepreneur and the heart of entrepreneurial action is the identification, ordering, and dissemination of rights and duties that push an idea, theory, or plan from something epistemically subjective into the realm of the epistemically objective. 当然，在创业环境中塑造信念的重要性并非新观点（例如，Gartner，1985）。这里的新颖之处在于提出，正是这种塑造信念的行为确立了创业努力的现实性，因此这是创业的核心任务。起初，创业者设想这些结构，而他们采取的每一个行动——建立生产或分销合作伙伴关系、与供应商建立关系、与客户交易、遵守地方和联邦法规、向政府实体纳税——都将其新生的社会结构更牢固地绑定到现有的社会结构网络中。从这个角度来看，创业者的核心任务和创业行动的核心是识别、排序和传播权利与义务，这些权利与义务将一个想法、理论或计划从认识论上主观的范畴推向认识论上客观的领域。

Who are Entrepreneurs?

什么是企业家？

Within the theoretical framework developed here, entrepreneurs can be thought of as individuals with beliefs about how a particular bundle of resources can generate economic value (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Barney, 1986; Felin & Zenger, 2017; Foss & Klein, 2012) who subsequently enroll stakeholders to assist in the realization of their idea (Alvarez, Young, & Woolley, 2015; Barney, 2018) through their absorption of deontics. Early-stage efforts typically operate under conditions of uncertainty where there is little empirical support for their pivotal assumptions (e.g., that people will be willing to exchange money for a “pet rock”). It is the job of the entrepreneur—the “first believer”—to propagate their beliefs in others, building consensus around beliefs that are often impossible to justify. 在本文构建的理论框架内，企业家可以被视为具有特定资源组合如何创造经济价值信念的个体（Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Barney, 1986; Felin & Zenger, 2017; Foss & Klein, 2012），他们随后通过吸收道义论（deontics）来招募利益相关者协助实现其想法（Alvarez, Young, & Woolley, 2015; Barney, 2018）。早期阶段的努力通常在不确定性条件下运作，此时对其关键假设（例如，人们会愿意为“宠物石头”支付金钱）几乎没有实证支持。企业家——即“第一个信徒”——的职责是向他人传播其信念，围绕那些往往难以证明的信念建立共识。

The discovery view takes value as a given, and many scholars working at the intersection of entrepreneurship and organization theory (e.g., Alvarez & Barney, 2004; 2005; Foss and Klein, 2012; Klein, 2008) have noted that this assumption has made it difficult to theorize about why firms come into existence and the role that the firm itself might play in the search for or creation of new value. It also obscures the need for stakeholder enrollment in the first place (Barney, 2018; Shelef et al., 2019). 发现视角将价值视为既定前提，许多在创业与组织理论交叉领域工作的学者（例如Alvarez & Barney, 2004; 2005; Foss and Klein, 2012; Klein, 2008）已指出，这一假设使得难以构建关于企业为何存在以及企业自身在搜寻或创造新价值中可能发挥何种作用的理论。它还掩盖了最初就需要利益相关者参与的必要性（Barney, 2018; Shelef et al., 2019）。

The creation view has implications for entrepreneurial action and organizational theory. There is a growing body of work exploring the specific organizational challenges facing actors creating value under conditions of Knightian uncertainty (e.g., Alvarez, Young, & Woolley, 2018; Burns et al., 2016; Engel, Kaandorp, & Elfring, 2017; Mauer, Wuebker, & Brettel, 2018; Shelef, Wuebker, & Barney, 2020; Shelef et al., 2019). For example, stakeholders have rights and responsibilities for the entrepreneurial effort—some of which might include working for the firm, but not necessarily. When stakeholders are vertically integrated, they have one set of rights and responsibilities; when they are not vertically integrated, they have another set of rights and responsibilities. Either way, they possess rights and responsibilities on behalf of the effort. 创业视角的构建对创业行动和组织理论具有重要意义。目前已有大量研究探讨在奈特不确定性条件下（例如，Alvarez, Young, & Woolley, 2018；Burns et al., 2016；Engel, Kaandorp, & Elfring, 2017；Mauer, Wuebker, & Brettel, 2018；Shelef, Wuebker, & Barney, 2020；Shelef et al., 2019），行动者创造价值时面临的具体组织挑战。例如，利益相关者对创业活动拥有权利和责任——其中一些可能包括为企业工作，但并非必然如此。当利益相关者实现垂直整合时，他们拥有一套权利和责任；当他们未实现垂直整合时，又会拥有另一套权利和责任。无论哪种情况，他们都代表该创业活动拥有相应的权利和责任。

There are opportunities for future work exploring a new set of entrepreneurial traits—those associated with the instantiation of beliefs and deontics. Some have argued that the research on distinctive entrepreneurial traits (e.g., Åstebro, Herz, Nanda, & Weber, 2014; Low & McMillan, 1998) “appears to have reached a dead end” (Aldrich, 1999: 76), but this conclusion may be premature. Perhaps distinctive traits have not been found because scholars are looking in the wrong place. Entrepreneurship theory might benefit from looking at the specific traits that enable agents to propagate beliefs and deontics in those around them. This work may draw inspiration from work in entrepreneurship on social competence (e.g., Baron & Markman, 2003), entrepreneurial empathy (McMullen, 2015), and narrative construction (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001), or draw on related insights from marketing (e.g., Cialdini, 1984), negotiation, and relationship building. 未来工作有机会探索一组新的创业特质——即与信念和道义规范的具体化相关的特质。一些学者认为，对独特创业特质的研究（例如Åstebro、Herz、Nanda和Weber，2014；Low和McMillan，1998）“似乎已陷入死胡同”（Aldrich，1999：76），但这一结论可能为时过早。也许独特的特质尚未被发现，是因为学者们找错了方向。创业理论或许可以从能够让个体向他人传播信念和道义规范的特定特质入手。这项工作可能会借鉴创业领域中关于社会能力（例如Baron和Markman，2003）、创业同理心（McMullen，2015）和叙事构建（Lounsbury和Glynn，2001）的研究，或借鉴营销学（例如Cialdini，1984）、谈判和关系建立等相关领域的见解。

Missing Beliefs and Missing Deontics Block the Execution of an Opportunity

缺失的信念与缺失的道义阻碍机会的执行

Beliefs and deontics constitute both the opportunity idea and the organization that executes the idea, so they are the core components crafted by the entrepreneur toward the end of securing economic profit. This means that lacking the relevant beliefs and lacking the relevant deontics will block the formation of the opportunity idea and its exercise. Other entrepreneurs did not build Uber or Airbnb (in part) because they did not possess the beliefs that constitute those ideas. Such beliefs were also missing from the wider socioeconomic environment, so they could not be discovered (Chesky, 2015; Wilson, 2011). Such an omission from the landscape does not prevent the re-creation of the idea or the execution of it, but being forced to regenerate the idea sui generis is nontrivial. Even once regenerated, a team still faces the detailed, laborious work of building out a huge web of deontic agreements that constitute an organization honed to exercise that vision. 信念和道义规范既构成了机会理念，也构成了执行该理念的组织，因此它们是企业家为获取经济利润而精心打造的核心组成部分。这意味着，缺乏相关信念和缺乏相关道义规范会阻碍机会理念的形成及其实施。其他企业家未能创建优步（Uber）或爱彼迎（Airbnb）（在一定程度上）是因为他们不具备构成这些理念的信念。这种信念在更广泛的社会经济环境中也缺失，因此无法被发现（Chesky, 2015；Wilson, 2011）。这种环境中的缺失并不会阻止对该理念的重新创造或实施，但被迫从头开始重新生成该理念并非易事。即使重新生成了该理念，团队仍然面临着详细且费力的工作，即构建一个庞大的道义规范协议网络，以构成一个能够践行该愿景的组织。

The collection of beliefs about an entrepreneurial effort are shaped through careful thinking and imagination. There are pieces critical to the opportunity without which the idea can never come to fruition. The entrepreneurs behind ride-sharing platforms, for example, held two beliefs: first, that millions of private vehicles were an enormous untapped resource; and second, that it would be possible to change society’s perspective on riding in a stranger’s private vehicle. The more that the critical beliefs are missing, “distant,” or impossible, the bigger the barrier to forming the idea. The more elaborate and difficult the deontic framework required for building the organization needed to exercise the opportunity, the greater the barrier to building it. 对创业努力的一系列信念是通过深思熟虑和想象力塑造而成的。有一些关键要素对于机会的实现至关重要，缺少它们，想法就永远无法付诸实践。例如，拼车平台背后的创业者持有两种信念：首先，数百万辆私家车是一个巨大的未开发资源；其次，改变社会对乘坐陌生人私家车的看法是可能的。关键信念越是缺失、“遥不可及”或难以实现，形成想法的障碍就越大。构建实现该机会所需组织所需的道义框架越是复杂和困难，构建该组织的障碍就越大。

Thiel and Masters (2014: 56) asked, “What important truth do very few people agree with you on?” and answered: " A good answer will take the following form: ‘Most people believe in $X$ , but the truth is the opposite of x.’” Put another way, Thiel and Masters referred to a belief that is missing from the general landscape (i.e., is not widely believed) that, if combined with the relevant deontic relationships, would generate profits. Heterogeneous beliefs, along with heterogeneous ability in establishing and maintaining appropriate deontic relationships, are mechanisms that enable economic profits to be created and sustained. 蒂尔和马斯特斯（2014：56）问道：“有什么重要的真理是很少有人会认同你的？”并回答道：“一个好的答案会采用以下形式：‘大多数人相信X，但真相却与X相反。’”换句话说，蒂尔和马斯特斯所指的是一种普遍认知中缺失的信念（即不被广泛相信的信念），如果将这种信念与相关的道义关系结合起来，就会产生利润。异质信念，以及在建立和维持适当道义关系方面的异质能力，是使经济利润得以创造和维持的机制。

You Cannot Search for and Discover What Does Not Exist

你无法搜索和发现不存在的事物

When it comes to subjective opportunities—very novel, innovative, ambitious, or very early-stage opportunities—there is a reason why the discovery theorist’s “treasure hunt model” fails: there is nothing there to discover. It is not just that an opportunity is not a physical object but that there is no object of any sort there. Beliefs constitute the idea for an opportunity but there is no aggregation of beliefs or deontics in a truly subjective opportunity by definition, so there is no noticeable collection of beliefs that could be discovered. 当谈到主观机会——非常新颖、创新、有抱负或处于非常早期阶段的机会——发现理论家的“寻宝模型”之所以失效，是有原因的：那里没有任何东西可供发现。这不仅仅是因为机会不是一个物理对象，而是因为根本不存在任何类型的对象。信念构成了机会的概念，但根据定义，在真正的主观机会中，不存在信念或道义的集合，因此没有可被发现的明显信念集合。

Before Airbnb catalyzed a widespread change in people’s beliefs about the viability of treating the spare room in their home as a source of revenue, beliefs and deontic agreements to do so simply did not exist (in any noticeable number). In fact, that aspect of Airbnb’s model was roundly rejected as implausible by the venture capital firms the founders attempted to enroll (Chesky, 2015). Arguing that it would have been feasible to “discover” the Airbnb model like a treasure in the forest is to suggest that entrepreneurs somehow search the landscape for a currently nonexistent, invisible belief and miraculously point to something that does not exist. Attempting an “entrepreneurial search” by running revenue models of socioeconomic worlds with unrealistic” and endless missing belief premises is an impossible prescription and does not match observational accounts of what entrepreneurs do in practice (e.g., Alvarez et al., 2015, 2018; Sarasvathy, 2001). 在Airbnb推动人们对将家中闲置房间视为收入来源的可行性的观念发生广泛转变之前，这样做的信念和道义共识根本不存在（数量上没有明显的体现）。事实上，创始人试图争取的风险投资公司普遍认为Airbnb模式的这一方面不可行（Chesky，2015）。声称像在森林中寻找宝藏一样“发现”Airbnb模式是可行的，这暗示企业家不知何故在环境中搜寻一种当前不存在、无形的信念，并奇迹般地指向某种不存在的事物。通过运行具有不切实际且永无止境的缺失信念前提的社会经济世界的收入模型来进行“创业搜寻”是一种不可能的方法，也不符合对企业家实际行为的观察性描述（例如，Alvarez等人，2015、2018；Sarasvathy，2001）。

CONCLUSION

结论

Management scholars are interested in a particular class of socioeconomic objects and activities. Although the interests of our field span topics, levels of analysis, and units of analysis, what unites management scholars is our common interest in mind-dependent social phenomena and the socialorganizational structures that facilitate the development and exploitation of economic value. 管理学者关注一类特定的社会经济对象和活动。尽管我们这一领域的研究兴趣涵盖多个主题、分析层次和分析单位，但将管理学者凝聚在一起的是我们对依赖心智的社会现象以及促进经济价值创造和利用的社会组织结构的共同关注。

Once the question about opportunity’s objectivity is divided into an ontological and an epistemological question, the debate is resolved, and we see that that all social phenomena, including opportunities, are ontologically subjective but vary on the continuum of epistemic objectivity. Taking seriously the core result—that any social phenomenon is made possible by beliefs and deontics—made it clear that any opportunity, and any social structure built to exploit it, must consist of beliefs and deontics, the greater the number and diversity of which increases its (epistemic) objectivity. Subjective opportunities involve implausible, nonexistent, or “lone” beliefs. Objective opportunities and the entities built to exploit them on the other end of the scale are grounded in known and proven beliefs and already-existing deontic relationships. 一旦将机会客观性的问题区分为本体论问题和认识论问题，争论就得到了解决，我们可以看到，所有社会现象（包括机会）在本体论上都是主观的，但在认识论客观性的连续体上存在差异。认真对待核心结果——即任何社会现象都是由信念和道义规范促成的——这一点很明确：任何机会以及为利用该机会而构建的任何社会结构，都必须由信念和道义规范构成，而这些信念和道义规范的数量和多样性越大，其（认识论）客观性就越强。主观机会涉及不可信、不存在或“孤立”的信念。而在连续体另一端的客观机会以及为利用这些机会而构建的实体，则建立在已知且已被证实的信念以及已存在的道义关系之上。

This work supplements social constructionist views of entrepreneurial opportunity and describes a new path toward an understanding of how economic value—and social phenomena more broadly— are created. The ontology of the social world is far more complex than the ontology of the physical world, and so the resultant confusions are understandable. However, we have made progress on a basic framework that renders some of this complexity approachable. Understanding that social phenomena are mind dependent and physical phenomena are mind independent will help avoid conflations of the two in the future. Much more remains to be said, however. We invite others to join us in exploring new applications of this perspective in entrepreneurship specifically and management and all the social sciences generally. 这项工作补充了创业机会的社会建构主义观点，并描述了一条理解经济价值（以及更广泛的社会现象）如何被创造的新路径。社会世界的本体论远比物理世界的本体论复杂，因此由此产生的困惑是可以理解的。然而，我们在一个基本框架上取得了进展，这个框架使部分复杂性变得易于理解。认识到社会现象依赖于意识而物理现象独立于意识，将有助于未来避免这两者的混淆。不过，还有很多内容有待阐述。我们邀请其他人与我们一起，专门在创业领域以及更广泛的管理学和所有社会科学中探索这一视角的新应用。

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Russ McBride (russ.mcbride@ucmerced.edu) is an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Merced, in the Department of the Management of Complex Systems and a Visiting Professor the Entrepreneurship & Strategy Department at the University of Utah. He received his PhD from UC Berkeley in philosophy under John Searle and George Lakoff. Russ McBride (russ.mcbride@ucmerced.edu) is an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Merced, in the Department of the Management of Complex Systems and a Visiting Professor in the Entrepreneurship & Strategy Department at the University of Utah. He received his PhD from UC Berkeley in philosophy under John Searle and George Lakoff.

Robert Wuebker (Robert.Wuebker@eccles.utah.edu) is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Entrepreneurship and Strategy, David Eccles School of Business, University of Utah. 罗伯特·韦布克（Robert.Wuebker@eccles.utah.edu）是犹他大学大卫·埃克尔斯商学院创业与战略系的助理教授。

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