OPEN TEAM PRODUCTION, THE NEW COOPERATIVEFIRM, AND HYBRID ADVANTAGE

开放团队生产、新合作企业与混合优势

MARCO BERTI University of Technology Sydney 悉尼科技大学 马尔科·贝尔蒂

CHRISTOS PITELIS University of Leeds CHRISTOS PITELIS 利兹大学

We critically assess the comparative efficiency advantages and disadvantages of capitalist versus cooperative firms using team production as a frame of reference. We revisit the debate about such (dis)advantages in the context of “open team production,” a situation in which team members are both internal and external to the firm. In contrast to the case of traditional “(closed) team production,” which focuses on the problem of monitoring team members within the firm, open team production requires incentivizing both internal and external team members to commit to firm-specific co-specialized investments, as well as orchestrating and monitoring these continued investments. We identify some comparative efficiency (dis)advantages of traditional cooperative and capitalist firms in dealing with the novel challenges posed by open team production, and we conclude that, in its context, a new type of a hybrid firm can possess comparative efficiency advantages vis-a-vis both types of traditional firms. 我们以团队生产为参照框架，批判性地评估资本主义企业与合作制企业的相对效率优势与劣势。我们在“开放式团队生产”的背景下重新审视这种（非）优势的争论，这种情况中团队成员既属于企业内部，又属于外部。与侧重于企业内部团队成员监督问题的传统“（封闭式）团队生产”不同，开放式团队生产需要激励内部和外部团队成员承诺进行企业特定的共同专业化投资，并协调和监督这些持续的投资。我们指出传统合作制企业和资本主义企业在应对开放式团队生产带来的新挑战时存在一些相对效率（非）优势，并得出结论：在这种背景下，一种新型混合企业相对于两种传统企业类型可能具有相对效率优势。

Many scholars (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1979) have argued that firms owned by their shareholders (i.e., capitalist firms) possess comparative efficiency advantages over “cooperatives” (or “co-ops”), firms owned by a group of stakeholders who share decision rights regardless of their level of investment (Borzaga & Tortia, 2017; Dow, 2001). These scholars also argue that, in the context of multiple cooperating agents (team production), capitalist firms are more efficient in reducing free riding or shirking by individual team members, hence increasing the outcome of the joint team effort (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). They maintain that financial capital suppliers, who become residual claimants to the surplus generated by the firm, have a stronger incentive to monitor others as well as to self-monitor, compared to members of cooperatives who are not the sole residual claimants (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Advocates of cooperatives respond that shirking can be prevented through mutual monitoring as well as through close and trusting social relationships (Adler, 2001; Borzaga & Galera, 2016). Moreover, they argue that co-ops offer advantages in terms of resilience (Cheney, Santa Cruz, Peredo, & Nazareno, 2014), longevity (Tortia, 2018), sustainability (Sacchetti & Tortia, 2020), gender balance (Hernández-Nicolás, Martín-Ugedo, & Mínguez-Vera, 2019), and overall contributions to society (Sabatini, Modena, & Tortia, 2014). 许多学者（Alchian & Demsetz, 1972；Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972；Jensen & Meckling, 1979）认为，由股东所有的企业（即资本主义企业）相比“合作社”（或“合作制企业”）具有相对效率优势。合作社是由一群利益相关者共同拥有、无论投资水平如何均共享决策权的企业（Borzaga & Tortia, 2017；Dow, 2001）。这些学者还指出，在多个合作主体（团队生产）的背景下，资本主义企业在减少个体团队成员的搭便车行为或偷懒行为方面效率更高，从而提升了团队联合努力的产出（Alchian & Demsetz, 1972）。他们认为，金融资本供给者作为企业产生盈余的剩余索取者，与合作社成员（后者并非唯一剩余索取者）相比，具有更强的监督他人及自我监督的动机（Alchian & Demsetz, 1972）。合作社的拥护者回应称，偷懒行为可通过相互监督以及紧密信任的社会关系来防止（Adler, 2001；Borzaga & Galera, 2016）。此外，他们指出，合作社在抗风险能力（Cheney, Santa Cruz, Peredo, & Nazareno, 2014）、存续时间（Tortia, 2018）、可持续性（Sacchetti & Tortia, 2020）、性别平衡（Hernández-Nicolás, Martín-Ugedo, & Mínguez-Vera, 2019）以及对社会的整体贡献（Sabatini, Modena, & Tortia, 2014）等方面具有优势。

Despite their differences, both parties to this debate focus on the productivity advantages that arise from the efficient monitoring of the contributions of team production members who are internal to the firm (Borzaga & Tortia, 2017; Porter & Scully, 1987). However, this assumption does not capture the reality faced by many contemporary firms (Alvarez, Zander, Barney, & Afuah, 2020), which often entails multiple actors, both internal and external to the firm, involved in “joint value creation” (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2015: 229), and where sustained competitive advantage (SCA) depends on a firm’s capacity to leverage resources from both within and without its boundaries (Barney, 2018). We define these conditions as “open team production” (OTP). In contrast to the traditional case of “closed’ team production,” in which the focus is on metering and monitoring the contribution of internal team members, in an OTP context, it is necessary to incentivize actors who are both internal and external to the firm to commit to firm-specific co-specialized investments (Barney, 2018; Kaufman & Englander, 2005). Moreover, it is also necessary to orchestrate and monitor these continued investments (Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2019; Pitelis & Teece, 2018). The need to consider ex ante incentivizing, ex post monitoring, and stakeholders’ orchestration greatly complicates the team production problem and it renders the comparative efficiency advantages and disadvantages of capitalist firms and co-ops more nuanced. 尽管存在差异，这场辩论中的双方都关注效率监测内部团队成员贡献所带来的生产力优势（Borzaga & Tortia, 2017; Porter & Scully, 1987）。然而，这一假设无法解释许多当代企业面临的现实（Alvarez, Zander, Barney, & Afuah, 2020），这些企业往往涉及多个内部和外部参与者共同参与“联合价值创造”（Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2015: 229），而持续的竞争优势（SCA）取决于企业利用其边界内外资源的能力（Barney, 2018）。我们将这些条件定义为“开放团队生产”（OTP）。与传统“封闭”团队生产（关注内部成员贡献的计量与监测）不同，在OTP情境中，需要激励企业内部和外部参与者承诺进行特定于企业的共同专业化投资（Barney, 2018; Kaufman & Englander, 2005）。此外，还需协调和监测这些持续的投资（Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2019; Pitelis & Teece, 2018）。考虑事前激励、事后监测以及利益相关者协调的需求极大地复杂化了团队生产问题，这使得资本主义企业与合作社在比较效率优势和劣势方面的分析更加细致。

Accordingly, the purpose of the present paper is to examine the comparative efficiency advantages of capitalist firms and of co-ops under conditions of OTP. Our analysis suggests that the challenge facing management today is not choosing between pure capitalist or exclusively cooperative firm governance, but, rather, to combine elements from both governance structures in a way that permits them to respond effectively to the challenges posed by the new OTP conditions. We submit that firms can become better suited for the opportunities offered by OTP when they adopt hybrid practices that integrate features of co-ops and capitalist firms in a way that increases their overall efficiency. This perspective suggests new possibilities for a more sustainable future for corporations and capitalism. 因此，本文的目的是考察在OTP条件下资本主义企业和合作社的比较效率优势。我们的分析表明，当今管理层面临的挑战不是在纯粹的资本主义或纯粹的合作制企业治理之间进行选择，而是以一种能够使它们有效应对新OTP条件带来的挑战的方式，结合两种治理结构的要素。我们认为，当企业采用混合实践，将合作社和资本主义企业的特征整合起来以提高整体效率时，它们就能更好地适应OTP提供的机遇。这一观点为企业和资本主义走向更可持续的未来提供了新的可能性。

We start the paper by outlining the debate on capitalist versus cooperative firms. The second section then looks at OTP and the issues it poses. In the third section, we revisit the advantages and disadvantages of co-ops and capitalist firms in an OTP context. In the fourth section, we consider the opportunities offered by hybridity as compared to “traditional” capitalist or cooperative firms. We conclude by examining the theoretical, managerial practice, and public policy implications of our argument. 我们在论文开头概述了关于资本主义企业与合作制企业的争论。第二部分随后探讨了OTP及其带来的问题。第三部分，我们在OTP的背景下重新审视合作制企业和资本主义企业的优缺点。第四部分，我们将混合模式与“传统”资本主义企业或合作制企业进行比较，分析其带来的机遇。最后，我们考察了我们论点在理论、管理实践和公共政策方面的影响。

CAPITALIST FIRMS, COOPERATIVE FIRMS,AND TEAM PRODUCTION

资本主义企业、合作制企业与团队生产

Much of economic theory suggests that capitalist firms are comparatively more efficient than cooperative firms (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Hansmann, 1996; Williamson, 1985). In capitalist firms, shareholders are typically the sole residual claimants; in other words, they are the economic agents who can legitimately appropriate the firm’s surplus and have the authority to select its top management team (Jensen & Meckling, 1979). 经济理论的大部分观点认为，资本主义企业比合作制企业更具效率（阿尔奇安与德姆塞茨，1972；汉思曼，1996；威廉姆森，1985）。在资本主义企业中，股东通常是唯一的剩余索取者；换句话说，他们是能够合法获取企业剩余并拥有选择企业高层管理团队权力的经济主体（詹森与梅克林，1979）。

Important changes in the nature of the firm (Alvarez et al., 2020; Pitelis & Teece, 2018; Zingales, 2000), as well as questions raised about the appropriateness of considering shareholder value maximization as the only goal of corporations (Battilana, Obloj, Pache, & Sengul, 2020), have rekindled a longstanding debate on the viability of co-ops (Birchall, 2011; Michie, Blasi, & Borzaga, 2017). Co-ops are firms owned by members who participate, with equal voting rights, in the governance and management of the enterprise (Jones & Kalmi, 2012) and benefit directly from their activities (Birchall, 2011). Because of the “one member, one vote” rule (Borzaga & Tortia, 2017: 64), co-ops are intended to be more democratic than capitalist firms (Rothschild, 1979), even if the concentration of decision-making power to a top management team can cause this attribute to degenerate (Cornforth, 1995). Co-op members can be consumers (as in the case of mutual insurers, consumer co-ops, housing co-ops, etc.), producers (e.g., primary producer co-ops, shared services co-ops, and retailer co-ops), producers and consumers (e.g., credit unions and cooperative banks), or employees (worker co-ops). Worker co-ops, also known as “labor-managed firms,” have received the most attention in the economic literature, partly to answer the question of why capital hires labor as opposed to labor hiring capital (Dow, 2018, 2020; Jensen & Meckling, 1979). 企业性质的重大变化（Alvarez等人，2020；Pitelis & Teece，2018；Zingales，2000），以及关于将股东价值最大化视为企业唯一目标的适当性的质疑（Battilana、Obloj、Pache & Sengul，2020），重新引发了关于合作社可行性的长期辩论（Birchall，2011；Michie、Blasi & Borzaga，2017）。合作社是由成员共同所有的企业，成员以平等的投票权参与企业的治理和管理（Jones & Kalmi，2012），并直接从企业活动中受益（Birchall，2011）。由于“一人一票”原则（Borzaga & Tortia，2017：64），合作社被认为比资本主义企业更具民主性（Rothschild，1979），尽管决策权力集中到高层管理团队可能会导致这一特性退化（Cornforth，1995）。合作社成员可以是消费者（如互助保险公司、消费合作社、住房合作社等）、生产者（如初级生产者合作社、共享服务合作社和零售商合作社）、生产者和消费者（如信用合作社和合作银行），或员工（工人合作社）。工人合作社，也被称为“劳动管理型企业”，在经济文献中受到最多关注，部分原因是为了回答资本为何雇佣劳动力而非劳动力雇佣资本的问题（Dow，2018，2020；Jensen & Meckling，1979）。

Many scholars view co-ops as “transient compromises that emerge out of necessity” (Boone & Ozcan, 2014: 991). Nevertheless, co-ops retain a significant economic role, involving one billion members and supplying more than 250 million jobs worldwide (Zamagni, 2017). Many are larger, rather than smallor medium-sized, organizations. Over 1,150 co-ops have an annual turnover exceeding $$ 100$ million (John & Ross, 2021), while some have grown to become multinationals (Bretos, Errasti, & Marcuello, 2019; Novkovic & Sena, 2007). The debate on the advantages and disadvantages of such firms has been raging for almost a century (for extensive reviews, see Cathcart, 2009; Michie et al., 2017). To economize on space, in Table 1, we summarize the principal arguments that have been presented to justify the comparative efficiency advantages of traditional capitalist firms, and, in Table 2, we contrast these arguments with those that have been advanced in support of traditional co-ops. 许多学者将合作社视为“因必要性而产生的临时性妥协”（Boone & Ozcan，2014：991）。然而，合作社仍发挥着重要的经济作用，全球拥有10亿成员，提供超过2.5亿个就业岗位（Zamagni，2017）。许多合作社规模较大，而非中小型组织。超过1150家合作社的年营业额超过1亿美元（John & Ross，2021），其中一些已发展成为跨国企业（Bretos, Errasti, & Marcuello, 2019；Novkovic & Sena, 2007）。关于这类企业优缺点的争论已持续近一个世纪（广泛综述见Cathcart, 2009；Michie et al., 2017）。为节省篇幅，我们在表1中总结了用于证明传统资本主义企业比较效率优势的主要论点，在表2中则将这些论点与支持传统合作社的论点进行对比。

Among the arguments against co-ops, the influential team production theory formulated by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) half a century ago “is widely held to be the strongest objection ever raised against democratic firms” (Jossa, 2009: 687). “Team production” refers to situations in which production requires the collaboration of multiple actors, and it is hard to “estimate marginal productivity by observing or specifying input behavior” (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972: 783). Since individual contributions are difficult to measure, shirking is likely to take place, hence threatening production efficiency. To address this challenge, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued that it is necessary to (a) treat the majority of individuals involved in team production (e.g., employees or contractors) as fixed claimants and (b) assign the task of “metering” (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972: 778) their marginal productivity to a monitor who becomes a residual claimant of any surplus generated, and, as such, has a clear incentive to self-monitor while avoiding an infinite regress of “who will monitor the monitor” (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972: 782). Since co-ops lack a residual claimant, they compare unfavorably to traditional capitalist firms. This problem is compounded by the restricted mobility of labor relative to capital: it is easier for financial investors to reallocate their capital than it is for workers to reallocate their labor. These two reasons help explain why co-ops are less prevalent in market economies (Dow, 2003). 在反对合作社的诸多论点中，半个世纪前由阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨（1972）提出的影响力深远的团队生产理论“被广泛认为是对民主企业提出的最强有力的反对意见”（乔萨，2009：687）。“团队生产”指的是生产需要多个参与者协作的情形，并且很难“通过观察或明确投入行为来估算边际生产率”（阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨，1972：783）。由于个人贡献难以衡量，偷懒行为可能发生，从而威胁到生产效率。为应对这一挑战，阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨（1972）认为有必要（a）将参与团队生产的大多数个体（例如员工或承包商）视为固定索取者，并且（b）将“计量”（阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨，1972：778）其边际生产率的任务分配给一位监督者，这位监督者成为任何产生的剩余的剩余索取者，因此，他有明确的动机进行自我监督，同时避免出现“谁来监督监督者”的无限循环（阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨，1972：782）。由于合作社缺乏剩余索取者，它们与传统资本主义企业相比处于不利地位。劳动力相对于资本的流动性受限进一步加剧了这一问题：金融投资者更容易重新配置其资本，而工人则更难重新配置其劳动力。这两个原因有助于解释为什么合作社在市场经济中不那么普遍（道，2003）。

TABLE 1 Arguments against Cooperatives
表1 反对合作社的理由

Advocates of co-ops have contested Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) argument by claiming that cooperation itself can be considered an efficient coordination mechanism (Borzaga & Tortia, 2017) in part because trust and altruism can serve as (mutual) monitoring devices (Adler, 2001; Borzaga & Galera, 2016). Proponents of co-ops have also questioned the commensurability of the two models, considering that their purposes differ, since co-ops are “associations that pursue social goals by economic means” (Pestoff, 2017: 80), and that individuals can be intrinsically motivated by the desire to belong to a community (Baldassarri, 2015; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) rather than by the pursuit of profit. 合作社的倡导者质疑阿尔钦和德姆塞茨（1972）的观点，认为合作本身可以被视为一种有效的协调机制（Borzaga & Tortia, 2017），部分原因是信任和利他主义可以作为（相互的）监督手段（Adler, 2001；Borzaga & Galera, 2016）。合作社的支持者还质疑这两种模型的可比性，认为它们的目的不同，因为合作社是“通过经济手段追求社会目标的协会”（Pestoff, 2017: 80），而且个人可能因归属感的需求而产生内在动机（Baldassarri, 2015；Fehr & Schmidt, 1999），而非追求利润。

TABLE 2 Arguments in Favor of Cooperatives
表2 支持合作社的论据

While this theoretical debate has raged for decades, some firms facing real-life competition had had to find ways to combine the strengths of the traditional capitalist model with the strengths of the cooperative model. For many firms today, the idea that firm performance can be measured exclusively in financial terms accruing to a single group alone has been disputed (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004; Weizenbaum, 1976). To retain their legitimacy, many capitalist firms seek to balance between their financial, environmental, and societal outcomes and consider wider stakeholder interests (Alvarez et al., 2020; Elkington, 2018). In this sense, many firms are already operating as hybrids. The present paper suggests that, under conditions of OTP, hybrid forms of organization can have comparative efficiency advantages vis-à-vis both traditional capitalist and cooperative firms. 尽管这场理论争论已经持续了数十年，但一些面临现实竞争的企业不得不寻找方法，将传统资本主义模式的优势与合作制模式的优势结合起来。如今，对于许多企业而言，认为企业绩效只能用单一群体获得的财务收益来衡量的观点已受到质疑（Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004; Weizenbaum, 1976）。为了保持合法性，许多资本主义企业试图在财务、环境和社会成果之间取得平衡，并考虑更广泛的利益相关者利益（Alvarez et al., 2020; Elkington, 2018）。从这个意义上说，许多企业已经在以混合体的形式运作。本文认为，在OTP（可能指特定情境或概念）条件下，混合组织形式相对于传统资本主义企业和合作制企业而言，可能具有比较效率优势。

THE NEW COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE AND OTP

新竞争格局与一次性密码（OTP）

Over the past two decades, we have witnessed a gradual, yet radical, shift in our understanding of the competitive landscape and sources of competitive advantage. Today, many scholars consider “human capital” (the stock of skills and competences embedded in humans) and knowledge assets to be often more important than physical assets as sources of SCA (Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012; Chadwick, 2017). Knowledge-intensive firms and intangible assets are an increasingly significant component of contemporary economies (Haskel & Westlake, 2018). In addition, many leading firms owe their success to their capacity to operate within a business ecosystem (i.e., an economic community made of interacting stakeholders who cocreate value) (John & Ross, 2021; Shipilov & Gawer, 2019). In this context, relationships between independent actors outside a firm’s boundaries must be taken into account in order to understand firm performances (Zingales, 2000). It can be argued that, rather than being stable, vertically integrated managerial hierarchies, many modern firms gradually resemble “loose and constantly changing affiliations of employees, technologies, and other factors of production” (Barney & Rangan, 2019: 3). Below, we examine in detail the impact of OTP (i.e., a situation in which the team players are both internal and external to the firm) on the comparative (in)efficiency properties of both the capitalist and the cooperative organizational governance structures. 在过去的二十年里，我们目睹了人们对竞争格局和竞争优势来源的理解发生了逐步但根本性的转变。如今，许多学者认为“人力资本”（即嵌入人体的技能和能力存量）和知识资产往往比有形资产更能成为竞争优势（SCA）的来源（Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012；Chadwick, 2017）。知识密集型企业和无形资产在当代经济中所占的比重日益重要（Haskel & Westlake, 2018）。此外，许多领先企业的成功归功于它们在商业生态系统（即由相互作用的利益相关者构成、共同创造价值的经济共同体）中运作的能力（John & Ross, 2021；Shipilov & Gawer, 2019）。在这种背景下，为了理解企业绩效，必须考虑企业边界之外独立行为体之间的关系（Zingales, 2000）。可以说，许多现代企业并非稳定的垂直整合管理层级，而是逐渐演变为“员工、技术和其他生产要素的松散且不断变化的联盟”（Barney & Rangan, 2019: 3）。下文我们将详细考察OTP（即团队成员既包括企业内部也包括外部的情况）对资本主义和合作组织治理结构的相对（非）效率特性的影响。

The Organizing Challenges Created by OTP

OTP 带来的组织挑战

The idea that organizational survival relies on resources controlled by external parties is not new and constitutes the central tenet of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ulrich & Barney, 1984). The key premise of OTP is that team production requires leveraging interdependent, knowledge-intensive resources and capabilities provided by multiple economic agents (Reypens, Lievens, & Blazevic, 2021; Sison, 2007), not all of whom are internal to the firm. In this context, the term “team member” refers to any actor who contributes firm-specific assets that are essential for the ability of the firm to create and capture value sustainably in the face of competition (Barney, 2018; Battilana et al., 2020; Chadwick, 2017; Klein et al., 2019). 组织生存依赖外部方控制资源的观点并不新鲜，这构成了资源依赖理论的核心原则（Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Ulrich & Barney, 1984）。组织理论视角（OTP）的关键前提是，团队生产需要利用多个经济主体（Reypens, Lievens, & Blazevic, 2021; Sison, 2007）提供的相互依赖、知识密集型资源和能力，而这些主体并非全部都是企业内部成员。在此背景下，“团队成员”指的是任何贡献企业特定资产的行为体，这些资产对于企业在竞争环境中可持续地创造和获取价值至关重要（Barney, 2018; Battilana et al., 2020; Chadwick, 2017; Klein et al., 2019）。

Forms of organizing that transcend traditional organizational boundaries are currently in vogue (Harrison & St. John, 1996; Shipilov & Gawer, 2019), demonstrating that strategic advantage can be acquired by means of interfirm and cross-boundary cooperation (Barney, 2011; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Some perspectives have focused on collaborative interactions among groups of firms, as in the case of industrial districts (Becattini, Bellandi, & De Propris, 2009; Lorenzoni & Lipparini, 1999), clusters and business ecosystems (Moore, 1996; Peltoniemi, 2006; Pitelis, 2012), interorganizational networks (Shipilov & Gawer, 2019; Zaheer, Gözübüyük, & Milanov, 2010), or business ecosystems (Pitelis & Teece, 2010), Others have reconceptualized supply chain relationships by considering the collaborative creation of value and co-specialized resource bundles as value nets (Bovel & Martha, 2000; Nalebuff, Brandenburger, & Maulana, 1996) or value constellations (Normann & Ramirez, 1993, 1998) that can also be used to pursue nonfinancial returns (Isaksson, Johansson, & Fischer, 2010). Firms increasingly rely on interdependencies with other organizations that they do not fully control hierarchically (Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018: 2264). In these setting, the distinction between internal and external agents is more fluid. Attributes such as influence, power, and legitimacy (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) that help incentivize and open team members become as, or more, important than the mere monitoring of internal production team members. 超越传统组织边界的组织形式目前正流行（Harrison & St. John，1996；Shipilov & Gawer，2019），这表明战略优势可以通过企业间和跨边界合作获得（Barney，2011；Powell，Koput，& Smith-Doerr，1996）。一些观点聚焦于企业群体间的协作互动，例如产业区（Becattini，Bellandi，& De Propris，2009；Lorenzoni & Lipparini，1999）、集群和商业生态系统（Moore，1996；Peltoniemi，2006；Pitelis，2012）、组织间网络（Shipilov & Gawer，2019；Zaheer，Gözübüyük，& Milanov，2010）或商业生态系统（Pitelis & Teece，2010）。另一些观点通过将价值的协作创造和共同专业化资源束视为价值网络（Bovel & Martha，2000；Nalebuff，Brandenburger，& Maulana，1996）或价值星座（Normann & Ramirez，1993，1998）来重新概念化供应链关系，这些概念也可用于追求非财务回报（Isaksson，Johansson，& Fischer，2010）。企业越来越依赖与其他组织的相互依存关系，而这些组织在层级上无法被其完全控制（Jacobides，Cennamo，& Gawer，2018：2264）。在这种情况下，内部和外部代理之间的区别更加模糊。影响力、权力和合法性等属性（Mitchell，Agle，& Wood，1997）有助于激励和开放团队成员，其重要性与对内部生产团队成员的单纯监控相当，甚至更为重要。

In the context of ecosystems, the focus is no longer exclusively on the acquisition and protection of in-house proprietary intellectual property and other assets. Firms can acquire advantages by developing open innovation capabilities, stimulating and harnessing the knowledge of external stakeholders (Chesbrough, 2006). In some cases, it is even possible to decouple team production from a focal organization, as happens in the context of diffused opensource collaboration (Forte & Lampe, 2013; Levine & Prietula, 2014; von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). Participation in collaborative ecosystems might also require an “open strategy,” which is the involvement of multiple team members in providing inputs to value creation and capture (Hautz, Seidl, & Whittington, 2017; Hemetsberger & Reinhardt, 2009; Whittington, Cailluet, & Yakis-Douglas, 2011). 在生态系统的背景下，关注点不再仅仅是获取和保护内部专有知识产权及其他资产。企业可以通过发展开放式创新能力，激发和利用外部利益相关者的知识来获得优势（Chesbrough，2006）。在某些情况下，甚至可以将团队生产与核心组织分离，这在分散式开源协作的背景下尤为常见（Forte & Lampe，2013；Levine & Prietula，2014；von Hippel & von Krogh，2003）。参与协作生态系统可能还需要一种“开放战略”，即让多个团队成员参与为价值创造和捕获提供投入（Hautz、Seidl & Whittington，2017；Hemetsberger & Reinhardt，2009；Whittington、Cailluet & Yakis-Douglas，2011）。

Traditional production teams entailed the internalization of activities, depending on comparative transaction and production cost efficiencies between markets and organizations (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981). OTP conditions require incentivizing independent firms and actors (including local authorities and the government) that are not internal to the firm. This includes the case of complementors in a business ecosystem (Jacobides et al., 2018; Pitelis & Teece, 2010). Some interorganizational interdependencies can still be managed through formal relationships, as in the case of “strategic alliances,” 传统生产团队需要将活动内部化，这取决于市场与组织之间的比较交易成本和生产效率（Coase，1937；Williamson，1981）。OTP条件要求激励不属于企业内部的独立企业和参与者（包括地方当局和政府）。这包括商业生态系统中的互补者案例（Jacobides等人，2018；Pitelis & Teece，2010）。一些组织间的相互依赖关系仍然可以通过正式关系来管理，例如“战略联盟”的情况。

defined as purposive relationships involving the exchange, sharing, or co-development of capabilities to achieve mutual benefits (Gulati, 1995). However, opportunities also derive from the development and leveraging of complementarities that are not regulated by formal agreements (Shipilov & Gawer, 2019) and result from deliberate experimentation and interfirm coordination activities (Jacobides et al., 2018; Pitelis & Teece, 2018). Firms can also engage in “co-opetition”; that is, they can collaborate with competitors in the pursuit of innovation and value cocreation (Czakon, Srivastava, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, 2020). 定义为涉及能力交换、共享或共同开发以实现互利的目的性关系（Gulati，1995）。然而，机会也源于未受正式协议规范的互补性的开发和利用（Shipilov & Gawer，2019），以及源于刻意实验和企业间协调活动（Jacobides et al.，2018；Pitelis & Teece，2018）。企业还可以参与“竞合”；即，它们可以与竞争对手合作以追求创新和价值共创（Czakon，Srivastava，Le Roy，& Gnyawali，2020）。

Managing a firm under OTP conditions is, therefore, not merely about sourcing and monitoring input suppliers. It also requires coaxing and incentivizing other firms to invest in value cocreation by participating in the business ecosystem (John & Ross, 2021). Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972: 783) assumption that “to alter the membership of the team” is the exclusive remit of the residual claimant is thus challenged. Ecosystem and organizational networks that expand the production team beyond the boundaries of the firm cannot be readily bought or created by executive fiat. Rather than formal contracting, they require incentivizing and the development of trust (Uzzi, 1997). They also require the capacity to act as brokers and orchestrators connecting different actors in the network (Obstfeld, 2005). For example, the large number of failures in digital platforms (Yoffie, Gawer, & Cusumano, 2019) can be attributed to failures to expand the production team rather than to difficulties in monitoring inputs of an existing one. 因此，在一次性付款（OTP）条件下管理公司不仅仅是寻找和监控投入供应商。它还需要通过参与商业生态系统（John & Ross，2021）来鼓励和激励其他公司投资于价值共创。阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨（1972：783）认为“改变团队成员”是剩余索取者的唯一职责，这一假设因此受到挑战。扩展生产团队超出公司边界的生态系统和组织网络无法通过高管的命令轻易购买或创建。它们需要的不是正式的契约，而是激励和信任的发展（Uzzi，1997）。它们还需要充当经纪人与协调者的能力，以连接网络中的不同参与者（Obstfeld，2005）。例如，数字平台的大量失败（Yoffie、Gawer & Cusumano，2019）可归因于未能扩展生产团队，而非难以监控现有生产团队的投入。

A key implication is that, under OTP conditions, the ability to incentivize internal and external team members to commit firm-specific investments that foster the cocreation of value and its capture in a sustained way is at least as important and arguably more important than the capacity to source and monitor extant team players. More specifically, OTP presents firms with three interconnected challenges: first, to incentivize production team members to make co-specialized investments (i.e., investments that leverage assets controlled by other actors and are idiosyncratic to a particular activity; Teece, 1986); second, to orchestrate team members that are not subject to hierarchical or contractual controls; and third, to monitor, in addition to their contractual contributions, their discretional efforts. In the context of OTP and drawing on the resource-based theory of the firm, nonfinancial resources (capabilities, knowledge, relations, etc.) supplied by production team members are more critical for SCA than financial resources (Barney, 2018). It is essential for a firm to anticipate the value of bundling and leveraging co-specialized resources (Teece, 2007). Accordingly, co-specialized investments become a more important source of SCA than the supply of more general, transferable assets (Barney & Wright, 1998). 一个关键含义是，在OTP（组织间团队协作）条件下，激励内部和外部团队成员进行公司特定投资以促进价值的共同创造并以可持续方式捕获价值的能力，至少与招聘和监督现有团队成员的能力同样重要，甚至可能更重要。更具体地说，OTP给企业带来了三个相互关联的挑战：首先，激励生产团队成员进行共同专业化投资（即利用其他参与者控制的资产并针对特定活动具有特殊性的投资；Teece，1986）；其次，协调不受层级或合同控制的团队成员；第三，除了他们的合同贡献外，还要监督他们的自由裁量努力。在OTP的背景下，基于企业的资源理论，生产团队成员提供的非财务资源（能力、知识、关系等）比财务资源对SCA（可持续竞争优势）更为关键（Barney，2018）。企业必须预见捆绑和利用共同专业化资源的价值（Teece，2007）。因此，共同专业化投资比提供更通用、可转移的资产成为SCA更重要的来源（Barney & Wright，1998）。

An implication from OTP is the alteration of the comparative advantage calculus of traditional capitalist and cooperative firms. For instance, an important challenge when shareholders are the sole residual claimants is that they can expose the co-specialized investments of non-shareholder team members to the potential of opportunistic behavior of financial shareholders (Barney, 2018). This poses a particularly significant risk for employees who make significant firm-specific investments but cannot disinvest as readily (Dow, 2003; Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2012). On the other hand, workers with firmspecific skills and capabilities can possess countervailing power deriving from the transferability of their skills to other firms (Teece, 2003), as in the case of knowledge workers (Carleton, 2011). Therefore, it is necessary to incentivize internal team members to commit their firm-specific assets and apply discretionary effort, which requires the right safeguards to be in place (Kaufman & Englander, 2005). Similar considerations apply to external team members who will commit to the collaboration only if the relationship is seen as fair and equitable (Barney, 2018) and if relational partners share both core values and strategic priorities (Bundy, Vogel, & Zachary, 2018). OTP（一次性密码）带来的一个影响是改变了传统资本主义企业和合作制企业的比较优势计算方式。例如，当股东是唯一剩余索取者时，一个重要的挑战是他们可能会将非股东团队成员的共同专业化投资置于金融股东机会主义行为的潜在风险之下（Barney，2018）。这对那些进行大量企业专用性投资但无法轻易撤资的员工构成了特别重大的风险（Dow，2003；Klein，Mahoney，McGahan，& Pitelis，2012）。另一方面，拥有企业特定技能和能力的工人可以凭借其技能向其他企业转移的可转移性获得抵消力（Teece，2003），知识型员工的情况便是如此（Carleton，2011）。因此，有必要激励内部团队成员投入其企业专用性资产并付出 discretionary effort（ discretionary effort 此处保留英文术语更准确，指“自主努力”），这需要建立适当的保障措施（Kaufman & Englander，2005）。类似的考虑也适用于外部团队成员，他们只有在认为这种关系公平合理（Barney，2018）且关系伙伴共享核心价值观和战略优先事项（Bundy，Vogel，& Zachary，2018）时才会承诺合作。

In addition to the need to incentivize team members to commit to co-specialized investment, there is also the need to coordinate this complex constellation of actors. OTP conditions require the development of “orchestration capabilities”; namely, “the ability to combine selected technologies, individuals, and other resources in new products and processes regardless of location and across organizational boundaries” (Lessard, Teece, & Leih, 2016: 214). This includes the capacity to diagnose, upgrade, and integrate the resources and capabilities of a plurality of actors (Pitelis & Teece, 2009). In other words, under OTP conditions, value is not created just by minimizing shirking but especially by innovating, by cocreating, and by orchestrating organizations, new markets, and business ecosystems (Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006; Kim & Mauborgne, 2005; Pitelis & Teece, 2018). 除了需要激励团队成员承诺共同专业投资外，还需要协调这一复杂的参与者群体。OTP 条件要求发展“协调能力”；即“无论地点和组织边界如何，都能将选定的技术、个人和其他资源整合到新产品和流程中的能力”（Lessard, Teece, & Leih, 2016: 214）。这包括诊断、升级和整合多个参与者的资源与能力的能力（Pitelis & Teece, 2009）。换句话说，在 OTP 条件下，价值的创造不仅通过减少搭便车行为，更通过创新、共同创造以及协调组织、新市场和商业生态系统（Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006；Kim & Mauborgne, 2005；Pitelis & Teece, 2018）。

Under OTP, the problem of monitoring individual contributions becomes more complex. In traditional team production theory, “shirking,” which is “a positive incentive to supply less effort” (Jones, 1984: 686), means evading contractual obligations; in practice, this means working with less alacrity or imperfectly executing mandated tasks (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Yet, the effective functioning of any firm implies the execution of “countless acts of cooperation” (Tirole, 1986: 208), requiring team members to be adaptable and creative in performing those routines in which the firm’s capabilities are embedded (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011; Wenzel, Danner-Schröder, & Spee, 2021). Thus, it is necessary to assess and incentivize discretional (non-purely contractual) contributions of internal team members. These contributions become particularly hard to monitor in knowledge-intensive firms (von Nordenflycht, 2010). The more specialized and value adding a team member’s contribution, the more difficult it will be for an external monitor to assess whether they are shirking. Especially when the knowledge of the production process is imperfect or it is impossible to measure production outputs accurately, hierarchical controls can fail; when this happens, trust, mutual control, and rituals become important (Ouchi, 1979). The aforementioned challenges are much more acute when the team members lie outside the boundaries and the contractual remit of the firm. 在双因素认证（OTP）下，监控个人贡献的问题变得更加复杂。在传统的团队生产理论中，“偷懒”（即“提供更少努力的正向激励”（Jones，1984：686））意味着逃避合同义务；在实践中，这意味着工作不够积极或未能完美执行规定任务（Alchian & Demsetz，1972）。然而，任何企业的有效运作都意味着执行“无数的合作行为”（Tirole，1986：208），这要求团队成员在执行嵌入企业能力的常规任务时具备适应性和创造力（Feldman & Pentland，2003；Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville，2011；Wenzel，Danner-Schröder，& Spee，2021）。因此，有必要评估和激励内部团队成员的自由裁量（非纯粹合同性）贡献。在知识密集型企业中，这些贡献尤其难以监控（von Nordenflycht，2010）。团队成员的贡献越专业、价值越高，外部监控者就越难判断其是否在偷懒。尤其是当生产过程的知识不完善或无法准确衡量生产产出时，层级控制可能会失效；此时，信任、相互控制和仪式变得至关重要（Ouchi，1979）。当团队成员处于企业的边界和合同范围之外时，上述挑战会更加严峻。

Table 3 summarizes our comparison of traditional and open team production contexts. Recapitulating, under OTP, a firm’s capacity to (a) induce production team members to commit to co-specialized investment, (b) orchestrate these contributions, and (c) monitor both contractually mandated and discretional efforts become more important in determining SCA than its capacity to monitor the inputs of individual internal team members. OTP renders the comparative efficiency calculus regarding traditional capitalist firms and co-ops more nuanced. We pursue this observation below. 表3总结了我们对传统团队生产和开放团队生产环境的比较。概括来说，在开放团队生产（OTP）下，企业的能力——（a）促使生产团队成员承诺共同专业化投资，（b）协调这些贡献，以及（c）监控合同规定的和自由裁量的努力——在决定供应链能力（SCA）方面变得比监控内部团队成员个人投入的能力更为重要。OTP使传统资本主义企业与合作社之间的比较效率计算更加细致。我们将在下文探讨这一观点。

COMPARING THE EFFICIENCY ADVANTAGES OF CAPITALIST AND COOPERATIVE FIRMS IN AN OTP CONTEXT

在OTP环境下比较资本主义企业与合作制企业的效率优势

Monitoring, Safeguarding, and Inducing Co-Specialized Investments 监测、保障与诱导协同专业化投资

As mentioned before, the lack of incentives for the top management team to invest in metering and monitoring can undermine a co-op’s ability to create and capture value, as compared to a capitalist firm (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). While retaining much of its strength, some of the assumptions upon which Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) argument was based have been challenged. Economists have highlighted the role of nonmonetary incentives (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; Cassar & Meier, 2018). 如前所述，与资本主义企业（阿尔钦和德姆塞茨，1972）相比，高层管理团队缺乏投资计量和监控的动力可能会削弱合作社创造和获取价值的能力。尽管阿尔钦和德姆塞茨（1972）的论点保留了其大部分说服力，但它所依据的一些假设受到了质疑。经济学家强调了非货币激励的作用（贝纳布和蒂罗尔，2003；卡萨和迈尔，2018）。

TABLE 3 Comparing Traditional Team Production and Open Team Production
表3 传统团队生产与开放式团队生产对比

Reciprocal trust, altruism, and the desire to belong to a community have been argued to act as motivators and self-monitoring devices (Adler, 2001; Borzaga & Galera, 2016). For example, Putterman and Skillman (1992) have claimed that horizontal peer monitoring can be more accurate and less costly than vertical monitoring. 互惠信任、利他主义以及归属社群的愿望被认为是激励因素和自我监控机制（Adler，2001；Borzaga & Galera，2016）。例如，Putterman和Skillman（1992）声称，横向同伴监控可能比纵向监控更准确且成本更低。

When reconsidered in an OTP context, this debate assumes a new significance. Even if the monitoring disadvantage of co-ops persist, under OTP, co-ops can partly offset this handicap thanks to some comparative efficiency advantages relating to inducing and safeguarding co-specialized investment of nonshareholders. This is because nonfinancial stakeholders such as labor (and other) suppliers can be deterred from committing to firm-specific investments in capitalist firms because of the precedence that suppliers of financial capital take over suppliers of other resources (Klein et al., 2012). Moreover, since financial investors have the opportunity to trade their asset, their investments are more mobile than those of nonfinancial investors, whose investments could be lost in the case of the firm’s sale (Dow, 2003; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Moreover, shareholders can diversify their portfolios of holdings across multiple firms (ensen & Meckling, 1979), an opportunity that is not readily available to many other production team members. 当在一次性密码（OTP）的背景下重新审视时，这场辩论具有了新的意义。即使合作社的监控劣势依然存在，但在OTP模式下，合作社可以部分抵消这一劣势，这得益于其在诱导和保障非股东的共同专业化投资方面的某些相对效率优势。这是因为，与金融资本供应商相比，非金融利益相关者（如劳动力和其他资源供应商）在资本主义企业中可能会被劝阻，不会对公司特定投资做出承诺（Klein等人，2012）。此外，由于金融投资者有机会交易其资产，他们的投资比非金融投资者的投资更具流动性，而非金融投资者的投资在公司出售时可能会损失（Dow，2003；Rajan & Zingales，1998）。此外，股东可以在多家公司的投资组合中进行多元化配置（Jensen & Meckling，1979），而这一机会并非许多其他生产团队成员都能轻易获得。

Since specialized investments of nonfinancial team production members can be an important determinant of SCA, various authors have suggested the need and importance of putting in place protection mechanisms to safeguard these investments (Hoskisson, Gambeta, Green, & Li, 2018; Kaufman & Englander, 2005; Wang & Barney, 2006). Such protection devices may include both ex ante devices, such as property rights allocation and protection against resource depreciation, as well as those that are ex post, such as monitoring and relational governance systems (Hoskisson et al., 2018). Implementing these devices helps introduce elements that are usually associated with cooperatives to the governance of capitalist firms. 由于非财务团队生产成员的专用性投资可能是SCA的一个重要决定因素，多位学者提出有必要并强调建立保护机制以保障这些投资的重要性（Hoskisson, Gambeta, Green, & Li, 2018；Kaufman & Englander, 2005；Wang & Barney, 2006）。这类保护机制既包括事前措施，如产权分配和防止资源贬值，也包括事后措施，如监控和关系治理系统（Hoskisson et al., 2018）。实施这些机制有助于将通常与合作社相关的要素引入资本主义企业的治理中。

Capitalist firms may also attempt to coax nonshareholders into committing resources; for example, they may try to “instill a spirit of loyalty” in their employees (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972: 791). Yet, since many shareholders in publicly traded companies are perceived as absentee landlords, whose investment is not specific and whose interest in the firm is rather instrumental (Alvarez et al., 2020), such attempts to build organizational loyalty can be read as indicative of manipulative intent (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002). Conversely, in the case of co-ops, the equality and non-tradability of ownership safeguards team members from the risk that other actors may act opportunistically and profit from their firm-specific investments. Even if the diversity of planning horizons between members causes a divergence of interests between new and older members, because the latter cannot recoup their investments (Furubotn & Pejovich, 1972; Vanek, 1970), the stock of accumulated resources remains a common good, which helps foster intergenerational solidarity (Borzaga & Tortia, 2017). 资本主义企业也可能试图诱导非股东投入资源；例如，它们可能试图“向员工灌输忠诚精神”（阿尔钦与德姆塞茨，1972：791）。然而，由于上市公司的许多股东被视为“ absentee landlords”（ absentee landlords），其投资缺乏特异性，对企业的利益诉求也更具工具性（阿尔瓦雷斯等人，2020），因此这种建立组织忠诚度的尝试可被解读为具有操纵意图（阿尔韦森与威尔莫特，2002）。相反，在合作社的情况下，所有权的平等性和不可交易性保护了团队成员免受其他行为者机会主义行为及利用其企业特异性投资获利的风险。即使成员之间规划视野的差异导致新老成员之间出现利益分歧（因为老成员无法收回其投资，富鲁博顿与佩约维奇，1972；瓦内克，1970），但积累的资源存量仍属于公共品，这有助于培育代际 solidarity（代际团结）（博尔扎加与托尔蒂亚，2017）。

注：此处保留了原文中“absentee landlords”“solidarity”等术语的英文表述，因涉及学术概念的标准译法或需进一步讨论，按规则应保留原文术语以确保准确性。若需完全中文术语，需结合学术规范调整，如“ absentee landlords”可译为“非参与式股东”或“消极股东”，“solidarity”译为“团结”。根据上下文，此处调整为更自然的中文表达：

资本主义企业也可能试图诱导非股东投入资源；例如，它们可能试图“向员工灌输忠诚精神”（阿尔钦与德姆塞茨，1972：791）。然而，由于上市公司的许多股东被视为“消极所有者”，其投资缺乏特异性，对企业的利益诉求也更具工具性（阿尔瓦雷斯等人，2020），因此这种建立组织忠诚度的尝试可被解读为具有操纵意图（阿尔韦森与威尔莫特，2002）。相反，在合作社的情况下，所有权的平等性和不可交易性保护了团队成员免受其他行为者机会主义行为及利用其企业特异性投资获利的风险。即使成员之间规划视野的差异导致新老成员之间出现利益分歧（因为老成员无法收回其投资，富鲁博顿与佩约维奇，1972；瓦内克，1970），但积累的资源存量仍属于公共品，这有助于培育代际团结（博尔扎加与托尔蒂亚，2017）。

（最终输出按规则仅保留译文，去除注脚，故正确译文为上述中文段落，确保术语准确且符合学术表达。）

最终输出（符合规则的纯译文）：

资本主义企业也可能试图诱导非股东投入资源；例如，它们可能试图“向员工灌输忠诚精神”（阿尔钦与德姆塞茨，1972：791）。然而，由于上市公司的许多股东被视为“消极所有者”，其投资缺乏特异性，对企业的利益诉求也更具工具性（阿尔瓦雷斯等人，2020），因此这种建立组织忠诚度的尝试可被解读为具有操纵意图（阿尔韦森与威尔莫特，2002）。相反，在合作社的情况下，所有权的平等性和不可交易性保护了团队成员免受其他行为者机会主义行为及利用其企业特异性投资获利的风险。即使成员之间规划视野的差异导致新老成员之间出现利益分歧（因为老成员无法收回其投资，富鲁博顿与佩约维奇，1972；瓦内克，1970），但积累的资源存量仍属于公共品，这有助于培育代际团结（博尔扎加与托尔蒂亚，2017）。

Going further, co-ops are structurally endowed with devices to protect non-shareholders: property rights and some forms of resource depreciation protection (e.g., takeover protections) are constitutional attributes of many co-ops. Mergers and acquisitions between co-ops are predominantly driven by solidarity, as a means of supporting co-ops in a crisis (Jones & Kalmi, 2012). Moreover, relational, trustbased governance, the purpose of which is to control the perverse effects of property rights allocation under environmental uncertainty and of resource depreciation under conditions of behavioral uncertainty (Hoskisson et al., 2018), is part and parcel of any co-op’s governance system. Rather than having to devise new, often complex systems of contractual and noncontractual protections to provide the necessary guarantees to external team production members, co-ops can redeploy their existing systems. Other things being equal, this is likely to be less costly than having to devise new ones from scratch. 进一步而言，合作社在结构上具备保护非股东利益的机制：产权和某些形式的资源贬值保护（例如收购保护）是许多合作社的宪法属性。合作社之间的合并和收购主要由团结精神驱动，作为在危机中支持合作社的一种手段（Jones & Kalmi，2012）。此外，基于关系和信任的治理——其目的是在环境不确定性下控制产权分配的反常影响，并在行为不确定性条件下控制资源贬值的反常影响（Hoskisson et al.，2018）——是任何合作社治理体系不可或缺的一部分。合作社无需为外部团队生产成员制定新的（通常复杂的）契约和非契约保护体系来提供必要的保障，而是可以重新部署其现有体系。在其他条件相同的情况下，这可能比从零开始设计新体系的成本更低。

In order to induce nonfinancial investors to commit to firm-specific investments, capitalist firms often also need to offer them larger monetary rewards. Such rewards can be costly and they may not always be able to compensate for the disadvantage of capitalist firms in inducing and safeguarding independent team members’ investments. When operating under OTP, this situation helps co-ops to offset the monitoring incentive advantage that capitalist firms have. 为了吸引非金融投资者进行企业特定投资，资本企业通常还需要向他们提供更大的货币奖励。这类奖励可能代价高昂，而且资本企业在诱导和保障独立团队成员投资方面的劣势可能无法通过这些奖励得到弥补。在采用OTP（可能是指某种特定机制或模式）的情况下，这种情况有助于合作社抵消资本企业所拥有的监督激励优势。

This leads to our first proposition: 这就引出了我们的第一个命题：

Proposition 1. Under OTP conditions, cooperative firms are comparatively more efficient than capitalist firms in safeguarding and inducing co-specialized, firm-specific investments by nonfinancial team production members. 命题1. 在员工持股计划（OTP）条件下，合作制企业在保障和引导非金融团队生产成员进行共同专业化、企业特定投资方面，比资本主义企业更具效率。

Similar to capitalist firms, the majority of co-ops rely on professional managers who act as proxies of the principals in monitoring and coordinating the rest of the team members. Managers must be monitored, too. This situation creates a potential misalignment between the interests of managers and other co-op members that is compounded by information asymmetry between these actors (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the case of capitalist firms, the market for corporate control (i.e., the acquisition of underperforming firms by new investors who can replace the underperforming managers) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Manne, 1965) can at least in part offer a mechanism that incentivizes management accountability. At the same time, internal rewards, such as share options, help to align incentives between managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The non-tradability of ownership rights deprives co-ops of these two mechanisms to reduce agency problems. Moreover, co-ops can become exposed to the risk that charismatic “diplomats” but technically incompetent managers will emerge and will be difficult to replace, as they are impervious to peer monitoring (Williamson, 1973). 与资本主义企业类似，大多数合作社依赖专业管理人员，这些管理人员作为委托人的代理人，负责监督和协调团队其他成员。管理人员也必须受到监督。这种情况会导致管理人员与其他合作社成员的利益之间产生潜在的不一致，而这种不一致又因这些主体之间的信息不对称而加剧（Eisenhardt，1989）。在资本主义企业的案例中，公司控制权市场（即新投资者收购表现不佳的企业，从而可以替换表现不佳的管理人员）（Jensen & Meckling，1976；Manne，1965）至少在一定程度上提供了一种激励管理问责制的机制。同时，内部奖励（如股票期权）有助于协调管理人员与股东之间的激励机制（Jensen & Meckling，1976）。合作社的所有权不可交易性使其无法利用这两种机制来减少代理问题。此外，合作社可能面临这样的风险：具有魅力但技术上不称职的管理人员会出现，并且难以替换，因为他们不受同行监督的影响（Williamson，1973）。

The emergence of an overly powerful cooperative managerial class, a phenomenon defined as “democratic degeneration,” has been a central feature of the debate on co-ops for more than a century (Chaves & Sajardo-Moreno, 2004; see Cornforth, 1995) and it is particularly felt in large co-ops. This leads to: 一个过于强大的合作管理阶层的出现，这一被定义为“民主退化”的现象，在长达一个多世纪的合作社辩论中一直是核心特征（Chaves & Sajardo - Moreno，2004；另见Cornforth，1995），并且在大型合作社中这种现象尤为明显。这导致：

Proposition 2. Under OTP conditions, capitalist firms are (remain) comparatively more efficient than cooperative firms at attracting and retaining managerial talent and replacing underperforming managers. 命题2. 在一次性总付（OTP）条件下，资本主义企业（仍然）比合作制企业在吸引和留住管理人才以及更换表现不佳的管理者方面相对更有效率。

The capitalist firms’ reliance on financial incentives to induce team members to make co-specialized investments may also offer comparative advantage under OTP conditions since the ability to offer larger economic rewards allows capitalist firms to attract a larger talent pool. Co-ops are often constrained by strong egalitarian principles (Piketty, 2020). Until relatively recently, the average ratio between CEOs’ and average employees’ salaries in co-ops was a small fraction of the ratio for capitalist firms (Rothschild, 2009). While this gradually changes as co-ops try to compete, capitalist firms remain more attractive to those who are motivated by financial incentives, which gives them a competitive advantage, considering the importance of attracting and retaining highperforming team production members (Kwon & Rupp, 2013). This issue is especially pertinent in labor-managed firms: even if caps on salaries in worker co-ops were removed, paying some team members significantly more than the average (e.g., highly paid professional managers) could prove problematic because it might conflict with cooperative members’ objectives and values (Meek & Woodworth, 1990). Because of the resulting difficulty in attracting highly skilled professionals to work in co-ops, they frequently resort to employing “homegrown talent” that rises through the ranks of the cooperative. This can have positive implications in relation to their commitment and long-term outlook (Bretos & Marcuello, 2017) but it can also imply a lack of external experience or a global outlook. The rigidity caused by equitable ownership models can particularly disincentivize entrepreneurship and “intrapreneurship”; namely, the pursuit of innovative entrepreneurial opportunities without and within organizations (Antoncic & Hisrich, 2001, 2003). Talented team members may expect their superior investments to reap higher rewards than those of other members whose contributions they perceive as less valuable, even irrespective of shirking (Piketty, 2020). Motivation factors (Benabou & Tirole, 2003), such as social incentives and recognition, are important drivers of entrepreneurial efforts (de Villiers-Scheepers, 2011). 在外部团队生产条件（OTP）下，资本主义企业依赖金融激励来促使团队成员进行共同专业化投资可能也具有相对优势，因为提供更大经济回报的能力使资本主义企业能够吸引更广泛的人才池。合作社往往受到强烈平等主义原则的限制（皮凯蒂，2020）。直到相对近期，合作社中首席执行官与普通员工的平均薪资比率只是资本主义企业该比率的一小部分（罗斯柴尔德，2009）。尽管随着合作社试图参与竞争，这种情况逐渐发生变化，但资本主义企业对那些受金融激励驱动的人来说仍然更具吸引力，这为其带来了竞争优势——考虑到吸引和留住高绩效团队成员的重要性（权赫 & 鲁普，2013）。这一问题在劳动管理型企业中尤为突出：即使取消工人合作社的薪资上限，向部分团队成员支付远高于平均水平的薪酬（例如高薪专业管理人员）也可能存在问题，因为这可能与合作社成员的目标和价值观相冲突（米克 & 伍德沃思，1990）。由于由此产生的吸引高技能专业人才加入合作社的困难，合作社经常不得不雇佣“本土培养的人才”——即从合作社内部晋升的成员。这可能对其忠诚度和长期前景产生积极影响（布雷托斯 & 马尔库埃洛，2017），但也可能意味着缺乏外部经验或全球视野。公平所有权模式造成的刚性尤其会抑制创业精神和“内部创业精神”——即组织内外追求创新创业机会的行为（安东西奇 & 希斯里奇，2001，2003）。才华横溢的团队成员可能期望自己的额外投入能带来比其他成员更高的回报，即使他们的贡献被认为价值较低，甚至不考虑偷懒行为（皮凯蒂，2020）。社会激励和认可等动机因素（贝纳布 & 蒂罗尔，2003）是创业努力的重要驱动力（德维利尔斯 - 谢佩尔斯，2011）。

Differential economic rewards conventionally are held to incentivize individuals to undertake risky investments (Wang & Barney, 2006), such as engaging in intrapreneurial initiatives. The impossibility for members to access accumulated assets if they leave the firm is a negative incentive for continued intrapreneurial investment in the cooperative (Boone & Ozcan, 2014). Moreover, even group solidarity could become a disincentive for individuals to undertake risky new ventures, as some group cultures tend to knock down “over”-achievers—a phenomenon known in Australia as “tall poppy syndrome” (Kirkwood, 2007)—thus inducing a reverse free-riding problem in co-ops. 传统上认为，差异化的经济回报会激励个人进行风险投资（Wang & Barney，2006），例如开展内部创业举措。如果成员离开公司就无法获得积累的资产，这对合作社中持续的内部创业投资构成了负面激励（Boone & Ozcan，2014）。此外，即使是群体凝聚力也可能成为个人开展风险新业务的阻碍，因为某些群体文化往往会打压“过度”成功者——这种现象在澳大利亚被称为“高罂粟综合征”（Kirkwood，2007）——从而在合作社中引发反向搭便车问题。

All these limitations are less applicable in capitalist firms, which can instead reward more enterprising team member with bonuses and stock options and offer them access to additional financial resources (Neessen, Caniëls, Vos, & De Jong, 2019). Thus: 所有这些限制在资本主义企业中不太适用，这些企业反而可以用奖金和股票期权奖励更有进取心的团队成员，并为他们提供获取额外财务资源的途径（Neessen, Caniëls, Vos, & De Jong, 2019）。因此：

Proposition 3. Under OTP conditions, capitalist firms are comparatively more efficient than cooperative firms at inducing innovative intra- and inter-firm entrepreneurial efforts. 命题3. 在一次性总付（OTP）条件下，资本主义企业在激发企业内部和企业间的创新创业努力方面，比合作制企业更具效率。

Orchestrating Co-Specialized Investments

协同专业化投资的统筹安排

Under OTP conditions, the complementarities generated by a business ecosystem are an important source of competitive advantage. Especially in open system situations in which no firm acts as a central hub with the power to design the network (Giudici, Reinmoeller, & Ravasi, 2018), the capacity to manage organizational interdependencies (Klein et al., 2019; Pitelis & Teece, 2018) becomes important. Focal actors supporting other members’ activities, fostering collaborative relationships, and helping network members to discover new configuration opportunities and complementarities achieve this management (Giudici et al., 2018). Moreover, when ecosystems produce positive complementarities (e.g., knowledge and innovation spillovers) that are not internalized, value capture by a leading capitalist firm can induce coordination problems that can suffocate the ecosystem. Conversely, the adoption of a cooperative governance system can reduce the disincentivizing effects of value capture, thereby increasing value creation in ecosystems (John & Ross, 2021). 在双因素认证（OTP）条件下，商业生态系统产生的互补性是竞争优势的重要来源。特别是在开放系统情境中，没有企业作为拥有设计网络权力的核心枢纽（Giudici, Reinmoeller, & Ravasi, 2018），管理组织相互依存关系的能力（Klein et al., 2019; Pitelis & Teece, 2018）变得至关重要。支持其他成员活动、促进合作关系，并帮助网络成员发现新配置机会和互补性的核心参与者能够实现这种管理（Giudici et al., 2018）。此外，当生态系统产生未被内部化的积极互补性（例如知识和创新溢出）时，领先资本主义企业的价值捕获可能引发协调问题，从而扼杀生态系统。相反，采用合作治理体系可以减少价值捕获的抑制效应，从而增加生态系统中的价值创造（John & Ross, 2021）。

Co-ops are likely to be better than capitalist firms at developing interorganizational collaboration, establishing solid interorganizational relations that offer the opportunity to generate “relational rents” (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 663). There are three reasons why co-ops can cooperate more readily than capitalist firms. First, they often share stronger values. Co-op members view association as inherently valuable, and, for many co-ops, their main reason for existence is the pursuit of social goals (Pestoff, 2017). By contrast, in capitalist firms, competition is often seen as the norm (Porter, 1980), while interfirm cooperation and alliances often emerge later in their life as a way to generate additional profit opportunities (Pitelis, 2012; Shipilov & Gawer, 2019). For capitalist firms, the development of “relational competition” (Chen & Miller, 2015: 765), which is a longterm commitment to collaborate with competitors, requires navigating tensions between competition and cooperation (Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016; Nalebuff et al., 1996). Collaborating with competitors offers opportunities but also risks exposure to opportunistic behavior and knowledge leaks (Park, Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2014). Conversely, for co-ops, “networking is not one opportunity among many others, but rather it is the normal way of operating” (Menzani & Zamagni, 2010: 122), and their management is expected to invest time and resources in liaising and seeking out agreements with other co-ops and other stakeholders (Jones & Kalmi, 2012). 合作社在发展组织间合作、建立稳固的组织间关系（这些关系能带来“关系租金”的机会，Dyer & Singh, 1998: 663）方面，可能比资本主义企业更具优势。合作社比资本主义企业更容易开展合作，原因有三。首先，它们往往拥有更强的共同价值观。合作社成员认为合作本身具有内在价值，对许多合作社而言，其存在的主要原因是追求社会目标（Pestoff, 2017）。相比之下，在资本主义企业中，竞争通常被视为常态（Porter, 1980），而企业间的合作与联盟往往在其发展后期才出现，作为一种获取额外利润机会的方式（Pitelis, 2012; Shipilov & Gawer, 2019）。对于资本主义企业而言，“关系型竞争”（一种与竞争对手长期合作的承诺，Chen & Miller, 2015: 765）的发展需要在竞争与合作之间调和张力（Bengtsson & Raza-Ullah, 2016; Nalebuff et al., 1996）。与竞争对手合作既有机遇，也有暴露于机会主义行为和知识泄露的风险（Park, Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2014）。相反，对于合作社而言，“网络构建并非众多机会中的一个，而是其正常的运营方式”（Menzani & Zamagni, 2010: 122），其管理层有责任投入时间和资源，与其他合作社及利益相关者建立联系并寻求协议（Jones & Kalmi, 2012）。

The second reason derives from the different structure of incentives. Capitalist firms’ pursuit of profit maximization can induce opportunistic behavior in interorganizational cooperation forms such as strategic alliances (Gnyawali, Madhavan, He, & Bengtsson, 2016). Members of a cooperative have a less immediate interest in maximizing profits of which they can only claim a small portion and a stronger interest in ensuring the survival of the firm. Co-ops are typically created with the intent of empowering suppliers and customers in market conditions that would otherwise disadvantage them; thus, the creation of a collaborative network among peers is at the core of the firm, while hierarchical authority is introduced at a later stage as an ancillary coordination and monitoring mechanism (Borzaga & Tortia, 2017). 第二个原因源于激励机制的不同结构。资本主义企业追求利润最大化可能会在战略联盟等组织间合作形式中诱发机会主义行为（Gnyawali、Madhavan、He & Bengtsson，2016）。合作组织的成员对最大化自身仅能获取一小部分的利润兴趣较低，而对确保企业存续的兴趣更强。合作社通常是在市场环境可能对供应商和客户不利的情况下成立，以赋予他们权力；因此，同行间协作网络的构建是企业的核心，而层级权威则是在后期作为辅助协调和监控机制引入的（Borzaga & Tortia，2017）。

Third, cooperative management is more likely to possess the requisite incentives and capabilities for the creation of a collaborative network. While executives in capitalist firms can focus on a small number of key stakeholders, in co-ops, their top managers need to constantly renew their legitimacy in a large constituency of stakeholders. Especially in large co-ops, acquiring a top management position requires an individual to demonstrate a special aptitude at building consensus and managing tensions and interest conflicts among different team production members. Instead, for capitalist firms, political networking skills are typically not listed among the key attributes of top management members (Stashevsky, Burke, Carmeli, & Tishler, 2006). The impact of “political operators” is only acknowledged in relation to the capacity of some executives to leverage their political connections or position (Fisman, Fisman, Galef, Khurana, & Wang, 2012), such as through lobbying (Zingales, 2017). 第三，合作社管理更有可能具备创建协作网络所需的动力和能力。在资本主义企业中，高管可以专注于少数关键利益相关者，而在合作社中，其高层管理者需要在众多利益相关者群体中不断重新确立自身的合法性。特别是在大型合作社中，获得高层管理职位需要个人展示出在建立共识以及管理不同团队生产成员之间的紧张关系和利益冲突方面的特殊才能。相反，对于资本主义企业而言，政治网络技能通常并不被列为高层管理人员的关键特质（Stashevsky, Burke, Carmeli, & Tishler, 2006）。“政治运作者”的影响仅在某些高管能够利用其政治关系或职位（如通过游说）的能力方面得到认可（Fisman, Fisman, Galef, Khurana, & Wang, 2012；Zingales, 2017）。

These theoretical arguments appear to be supported by empirical evidence. Confederations and cooperative districts (Powell, 1990) and other forms of inter-cooperative alliances (Cheney, 2002; Etxagibel, Cheney, & Udaondo, 2012) are widespread. For example, Italian cooperative firms do not operate in isolation but participate in a vibrant ecosystem, including “horizontal” consortia, vertical supply chains, alliances driven by complementarity, financial groupings created for mutual support, and networks of networks, umbrella organizations with system governance and representation functions (Menzani & Zamagni, 2010). 这些理论论证似乎得到了实证证据的支持。联盟和合作区（Powell，1990）以及其他形式的合作间联盟（Cheney，2002；Etxagibel、Cheney & Udaondo，2012）十分普遍。例如，意大利的合作企业并非孤立运营，而是参与到一个充满活力的生态系统中，其中包括“横向”联盟、垂直供应链、基于互补性的联盟、为相互支持而创建的金融集团，以及由网络构成的网络、具有系统治理和代表职能的伞状组织（Menzani & Zamagni，2010）。

This networking capacity can extend to co-ops’ capacity to incentivize the participation of various team production members, including not-for-profit organizations and individuals (Birchall, 2011). A new trend that has emerged in the last decade is the institution of multistakeholder co-ops that leverage the technological advances that enabled the “sharing economy” (Cohen, 2017). One example of these so-called “platform cooperatives” (Scholz, 2016: 11) is SMART, which is an international organization supporting the operation and growth of freelance creative and cultural entrepreneurs providing a range of accounting, financial, legal, and training services (CICOPA, 2018). 这种网络能力可以延伸到合作社激励各类团队生产成员（包括非营利组织和个人）参与的能力（Birchall，2011）。过去十年出现的一个新趋势是多利益相关方合作社的建立，这类合作社利用了促成“共享经济”的技术进步（Cohen，2017）。所谓的“平台合作社”（Scholz，2016：11）的一个例子是SMART，它是一个国际组织，支持自由创意和文化创业者的运营与发展，提供一系列会计、财务、法律和培训服务（CICOPA，2018）。

Our discussion leads to the following proposition: 我们的讨论得出以下命题：

Proposition 4. Cooperative firms have comparative efficiency advantages at inducing and orchestrating inter-firm cooperation. 命题4. 合作企业在诱导和协调企业间合作方面具有相对效率优势。

Summary Assessment

总结评估

We summarize our comparative assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of capitalist firms and co-ops under OTP conditions in Figure 1. It is important to note that many of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of these two alternative types of firms are interconnected, in that some strengths are also sources of weakness. In particular, self- and peer monitoring in co-ops can moderate the lack of economic incentives for intrapreneurial efforts and also enable talent retention. By contrast, the superior capacity to orchestrate strong interorganizational relationships can exacerbate the difficulty in monitoring co-op managers, because inefficient co-ops can be subsidized by the cooperative ecosystem, thereby concealing the losses caused by inefficient managers. Also, an inferior capacity to attract talent could also be a disincentive for other actors to make co-specialized investments. 我们在图1中总结了在OTP条件下资本主义企业和合作社的优势与劣势的对比评估。需要注意的是，这两种替代企业类型的许多比较优势和劣势是相互关联的，因为某些优势也是劣势的来源。特别是，合作社中的自我和同伴监督可以缓解内部创业努力缺乏经济激励的问题，还能促进人才留存。相比之下，协调强大组织间关系的优越能力可能会加剧对合作社管理者监督的难度，因为低效的合作社可能会得到合作生态系统的补贴，从而掩盖了低效管理者造成的损失。此外，吸引人才的能力不足也可能阻碍其他行为体进行协同专业化投资。

Based on this assessment, neither capitalist firms nor co-ops should be considered as superior to each other under OTP conditions. Indeed, in order to address the challenges posed by the real-life competition, many firms gradually adopt hybrid traits. For example, co-ops tend to incorporate capitalist elements, while capitalist firms become increasingly more open to forms of stakeholder and employee participation. In the next section, we consider this emerging hybridity. 基于这一评估，在OTP（可能指“其他类型的产权结构”或特定语境下的缩写，需根据具体领域确定，此处保留原缩写）条件下，既不应认为资本主义企业也不应认为合作社更具优越性。事实上，为应对现实竞争带来的挑战，许多企业逐渐采用混合特质。例如，合作社倾向于融入资本主义元素，而资本主义企业则越来越多地接受利益相关者和员工参与的形式。在下一节中，我们将探讨这种新兴的混合形态。

WHY HYBRIDS?

为什么选择混合动力车？

In the contemporary economy, OTP is increasingly becoming the norm. For example, firms can participate in business ecosystems, exploiting complementarities (Ganco, Kapoor, & Lee, 2020). Participation in ecosystems can become a source of sustained advantage. Indicatively, five of the six firms with the highest market value in the world are built around platforms (Yoffie et al., 2019) based on a core technology on which complementors can latch their complementary products and services (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). 在当代经济中，一次性密码（OTP）正日益成为常态。例如，企业可以参与商业生态系统，利用互补性（Ganco、Kapoor 和 Lee，2020）。参与生态系统可以成为持续优势的来源。值得注意的是，全球市值最高的六家公司中有五家是围绕平台构建的（Yoffie 等人，2019），这些平台基于核心技术，互补者可以在该技术上依附其互补产品和服务（Gawer 和 Cusumano，2002）。

Business ecosystems are not mere extensions of internal production teams, obtained by outsourcing some functions. They operate as “the alignment structure of the multilateral set of partners that need to interact in order for a focal value proposition to materialize” (Adner, 2017: 40). Thus, they require an “open system” form of orchestration, aimed not only at maximizing the short-term profit of a single focal firm but also involving a “prosocial, other-oriented” orientation aimed at facilitating cooperation in the network (Giudici et al., 2018: 1371). In order to foster the development of ecosystems, organizations often need to combine capabilities that are associated with a plurality of organizational forms and governance structures, including those usually associated with cooperative firms. 商业生态系统不仅仅是内部生产团队的延伸，也不是通过外包部分职能获得的。它们运作的方式是“多边合作伙伴群体的对齐结构，这些合作伙伴需要相互作用才能实现核心价值主张”（Adner，2017：40）。因此，它们需要一种“开放系统”形式的协调，其目标不仅是最大化单一核心企业的短期利润，还涉及一种“亲社会、以他人为导向”的取向，旨在促进网络中的合作（Giudici等人，2018：1371）。为了促进生态系统的发展，组织往往需要结合与多种组织形式和治理结构相关的能力，包括那些通常与合作企业相关的能力。

What Is a “Hybrid” Firm?

什么是“混合”企业？

Most real organizations do not conform to a “pure” type. In reality, there exist multiple forms, degrees, and ranges of participation in the governance, decision-making, and ownership of the firm. Participation is a complex social phenomenon that is driven by different purposes, can manifest in different forms, and can be assessed with different outcomes (Dachler & Wilpert, 1978). 大多数真实的组织并不符合“纯粹”的类型。实际上，在公司的治理、决策和所有权方面，存在多种形式、程度和参与范围。参与是一种复杂的社会现象，其驱动力是不同的目的，表现形式各异，且可以通过不同的结果来评估（Dachler & Wilpert，1978）。

Moreover, there is a continuum between involvement and noninvolvement in decision-making or in the influence on decisional outcomes, as well as a variability in the types of decisions and in the range of actors involved in them (Dachler & Wilpert, 1978). For example, in the context of strategy-making, the level of openness and participation can be assessed both in relation to transparency about the strategy and to inclusiveness of the range of actors involved in its formulation (Whittington et al., 2011). Therefore, it is possible to “modulate” forms of stakeholder participation in decision-making and in the distribution of residual benefits according to different circumstances and to different approaches to leadership (Pitelis & Wagner, 2019). 此外，在决策或对决策结果的影响中，参与和不参与之间存在连续性，同时决策类型以及参与其中的行为者范围也存在差异（Dachler & Wilpert, 1978）。例如，在战略制定的背景下，可以从战略透明度以及参与战略制定的行为者范围的包容性两个方面来评估开放程度和参与度（Whittington et al., 2011）。因此，根据不同的情况和不同的领导方式，有可能“调节”利益相关者参与决策和剩余利益分配的形式（Pitelis & Wagner, 2019）。

Another source of hybridity concerns the purpose and governance of the firm. Rather than considering shareholder value and social sustainability as mutually exclusive orientations, 21st-century firms are increasingly required to find effective ways to reconcile their social, environmental, and financial obligations as the concepts of ownership rights and stewardship duties evolve (Alvarez et al., 2020). Organizations that place the creation of synergies between multiple logics at the core of their mission have emerged in recent decades. Examples of such hybrids include community banks (Almandoz, 2012), social enterprises (Battilana & Lee, 2014), 混合性的另一个来源涉及企业的目的和治理。21世纪的企业不再将股东价值和社会可持续性视为相互排斥的导向，随着所有权权利和管理职责概念的演变，它们越来越需要找到有效方法来调和其社会、环境和财务义务（Alvarez等人，2020）。近几十年来，以在多种逻辑之间创造协同效应为使命核心的组织应运而生。这类混合体的例子包括社区银行（Almandoz，2012）、社会企业（Battilana & Lee，2014），

FIGURE 1 Comparative Advantages of Different Types of Firms in the Context of OTP 图1 OTP背景下不同类型企业的比较优势

Notes: P1, proposition 1; P2, proposition 2, ec. $\mathrm { C _ { f } } .$ cooperative firm; $\mathrm { K } _ { \mathrm { f } } ,$ capitalist firm; OTP, open team production. 注释：P1，命题1；P2，命题2，等等。$\mathrm{C_{f}}$，合作企业；$\mathrm{K_{f}}$，资本主义企业；OTP，开放式团队生产。

public—private partnerships (Jay, 2013), benefit corporations (Hiller & Shackelford, 2018), and some health care firms (Reay & Hinings, 2009). public—private partnerships (Jay, 2013)， benefit corporations (Hiller & Shackelford, 2018)，以及一些医疗保健公司 (Reay & Hinings, 2009)。

Hybridity also plays an important role in the orchestration of multistakeholder networks (Reypens et al., 2021). Indeed, cooperative networking has led to the development of hybrid forms, as in the case of the creation in Italy of large cooperative corporations that are joint stock companies owned by co-ops (Menzani & Zamagni, 2010). The acquisition or creation of capitalist subsidiaries has also helped overcoming the normative, cultural, and competitive barriers to the internationalization of large cooperative firms (Bretos & Marcuello, 2017). 混合性在多方利益相关者网络的协调中也发挥着重要作用（Reypens等人，2021）。事实上，合作网络促成了混合形式的发展，例如在意大利创建了由合作社拥有的大型股份合作制企业（Menzani & Zamagni，2010）。大型合作社企业收购或创建资本主义子公司也有助于克服其国际化过程中的规范、文化和竞争壁垒（Bretos & Marcuello，2017）。

Hybridity can also refer to transaction coordination forms that transcend markets, hierarchies, and clans, such as those that are emerging in the digital economy. Consider, for example, the open-source license, which is a type of contractual agreement that has emerged in the software development industry to enable agents to profit from their specific contributions to a common asset (the source code) that remains free and public. The governance model at the basis of this form of cooperative effort has been described as a “bazaar” model (Demil & Lecocq, 2006: 1447). It does not require the development of interpersonal relationships to operate and can work in the presence of differentiated levels of individual contribution. This new institutional form used to manage transactions relies on intertwined user and producer roles and on voluntary and differentiated levels of participation and contribution. 混合性也可以指超越市场、层级和氏族的交易协调形式，例如数字经济中正在出现的那些形式。例如，考虑开源许可证，这是软件开发行业中出现的一种契约协议，旨在使参与者能够从其对公共且免费的共同资产（源代码）的特定贡献中获利。这种合作形式所依据的治理模式被描述为“集市”模式（Demil & Lecocq，2006：1447）。它不需要发展人际关系就能运作，并且可以在个体贡献水平存在差异的情况下发挥作用。这种用于管理交易的新型制度形式依赖于用户和生产者角色的交织，以及自愿和差异化的参与及贡献水平。

Is There a Hybrid Advantage?

是否存在混合优势？

We claim that, in the context of OTP, hybrid cooperativecapitalist firms can possess comparative efficiency advantages relative to both traditional capitalist firms or co-ops. This is because hybrid firms can retain the superior capacity of co-ops to induce internal and external team members to commit to co-specialized investments, while removing some of the tensions and costs arising from the confluence between profit-seeking and social responsibility logics. To achieve this result, it is necessary to navigate the trade-offs and tensions between individual and collective rights, rewards and egalitarian principles, hierarchy and collegiality, and market-enabled controls and market-induced disruptions. Hybridity entails integrating different, potentially divergent logics (Jay, 2013). Attempts toward integration can cause conflicts, the intensity of which depends, among others, on the degree of compatibility of the logics, on whether one logic is dominant or not (Besharov & Smith, 2014). 我们认为，在一次性密码（OTP）的背景下，混合合作资本主义企业相对于传统资本主义企业或合作社可以拥有比较效率优势。这是因为混合企业能够保留合作社诱导内部和外部团队成员对共同专业化投资做出承诺的卓越能力，同时消除因追求利润和社会责任逻辑的融合而产生的一些紧张关系和成本。为实现这一结果，有必要在个人与集体权利、奖励与平等原则、层级与合议制、市场驱动的控制与市场引发的破坏之间进行权衡和应对紧张关系。混合性意味着整合不同的、可能存在分歧的逻辑（Jay，2013）。整合尝试可能会引发冲突，冲突的强度取决于多种因素，包括逻辑的兼容程度、是否存在主导逻辑（Besharov & Smith，2014）。

Consequently, different hybrids are possible. “Hybrid cooperatives” are firms combining a dominant cooperative logic (a strong focus on solidarity and members’ ownership) with some capitalist features. Mondragon, the largest worker cooperative in the world (Bretos et al., 2019; Errasti, Heras, Bakaikoa, & Elgoibar, 2003), offers a good example. Mondragon has a well-developed managerial techno-structure, which is aligned with that of most multinational companies (Etxagibel et al., 2012), and its internationalization strategy has been based on the creation and acquisition of private capital-affiliated companies (Errasti et al., 2003). The organization has also developed a “mixed” cooperative model, in which members can have differentiated participation rights in function of their investment (Flecha & Ngai, 2014). The existence of different classes of voting rights relaxes cooperative firms’ egalitarian principles: it allows enhancement of the decisional power of key investors while protecting the fundamental rights of minor stakeholders, giving them voice in case of decisions that could damage them (Piketty, 2020). 因此，存在多种混合形式。“混合合作社”是结合了主导性合作社逻辑（高度重视团结和成员所有权）与某些资本主义特征的企业。蒙德拉贡（Mondragon）是全球最大的工人合作社（Bretos et al., 2019；Errasti, Heras, Bakaikoa, & Elgoibar, 2003），是一个很好的例子。蒙德拉贡拥有高度发达的管理技术结构，这与大多数跨国公司的结构一致（Etxagibel et al., 2012），其国际化战略基于创建和收购与私人资本相关联的公司（Errasti et al., 2003）。该组织还开发了一种“混合”合作社模式，成员可根据其投资获得差异化的参与权（Flecha & Ngai, 2014）。不同类别投票权的存在放松了合作社企业的平等原则：它允许增强关键投资者的决策权，同时保护小利益相关者的基本权利，在可能损害他们的决策中赋予他们发言权（Piketty, 2020）。

On the other end of the spectrum, “hybrid capitalist firms” maintain their capitalist structure and objectives while incorporating participative elements that are typical of coops. An example is the Institute for Codetermination giving employees the right to vote for representatives on the board of directors in a company (Addison, 2009). This corporate governance model, mandated by law for large firms in Germany and other European countries but only sporadically used in the United States, is based on a form of “conflictual partnership” between business and workers (Silvia, 2013: 51). Similarly, Dutch firms with more than 50 employees are required to have a Workers’ Council that has approval rights in respects of company decisions that impact employment (Goodijk, 2018). Changes in corporate governance legislation, such as the separate role between CEO and chair of the board and stipulations about corporate social responsibility, can often also help fostering a higher degree of participation and nuance in objectives, hence hybridity (Harjoto & Jo, 2011). Another example is profit sharing, an idea strongly championed by Weitzman (1985). 在另一个极端，“混合资本主义企业”在保持资本主义结构和目标的同时，融入了合作社典型的参与性元素。例如，《共同决定法》（Institute for Codetermination）赋予员工在公司董事会选举代表的权利（Addison, 2009）。这种公司治理模式在德国和其他欧洲国家的大型企业中是法律规定的，但在美国仅零星使用，它基于企业与工人之间的一种“冲突性伙伴关系”（Silvia, 2013: 51）。同样，荷兰员工超过50人的企业必须设立员工委员会，该委员会对影响就业的公司决策拥有批准权（Goodijk, 2018）。公司治理立法的变化，如CEO与董事会主席的分离角色以及关于企业社会责任的规定，往往也有助于促进更高程度的参与和目标的精细化，从而形成混合性（Harjoto & Jo, 2011）。另一个例子是利润分享，这一理念由Weitzman（1985）大力倡导。

A hybrid firm can soften the excessive power of major investors by capping their voting rights, a solution that has been proposed for some types of not-for-profit firms that rely heavily on donors (Cagé, 2016). This solution could be extended to forprofit firms, thereby addressing the problem of incentivizing forms of active ownership rather than “exercising faceless on-paper-only controlling” (Alvarez et al., 2020: 712). Dual-purpose corporations that choose to pursue financial and social goals simultaneously also represent a form of capitalist hybrid; in this case, governance arrangements and reward systems are instrumental to manage trade-offs between different stakeholders’ expectations (Battilana et al., 2020). 混合企业可以通过限制主要投资者的投票权来削弱其过度权力，这一解决方案已被提出用于某些严重依赖捐赠者的非营利企业（Cagé, 2016）。这一方案可推广至营利性企业，从而解决激励积极所有权形式而非“行使仅存在于纸面的匿名控制权”的问题（Alvarez et al., 2020: 712）。选择同时追求财务和社会目标的双重目标公司也代表了一种资本主义混合体；在这种情况下，治理安排和奖励机制对于管理不同利益相关者期望之间的权衡至关重要（Battilana et al., 2020）。

Another possibility is combining cooperative and capitalist features in a ““pure’ hybrid firm” in which neither logic is dominant; an example is offered by social enterprises, which aim to pursue solidaristic goals while at the same time being financially successful. When the coexisting logics are not well aligned, conflict emerges (Besharov & Smith, 2014). This implies the need to develop structures, processes, and practices to navigate the tensions that derive from the need to combine interdependent but contrasting logics (Gümüsay, Smets, & Morris, 2020; Smith & Besharov, 2019). 另一种可能性是在“纯粹的混合企业”中结合合作与资本主义特征，在这种企业中两种逻辑都不占主导地位；社会企业就是一个例子，它们旨在追求团结目标的同时又能实现财务成功。当共存的逻辑不一致时，就会产生冲突（Besharov & Smith，2014）。这意味着需要开发结构、流程和实践来应对因需要结合相互依存但相互矛盾的逻辑而产生的紧张关系（Gümüsay、Smets & Morris，2020；Smith & Besharov，2019）。

Tensions can emerge also in hybrid cooperative and in hybrid capitalist firms. For example, to counterbalance the lack of market incentives for corporate control, it is possible to make all shares negotiable while maintaining governance rules designed to promote employee ownership (Hand, 2008), employee pre-emption rights (Piketty, 2020), and low share denominations (Toms, 2012). This combination of protections and free market principles is bound to generate tensions and trade-offs. For example, should pre-emption rights be curtailed if the very survival of the organization is at stake—or, in other words, should a cooperative betray solidarity toward some members in order to safeguard its existence? 在混合合作企业和混合资本主义企业中也可能出现紧张关系。例如，为了抵消企业控制权缺乏市场激励的问题，可以使所有股份可交易，同时维持旨在促进员工持股（Hand，2008）、员工优先购买权（Piketty，2020）和低股票面值（Toms，2012）的治理规则。这种保护措施与自由市场原则的结合必然会产生紧张关系和权衡。例如，如果组织的生存受到威胁，是否应该限制优先购买权——换句话说，合作社是否应该为了维护自身存在而背弃对某些成员的团结？

The increased likelihood of tensions caused by combination of different logics in hybrid firms constitutes a challenge, but it should not be considered a potential disadvantage of hybridity, since all firms, including “pure forms,” are potentially affected by trade-offs and tensions that need to be balanced (Smith & Lewis, 2011), such as the those between exploration and exploitation, requiring “ambidexterity” (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; Papachroni, Heracleous, & Paroutis, 2016). 混合企业中不同逻辑组合引发的紧张局势可能性增加，这构成了一项挑战，但不应将其视为混合性的潜在劣势，因为包括“纯粹形式”企业在内的所有企业，都可能受到需要平衡的权衡和紧张局势的影响（Smith & Lewis，2011），例如探索与开发之间的权衡，这需要“双元性”（Andriopoulos & Lewis，2009；Papachroni，Heracleous，& Paroutis，2016）。

In sum, developing hybrid advantage implies tensions and costs, does not evade the challenges of implementation, and does not equally apply to all firms, activities, and sectors. In general, one might expect firms to move toward hybridization in contexts that justify the additional investment. Based on our discussion, the more a particular firm and activity conforms to OTP, the more one would anticipate firms to move toward hybridization. By extension, as OTP becomes more prevalent, we would expect firms to consider the cost of investment in hybridization and in identifying ways to adopt the right measures in a cost-efficient way worth undertaking. This leads us to posit: 总之，发展混合优势意味着存在张力和成本，无法回避实施的挑战，且并非适用于所有企业、活动和行业。一般而言，人们可能会期望企业在有理由进行额外投资的情况下走向混合化。根据我们的讨论，某一特定企业和活动越符合OTP（可能是指某种特定理论或模式，此处保留缩写），就越可预期企业会走向混合化。进一步而言，随着OTP的普及，我们预计企业会考虑混合化投资的成本，并寻求以经济高效且值得开展的方式采用正确措施的途径。这使我们提出以下假设：

Proposition 5. Under OTP conditions, hybrid firms can possess comparative efficiency advantages relative to both traditional capitalist and cooperative firms. 命题5. 在一次性密码本（OTP）条件下，混合企业相对于传统资本主义企业和合作制企业都能拥有相对效率优势。

DISCUSSION

讨论

We have argued that, today, team production does not take place only within the boundaries of the firm, nor is the team production problem limited to metering and monitoring internal team members. Instead, team production often involves independent actors who need to be incentivized to participate in a value cocreation process by investing in co-specialized firm specific assets. Succeeding in these new conditions of OTP entails incentivizing and orchestrating, as well as monitoring internal and external team members. This renders the comparative efficiency calculus of capitalist and cooperative firms more nuanced and brings back the old debate about these two governance structures. 我们认为，如今的团队生产不仅发生在企业边界之内，团队生产问题也并非仅限于对内部团队成员的计量与监督。相反，团队生产常常涉及独立行动者，他们需要被激励参与价值共创过程，为此需投入共同专业化的企业特定资产。在这些新的“OTP”（可能指特定术语，此处保留原文）条件下取得成功，需要激励、协调以及监督内部和外部团队成员。这使得资本主义企业与合作制企业的相对效率计算更加复杂，并重新引发了关于这两种治理结构的古老争论。

Under OTP, it is necessary to consider the problems of incentivizing, monitoring, and orchestrating the team production of both internal and external team members who commit to firm-specific investments. Under OTP conditions, cooperative firms have some comparative advantages; notably, in inducing firmspecific investments from external and internal team members that can help offset some, albeit not all, of their traditional disadvantages. This raises the issue of hybridity and hybrid advantage. In particular, we have claimed that, under OTP, hybrid firms that seek to integrate suitably and effectively elements from both types of governance structures can possess comparative efficiency advantages vis-à-vis both types of traditional firms, and may gradually become more common. While such cross-fertilization can be a positive trait, it can also be a challenge, in that the process of integration can be costly, offsetting any advantages. In general, one might expect that, the more conditions resemble OTP, the more firms will tend to move toward hybridization. 在基于内部组织理论（OTP）的框架下，有必要考虑激励、监督和协调内部及外部团队成员进行企业特定投资的问题。在OTP条件下，合作型企业具有一定的比较优势；特别是在吸引外部和内部团队成员进行企业特定投资方面，这些投资有助于抵消其部分（尽管并非全部）传统劣势。这就引出了“混合性”和“混合优势”的问题。具体而言，我们认为，在OTP条件下，寻求适当且有效地整合两种治理结构要素的混合企业，相对于两种传统类型的企业，可能具有比较效率优势，并且可能会逐渐变得更为普遍。虽然这种交叉借鉴可以是一种积极特质，但也可能带来挑战，因为整合过程可能成本高昂，抵消任何潜在优势。一般而言，人们可能会预期，条件越接近OTP，企业就越倾向于向混合化方向发展。

An implication of this theoretical argument is that, in hybrid firms, the trade-offs between features of capitalist and cooperative firms—such as that offering decision rights to stakeholders can undermine the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities—need to be managed in an adaptive, dynamic manner, as opposed to looking for a static optimum solution (Boone & Özcan, 2016; Smith & Besharov, 2019). 这一理论论证的含义是，在混合企业中，资本主义企业和合作制企业特征之间的权衡（例如，向利益相关者授予决策权可能会损害对创业机会的追求）需要以适应性、动态的方式进行管理，而不是寻求静态的最优解（Boone & Özcan, 2016; Smith & Besharov, 2019）。

Our analysis points to a wealth of research opportunities and also managerial and policy implications. While our focus was on the comparative assessment of co-ops and capitalist firms under OTP, new theory could be developed to explicate why and under which circumstances OTP is superior (or not) to traditional team production. For example, it is arguable that, in sectors where production is based on tangible assets and well-known transformation processes, traditional team production theory remains relevant. 我们的分析指出了大量的研究机会，同时也涉及管理和政策层面的影响。虽然我们的研究重点是在在线团队生产（OTP）下合作社与资本主义企业的比较评估，但可以发展新的理论来阐释为何以及在何种情况下OTP优于（或不优于）传统团队生产。例如，有理由认为，在生产基于有形资产和众所周知的转化过程的行业中，传统团队生产理论仍然具有相关性。

Within an OTP framework, the notions of value creation and SCA could also be expanded. Different stakeholders might have different views on what is sustainable or what constitutes added value. Therefore, in addition to the considerations presented in our paper, forms of organization that empower multiple stakeholders can help fostering system-wide sustainability (Gibson, 2012; Klein et al., 2019; Seuring & Gold, 2013). 在OTP框架内，价值创造和供应链韧性（SCA）的概念也可以得到拓展。不同的利益相关者可能对什么是可持续性或什么构成增值有不同的看法。因此，除了我们论文中提出的考虑因素外，能够赋能多个利益相关者的组织形式有助于促进全系统的可持续性（Gibson, 2012; Klein et al., 2019; Seuring & Gold, 2013）。

The need to consider the alternative governance structures and their comparative efficiency advantages is bolstered by concerns over economic power by corporations morphing into political power (Zingales, 2017), increasing wealth inequalities (Piketty, 2014, 2020) and environmental challenges (Newell & Paterson, 2010), that have also raised questions about the sustainability of capitalist corporation and of capitalism as a whole. The almost exclusive focus of many capitalist firms on shareholder value maximization has been extensively criticized by friends and foes of capitalism alike (Alvarez et al., 2020; Lazonick, 2014; Piketty, 2020). 对经济权力由企业演变为政治权力（Zingales，2017）、财富不平等加剧（Piketty，2014、2020）以及环境挑战（Newell & Paterson，2010）的担忧，促使人们需要考虑替代治理结构及其相对效率优势。这些问题也引发了人们对资本主义企业以及整个资本主义体系可持续性的质疑。许多资本主义企业几乎只专注于股东价值最大化，这一点受到了资本主义的支持者和反对者的广泛批评（Alvarez等人，2020；Lazonick，2014；Piketty，2020）。

While we have so far explicitly focused on comparative economic efficiency advantages, one should not dismiss the importance of factoring social and environmental considerations into the assessment of the “superiority” of any form of firm governance. For example, it is widely agreed that co-ops contribute more to local economies, are more gender balanced, outsource less, contribute to philanthropic causes more, are more environmentally friendly and sustainable, and give rise to lower inequalities (Rothschild, 2009; Sacchetti & Tortia, 2020). This might suggest moving away from the value created by a single firm, industry, or nation to global, sustainable value creation (Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2009) as a criterion for comparative systemic efficiency and welfare. As the capacity to demonstrate social sustainability becomes essential for a firm’s legitimacy, it is likely that capitalist firms will be increasingly induced to incorporate features and capabilities typical of co-ops. That said, as co-ops acquire more capitalist features, some of their social value creation advantages may well dissipate. 虽然我们到目前为止明确关注的是比较经济效率优势，但不应忽视将社会和环境因素纳入对任何形式企业治理“优越性”评估的重要性。例如，人们普遍认为合作社对地方经济的贡献更大、性别更均衡、外包更少、对公益事业的贡献更多、更环保且可持续，并且能减少不平等现象（Rothschild, 2009；Sacchetti & Tortia, 2020）。这可能表明，应从单一企业、行业或国家创造的价值转向全球可持续价值创造（Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2009），以此作为比较系统性效率和福利的标准。由于证明社会可持续性的能力对企业合法性变得至关重要，资本主义企业可能会越来越多地被诱导纳入合作社典型的特征和能力。话虽如此，随着合作社获得更多资本主义特征，其部分社会价值创造优势很可能会消散。

Our effort to bypass ideological and paradigmatic stumbling blocks should not imply a dismissal of ideology or economic and political power relations either (Zingales, 2017). As Piketty (2020: 4) pointed out, “every society, every inequality regime, is characterized by a set of more or less coherent and persistent answers to … questions about its political and property regimes.” However, we must endeavor to test some of these answers logically within a consistent frame of reference. In our case, this was provided by OTP and the resource- or capabilities-based view of the firm. 我们试图绕过意识形态和范式性障碍，不应意味着否定意识形态或经济政治权力关系（Zingales, 2017）。正如皮凯蒂（2020: 4）所指出的，“每个社会、每种不平等制度，都以一套或多或少连贯且持久的答案来回应……关于其政治和财产制度的问题。”然而，我们必须努力在一个一致的参照框架内，对其中一些答案进行逻辑检验。在我们的案例中，这一框架由OTP以及基于资源或能力的企业观提供。

It is reasonable to expect that, faced with superior capitalist competitors, co-ops have had a higher incentive to pursue hybridization. This may help in explaining why hybridization is more prevalent in co-ops than in capitalist firms. That said, the increasing diffusion of production teams that span across organizational boundaries, along with the shifting locus of sustainable advantage from inside to both inside and without the firm, is likely to gradually induce more organizations to pursue hybrid governance, ownership, and participation structures purposefully. That said, the existence of hybrid advantages need not imply a convergence of forms. In part, this is because, absent proper integration, picking and choosing can result in the worst of all worlds. Rather, we envisage the coexistence of a plurality of governance structures each with their own comparative advantages. 面对更强大的资本主义竞争对手，合作社有更高的动力去追求混合化，这是合理的预期。这或许有助于解释为何混合化在合作社中比在资本主义企业中更为普遍。话虽如此，跨组织边界的生产团队日益普及，以及可持续优势的来源从企业内部转向企业内外兼有的转变，可能会逐渐促使更多组织有目的地采用混合治理、所有权和参与结构。话虽如此，混合优势的存在并不意味着形式的趋同。部分原因在于，若缺乏适当整合，随意选择可能会导致“最坏的结果”。相反，我们设想多种治理结构共存，每种结构都有其自身的比较优势。

Our analysis has revealed the emergence of various tensions that are connected with the compresence of multiple divergent but also interdependent logics under OTP. This suggests that a “theory of the firm for the 21st century” (Alvarez et al., 2020: 711) should also incorporate the idea that problems relating to organizing factors of production may not be amenable to “optimizing” solutions, an idea that can be traced back to Cyert and March (1963). 我们的分析揭示了在操作技术平台（OTP）下，多种不同但又相互依存的逻辑并存所引发的各种紧张关系的出现。这表明，“21世纪的企业理论”（Alvarez等人，2020：711）也应纳入这样一种观点，即与生产要素组织相关的问题可能无法通过“优化”解决方案来解决，这一观点可追溯至Cyert和March（1963）。

In conclusion, hybridity is neither easy to achieve nor can it be seen as a panacea to the complex challenges of the contemporary world. It is, however, a reminder of the importance of acknowledging and dealing with ambiguities, contradictions, and paradoxes (Berti & Simpson, 2021; Smith & Lewis, 2011), rather than the alleged superiority of pure capitalist governance structures and objectives derived from unrealistic or dated assumptions such as perfectly competitive markets and closed team production. 总之，混合性既难以实现，也不能被视为解决当代世界复杂挑战的万灵药。然而，它提醒我们，重要的是承认并处理模棱两可、矛盾和悖论（Berti & Simpson, 2021; Smith & Lewis, 2011），而不是所谓的纯粹资本主义治理结构和目标（这些目标源于诸如完全竞争市场和封闭团队生产等不切实际或过时的假设）。

In this context, some musings by Keynes (1933: 765) appear current: 在这种背景下，凯恩斯（1933：765）的一些思考如今看来颇具现实意义：

The decadent international but individualistic capitalist system … is not a success. It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous … But when we wonder what to put in its place, we are extremely perplexed. 腐朽的国际但个体主义的资本主义制度……并不成功。它不理智，不美好，不公正，也不道德……但当我们思考该用什么取代它时，却感到极度困惑。

Keynes (1936/2018) went on to claim that, all considered, capitalism was the better system as compared with state socialism, provided that it dealt adequately with involuntary unemployment and unequal distribution. Capitalism’s recent record on these two fronts leaves something to be desired (Stilwell, 2019). It is arguable that hybridity can serve as a partial corrective that helps address some limitations while retaining some of the advantages. In claiming this, we hope to have provided a way forward. 凯恩斯（1936/2018）进而指出，综合来看，资本主义是比国家社会主义更好的制度，前提是它能妥善应对非自愿失业和分配不均问题。资本主义在这两个方面的近期表现不尽如人意（斯蒂尔韦尔，2019）。可以说，混合性可以作为一种部分矫正手段，有助于解决一些局限性，同时保留一些优势。在提出这一观点时，我们希望能提供一条前进的道路。

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Marco Berti (Marco.Berti@uts.edu.au) is senior lecturer in management at UTS Business School, University of Technology Sydney. His research focuses on organizational paradox and tensions, critical themes, and the role of power and discourse in organizations. He earned his PhD in organization studies from the University of Technology Sydney. Marco Berti (Marco.Berti@uts.edu.au) 是悉尼科技大学UTS商学院的高级管理学讲师。他的研究重点是组织悖论与张力、关键主题，以及权力和话语在组织中的作用。他在悉尼科技大学获得组织研究博士学位。

Christos Pitelis (C.Pitelis@leeds.ac.uk) is professor of international business and sustainable competitiveness and head of international business, University of Leeds, and life fellow, Queens’ College, University of Cambridge. His research focuses on international business organization and governance and strategy for sustainable value cocreation and capture. He earned his PhD in economics from the University of Warwick. 克里斯托斯·皮泰利斯（C.Pitelis@leeds.ac.uk）是利兹大学国际商务与可持续竞争力教授、国际商务系主任，同时也是剑桥大学皇后学院终身院士。他的研究重点是国际商务组织与治理，以及可持续价值共创与获取的战略。他在华威大学获得经济学博士学位。

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