BUSINESS AND PEACE: THE IMPACT OF FIRM-STAKEHOLDER RELATIONAL STRATEGIES ON CONFLICT RISK

商业与和平：企业-利益相关者关系策略对冲突风险的影响

BRIAN GANSON Stellenbosch University 布莱恩·甘森 斯坦陵布什大学

TONY L. HE Rutgers University 托尼·L·何 罗格斯大学

WITOLD J. HENISZ University of Pennsylvania 宾夕法尼亚大学 维托尔德·J·赫尼什

We explain how a firm’s relational strategies impact conflict risk in the broader network of societal relations. To make this contribution, we highlight how managerial decisions are evaluated, and acted on, not only by the firm’s stakeholders, but also by others attentive to their group’s access to, and control over, economic, political, and social assets in comparison to other groups with whom they are in conflict. We show that, when firm actions that form or break ties in its stakeholder network inhibit the ability of groups to reach mutually acceptable settlements on the relative distribution of the costs and benefits from firm operations, conflict risk in the broader societal network increases. We thereby emphasize that managerial decisions in the normal course of business can impact conflict risk, even if unintentionally, by changing the structure of relationships between groups in conflict-affected areas. 我们解释了企业的关系策略如何在更广泛的社会关系网络中影响冲突风险。为了做出这一贡献，我们强调，管理决策不仅会被企业的利益相关者评估和采取行动，还会被其他关注自身群体与其他存在冲突的群体相比，在经济、政治和社会资产的获取与控制方面的群体所关注。我们表明，当企业在其利益相关者网络中形成或打破关系的行动阻碍了各群体就企业运营成本和收益的相对分配达成双方可接受的解决方案时，更广泛的社会网络中的冲突风险就会增加。因此，我们强调，企业日常运营中的管理决策即使是无意的，也可能通过改变受冲突影响地区各群体之间的关系结构来影响冲突风险。

Early work on business and peace has suggested that business-generated prosperity in a conflictaffected area1 can be positively associated with greater peace in that area. This work argued that the positive externalities of business help to address grievances related to the absolute deprivation or poverty often presumed to underlie violent conflict (Fort & Schipani, 2004; Oetzel, Westermann-Behaylo, Koerber, Fort, & Rivera, 2009). Subsequent work posited that the reduction of conflict also depends on the distribution of costs and benefits between conflicting groups (Joseph, Katsos, & Daher, 2021; Miklian & Schouten, 2019). Absent intergroup agreement on these distributions, the resources that corporations bring to conflict-affected areas can increase conflict risk, notwithstanding explicit intentions to deliver a “development dividend” (Schouten & Miklian, 2020). 早期关于商业与和平的研究表明，在受冲突影响的地区，商业带来的繁荣可能与该地区更大程度的和平正相关。这项研究认为，商业的积极外部性有助于解决与绝对贫困或匮乏相关的不满情绪，而这种贫困或匮乏通常被认为是暴力冲突的根源（Fort & Schipani, 2004；Oetzel, Westermann-Behaylo, Koerber, Fort, & Rivera, 2009）。后续研究假设，冲突的减少还取决于冲突各方之间成本与收益的分配（Joseph, Katsos, & Daher, 2021；Miklian & Schouten, 2019）。如果各方在这些分配问题上没有达成群体间共识，那么企业带入受冲突影响地区的资源可能会增加冲突风险，尽管企业明确意图是带来“发展红利”（Schouten & Miklian, 2020）。

However, the general mechanisms by which firm actions affect conflict risk at the societal level by enabling or inhibiting such intergroup agreements remain unarticulated. Prior work has suggested that groups in conflict are aware of how firm activities shape economic dependence or interdependence, altering the perceived cost of conflict and resistance to collaboration across groups (Katsos & Forrer, 2014). Group members’ interactions with firms also influence working relationships in ways that improve or inhibit the communication capabilities, shared understanding of the context, sufficient consensus on the fairness of decisions made, and working trust in their implementation (Ganson & Wennmann, 2016; Miller, Ganson, Cechvala, & Miklian, 2019) necessary to intergroup agreement. Thus, a firm in its normal course of business may play a more pronounced role vis-à-vis conflict and peace than through any extraordinary peacebuilding intervention it undertakes (Bardouille-Crema, Chigas, & Miller, 2013; Miller et al., 2019; Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009). Theory that allows us to model how firm actions affect these dynamics and therefore conflict risk could provide important managerial insights. 然而，企业行动通过促成或抑制此类群体间协议，在社会层面影响冲突风险的一般机制仍未明确阐述。先前的研究表明，处于冲突中的群体意识到企业活动如何塑造经济依赖或相互依赖，从而改变群体间冲突的感知成本以及合作阻力（Katsos & Forrer, 2014）。群体成员与企业的互动还会以改善或抑制沟通能力、对情境的共同理解、对决策公平性的充分共识以及实施过程中的工作信任等方式影响工作关系（Ganson & Wennmann, 2016；Miller, Ganson, Cechvala, & Miklian, 2019），而这些因素对于群体间协议至关重要。因此，企业在其正常经营过程中可能比其开展的任何特殊和平建设干预措施，在冲突与和平问题上发挥更为显著的作用（Bardouille-Crema, Chigas, & Miller, 2013；Miller et al., 2019；Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009）。能够帮助我们模拟企业行动如何影响这些动态并进而影响冲突风险的理论，可能会提供重要的管理见解。

We use the tools of social network theory to explain how managerial decisions intended to create prosperity in a conflict-affected area impact conflict risk in the broader network of societal relations by forming or breaking stakeholder2 ties. We draw on the study of horizontal inequalities in political economy to show how these managerial choices are evaluated, and acted on, not only by a firm’s stakeholders (Lange, Bundy, & Park, 2020; Nason, Bacq, & Gras, 2018), but also by others attentive to their group’s access to, and control over, economic, political, and social assets (Brown & Langer, 2010; Canelas & Gisselquist, 2018) in ways that influence conflict risk (Hillesund et al., 2018; Østby, 2013; Stewart, 2011). We develop four propositions linking the decisions that managers make about the structure of their economic, political, and social relationships with and between stakeholders to conflict risk in the presence of substantial horizontal inequalities. In doing so, we explore how business actions that alter the structure of relationships with and between stakeholders impact the capacity of groups to resolve any grievances resulting from social comparisons. We thus call attention to how and when these business actions can propagate conflict risk from a stakeholder network consisting of the firm and its stakeholders to the broader societal network3 encompassing the firm, its stakeholders, and the full set of actors with whom the firm’s stakeholders share relationships (Boutilier, 2009). 我们运用社会网络理论的工具，解释在受冲突影响地区，旨在创造繁荣的管理决策如何通过形成或打破利益相关者2关系，影响更广泛的社会关系网络中的冲突风险。我们借鉴政治经济学中关于横向不平等的研究，说明这些管理决策不仅会被企业的利益相关者（Lange, Bundy, & Park, 2020；Nason, Bacq, & Gras, 2018）评估和采取行动，还会被其他关注其群体获取和控制经济、政治及社会资产的主体（Brown & Langer, 2010；Canelas & Gisselquist, 2018）以影响冲突风险的方式（Hillesund et al., 2018；Østby, 2013；Stewart, 2011）所关注。我们提出四个命题，将管理者在经济、政治和社会关系结构方面（与利益相关者之间及利益相关者内部）的决策与存在显著横向不平等时的冲突风险联系起来。在此过程中，我们探讨改变与利益相关者之间及利益相关者内部关系结构的商业行动如何影响群体解决因社会比较产生的不满的能力。因此，我们关注这些商业行动如何以及何时能将冲突风险从由企业及其利益相关者组成的利益相关者网络传播到更广泛的社会网络3（涵盖企业、其利益相关者以及与企业利益相关者存在关系的所有行为体）（Boutilier, 2009）。

PROSPERITY, NETWORKS OF IDENTITY GROUPS, AND THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS

繁荣、身份群体网络以及管理在受冲突影响地区的作用

The fundamental premise of business and peace— “that businesses have a role to play in maintaining and promoting peace and societal development in conflict-affected parts of the world” (Miklian & Schouten, 2019: 2)—finds longstanding expression in the management literature. The first issue of Journal of World Business argued that business is an unmatched force for peace (Brown, 1966: 6). Howard V. Perlmutter named “the senior executives engaged in building the geocentric enterprise … the most important social architects of the last third of the twentieth century.” Their “greater universal sharing of wealth” would offer “control of the explosive centrifugal tendencies of our evolving world community” as companies provided new frameworks that “could conceivably make war less likely” (Perlmutter, 1969: 910). Subsequent works in management and related disciplines unpack the elements he named: the importance of the resources that businesses unlock, the centrifugal forces that managers seek to moderate, and the search for viable structures of relationships for doing so. 商业与和平的基本前提——“企业在受冲突影响的地区维护和促进和平与社会发展方面发挥作用”（Miklian & Schouten，2019：2）——在管理文献中长期得到体现。《世界商业杂志》（Journal of World Business）首期就指出，商业是推动和平的无可比拟的力量（Brown，1966：6）。霍华德·V·佩尔穆特（Howard V. Perlmutter）将“致力于建立全球中心型企业的高管们……称为二十世纪最后三分之一时间里最重要的社会架构师”。他们“更广泛地分享财富的行为”将有助于“控制我们不断发展的世界共同体中具有爆炸性的离心倾向”，因为企业提供了新的框架，“在某种程度上有可能使战争不太可能发生”（Perlmutter，1969：910）。后续的管理及相关学科研究剖析了他所提出的要素：企业释放的资源的重要性、管理者试图缓和的离心力，以及寻找可行的关系结构来实现这一点。

Business-Generated Prosperity and Peace

商业带来的繁荣与和平

The original theory of business and peace posited a role for direct investment to bring development to conflict-affected contexts (Fort, 2008) and for ethical leadership in promoting adherence to international norms and standards on matters such as wages or labor conditions (Getz, 1990; Kolk & van Tulder, 2002). The focus was on economic benefits, such as jobs and tax revenues, that could help to address the presumed root causes of conflict (Fort & Schipani, 2004). This logic suggested that any decision to conduct business ethically in a conflict-affected area is inherently peace-positive (Ford, 2015; Fort, 2007, 2008; Oetzel & Miklian, 2017; Oetzel et al., 2009) Yet, empiricists found only weak evidence that the private sector positively impacts post-conflict reconstruction (MacSweeney, 2008) or peacebuilding (Ford, 2015; Hoffmann, 2014; Katsos & Forrer, 2014). 商业与和平的原始理论认为直接投资在为受冲突影响地区带来发展方面发挥作用（Fort，2008），并认为道德领导力在促进对工资或劳动条件等问题上遵守国际规范和标准方面发挥作用（Getz，1990；Kolk & van Tulder，2002）。焦点在于经济利益，如就业和税收收入，这些利益有助于解决冲突的假定根本原因（Fort & Schipani，2004）。这种逻辑表明，在受冲突影响地区进行道德商业决策本质上是有利于和平的（Ford，2015；Fort，2007，2008；Oetzel & Miklian，2017；Oetzel等人，2009）。然而，经验主义者发现只有微弱的证据表明私营部门对冲突后重建（MacSweeney，2008）或建设和平（Ford，2015；Hoffmann，2014；Katsos & Forrer，2014）有积极影响。

By contrast, there was strong evidence of business as a conflict actor (Drohan, 2010; Ganson, 2019a) that has unintended negative consequences on conflict risk (Bardouille-Crema et al., 2013; Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009). Attempts to promote private sector investments were often found to have perverse impacts (Miklian & Schouten, 2019), as the new resources unlocked by business were associated less with development or conflict reduction than they were with the entrenchment of winning and losing groups engaged in economic and political competition (Miklian, 2019). Corporate operations in volatile environments thus prolonged or exacerbated conflict by increasing grievances or marginalization (Obenland, 2014), notwithstanding explicit intentions to deliver a “development dividend” (Schouten & Miklian, 2020).4 相比之下，有强有力的证据表明商业行为体（Drohan, 2010；Ganson, 2019a）会对冲突风险产生意外的负面影响（Bardouille-Crema等人，2013；Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009）。促进私营部门投资的尝试往往被发现会产生适得其反的影响（Miklian & Schouten, 2019），因为商业活动释放的新资源与其说是用于促进发展或减少冲突，不如说是用于巩固参与经济和政治竞争的胜方与败方群体（Miklian, 2019）。因此，企业在动荡环境中的运营通过加剧不满或边缘化延长或加剧了冲突（Obenland, 2014），尽管其明确意图是实现“发展红利”（Schouten & Miklian, 2020）。4

Identity Groups, Horizontal Inequalities, and Conflict

身份群体、水平不平等与冲突

Insights from the study of “horizontal inequalities,” a defining construct in the literature on the political economy of conflict, have helped to explain the contingencies behind these perverse impacts of business-generated prosperity. Put simply, horizontal inequalities are differences in the distribution of economic, political, and social resources between groups (Stewart, 200o). The scholarship on horizontal inequalities differs from the more typical study of income inequality, which “captures the distribution of income across participants in a collective” (Cobb, 2016: 326), in two important respects. First, horizontal inequalities capture differences between groups rather than the distributions within them or the larger society. Second, the measures of horizontal inequalities are multidimensional, encompassing not only income and economic assets but also access to critical infrastructure (e.g., education, health care, and housing), social status, cultural identity, and political voice. Importantly, horizontal inequalities focus on disparity in distribution between groups, rather than each group’s absolute or average level. 对“横向不平等”（这是冲突政治经济学文献中的一个核心概念）的研究见解，有助于解释商业带来的繁荣产生这些反常影响背后的具体情况。简而言之，横向不平等指的是不同群体之间在经济、政治和社会资源分配上的差异（Stewart, 2000）。关于横向不平等的学术研究与更常见的收入不平等研究存在两个重要区别。首先，横向不平等关注的是群体之间的差异，而非群体内部或更广泛社会中的分配情况。其次，横向不平等的衡量标准是多维度的，不仅包括收入和经济资产，还涵盖对关键基础设施（如教育、医疗和住房）的获取、社会地位、文化认同和政治话语权。重要的是，横向不平等关注的是群体之间分配的差距，而非每个群体的绝对水平或平均水平。

Horizontal inequalities shape group identities in the broader societal network. People group themselves and others into a variety of collective identities (“identity groups”), including ethnicity, religion, culture, race, political ideology, class, gender, age, geography, and organizational affiliation (Stewart, 2008). Group boundaries form in part through interactions in which one “group has control of the means of production utilized by another group” or in which groups are characterized by “differential control of assets that are valued by all groups” (Barth, 1969: 27; Canelas & Gisselquist, 2018). Collective disadvantages experienced by members of a group further reinforce group cohesion and identity (Brown & Langer, 2010; Gurr, 1993). Thus, the broader societal network can be understood as comprised in part of groups whose members are attentive to their collective access to, and control over, economic, political, and social assets. 水平不平等塑造了更广泛社会网络中的群体认同。人们将自己和他人归为多种集体身份（“身份群体”），包括种族、宗教、文化、种族、政治意识形态、阶级、性别、年龄、地域和组织隶属关系（Stewart，2008）。群体边界的形成部分是通过一种互动：一方“控制了另一方群体所利用的生产资料”，或者群体被描述为“对所有群体都有价值的资产拥有差异化控制权”（Barth，1969：27；Canelas & Gisselquist，2018）。群体成员经历的集体劣势进一步强化了群体凝聚力和身份认同（Brown & Langer，2010；Gurr，1993）。因此，更广泛的社会网络在一定程度上可以被理解为由这样一些群体构成：其成员关注自身对经济、政治和社会资产的集体获取与控制权。

Horizontal inequalities also shape conflict and cooperation between groups. Pronounced horizontal inequalities increase the propensity for collective action within identity groups to address perceived injustices (De Juan & Wegner, 2019). Additionally, group membership facilitates social control in ways that keep members aligned (Gubler & Selway, 2012; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008). At the same time, perceived inequalities reduce social cohesion between identity groups and the willingness to socialize across group boundaries (David, Guilbert, Leibbrandt, Potgieter, & Hino, 2018; Hino, Leibbrandt, Machema, Shifa, & Soudien, 2018). Each group increasingly defines justice in its own way (Schmidt-Catran, 2014), with members of advantaged groups mobilizing in turn to protect their interests (Stewart, 2002). 水平不平等也会影响群体间的冲突与合作。显著的水平不平等会增加身份群体内采取集体行动以解决感知到的不公的倾向（De Juan & Wegner, 2019）。此外，群体成员身份以保持成员一致性的方式促进了社会控制（Gubler & Selway, 2012；Humphreys & Weinstein, 2008）。同时，感知到的不平等会降低身份群体之间的社会凝聚力以及跨群体边界进行社交的意愿（David, Guilbert, Leibbrandt, Potgieter, & Hino, 2018；Hino, Leibbrandt, Machema, Shifa, & Soudien, 2018）。每个群体越来越以自己的方式定义正义（Schmidt-Catran, 2014），优势群体成员随后会动员起来保护自身利益（Stewart, 2002）。

These effects of horizontal inequalities on conflict escalation may be exacerbated by the influx of economic resources (Asal, Findley, Piazza, & Walsh, 2016; Hunziker & Cederman, 2017; Joseph et al., 2021; Mähler & Pierskalla, 2015) as the distribution of those resources becomes an additional source of intergroup contestation (Ganson, 2019b; Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009). Therefore, in conflict-affected areas marked by a high level of preexisting horizontal inequalities, business-generated prosperity may contribute to perverse impacts that include the reinforcement of identity group boundaries, increased perceptions of comparative injustice, and the escalation of intergroup conflict. 水平不平等对冲突升级的这些影响可能会因经济资源的流入而加剧（Asal、Findley、Piazza和Walsh，2016；Hunziker和Cederman，2017；Joseph等人，2021；Mähler和Pierskalla，2015），因为这些资源的分配成为群体间争夺的另一个来源（Ganson，2019b；Zandvliet和Anderson，2009）。因此，在存在高度既有水平不平等的受冲突影响地区，商业带来的繁荣可能会产生适得其反的影响，包括强化身份群体边界、增加对相对不公的感知以及加剧群体间冲突。

Intergroup Relationships in Conflict-Affected Areas

受冲突影响地区的群体间关系

Growing primarily out of case studies, one body of work explores how managers improve intergroup relations in conflict-affected areas (Hoben, Kovick, Plumb, & Wright, 2012; Idemudia, 2014; Miller et al., 2019). This work finds that the role of a firm in conflict mitigation rarely relies on its ability to remedy horizontal inequalities or economic grievances directly, which are often too deep and broad for any one business to address. Rather, the most important impact involves the incentives created by the business for each identity group to change the nature of their engagements with each other and to work, over time, toward mutually acceptable settlements on the issues that divided them (Kemp, Owen, Gotzmann, & Bond, 2011). The increased density of social networks around business operations may also help to normalize relations between conflicting groups (Humphreys, 2005). 主要源于案例研究，有一项研究探讨了管理者如何在受冲突影响地区改善群体间关系（Hoben, Kovick, Plumb, & Wright, 2012；Idemudia, 2014；Miller et al., 2019）。该研究发现，企业在冲突缓解中的作用很少依赖其直接解决横向不平等或经济不满的能力，因为这些问题往往过于深刻和广泛，任何单一企业都难以应对。相反，最重要的影响涉及企业为每个身份群体创造的激励，促使他们改变彼此互动的性质，并随着时间的推移，在导致分歧的问题上达成双方都能接受的解决方案（Kemp, Owen, Gotzmann, & Bond, 2011）。企业运营周围社会网络密度的增加也可能有助于使冲突群体之间的关系正常化（Humphreys, 2005）。

Related works in political economy of conflict have also pointed to the peacebuilding effects of facilitating cooperative relationships between identity groups in conflict-affected areas. Peace-positive settlements typically require a set of relationships between conflicting groups that enables them, despite their differences, to jointly analyze the context, develop solutions, and plan for their dependable implementation in a mutually acceptable manner (Ganson & Wennmann, 2016). Because extant governance structures that facilitate such interactions are often insufficient (Hillesund et al., 2018; Stewart, 2011), companies seeking to mitigate conflict in order to advance business objectives must themselves contribute to the positive reshaping of intergroup structures and processes (Ganson & Wennmann, 2017; Kolk & Lenfant, 2013). 政治经济学中关于冲突的相关研究也指出，在受冲突影响地区促进身份群体间的合作关系具有建设和平的效果。促进和平的解决方案通常需要冲突群体之间建立一系列关系，使他们尽管存在差异，仍能共同分析局势、制定解决方案，并以双方都可接受的方式规划可靠的实施计划（Ganson & Wennmann, 2016）。由于现有的促进此类互动的治理结构往往不足（Hillesund et al., 2018; Stewart, 2011），为了推进商业目标而试图缓解冲突的企业必须自身参与到群体间结构和流程的积极重塑中（Ganson & Wennmann, 2017; Kolk & Lenfant, 2013）。

If managers are to facilitate such improvements in intergroup relationships, they must remain attentive to the issues and dynamics that divide or connect identity groups (Ganson, 2019b; Miller et al., 2019), and not just the relationships between the firm and its stakeholders. Groups and individuals do not define themselves primarily in relation to the focal firm. Categories such as “customer” or “supplier” neglect “the social glue, the bonds of group cohesion, identity, and difference that typically form the basis for claim making in relation to the firm” (Crane & Ruebottom, 2011: 77). Therefore, the monitoring of intergroup relations as an ongoing management function (Ganson, 2014, 2019b) and assessment of how the firm may affect these (Bardouille-Crema et al., 2013; Hoffmann, 2014; Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009) are critical to avoiding the exacerbation of conflict. However, frameworks for analyzing how a firm’s everyday managerial decisions can impact conflict risk through specific reconfigurations of the relationships between identity groups are lacking. 如果管理者要促进群体间关系的此类改善，他们必须始终关注那些造成或联结身份群体的问题和动态（Ganson, 2019b；Miller et al., 2019），而不仅仅是企业与其利益相关者之间的关系。群体和个人并非主要通过与核心企业的关系来定义自身。诸如“客户”或“供应商”这样的类别忽略了“通常构成与企业相关诉求基础的社会纽带、群体凝聚力、身份认同及差异”（Crane & Ruebottom, 2011: 77）。因此，作为一项持续管理职能的群体间关系监测（Ganson, 2014, 2019b）以及对企业可能如何影响这些关系的评估（Bardouille-Crema et al., 2013；Hoffmann, 2014；Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009），对于避免冲突加剧至关重要。然而，缺乏分析企业日常管理决策如何通过身份群体间关系的特定重构影响冲突风险的框架。

The Impact of Managerial Decision-Making on Intergroup Conflict

管理决策对群体间冲突的影响

Building from previous analyses, we argue that, in the presence of substantial horizontal inequalities, managerial decisions that change the structure of relationships within the focal firm’s stakeholder network can impact conflict risk in the broader societal network. Business activities that involve a firm and its stakeholders, such as the allocation of resources for business purposes, form the dyads of a network linking a firm to its stakeholders (i.e., a stakeholder network) (Rowley, 1997). Managerial decisions regarding the structure of this stakeholder network, the identity of the actors, and the magnitude of the resource flows within it are evaluated by its stakeholders as well as by other members of the identity groups of which these stakeholders are members. The stakeholder network is thus embedded in a broader societal network of identity group relations. Following the work of Nickerson and Zenger (2008) on interfirm allocations and Nason et al. (2018) and Lange et al. (2020) on inter-stakeholder allocations, we posit that these evaluations are at least partly social. However, in contrast to those arguments, and more consistent with the literature on horizontal inequalities, the social comparison is made with primary reference not to the allocations made to other stakeholders of the firm, but, rather, with reference to the broader structure of relationships between identity groups and the access to resources that this structure enables. 基于先前的分析，我们认为，在存在显著水平不平等的情况下，改变焦点企业利益相关者网络内部关系结构的管理决策可能会影响更广泛社会网络中的冲突风险。涉及企业及其利益相关者的商业活动（例如为商业目的分配资源）构成了将企业与其利益相关者连接起来的网络二元组（即利益相关者网络）（Rowley，1997）。企业利益相关者网络的结构、行为者的身份以及其中资源流动的规模等管理决策，会受到其利益相关者以及这些利益相关者所属身份群体的其他成员的评估。因此，利益相关者网络嵌入在更广泛的身份群体关系社会网络中。借鉴Nickerson和Zenger（2008）关于企业间分配的研究，以及Nason等人（2018）和Lange等人（2020）关于利益相关者间分配的研究，我们假设这些评估至少部分具有社会性。然而，与这些观点不同，且更符合关于水平不平等的文献，社会比较的主要参考对象不是对企业其他利益相关者的分配，而是更广泛的身份群体之间的关系结构以及该结构所能提供的资源获取途径。

Furthermore, managerial decisions will have such impacts whether or not there is awareness of, or intention to effect, such outcomes. For example, managers of a firm operating in a conflict-affected area might allocate information, corporate social responsibility programs, jobs, contracts, or other opportunities to various stakeholders. The impact of this allocation of resources on the relationships between the firm’s stakeholders, as well as between other actors who share relationships with them within the broader societal network, may be direct or indirect. First, the firm’s allocation may be unequal across members of different identity groups, which can exacerbate (or reduce) horizontal inequalities across these groups. As, or more, important are the indirect channels of influence, including the processes by which resources are allocated and the inclusion or exclusion of stakeholders “at the table.” These processes of resource allocation and patterns of inclusion or exclusion can catalyze or inhibit the formation of other relationships between members of identity groups to which the firm’s stakeholders belong, as well as change their information and understanding about the economic activity at hand. Whether or not intended by the firm, the results may thus extend to affective ties and the capability of identity group members to address the horizontal inequalities that underlie conflict. 此外，无论管理者是否意识到或有意促成此类结果，管理决策都会产生这样的影响。例如，在受冲突影响地区运营的公司管理者可能会将信息、企业社会责任项目、工作岗位、合同或其他机会分配给不同的利益相关者。这种资源分配对公司利益相关者之间以及更广泛社会网络中与他们有联系的其他行为者之间关系的影响，可能是直接的或间接的。首先，公司的分配可能在不同身份群体的成员之间不均等，这可能加剧（或减少）这些群体之间的横向不平等。同样重要甚至更为重要的是间接影响渠道，包括资源分配的过程以及利益相关者“参与决策”的纳入或排除。这些资源分配过程以及纳入或排除的模式可能会催化或抑制身份群体成员之间（公司利益相关者所属的身份群体）其他关系的形成，也可能改变他们对当前经济活动的信息和理解。因此，无论公司是否有意，这些结果可能会延伸到情感联系以及身份群体成员解决冲突背后横向不平等的能力。

Finally, even managers attempting to apply principles of fairness (Phillips, 1997) in striving to maximize value added for the firm and its stakeholders (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Harrison & Wicks, 2013) may exacerbate conflict as they create or restrict access to important economic, political, and social assets in the broader societal network. For example, managers might strive to improve the working conditions and wages of the firm’s suppliers’ workforce to address the demands of advocacy groups; but they might fail to recognize that the suppliers and their workers all come from the same ethnic group in a society characterized by ethnic tensions. As the benefits flow to only one ethnic group—even as they are more fairly distributed between supplier firms and their workers within that ethnic group—horizontal inequalities, and, hence, conflict risk, increase between ethnic groups. 最后，即便管理者试图应用公平原则（Phillips，1997），力求为公司及其利益相关者创造最大增值（Garcia - Castro & Aguilera，2015；Harrison & Wicks，2013），他们在更广泛的社会网络中创造或限制对重要经济、政治和社会资产的获取时，也可能加剧冲突。例如，管理者可能努力改善公司供应商员工的工作条件和工资，以回应倡导团体的要求；但他们可能没有意识到，在一个存在种族紧张局势的社会中，供应商及其工人都来自同一个种族。由于利益仅流向一个种族群体——即便在该种族群体内部，供应商公司与其工人之间的分配更为公平——种族群体之间的横向不平等以及由此引发的冲突风险也会增加。

FIRM-STAKEHOLDER RELATIONAL STRATEGIES AND CONFLICT RISK IN THE BROADER SOCIETAL NETWORK

更广泛社会网络中的企业-利益相关者关系策略与冲突风险

Because horizontal inequalities shape how members of identity groups perceive and interact with one another, managerial decisions that change the structure of relationships by which the firm and other actors distribute economic, political, and social assets can create, reinforce, or weaken intergroup conflicts. A central question is thus how a firm’s relational strategies—which we define, in the spirit of Shipilov (2005), as managerial choices that alter the structure of relationships within its stakeholder network to advance firm goals—increase or decrease conflict risk between identity groups in the broader societal network characterized by preexisting horizontal inequalities. 因为横向不平等塑造了身份群体成员彼此感知和互动的方式，因此，通过改变企业与其他行为体分配经济、政治和社会资产的关系结构的管理决策，可能会引发、强化或削弱群体间冲突。因此，一个核心问题是，企业的关系策略——我们借鉴Shipilov（2005）的精神，将其定义为改变利益相关者网络内部关系结构以推进企业目标的管理选择——如何在由预先存在的横向不平等所特征化的更广泛社会网络中，增加或减少身份群体之间的冲突风险。

Using the tools of social network theory, we develop four propositions that examine how managers’ relational strategies can impact conflict risk by reshaping the structure of relationships between identity groups in conflict-affected areas. Our central aim in this section is not to explore why a profitmaximizing firm might choose one relational strategy over another, though we do highlight the potential private benefits and costs of these strategies. Rather, our aim is to uncover the broader societal consequences of each strategy. Our analysis highlights the contingent (i.e., dependent upon the level of horizontal inequalities) impact of these relational strategies, showing that, in the presence of horizontal inequalities between identity groups of which a firm’s stakeholders are members, certain relational strategies are more likely to increase (or reduce) conflict risk in the broader societal network. 利用社会网络理论的工具，我们提出四个命题，研究管理者的关系策略如何通过重塑受冲突影响地区身份群体间的关系结构来影响冲突风险。本节的核心目标并非探究追求利润最大化的企业为何可能选择一种关系策略而非另一种，尽管我们确实会强调这些策略潜在的私人收益和成本。相反，我们的目标是揭示每种策略带来的更广泛的社会后果。我们的分析凸显了这些关系策略的权变（即取决于横向不平等程度）影响，表明在企业利益相关者归属的身份群体之间存在横向不平等的情况下，某些关系策略更有可能增加（或降低）整个社会网络的冲突风险。

Brokerage versus Convening of Identity Groups

经纪公司与身份群体召集

（注：此处"Brokerage"在特定语境下指中介、经纪行为，“Convening of Identity Groups"指身份群体的召集，整体标题直译为"经纪公司与身份群体召集”，若需更精准需结合具体上下文，但按规则仅作字面翻译。）

（注：根据用户要求，若无需翻译（如标题类可能为专有名词或需保留原格式），但此处"Brokerage"和"Convening"为普通术语，需翻译。最终输出：）

经纪与身份群体召集

We begin by considering how the structure of a firm’s relationships with stakeholders that span identity groups across distinct network subcomponents in a broader societal network impact conflict risk. A network subcomponent is a group or subset of actors (nodes) in a network who are more densely tied to one another than to others in the network. In Figure 1, we depict three distinct subcomponents within a broader societal network of actors. The primary identity group affiliation of each actor is represented by the node’s color scheme and pattern.5 我们首先考虑企业与利益相关者的关系结构如何影响冲突风险，这些利益相关者跨越更广泛社会网络中的不同网络子组件，涉及不同身份群体。网络子组件是指网络中一组或一类参与者（节点），他们彼此之间的联系比与网络中其他参与者的联系更为紧密。在图1中，我们描绘了更广泛的社会参与者网络中的三个不同子组件。每个参与者的主要身份群体归属由节点的色彩方案和图案表示。5

When there are weak or nonexistent connections between subcomponents, actors within a subcomponent are less likely to engage in mutual economic or social exchange with actors in another subcomponent. Seminal works in social network analysis by Simmel (1950) and Burt (1992, 2000), among others, have explained that such a network includes structural holes that managers may exploit to extract economic rents. When a firm occupies a structural hole (Figure 1A), defined as a network position that connects otherwise disconnected parties, managers act as the “brokers” of information with the ability to gather, recombine, and redirect resources to their advantage (Burt, 2004). 当子组件之间的连接微弱或不存在时，子组件内的参与者就不太可能与另一子组件中的参与者进行相互的经济或社会交换。西美尔（Simmel，1950）、伯特（Burt，1992、2000）等学者在社会网络分析方面的开创性著作解释说，此类网络包含结构洞，管理者可利用这些结构洞获取经济租金。当一家企业占据结构洞（图1A）时，即占据了一个连接原本不相连的各方的网络位置，管理者就充当信息的“经纪人”，能够收集、重组并将资源导向对其有利的方向（Burt，2004）。

To sustain the advantages of occupying a structural hole, managers can pursue a disunion or tertius gaudens strategy that keeps network subcomponents disconnected or in conflict with each other (Obstfeld, 2005). By doing so, the firm maintains access to unique rent-seeking opportunities, as managers can “manipulate or exploit” the disconnected parties for the firm’s benefit (Obstfeld, 2005). For example, in a context of interethnic conflict, a mining firm may gather knowledge from local elders and officials dominated by one ethnic group to develop its own proposal for a social and environmental plan negotiated in the capital with national officials of another ethnic group, which is only then delivered back to the local elders and officials. The firm thus maintains much greater control over the plan’s terms and conditions, such as resource commitments for social investments (Ganson & M’cleod, 2019; Ganson & Wennmann, 2016). 为了维持占据结构洞的优势，管理者可以采取分裂或“第三者获利”（tertius gaudens）策略，使网络子组件相互分离或产生冲突（Obstfeld, 2005）。通过这种方式，企业能够保持对独特寻租机会的获取，因为管理者可以“操纵或利用”这些分离的各方为企业谋取利益（Obstfeld, 2005）。例如，在族群冲突的背景下，一家矿业公司可能从由某一族群主导的当地长老和官员那里获取知识，制定自己的社会和环境计划提案，并在首都与另一族群的国家官员进行谈判，之后才将该提案反馈给当地长老和官员。因此，该公司对计划的条款和条件（如社会投资的资源承诺）拥有更大的控制权（Ganson & M’cleod, 2019；Ganson & Wennmann, 2016）。

A firm’s private benefits and costs from maintaining a brokerage position across disconnected subcomponents, however, are distinct from the impact of this strategy on the broader societal network. When managers pursue a disunion strategy that keeps subcomponents apart, social network theory suggests that the sparsity of direct communication channels between subcomponents would restrict both the speed and accuracy of information flows between them (Burt, 2000; Coleman, 1988). Therefore, when managers negotiate benefits agreements independently with stakeholders from distinct subcomponents, each stakeholder—and the other actors belonging to the same subcomponent as the focal stakeholder—might not possess complete and accurate information about the distributive arrangements of the other firm-stakeholder relationships. Research on the political economy of conflict has shown that, when network subcomponents are characterized by horizontal inequalities across identity groups, this barrier to information can erode actors’ confidence in the fair distribution of the firm’s benefits, costs, and risks (Paczynska, 2016). In turn, these perceptions of unfairness, amplified by the firm’s independent agreements, contribute to the reinforcement of boundaries that delineate the identity groups and increase conflict risk (Stewart, 2008). 然而，企业在维持跨越不相连子组件的经纪地位时所获得的私人收益和成本，与其这一战略对更广泛的社会网络的影响截然不同。当管理者采取将子组件分离的分散战略时，社会网络理论表明，子组件之间直接沟通渠道的稀疏性会限制它们之间信息流的速度和准确性（Burt，2000；Coleman，1988）。因此，当管理者与来自不同子组件的利益相关者独立协商利益协议时，每个利益相关者以及与焦点利益相关者同属一个子组件的其他行为体，可能并不完全了解其他企业 - 利益相关者关系的分配安排。对冲突政治经济学的研究表明，当网络子组件具有基于身份群体的横向不平等特征时，这种信息障碍会削弱行为体对企业收益、成本和风险公平分配的信心（Paczynska，2016）。反过来，这些不公平的看法会因企业的独立协议而被放大，进而加剧界定身份群体的边界，增加冲突风险（Stewart，2008）。

Indeed, because a firm’s stakeholders do not exist in a vacuum, disputes fostered by managers’ actions can extend into the broader societal network through group identities shared between stakeholders and other societal actors with whom the firm’s stakeholders have relationships (McKenna, 2015). Ganson and Wennmann (2016) detailed that, in the Albertine Graben region of Uganda, local chiefs had cooperated for many years to prevent conflict with respect to overlapping colonial-era land claims. As it became clear that oil under the land was considered commercially viable, each chieftaincy separately asserted its rights to receive a greater share of royalties from the firm pursuing its development, with management making no apparent efforts to bring the chiefs together. Collaboration between the chiefs deteriorated to the point where groups affiliated with one chieftaincy or another engaged in violent and sometimes deadly conflict with each other over their disputed historical land claims that were now tied to oil revenues. In another case, Anderson, Fraser, and Zandvliet (2001) evaluated a mining company in Papua New Guinea that negotiated land usage and compensation individually with 23 local government entities, each of which was affiliated with a different sub-clan. They found that this strategy exacerbated group divisions between the broader sub-clans in ways that resulted in widespread violence between communities. While managers were reportedly not intentionally reducing information flow to improve the firm’s negotiating position, the effect was to create the widespread belief within each identity group that the others were benefiting at its expense. 事实上，由于企业的利益相关者并非孤立存在，管理者行为引发的争端可能通过利益相关者与其他社会行为体（这些行为体与企业利益相关者存在关系）之间共享的群体身份，延伸至更广泛的社会网络（McKenna, 2015）。Ganson 和 Wennmann（2016）详细描述，在乌干达的阿尔贝丁地堑地区，当地酋长多年来一直合作，以防止因殖民时期重叠的土地主张而产生冲突。随着地下石油被认定为具有商业开发价值，各酋长国分别主张有权从开发石油的企业那里获得更多特许权使用费，而管理层显然未努力促成酋长们进行协商。酋长之间的合作恶化到这种地步：所属不同酋长国的群体因与石油收入相关的有争议的历史土地主张，彼此之间爆发了暴力甚至致命的冲突。在另一个案例中，Anderson、Fraser 和 Zandvliet（2001）评估了巴布亚新几内亚的一家矿业公司，该公司与 23 个地方政府实体（每个实体都隶属于不同的亚氏族）分别协商土地使用和补偿事宜。他们发现，这种策略加剧了更广泛的亚氏族之间的群体分裂，导致社区间发生大规模暴力事件。据报道，尽管管理者并非有意减少信息流通以改善企业的谈判地位，但这种做法在每个身份群体内部造成了一种普遍的信念，即其他群体正以自身的利益为代价获益。

In contrast to a firm that pursues a brokerage position across disconnected subcomponents, a firm obtains a different kind of advantage by fostering network closure across subcomponents within the broader societal network (Figure 1B), where network closure is defined as a high density of direct connections between actors from different subcomponents (Burt, 200o). Coined as tertius iungens by Obstfeld (2005), this type of relational strategy involves the facilitation of cooperation between two or more stakeholders of the firm. Scholarship in the business and peace literature has documented this “convening” role that managers can play by creating a space in which diverse actors can advance dialogue “under the rubric of its legitimate business interests” (Miller et al., 2019: 43). In this convening role, managers, instead of maintaining the structural hole and brokering separate benefits agreements with stakeholders of different subcomponents, attempt to strengthen cooperation between the disparate parties. If the stakeholders are disconnected, managers can create introductions and propose collaborative endeavors; and, if the stakeholders are in conflict, managers can act as a catalyst or facilitator for positive dialogue (Ganson, 2019b). 与在不相关的子组件间追求经纪商地位的企业不同，另一种企业优势来源于在更广泛的社会网络内促进子组件间的网络闭合（图1B），其中网络闭合被定义为不同子组件中行动者之间高密度的直接连接（Burt，2000）。Obstfeld（2005）将这种关系策略称为“中介联结者”（tertius iungens），它涉及促进企业两个或更多利益相关者之间的合作。商业与和平领域的学术研究记录了管理者可以发挥的这种“召集”作用，即通过创造一个空间，让不同的行动者能够以“其合法商业利益为框架”推进对话（Miller等人，2019：43）。在这种召集角色中，管理者不再维持结构洞并与不同子组件的利益相关者单独协商利益协议，而是试图加强不同方之间的合作。如果利益相关者之间存在脱节，管理者可以进行介绍并提议合作项目；如果利益相关者之间存在冲突，管理者可以充当积极对话的催化剂或促进者（Ganson，2019b）。

There are potential costs and benefits to the firm when managers choose a convening strategy over a brokerage strategy. As the joining of groups enables a more active mobilization of resource flows across the parties, the firm loses potential brokerage rents and incurs the costs of coordinating across network subcomponents (Obstfeld, 2005). Relative to a firm situated as a broker across disconnected subcomponents, however, a firm acting as a convener of actors from different identity groups can enable better communication and coordination that might benefit the firm and those convened, such as by bringing together actors across subcomponents to develop, legitimize, and implement solutions to problems of both private and public interest (Lashitew, Bals, & van Tulder, 2018). 当管理者选择召集策略而非经纪策略时，企业可能面临潜在的成本与收益。由于群体的联合能够更积极地调动各方之间的资源流动，企业会失去潜在的经纪租金，并承担协调网络子组件的成本（Obstfeld, 2005）。然而，与处于不同子组件之间作为经纪方的企业相比，作为不同身份群体参与者召集者的企业能够促进更好的沟通与协调，这可能对企业及被召集者都有利，例如通过召集不同子组件的参与者共同开发、认可并实施解决私人和公共利益问题的方案（Lashitew, Bals, & van Tulder, 2018）。

FIGURE 1 Brokerage versus Convening of Network Subcomponents
图1 经纪人与网络子组件的召集

T a higher degree of network closure. T 更高程度的网络封闭性。

Furthermore, the convening of actors from distinct subcomponents can strengthen the bridging social capital of the broader societal network. In his work on social capital, Putnam (200o) distinguished between bonding social capital, defined as shared trust, norms, and understanding between actors of a homogenous identity group, and bridging social capital, defined as shared trust, norms, and understanding between actors from different identity groups. Although both types of social capital can be drawn upon as a resource to help actors achieve mutually beneficial goals, bonding social capital often “only benefits those with internal access” because it fosters an in-group identity through “tight bonds of trust and solidarity” that are by nature exclusionary of outsiders (Leonard, 2004: 929). In contrast, bridging social capital, by strengthening ties across identity groups, fosters the inclusion of actors from diverse backgrounds in collective social decision-making. 此外，来自不同子组件的参与者的召集可以增强更广泛社会网络的桥接社会资本。在其关于社会资本的研究中，普特南（2000）区分了结合型社会资本和桥接型社会资本：结合型社会资本被定义为具有同质性身份群体的参与者之间的共同信任、规范和理解，而桥接型社会资本被定义为不同身份群体的参与者之间的共同信任、规范和理解。尽管这两种类型的社会资本都可以作为资源，帮助参与者实现互利目标，但结合型社会资本往往“只惠及那些具有内部准入权的人”，因为它通过“紧密的信任和团结纽带”培养群体内身份，而这种纽带本质上对外人具有排他性（Leonard，2004：929）。相比之下，桥接型社会资本通过加强不同身份群体之间的联系，促进来自不同背景的参与者纳入集体社会决策。

When managers adopt a convening role instead of a brokering role, they build bridging social capital within the network, because network closure facilitates the volume, depth, and accuracy of information and resource exchange between actors from different identity groups (Burt, 2000). As each party can observe and facilitate their partners’ continued cooperation with each other (Kinne, 2013), managers and the firm’s stakeholders are more likely to develop collective communication capabilities, such as knowledge about one another’s idiosyncrasies, shared mental models of cooperation, and mutual understanding of tacit rules and obligations (Schreiner, Kale, & Corsten, 2009). As such, an actor is more likely to receive accurate knowledge about, and correctly interpret the interactions of, every firmstakeholder pair, thus avoiding potential misunderstandings about distributional agreements that might worsen preexisting conflicts over horizontal inequalities between identity groups within the broader societal network. In addition, when managers encourage intergroup agreements between the firm’s stakeholder partners, they gain additional information about stakeholders’ preferred distributional, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms. This revelation of preferences increases the likelihood that all parties can find an arrangement in which preferences overlap, so that members from different subcomponents can converge on mutually favored arrangements through joint problem-solving rather than contest incompatible outcomes (Kinne, 2013). 当管理者采用召集者角色而非协调者角色时，他们会在网络中构建桥接型社会资本，因为网络封闭性促进了不同身份群体成员之间信息和资源交换的数量、深度与准确性（Burt，2000）。由于各方能够观察并促进合作伙伴之间的持续合作（Kinne，2013），管理者和企业利益相关者更有可能发展出集体沟通能力，例如了解彼此的特质、合作的共享心智模型，以及对隐性规则和义务的相互理解（Schreiner，Kale，& Corsten，2009）。因此，行为者更有可能获得关于每个企业利益相关者对的准确知识，并正确解读其互动，从而避免对分配协议的潜在误解——这类误解可能会加剧更广泛社会网络中不同身份群体之间因横向不平等而存在的既有冲突。此外，当管理者鼓励企业利益相关者伙伴之间的群体间协议时，他们会获得关于利益相关者偏好的分配、监控和执行机制的额外信息。这种偏好的揭示增加了所有各方找到偏好重叠安排的可能性，使得不同子群体的成员能够通过联合解决问题而非争夺不相容的结果，达成彼此认可的安排（Kinne，2013）。

Empirical research has found that areas with high (low) conflict are often characterized by low (high) bridging social capital (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Vervisch, 2011). The impact of bridging social capital on conflict risk is particularly important in the presence of substantial horizontal inequalities, as the firm’s stakeholders are, at the same time, members of identity groups whose members “share criteria for evaluation and judgement” (Barth, 1969: 15), and who make cumulative choices with respect to intergroup permeability or rigidity based on group interests (Wimmer, 2008). When managers foster bridging social capital by facilitating mutually advantageous cooperative bonds between stakeholders of different identity groups, they may reduce conflict risk by instilling a shared sense of justice across groups or reducing the perceived need to mobilize in self-protection against the other group (Hillesund et al., 2018; Østby, 2013; Stewart, 2011). They may increase cooperative potential by making the choice to trust, interact, or cooperate across group boundaries in new ways appear less risky or more advantageous to group members (David et al., 2018; Hino et al., 2018). 实证研究发现，冲突程度高（低）的地区往往具有低（高）桥接社会资本特征（Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Vervisch, 2011）。在存在大量横向不平等的情况下，桥接社会资本对冲突风险的影响尤为重要，因为企业利益相关者同时也是身份群体的成员，这些群体成员“共享评价和判断标准”（Barth, 1969: 15），并基于群体利益对群体间的渗透性或刚性做出累积性选择（Wimmer, 2008）。当管理者通过促进不同身份群体利益相关者之间互利的合作关系来培育桥接社会资本时，他们可能通过在群体间灌输共同的正义感，或减少为自我保护而针对另一群体动员的必要性，来降低冲突风险（Hillesund et al., 2018; Østby, 2013; Stewart, 2011）。他们还可能通过让群体成员觉得跨越群体界限进行信任、互动或合作的选择风险更低或更有利，从而提高合作潜力（David et al., 2018; Hino et al., 2018）。

One particularly well-documented case of the myriad positive effects of actors building bridging social capital across identity groups was undertaken by Chevron in Nigeria, where intercommunal conflict had been a key cause of the company’s suspension of operations in the Niger Delta. Chevron’s managers explicitly committed to fostering peaceful coexistence not only in Chevron’s relationships with its stakeholders, but also in relations between those stakeholders (Chevron, 2014). Management reorganized the firm’s community relations from dozens of dyadic agreements into a much smaller number of regional development councils, each of which represented a cluster of proximate communities that consciously bridged identity groups. Managers also explicitly supported activities geared toward empowering local actors in peacebuilding and conflict mitigation within and between those communities; for example, by helping them to create “rapid response teams” that could intervene in conflicts over land between neighboring communities. Through councils working on rural development from a regional rather than a local community perspective, Chevron’s managers thus fostered the growth of bridging social capital that served to improve relations between communities. Such approaches that connected stakeholders from different identity groups characterized by horizontal inequalities resulted in a “dramatic” reduction in violence, both against company operations and facilities, and, most notably, between communities that had formerly seen themselves as pitted against one another (Hoben et al., 2012). Evaluations in 2008 and 2011, including those undertaken by members of the affected identity groups, documented stakeholders’ perceptions of a “greater sense of fairness” that “create[d] some of the key conditions for productive interaction and problem solving” (Hoben et al., 2012: 12). 在身份群体间建立桥梁型社会资本的演员所带来的无数积极影响中，有一个特别有案可查的案例是雪佛龙公司在尼日利亚开展的项目。在那里，社区间冲突一直是该公司在尼日尔三角洲暂停运营的关键原因。雪佛龙的管理人员明确承诺，不仅要在雪佛龙与其利益相关者的关系中，还要在这些利益相关者之间（雪佛龙，2014年）促进和平共处。管理层将公司的社区关系从数十个二元协议重组为数量少得多的区域发展委员会，每个委员会都代表了一组邻近社区，这些社区有意识地搭建了身份群体之间的桥梁。管理人员还明确支持旨在增强当地行为者在社区内部及社区之间的和平建设和冲突缓解能力的活动；例如，帮助他们创建“快速反应小组”，以干预邻近社区之间的土地冲突。通过从区域而非地方社区的角度开展农村发展工作的委员会，雪佛龙的管理人员因此促进了桥梁型社会资本的增长，这种资本有助于改善社区之间的关系。这些将具有横向不平等特征的不同身份群体的利益相关者联系起来的方法，导致暴力行为“显著”减少，既包括针对公司运营和设施的暴力，也包括最值得注意的是，曾经相互对立的社区之间的暴力（Hoben等人，2012年）。2008年和2011年的评估（包括受影响身份群体成员开展的评估）记录了利益相关者对“更大公平感”的看法，这种看法“创造了一些有效互动和解决问题的关键条件”（Hoben等人，2012年：12）。

Proposition 1. The higher the preexisting level of horizontal inequalities, the more a firm fosters a denser (sparser) network of cooperative ties between identity groups, the more it reduces (raises) conflict risk in the broader societal network. 命题1。水平不平等的既有程度越高，企业在身份群体间培育的合作关系网络越密集（稀疏），则在更广泛的社会网络中降低（提高）冲突风险的程度也越大。

Exclusion versus Inclusion of Stakeholders

利益相关者的排除与纳入

We next consider how the patterns of exclusion and inclusion that determine the composition of stakeholders with whom a firm builds relationships can exacerbate or moderate conflict between actors of different identity groups in the broader societal network. 我们接下来要考虑的是，那些决定企业与哪些利益相关者建立关系的排斥与包容模式，如何会加剧或缓和更广泛的社会网络中不同身份群体成员之间的冲突。

A strand of stakeholder theory argues that resourceconstrained managers face incentives to pursue relational strategies that prioritize one group over another. Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) suggested that managers prioritize stakeholders by assessing their power, legitimacy, and urgency. Some of the same institutional factors (e.g., corruption, weak rule of law, high fractionalization) that contribute to conflict risk can provide incentives to managers to prioritize stakeholders with greater economic, political, or social resources (Amengual, in press; Jones, Felps, & Bigley, 2007; Nartey, Henisz, & Dorobantu, 2018). 利益相关者理论的一种观点认为，资源受限的管理者面临着追求关系战略的动机，这种战略会优先考虑某一群体而非另一群体。米切尔、阿格尔和伍德（1997）提出，管理者通过评估利益相关者的权力、合法性和紧迫性来对其进行优先排序。一些导致冲突风险的制度因素（例如腐败、法治薄弱、高度分化），也可能促使管理者优先考虑具有更强经济、政治或社会资源的利益相关者（阿门瓜尔，待刊；琼斯、费尔普斯和比格利，2007；纳特伊、亨尼兹和多拉班图，2018）。

The collection of stakeholders that a firm has directly engaged with typically represents only a subset of the identity groups present in the broader societal network. By building cooperative ties primarily with and between stakeholders from one identity group (or a subset of groups), managers may contribute to other actors’ feelings of relative deprivation or envy (Nickerson & Zenger, 2008), particularly in regions with high preexisting horizontal inequalities. Building upon a growing literature in stakeholder theory, Lange et al. (2020) posited that each stakeholder of a firm may view another stakeholder as “a referent for interpersonal equity comparisons” and “either a perceived competitor for or facilitator of resources.” Applied more broadly at the identity group level, these ideas suggest that managers’ preferential engagement with one group over another would create an additional dimension of inequality that triggers social comparisons between actors of different identity groups (Stewart, 2008). 企业直接接触的利益相关者集合通常仅代表更广泛社会网络中存在的身份群体的一个子集。通过主要与来自一个身份群体（或群体的子集）的利益相关者建立合作关系并在他们之间建立合作关系，管理者可能会加剧其他行为体的相对剥夺感或嫉妒感（Nickerson & Zenger，2008），尤其是在存在高度初始横向不平等的地区。基于利益相关者理论中日益丰富的文献，Lange等人（2020）提出，企业的每个利益相关者可能会将另一个利益相关者视为“人际公平比较的参照点”，并且“要么是资源的感知竞争对手，要么是资源的促进者”。在身份群体层面更广泛地应用这些观点，表明管理者对某一群体相对于另一群体的优先参与会产生额外的不平等维度，从而引发不同身份群体行为体之间的社会比较（Stewart，2008）。

Indeed, the composition of a firm’s stakeholder relationships can influence conflict risk between actors of different identity groups within the broader societal network. This scenario is depicted in Figure 2A, which shows that a firm has preferentially engaged with high-power actors who belong to the same identity group. From the perspective of managers, this relational strategy might be rational for a profit-maximizing firm (Mitchell et al., 1997), because, for instance, the firm’s preferential engagement can solidify the political support of influential parties. However, the firm and its stakeholders do not exist in a vacuum. By distributing benefits to members of one group over others, the firm impacts horizontal inequalities in the broader societal network. As a result, group polarization can intensify, deteriorating intergroup communication and leading to greater conflict risk over institutional arrangements to distribute benefits, costs, and risks (Oliker & Szayna, 2003). Empirical evidence also shows that, when a firm preferentially engages with one group over another in conflict-affected areas, the capacity or willingness of actors across groups to resolve problems together can diminish (Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009). When actors become more entrenched within their own identity group, they may identify more strongly with their own group; may process information in a biased manner against the out-groups; may respond more emotionally toward the actions of the out-groups; or may avoid interactions with the out-groups (Stephan & Stephan, 1985) in ways that increase conflict risk. 事实上，企业利益相关者关系的构成会影响更广泛的社会网络中不同身份群体参与者之间的冲突风险。这一情景如图2A所示，该图显示企业优先与属于同一身份群体的高权力参与者开展合作。从管理者的角度来看，这种关系策略对追求利润最大化的企业而言可能是合理的（Mitchell等人，1997），例如，企业的优先合作可以巩固有影响力方的政治支持。然而，企业及其利益相关者并非孤立存在。通过向某一群体成员而非其他群体成员分配利益，企业会影响更广泛社会网络中的横向不平等。结果，群体极化可能加剧，恶化群体间沟通，并导致在分配利益、成本和风险的制度安排方面出现更大的冲突风险（Oliker & Szayna，2003）。实证证据还表明，当企业在受冲突影响的地区优先与某一群体而非另一群体合作时，不同群体参与者共同解决问题的能力或意愿会降低（Zandvliet & Anderson，2009）。当参与者在自身身份群体中更加根深蒂固时，他们可能会更强烈地认同自己的群体；可能会以偏向性的方式处理针对外群体的信息；可能会对外群体的行为做出更情绪化的反应；或者可能会避免与外群体互动（Stephan & Stephan，1985），这些方式都会增加冲突风险。

On the other hand, managers can construct the firm’s network of stakeholder relationships in a manner that convenes the firm with different identity groups (Figure 2B). The strengthening of relationships with and between a more diverse set of actors requires the investment of firm resources. However, the impact of the firm’s economic activities—the distribution of benefits, costs, and risks—can then be discussed with members of multiple identity groups. Through such conscious engagement with stakeholders across identity groups, managers reduce the likelihood of envy or perceptions of relative deprivation from social comparisons fostered by the selective inclusion for or exclusion from dialogue; avoid the reinforcement of intergroup differences; and enable the joint development of communication capabilities and shared norms of behavior (Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009). In addition, these communication capabilities and norms of behavior across identity groups developed within a firm’s stakeholder network can serve as a template for constructive engagement between societal actors who are themselves connected to and share the same identities as the firm’s stakeholders—an argument consistent with a growing body of empirical work (Miller et al., 2019) on business practices aimed to reduce conflict in the operational environment. 另一方面，管理者可以以一种将企业与不同身份群体联系起来的方式（图2B）构建企业的利益相关者关系网络。与更多样化的参与者建立和维系关系需要企业投入资源。然而，企业经济活动的影响——即利益、成本和风险的分配——随后可以与多个身份群体的成员进行讨论。通过与不同身份群体的利益相关者进行这种有意识的互动，管理者可以降低因选择性纳入或排除对话而引发的嫉妒感，或因社会比较产生的相对剥夺感；避免强化群体间差异；并促进沟通能力和共同行为规范的共同发展（Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009）。此外，企业利益相关者网络中不同身份群体之间形成的这些沟通能力和行为规范，可以作为社会参与者之间建设性互动的模板，这些社会参与者本身与企业的利益相关者有着联系并拥有相同的身份——这一论点与越来越多关于旨在减少运营环境中冲突的商业实践的实证研究一致（Miller et al., 2019）。

These mechanisms can occur through subtle pathways, as when an oil company in Nigeria faced protests over its practice of administering a competitive exam to select children for scholarships. Renouard (2013) related how its managers’ presumably well-meaning actions surfaced conflict between “traditionalists,” who were happy to see the local chief allocate access to important assets (typically, by awarding the scholarship to a boy from a prominent family whom he believed could later help lead the community), and “progressives,” who believed that there should be broader fairness in the allocation of valuable resources (and therefore believed that any boy or girl should have an equal chance to be considered). Managers reversed course, expanding their network to convene elders, teachers, and government officials who had varying perspectives on whether boys or girls, more meritorious or more needy students should be selected. They reached broad agreement on the framework for awarding scholarships, resulting in a modest evolution of local cultural practices and perspectives that reduced conflict between the traditionalists and progressives competing for control over scarce resources. 这些机制可能通过微妙的途径产生，例如尼日利亚的一家石油公司因向儿童进行竞争性考试以选拔奖学金获得者而面临抗议。勒努阿尔（2013）讲述了该公司管理者的行为——他们本以为是善意的举动——却引发了“传统派”与“进步派”之间的冲突：传统派乐见当地首领分配重要资产的机会（通常是将奖学金授予他认为日后能帮助领导社区的显赫家族男孩），而进步派则认为宝贵资源的分配应更广泛地体现公平（因此认为任何男孩或女孩都应有平等的机会被考虑）。管理者改变了策略，扩大了沟通网络，召集了对应选拔男孩还是女孩、更优秀还是更贫困的学生有不同看法的长者、教师和政府官员。他们就奖学金评定框架达成了广泛共识，这使得当地文化习俗和观念有了适度的演变，减少了争夺稀缺资源控制权的传统派与进步派之间的冲突。

The firm’s intentional engagement of identity groups in conflict can also unfold along more dramatic and systemic pathways. Charney (1999) documented that, during the apartheid era in South Africa, the heads of a few important industrial concerns had the clout to publicly flout apartheid laws that forbade them from meeting with African National Congress leaders whom the government had declared to be “terrorists”. They did so to encourage further meetings between white business leaders and mass movement leaders who previously had almost no contact and who harbored deep mutual suspicions. Some of these leaders went on to 该公司有意拉拢处于冲突中的身份群体，也可能通过更具戏剧性和系统性的途径展开。查尼（1999）记录到，在南非种族隔离时代，少数重要工业企业的负责人有足够影响力公开违抗禁止他们与非洲人国民大会（ANC）领导人会面的种族隔离法律——政府已将这些领导人宣布为“恐怖分子”。他们这样做是为了鼓励白人商界领袖与此前几乎没有接触且彼此心存深深疑虑的群众运动领袖开展更多会面。其中一些领导人后来继续

FIGURE 2 Pursuing Exclusive versus Inclusive Engagement of Identity Groups 图2 追求身份群体的排他性参与与包容性参与

co-found with their civil society counterparts the Consultative Business Movement. The Consultative Business Movement facilitated countless meetings between business and civil society leaders across racial and political divides, eventually co-chairing the Secretariat to the convention that birthed the country’s new constitution. Like the oil company in Nigeria, the South African firms’ intentional bridging of identity groups in their stakeholder networks opened the door to greater distributional fairness and the reduction of conflict risk at the broader societal level. 与民间社会伙伴共同创立了咨询商业运动。咨询商业运动促进了商界与民间社会领袖跨越种族和政治分歧的无数次会面，最终联合主持了促成该国新宪法诞生的公约秘书处。与尼日利亚的石油公司类似，南非企业在其利益相关者网络中有意搭建身份群体间的桥梁，为更广泛的社会层面带来了更大的分配公平性，并降低了冲突风险。

Proposition 2. The higher the preexisting level of horizontal inequalities, the more a firm bridges identity groups (privileges one identity group over another) when building firmstakeholder relationships, the more it reduces (raises) conflict risk in the broader societal network. 命题2. 既有水平不平等程度越高，企业在构建利益相关者关系时对身份群体的桥梁作用（即对某一身份群体赋予特权）越强，其在更广泛的社会网络中降低（提高）冲突风险的程度也越大。

Managing Faultlines within a Firm’s Network of Stakeholders

管理企业利益相关者网络中的断层线

We now consider how a firm, by having bridged identity groups in the construction of its stakeholder network, may either replicate (and thus reinforce) or diminish conflict between actors in these identity groups in the broader societal network. 我们现在考虑，一家企业通过在利益相关者网络构建中弥合身份群体之间的差异，可能会在更广泛的社会网络中要么复制（从而强化）这些身份群体内行为者之间的冲突，要么减少这种冲突。

When managers build cooperative ties with stakeholders from different identity groups (Figure 2B), the firm’s stakeholder network may simply expand in a way that mirrors the societal boundaries between these groups. In Figure 3A, managers have avoided giving preferential voice to one identity group by engaging with members of both the more and the less powerful identity groups. However, managers still risk reinforcing their intergroup division if issues regarding the firm’s distribution of benefits, costs, and risks cause stakeholders to align themselves across identity group affiliations. If preexisting horizontal inequalities are high, the likelihood of stakeholders to sort along the identity group boundary on these issues of distribution increases (Stewart, 2008), as members of each group mobilize to protect their advantaged (or change their disadvantaged) status (Stewart, 2002). 当管理者与来自不同身份群体的利益相关者建立合作关系时（图2B），企业的利益相关者网络可能只是以一种反映这些群体之间社会边界的方式简单地扩大。在图3A中，管理者通过与更有权势和较无权力的身份群体成员互动，避免了给予某一身份群体优先话语权。然而，如果涉及企业利益、成本和风险分配的问题导致利益相关者根据身份群体归属进行结盟，管理者仍然有强化群体间分裂的风险。如果既有的横向不平等程度较高，利益相关者在这些分配问题上沿着身份群体边界进行分化的可能性就会增加（Stewart, 2008），因为每个群体的成员都会动员起来保护自己的优势地位（或改变自己的劣势地位）（Stewart, 2002）。

An identity group boundary that has been reinforced by multiple economic, political, and social issues or interests that align members along that boundary is referred to as a faultline in the management scholarship (Heidl, Steensma, & Phelps, 2014; Lau & Murnighan, 1998), or an overlapping social cleavage in the ethnopolitics literature (Scarcelli, 2014).6 A strong faultline within a firm’s stakeholder network can provide an “informal structure” for conflict (Lau & Murnighan, 2005: 645), because it can foster such strong in-group affinity from common demographic attributes, roles, and interests that the intergroup boundary becomes a decision rule for group members for whether or not they can interact on other issues across that boundary (Scarcelli, 2014).7 We expect each of these challenges to increase with the level of preexisting horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2008). 在管理学术领域（Heidl, Steensma, & Phelps, 2014；Lau & Murnighan, 1998）中，一个因多个经济、政治和社会问题或利益而强化、使成员沿该边界形成一致的身份群体边界被称为断层线（faultline），而在民族政治文献中则被称为重叠的社会分裂（Scarcelli, 2014）。6 企业利益相关者网络内的强烈断层线可为冲突提供一种“非正式结构”（Lau & Murnighan, 2005: 645），因为它能通过共同的人口统计学特征、角色和利益培养强烈的群体内亲和力，使得群体间边界成为群体成员在其他问题上是否能跨越该边界进行互动的决策规则（Scarcelli, 2014）。7 我们预计，这些挑战中的每一个都会随着既有水平不平等的程度而增加（Stewart, 2008）。

Such faultlines were evident within small enterprises that worked in the city of Drvar in the Croat-Muslim Federation of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina to bridge divides between Serbs and Croats who had long competed to advance their own agendas across economic, political, and social dimensions. Although the project’s sponsors were well intentioned in their attempts to foster amity between the two ethnic groups in a private sector setting, they ended up replicating the dominant faultline between the identity groups that had existed at the broader societal level before, during, and after the war. Wanting to commit resources to the development of workplaces where workers from different identity groups physically sat side by side, they deprioritized dialogue about workers’ relationships in the context of ethnic identity and the effects of war, while emphasizing that workers had been chosen on the basis of their ethnic identities. This arrangement left participants vulnerable to internal conflicts over their feelings about coexistence, leading in turn to dwindling interest in continuing participation and reduced willingness to maintain relationships with the other side. One person in a bi-ethnic agricultural enterprise summed up the broadly expressed resistance to cooperation as follows: “I go to work, I do my job, that’s all” (Chigas & Ganson, 2003: 80). This example highlights that, when a firm reinforces the faultlines between identity groups within its stakeholder network, the firm may have limited positive impact on—and potentially magnifies—the preexisting tensions, inequalities, or conflicts that have divided the Such faultlines were evident within small enterprises that worked in the city of Drvar in the Croat-Muslim Federation of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina to bridge divides between Serbs and Croats who had long competed to advance their own agendas across economic, political, and social dimensions. Although the project’s sponsors were well intentioned in their attempts to foster amity between the two ethnic groups in a private sector setting, they ended up replicating the dominant faultline between the identity groups that had existed at the broader societal level before, during, and after the war. Wanting to commit resources to the development of workplaces where workers from different identity groups physically sat side by side, they deprioritized dialogue about workers’ relationships in the context of ethnic identity and the effects of war, while emphasizing that workers had been chosen on the basis of their ethnic identities. This arrangement left participants vulnerable to internal conflicts over their feelings about coexistence, leading in turn to dwindling interest in continuing participation and reduced willingness to maintain relationships with the other side. One person in a bi-ethnic agricultural enterprise summed up the broadly expressed resistance to cooperation as follows: “I go to work, I do my job, that’s all” (Chigas & Ganson, 2003: 80). This example highlights that, when a firm reinforces the faultlines between identity groups within its stakeholder network, the firm may have limited positive impact on—and potentially magnifies—the preexisting tensions, inequalities, or conflicts that have divided the

FIGURE 3 Reinforcing versus Eroding Faultlines within the Firm’s Stakeholder Network 图3 企业利益相关者网络内的强化与侵蚀断层线

T ily identifiable faultline between two identity groups in its stakeholder network. T ily 是其利益相关者网络中两个身份群体之间可识别的断层线。

groups in other contexts within the broader societal network. 在更广泛的社会网络中的其他情境下的群体。

Conversely, managers can make the boundaries between identity groups less visible or salient by expanding the firm’s stakeholder network in a manner that is more likely to lead to substantive interactions by actors from different identity groups. In Figure 3B, managers have constructed a stakeholder network without a faultline that is as visible or salient. When managers convene stakeholders affiliated with identity groups delineated by varied boundaries, they may contribute to the growth of bridging social capital within the network by providing a context for actors to share perceptions and interests in the course of business pursuits (Reade, 2015). Scholarship from social network theory suggests that having “common third parties” that cut across otherwise strong faultlines can help facilitate the sharing of information across parties and prevent opportunistic behavior by acting as additional monitors (Heidl et al., 2014). In addition, these “boundary-spanning” stakeholders can serve as peacekeepers or mediators for groups in conflict (Zhang & Guler, 2019), because they might be incentivized to help resolve disputes and sustain mutual cooperation in the distribution of the firm’s benefits, costs, and risks. 相反，管理者可以通过以更可能导致不同身份群体的参与者进行实质性互动的方式扩大公司的利益相关者网络，来减少身份群体之间的界限的可见性或显著性。在图3B中，管理者构建了一个没有明显或突出断层线的利益相关者网络。当管理者召集与以不同界限划分的身份群体相关联的利益相关者时，他们可能通过为参与者在商业活动过程中分享看法和利益提供一个环境，来促进网络内桥接社会资本的增长（Reade，2015）。社会网络理论的研究表明，拥有“共同第三方”可以跨越原本强烈的断层线，这有助于促进各方之间的信息共享，并通过充当额外的监督者来防止机会主义行为（Heidl等人，2014）。此外，这些“跨边界”利益相关者可以作为冲突群体的和平维护者或调解人（Zhang & Guler，2019），因为他们可能有动力帮助解决争端并在公司利益、成本和风险的分配中维持相互合作。

Furthermore, these actors may introduce issues and opportunities to the network that tend to diminish rather than reinforce the dominant faultline by introduction of cross-cutting (and thus conflictdiminishing) interests (Powell, 1976). This is not to say that the dominant faultline can or should be ignored; rather, the nurturing of mutual interests may allow each group to “revise its own identity just enough to accommodate the identity of the other” through the internalization of a more multifaceted relationship (Kelman, 2004: 119). In this way, the firm’s stakeholder network can act as a platform through which historical grievances and present distributions might be discussed and managed under a less divisive relational structure than one in which only the firm and two identity groups are present, thus reducing conflict risk. 此外，这些行为者可能会给网络带来问题和机遇，这些问题和机遇往往会通过引入跨领域（从而减少冲突）的利益（Powell，1976）来削弱而非强化占主导地位的断层线。这并不是说占主导地位的断层线可以或应该被忽视；相反，通过内化一种更加多层面的关系，共同利益的培养可能会让每个群体“对自身身份进行适当调整，以适应对方的身份”（Kelman，2004：119）。通过这种方式，企业的利益相关者网络可以充当一个平台，在这个平台上，历史不满和当前的资源分配可以在一个比仅存在企业和两个身份群体的结构更少分裂性的关系结构下得到讨论和管理，从而降低冲突风险。

As illustrated in the case of the commercial vehicle manufacturer Scania in Iraq (Ganson, 2013), the inclusion of “common third parties” (Heidl et al., 2014) can mitigate in-group mobilization across faultlines and enhance consensus. As part of its re-entry strategy into the country after the Second Gulf War, Scania needed to train a new generation of truck mechanics to international standards of technical sophistication. The project was fraught, as operating a technical school required cooperation with both national (Iraqi) and provincial (Kurdish) stakeholders whose relationships had been characterized by violent confrontation since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Scania’s management reached out to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which provided a trusted bridge between the Kurdish and national governments. Additionally, an increasingly dense and diverse network of relationships between the firm, the governments, UNIDO, foreign donors, and technical experts on issues of vocational education, English language instruction, education of girls, and other issues less central to the dominant Iraqi-Kurdish conflict faultline increased trust in ways that allowed for more impactful implementation. Donors, for example, were willing to put money at risk to expand opportunities at a state-owned facility, despite widespread government corruption, because of Scania’s and UNIDO’s involvement. The diverse network of trust also allowed for more complex agreements; for example, by bringing the government in Baghdad on board with a plan to pursue predominantly Kurdish recruitment to the school in early years under a promise that a hostel would be built to facilitate recruitment from other regions in later years. The increase in common ties across groups through the emphasis on issues and actors not perceived as favoring one or another identity group increased communication and mutual trust across the groups (Krackhardt, 1999). This in turn helped to address (in admittedly modest steps) issues of horizontal inequalities in the provision of education and economic opportunity, and proved that Kurds and Iraqis could in fact collaborate to their mutual advantage despite their conflict history. 如伊拉克商用车辆制造商斯堪尼亚（Scania）的案例所示（Ganson, 2013），纳入“共同第三方”（Heidl等人，2014）可以缓解跨断层线的内群体动员，并增强共识。海湾战争后，斯堪尼亚重返伊拉克，需要按照国际技术标准培训新一代卡车机械师。该项目充满挑战，因为运营一所技术学校需要与伊拉克国家和库尔德省的利益相关者合作，而自奥斯曼帝国垮台以来，这些利益相关者的关系一直以暴力对抗为特征。斯堪尼亚管理层与联合国工业发展组织（UNIDO）取得联系，UNIDO在库尔德政府和国家政府之间搭建了信任的桥梁。此外，公司、政府、UNIDO、外国捐赠者以及在职业教育、英语教学、女童教育和其他与占主导地位的伊拉克-库尔德冲突断层线关联不大的问题上的技术专家之间，关系网络日益密集和多样化，这种关系网络在多个方面增进了信任，使得项目能够更有影响力地实施。例如，尽管政府腐败普遍，捐赠者仍愿意冒险投入资金，以扩大一家国有设施的机会，这是因为斯堪尼亚和UNIDO的参与。这种信任的多样化网络还促成了更复杂的协议；例如，通过使巴格达政府同意一项计划，即早期主要招募库尔德人入学，并承诺后来在其他地区建立宿舍以方便招募，从而促成了这一计划。通过强调不被视为偏向某一身份群体的问题和行为体，群体间共同纽带的增加促进了群体间的沟通和相互信任（Krackhardt, 1999）。这反过来又有助于（尽管是在适度的步骤中）解决教育和经济机会提供方面的横向不平等问题，并证明库尔德人和伊拉克人尽管有冲突历史，实际上可以合作实现互利共赢。

Proposition 3. The higher the preexisting level of horizontal inequalities, the more a firm erodes (reinforces) the boundary between identity groups within its stakeholder network, the more it reduces (raises) conflict risk in the broader societal network. 命题3。水平不平等的既有水平越高，企业对其利益相关者网络内身份群体之间的边界侵蚀（强化）程度就越大，在更广泛的社会网络中减少（提高）冲突风险的程度也越大。

Supplanting versus Supporting Helpful Brokers

取代有帮助的经纪人 vs 支持有帮助的经纪人

Lastly, we consider how a manager’s choice of how to bridge subcomponents characterized by weak intergroup ties—a structural hole—in the presence of so-called “helpful brokers” in a conflictedaffected area may impact conflict risk in the broader societal network. 最后，我们考虑管理者如何在存在所谓“有帮助的中介者”的冲突影响区域中，通过桥接以弱群体联系（结构洞）为特征的子组件，从而影响更广泛社会网络中的冲突风险。

Managers who pursue a relational strategy of bridging structural holes in the broader societal network may find that, in the presence of acute conflict between network subcomponents underpinned by horizontal inequalities, there are few extant entry points for the building of relationships between themselves and the parties or between the parties. The members of two subcomponents may be geographically proximate and even economically interdependent—engaging in daily market transactions, for example—but still be characterized predominantly by distant or conflictual relationships because of strong differences in their membership across identity groups that contest the distribution of economic, political, and social assets. 追求在更广泛社会网络中填补结构空洞的关系型策略的管理者可能会发现，在由横向不平等支撑的网络子组件之间存在严重冲突的情况下，他们与各方之间或各方之间建立关系的现有入口寥寥无几。两个子组件的成员可能地理位置相近，甚至在经济上相互依存——例如，参与日常市场交易——但由于其成员在争夺经济、政治和社会资产分配的身份群体中的差异巨大，他们的关系仍主要表现为疏远或冲突。

Yet, it is rare in such situations for there to be no brokers at all between the conflicting subcomponents. The peacebuilding literature increasingly emphasizes that “many of the systems, institutions, attitudes, values, and interests that support conflict prevention are already in place” in conflict-affected areas (Anderson & Wallace, 2013: 98) and that such existing capacities can provide the foundation for meaningful progress. These existing capacities may include “helpful” or “honest” brokers who generate (but do not attempt to capture) value from their position in the system across some combination of economic, political, and social dimensions (Leonard, 2004). They may organize dispersed knowledge, provide space for friendly or neutral interactions to occur, or create incentives to motivate cooperative behavior (Halevy, Halali, & Zlatev, 2019). Such brokers are inherently a part of network subcomponents with members engaged in some preexisting conflict (Figure 4A), but they might also possess a degree of embeddedness in each subcomponent that provides them with some credibility and trust with the members of each (Stys, Verweijen, Muzuri, Muhindo, Vogel, & Koskinen, 2020). These brokers might possess a strong combination of both bonding social capital with those whom they are primarily affiliated and bridging social capital with those affiliated with the other identity group. Where such brokers are connected to, and trusted by, important local constituencies, they can build trust in processes and outcomes where state institutions are too weak or illegitimate to do so, de-escalating and managing conflict risk (Mason, 2009). 然而，在这种情况下，冲突的子组件之间完全没有调解人的情况非常罕见。建设和平文献越来越强调，在受冲突影响的地区，“许多支持预防冲突的系统、机构、态度、价值观和利益已经存在”（Anderson & Wallace，2013：98），并且这种现有能力可以为有意义的进展提供基础。这些现有能力可能包括“有帮助”或“诚实”的调解人，他们从自身在系统中的地位出发，在经济、政治和社会维度的某种组合中创造（而非试图攫取）价值（Leonard，2004）。他们可能组织分散的知识，为友好或中立的互动提供空间，或创造激励措施以激发合作行为（Halevy, Halali, & Zlatev, 2019）。此类调解人本质上是网络子组件的一部分，其成员参与某种既有的冲突（图4A），但他们也可能在每个子组件中具有一定程度的嵌入性，这为他们赢得了与每个子组件成员的一定可信度和信任（Stys, Verweijen, Muzuri, Muhindo, Vogel, & Koskinen, 2020）。这些调解人可能同时具备与主要所属群体的结合型社会资本，以及与其他身份群体所属者的桥接型社会资本。当此类调解人与重要的地方群体建立联系并获得其信任时，他们可以在国家机构过于薄弱或缺乏合法性而无法做到的地方，建立对流程和结果的信任，缓和并管理冲突风险（Mason, 2009）。

The manager attempting to bridge a structural hole thus faces a choice: whether to position the firm as an independent broker or convener between the parties, or to work through helpful brokers who are indigenous to the system. The former strategy may seem more straightforward: it builds the firm’s own social capital; can keep the agenda more focused on the business issues of greatest immediate relevance to the firm (and possibly, to other immediate stakeholders); and maintains greater firm control over processes and outcomes. Yet, this strategy can be highly problematic within the broader societal network. Helpful brokers, although sometimes difficult for companies entering a community to recognize, are part of the often informal but well-developed structures (Boege, Brown, Clements, & Nolan, 2009) that help to sustain an acceptable level of cooperative relations despite the stresses of the conflict environment (Pouligny, 2010). When outside actors intervene in ways that fail to take into account the nature of existing relationships that make up the broader societal network, they risk increasing intergroup conflict within the network (de Coning, 2016), because the resources that outside actors bring to an even well-meaning convener role can divert attention, status, and social capital away from locally helpful brokers. This weakening of the helpful brokers undermines their effectiveness not only on the issue of interest to the firm, but also in their broader role of mitigating intergroup conflict and maintaining social stability—an outcome that has been well documented in the humanitarian (Anderson, 1999), peacebuilding (Anderson & Olson, 2003), and company-community relations literatures (Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009). 试图填补结构空洞的管理者因此面临一个选择：是将公司定位为各方之间独立的中介或召集者，还是通过系统内本土的有帮助的中介来运作。前一种策略似乎更直接：它能建立公司自身的社会资本；可以让议程更专注于对公司（以及可能对其他直接利益相关者）最具即时相关性的业务问题；并能对流程和结果保持更大的公司控制权。然而，这种策略在更广泛的社会网络中可能会产生严重问题。虽然进入某个社区的公司有时难以识别有帮助的中介，但他们是通常非正式但发展完善的结构的一部分（Boege, Brown, Clements, & Nolan, 2009），这些结构在冲突环境的压力下仍能维持可接受水平的合作关系（Pouligny, 2010）。当外部行为者干预时，如果未能考虑构成更广泛社会网络的现有关系的性质，他们就有增加网络内群体间冲突的风险（de Coning, 2016），因为外部行为者即使出于善意进行召集，其带来的资源也可能将注意力、地位和社会资本从本地有帮助的中介那里转移开。这种对有帮助中介的削弱不仅会损害他们在公司关注的问题上的效力，还会削弱他们在缓解群体间冲突和维持社会稳定方面的更广泛作用——这一结果在人道主义（Anderson, 1999）、建设和平（Anderson & Olson, 2003）以及公司-社区关系文献（Zandvliet & Anderson, 2009）中已有充分记载。

We depict these potentially negative dynamics in Figure 4B, illustrating an entering firm that has undermined a locally helpful broker by attempting to independently develop cooperative relations regarding the distribution of benefits, costs, and risks with stakeholders Alpha and Beta, who are members of different identity groups in conflict. Such circumstances are set out by Bardouille-Crema et al. (2013), who related the case of a foreign company in Nigeria that, as a corporate social responsibility project, sank a borehole on land that it only later ascertained was owned by a Christian. Conflict erupted between Christians, who believed themselves to be a disadvantaged group entitled to preferential access to this small benefit, and the Muslim majority, who believed that they should have equal access to the new water source. Unaware of a respected local sheikh on whom both religious communities regularly called to resolve disputes, managers tried to work with a local government widely perceived as illegitimate to settle the matter, and the conflict escalated into violence. 我们在图4B中描述了这些潜在的负面动态，展示了一家进入市场的企业如何通过试图独立与利益相关者Alpha和Beta（他们是处于冲突中的不同身份群体的成员）就利益、成本和风险的分配建立合作关系，从而损害了当地有帮助的经纪人。这种情况由Bardouille-Crema等人（2013）提出，他们讲述了一家尼日利亚外国公司的案例：作为企业社会责任项目，该公司在一片土地上打了一口井，但后来才发现这片土地属于一名基督徒。基督徒认为自己是处于不利地位的群体，有权优先获得这一微小利益，而穆斯林多数群体则认为他们应该平等获得新的水源，双方因此爆发冲突。由于不了解双方宗教团体经常求助解决纠纷的一位受尊敬的当地谢赫，管理人员试图与被广泛视为非法的当地政府合作解决此事，冲突最终升级为暴力事件。

Conversely, managers can “recognize and work through” helpful brokers (Bardouille-Crema et al., 2013: 80)—acknowledging their capabilities and legitimacy in the local context—in ways that “support and reinforce” them (Anderson, 1999: 146). In Figure 4C, we depict this relational strategy by showing that the entering firm has developed a cooperative tie with the helpful broker, and that managers are building new relationships with other stakeholders under the guidance of the helpful broker in a way that avoids worsening the network’s preexisting conflict. The case of ISAGEN in Colombia in its construction of the Río Amoyá Hydroelectric Center (Patiño & Miller, 2016) provides an example. ISAGEN, then a parastatal company, 相反，管理者可以“识别并借助”有帮助的经纪人（Bardouille-Crema等人，2013：80）——认可他们在当地环境中的能力和合法性——以“支持和强化”他们的方式（Anderson，1999：146）。在图4C中，我们通过展示进入的公司已与有帮助的经纪人建立了合作关系，以及管理者在有帮助的经纪人的指导下与其他利益相关者建立新关系，同时避免加剧网络中已有的冲突，来描述这种关系策略。ISAGEN在哥伦比亚建设Río Amoyá水电站项目（Patiño & Miller，2016）的案例就是一个例子。当时，ISAGEN还是一家国有企业，

FIGURE 4 Supplanting versus Supporting Helpful Brokers 图4 替代型与支持型有益经纪人

T T

decided in 2006 to initiate the project in the Canyon de las Hermosas, which was also the base of operations for Front 21, one of the oldest of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC,” by its Spanish acronym). FARC was borne as a peasant and laborer movement in the MarxistLeninist tradition that engaged in armed struggle in favor of land reform, increased social services, and an opening of the political order. Front 21’s control over the Canyon de las Hermosas was so complete that it administered justice, maintained security and civic order, controlled transit schedules and movement of people, and solemnized marriages. As the developer of a national infrastructure project that would use large amounts of explosives in the construction phase, ISAGEN could not proceed without army accompaniment. This meant that ISAGEN would need to bridge two subcomponents of the broader societal network—one comprised of pro-government businesses, the army, more right-wing political parties, and the national government in power; the other comprised of local community groups, human rights advocates, development actors, and the FARC— which had few points of intersection, and even fewer positive ones, between them. 2006年决定在Canyon de las Hermosas启动该项目，这里也是“哥伦比亚革命武装力量”（西班牙语缩写为“FARC”）最古老的组织之一Front 21的行动基地。FARC起源于马克思列宁主义传统下的农民和劳动者运动，开展武装斗争以争取土地改革、增加社会服务以及政治秩序开放。Front 21对Canyon de las Hermosas的控制极为彻底，其管理司法、维护安全与公民秩序、控制交通时刻表和人员流动，并主持婚礼。作为一个在建设阶段将使用大量炸药的国家基础设施项目开发商，ISAGEN若没有军队护送便无法推进。这意味着ISAGEN需要搭建更广泛社会网络的两个子部分——一个由亲政府企业、军队、更多右翼政党和执政的国家政府组成；另一个由当地社区团体、人权倡导者、发展行动者和FARC组成——这两个部分之间交集极少，甚至正面交集更是寥寥无几。

At a variety of junctures, ISAGEN worked through existing, locally legitimate, helpful brokers. Managers identified the Las Hermosas Association for 在不同的关键时刻，ISAGEN通过现有的、在当地合法且有帮助的经纪人开展工作。管理人员确定了拉斯埃莫萨斯协会（Las Hermosas Association），

Development toward the Future (Asohermosas) as a group with particularly deep community roots, as well as the ability to navigate between government agencies (who would need to sign as guarantors of the benefits agreement) and the FARC (who would at least informally also need to approve it). Rather than attempting to set up its own structures, the company provided Asohermosas with offices and a budget to play its mediation role, including with the company. It was also clear that allegations of human rights abuses would need to be managed, given the tense relationship between the national army and the FARC. Managers supported the involvement of the then-Governor of Tolima, who was a well-respected figure among the authorities and communities in the municipality. His involvement was instrumental to the establishment of a community-based Human Rights Observatory to identify and document developments that could affect human rights or community-army relations, and a Transparency Roundtable in which up to 400 people representing civil society groups, the army, international human rights organizations, and the local, regional, and national government discussed and tracked commitments made with respect to allegations of army abuse or illegal activity. The company remained an observer, rather than a principal party, to these processes. 面向未来的发展（Asohermosas）作为一个社区根基深厚的团体，同时也有能力在政府机构（他们需要作为福利协议的担保人签署文件）和哥伦比亚革命武装力量（FARC，他们至少在非官方层面也需要批准该协议）之间进行协调。该公司没有试图建立自己的结构，而是为Asohermosas提供了办公室和预算，让其发挥调解作用，包括与公司自身的调解工作。此外，鉴于国家军队与FARC之间的紧张关系，人权侵犯指控的管理也变得十分明确。管理人员支持当时的托利马省省长的参与，他在该市政当局的当局和社区中是一位备受尊敬的人物。他的参与对于建立一个以社区为基础的人权观察站至关重要，该观察站旨在识别并记录可能影响人权或社区与军队关系的事态发展；同时也促成了一个透明圆桌会议的成立，该会议有多达400人参与，包括民间社会组织代表、军队、国际人权组织以及地方、区域和国家各级政府，他们共同讨论并跟踪针对军队虐待或非法活动指控的承诺履行情况。在这些进程中，该公司以观察员身份参与，而非主要参与方。

The resulting successful implementation of the hydroelectric project, benefits of local development, and relative peace experienced in the valley demonstrated how ISAGEN managers advanced their own business objectives by supporting helpful brokers on whose stronger bonding and bridging social capital the company could rely. In addition to serving firm ends, this relational strategy also increased the cooperative stability of actors within the broader societal network, including between the local communities and the national government, whose relationship had for decades been characterized by deep mistrust; and between the local FARC and the Colombian military, who, at least within the bounds of the Canyon de las Hermosas, ceased armed confrontation. 该水力发电项目的成功实施、当地发展的益处以及山谷中相对的和平局面，展示了ISAGEN的管理者如何通过支持有能力的经纪人来实现自身商业目标——公司可以依靠这些经纪人更强的社会纽带和桥梁作用。除了服务于公司自身目标外，这种关系策略还增强了更广泛社会网络中参与者的合作稳定性，包括当地社区与国家政府之间（其关系数十年来一直以深深的不信任为特征），以及当地哥伦比亚革命武装力量（FARC）与哥伦比亚军队之间（至少在Canyon de las Hermosas范围内，双方停止了武装对抗）。

Proposition 4. The higher the preexisting level of horizontal inequalities across conflictual network subcomponents, the more a firm supports (supplants) a helpful broker’s ties across those subcomponents, the more it reduces (raises) conflict risk in the broader societal network. 命题4。冲突网络子组件之间的既有水平不平等程度越高，企业对这些子组件之间互助型中间人关系的支持（取代）程度就越高，其在更广泛的社会网络中降低（提高）冲突风险的程度也越高。

DISCUSSION

讨论

We develop four propositions that examine how a firm’s relational strategies with its stakeholders—(1) 我们提出四个命题，以考察企业与其利益相关者的关系策略——（1）

brokering or convening stakeholders from different subcomponents; (2) managing the exclusion or inclusion of stakeholders within the firm’s stakeholder network; (3) strengthening or eroding faultlines within that stakeholder network; and (4) supplanting or supporting “helpful brokers”— impact conflict risk in conflict-affected areas. Our argument emphasizes that managerial decisions in pursuit of business prosperity allocate resources (including attention and conferred status) to various stakeholders in ways that alter the structure of relationships within the broader societal network. Within identity groups, these firm relational strategies shape the relative attractiveness of conflict or collaboration as members consider their impact on group access to, and control over, economic, political, or social assets. Between identity groups, these strategies affect conflict risk by fostering (or diminishing) communication, trust, norms, understandings, and consensus building that enable (or inhibit) intergroup settlements. 促成或召集来自不同子组件的利益相关者；（2）管理公司利益相关者网络内利益相关者的排斥或纳入；（3）加强或削弱该利益相关者网络内的断层线；以及（4）取代或支持“有帮助的中介者”——这会影响受冲突影响地区的冲突风险。我们的论点强调，为追求商业繁荣而做出的管理决策，会以改变更广泛社会网络内关系结构的方式，将资源（包括注意力和赋予的地位）分配给各类利益相关者。在身份群体内部，这些公司关系策略会影响成员对冲突或合作的相对吸引力的考量，因为成员会考虑这些策略对其群体获取和控制经济、政治或社会资产的影响。在身份群体之间，这些策略通过促进（或削弱）沟通、信任、规范、理解和共识建设来影响冲突风险，而这些因素会促成（或阻碍）群体间的解决。

These arguments pose a direct challenge to overoptimistic interpretations of the business and peace literature (Fort, 2007). Consistent with the inductive theory building of Joseph et al. (2021), we contend that a direct causal link from private sector development to peace is misplaced or, at least, is in need of more nuance. Even ethical private sector interventions that bring jobs, tax revenue, local procurement, knowledge creation, and other productive benefits of business-led prosperity cannot be presumed to be peace-positive. Rather, in divided societies—whether along lines of ethnicity, religion, culture, race, political ideology, class, gender, age, geography, or organizational affiliation (Stewart, 2008)—which identity group’s capacities are built, whose interpretations of the rule of law are supported, which group benefits from jobs or contracts, as well as which intergroup bonds are built or broken through private sector activities will critically impact social cohesion and conflict risk (Joseph et al., 2021; Miklian & Schouten, 2019). We thus join voices calling for more attention to “the vectors through which, in theory, business actors can affect the prospects, intensity, etc., of peace or conflict” (Ford, 2015: 451), with particular focus on the structural dimensions of conflict (Idemudia, 2017). 这些论点直接挑战了对商业与和平相关文献的过度乐观解读（Fort，2007）。与Joseph等人（2021）的归纳理论构建一致，我们认为从私营部门发展到和平的直接因果关系是不恰当的，或者至少需要更细致的考量。即使是带来就业、税收收入、本地采购、知识创造以及商业主导繁荣带来的其他生产性收益的道德私营部门干预，也不能被假定为对和平有利。相反，在分裂社会中——无论这些分裂是基于种族、宗教、文化、种族、政治意识形态、阶级、性别、年龄、地理或组织归属（Stewart，2008）——哪些身份群体的能力得到培养、哪些群体的法治解读得到支持、哪些群体从工作或合同中受益，以及私营部门活动会建立或打破哪些群体间联系，都将极大影响社会凝聚力和冲突风险（Joseph et al.，2021；Miklian & Schouten，2019）。因此，我们支持呼吁更多关注“理论上，商业行为体如何影响和平或冲突的前景、强度等的途径”（Ford，2015：451），并特别关注冲突的结构性维度（Idemudia，2017）。

Our propositions specifically highlight managerial decision-making as an explanatory variable in societal conflict. We thus bridge a gap between scholarship at the firm level and at the societal level. Theoretical and empirical work at the firm level has focused on a firm’s impact within its stakeholder (ego) network, with a dependent variable of conflict in that network. By contrast, work at the societal level analyzes the impact of a functioning and ethical private sector, with a dependent variable of conflict risk in society. We integrate the two to show how an individual firm’s actions can propagate conflict risk from its stakeholder network to the broader societal network. We demonstrate how the impacts of a firm’s relational strategies on intergroup conflict may outweigh the importance of direct economic impacts in societies characterized by substantial horizontal inequalities. Presumably, other managerial decisions—across the gamut of strategy, finance, marketing, organization, human resources, operations, corporate social responsibility, and so on—also shape whether “groups see each other as being in competition for power, legitimacy, or resources,” and can similarly “exacerbate grievances, deepen tensions, and widen the divide among them” (Bardouille-Crema et al., 2013: 80). To the extent that this is true, a firm operating in a conflictaffected area engages in peacebuilding—or undermines it—not primarily through any extraordinary efforts to bring parties together, but through its everyday decisions and actions. This underlines the value of a more focused managerial lens in business and peace scholarship that not only explores the boundaries of the private sector’s peace-positive role, but also managerial agency within them. 我们的主张特别强调管理决策作为社会冲突的解释变量。因此，我们弥合了企业层面和社会层面学术研究之间的鸿沟。企业层面的理论和实证研究主要关注企业在其利益相关者（自我）网络中的影响，因变量是该网络中的冲突。相比之下，社会层面的研究分析运作良好且符合道德的私营部门的影响，因变量是社会中的冲突风险。我们将两者整合，以展示单个企业的行动如何将冲突风险从其利益相关者网络传播到更广泛的社会网络。我们证明，在存在大量横向不平等的社会中，企业关系策略对群体间冲突的影响可能超过直接经济影响的重要性。据推测，其他管理决策——涵盖战略、财务、营销、组织、人力资源、运营、企业社会责任等各个方面——也会影响“群体是否认为彼此在争夺权力、合法性或资源”，并可能同样“加剧不满、加深紧张局势并扩大他们之间的分歧”（Bardouille-Crema等人，2013：80）。在这一点成立的范围内，一家在受冲突影响地区运营的企业进行和平建设——或破坏和平建设——主要不是通过任何非凡的努力来促成各方和解，而是通过其日常决策和行动。这凸显了在商业与和平研究中采用更聚焦的管理视角的价值，该视角不仅要探索私营部门和平积极作用的边界，还要探索其中的管理能动性。

We also contribute to the business and peace literature by drawing on the tools of social network analysis to offer a theoretical toolkit with constructs that can be empirically observed and analyzed in subsequent works. Specifically, given the critical nexus of a firm’s intentional or unintentional impacts on the structure of relationships among identity groups characterized by horizontal inequalities, we analyze the implications of managerial actions to form or break ties in a stakeholder network on conflict risk in the broader societal network. We link the stakeholder network to that broader societal network through shared identity group membership. Our approach is consistent with the recent skepticism of top-down institutional design and peacebuilding efforts that focus on state capacity or national governance (Ganson & Wennmann, 2017) in favor of more micro-level interventions (de Coning, 2016). However, we shy away from the strong-form critique that such micro-level interventions are so contextually dependent as to not be analyzable without reference to that context (Loode, 2011). Rather, we argue that the basic patterns of organizations embedded in stakeholder networks that are linked through identity group membership are indeed generalizable. We thus provide new theory that opens important avenues for empirical analysis that can build from the context-specific insights of extant qualitative studies. 我们还通过借鉴社会网络分析工具，为商业与和平领域的文献贡献了一套理论工具包，其中包含可在后续研究中进行实证观察和分析的概念框架。具体而言，鉴于企业对以横向不平等为特征的身份群体间关系结构产生的有意或无意影响这一关键关联，我们分析了管理者在利益相关者网络中形成或打破关系的行为对更广泛社会网络中冲突风险的影响。我们通过共享身份群体成员身份将利益相关者网络与更广泛的社会网络联系起来。我们的方法与近期对自上而下的制度设计和以国家能力或国家治理为重点的和平建设努力的质疑（Ganson & Wennmann, 2017）一致，转而支持更微观层面的干预措施（de Coning, 2016）。然而，我们避免接受那种强式批判，即认为此类微观层面的干预措施具有极强的情境依赖性，以至于脱离该情境便无法分析（Loode, 2011）。相反，我们认为，嵌入在通过身份群体成员身份相互关联的利益相关者网络中的组织基本模式确实具有可推广性。因此，我们提供了新的理论，为实证分析开辟了重要途径，这些分析可以从现有定性研究的情境特异性见解中发展而来。

We further contend that this same pattern manifests even outside of conflict-affected areas. As a result, scholars of strategic management employing network tools (Burt, 1992, 2000, 2004) may consider the impact of network positions not only on rents and flows of information or other resources, but also on societal-level conflict risk. While substantial attention has been focused on related issues in research on diversity, faultlines, and spillovers, that research remains largely focused on local- rather than network-level impacts. Our analysis suggests, by contrast, that the choices of firms on the management of these issues may have far broader implications for members of identity groups with whom their employees, customers, suppliers, and other members of ecosystems or innovation networks share ties. 我们进一步主张，同样的模式甚至在受冲突影响地区之外也会显现。因此，运用网络工具的战略管理学者（Burt，1992、2000、2004）可能会考虑网络位置不仅对租金、信息或其他资源的流动产生影响，还会对社会层面的冲突风险产生影响。尽管在多样性、断层线和溢出效应的研究中，相关问题已得到大量关注，但该研究仍主要聚焦于局部层面而非网络层面的影响。相比之下，我们的分析表明，企业在管理这些问题时的选择，可能会对身份群体成员产生更为广泛的影响——这些身份群体与企业员工、客户、供应商以及生态系统或创新网络的其他成员存在关联。

An important example of such consideration would be to challenge the choices that stakeholder theorists have made to focus on value creation for stakeholders (Phillips, 2003; Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003). The firm and its stakeholders are not a closed network; rather, each firm exists on a common platform for negotiation of the terms on which benefits, costs, and risks are distributed within the broader societal network (Lucea, 2007, 2010; Rowley, 1997). Even where managerial decisions promote communal-sharing relational ethics (Jones, Harrison, & Felps, 2018) by following principles of fairness (Phillips, 1997) to maximize value added for their stakeholders (Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015; Harrison & Wicks, 2013), “balance and harmony” (Freeman, 2010: 8) may not extend to the members of the interconnected set of identity groups with whom stakeholders share preexisting and arguably more fundamental relationships. If businesses are to contribute more dependably to peace, analyses of the “set of relationships among groups that have a stake in the activities that make up the business” (Parmar, Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Purnell, & De Colle, 2010: 5) must encompass relations among identity groups in the broader societal network. 对这种考量的一个重要例子是质疑利益相关者理论学者选择关注为利益相关者创造价值的做法（Phillips, 2003；Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003）。企业与其利益相关者并非一个封闭的网络；相反，每个企业都存在于一个共同的协商平台上，以确定在更广泛的社会网络中如何分配收益、成本和风险（Lucea, 2007, 2010；Rowley, 1997）。即使管理决策遵循公平原则（Phillips, 1997）以最大化对利益相关者的价值增值（Garcia-Castro & Aguilera, 2015；Harrison & Wicks, 2013），从而促进共享关系伦理（Jones, Harrison, & Felps, 2018），“平衡与和谐”（Freeman, 2010: 8）也可能无法延伸到与利益相关者有着既存且可说是更根本关系的身份群体的互联集合中的成员。如果企业要更可靠地为和平做出贡献，对“构成企业活动的利益相关群体之间的关系集合”（Parmar, Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Purnell, & De Colle, 2010: 5）的分析必须涵盖更广泛社会网络中身份群体之间的关系。

Even more broadly, and speculatively, we perceive similar dynamics of identity group conflict and firms’ exacerbation thereof to be in play in the fraught national political debates surrounding free trade, immigration, race relations, and the role of religion in public policy. Debates on these topics pit socially constructed identity groups against one another in increasingly polarized competitions (McCoy, Rahman, & Somer, 2018). To the extent that firms’ stakeholders are members of identity groups constructed along socio-economic, ideological, or religious dimensions with strong in-group homogeneity of preferences on these issues, firms’ relational strategies can contribute to the amelioration (or exacerbation) of tensions between populist, nativist, and nationalist political forces and those supporting more globalist, progressive, and universal values. 更广泛地、且带有推测性地说，我们认为身份群体冲突及其加剧的类似动态，也在围绕自由贸易、移民、种族关系以及宗教在公共政策中作用的紧张国家政治辩论中发挥作用。这些话题的辩论将社会建构的身份群体彼此对立起来，形成日益极化的竞争（McCoy, Rahman, & Somer, 2018）。在一定程度上，企业的利益相关者是沿社会经济、意识形态或宗教维度构建的身份群体成员，且在这些问题上具有强烈的群体内偏好同质性，因此企业的关系策略可以促进（或加剧）民粹主义、本土主义和民族主义政治力量与支持更具全球视野、进步和普世价值观的力量之间的紧张关系的缓和（或加剧）。

While we believe that these theoretical implications are substantive, we acknowledge limitations to our theoretical development and areas for future research. We did not consider the mechanisms that foster relationship formation, maintenance, or breaking, nor the relative efficacy across various mechanisms for doing so. We also did not explicitly compare the relative costs in terms of financial or human resources, the opportunity costs of pursuing these strategies, or the contextual contingencies or moderators that impact these costs. Nor did we provide the means to compare the efficacy or cumulative impact of the relational strategies examined in the paper. Furthermore, we consider these four relational strategies but acknowledge that they are neither exclusive nor comprehensive. More fundamentally, we focus on firm choices while acknowledging that civil society and public sector actors also possess agency. They also pursue relational strategies that have important impacts on horizontal inequities, conflict, and cooperation that interact with firms’ decisions in ways yet to be explored. In particular, the role of formal and informal institutions in moderating the impact of horizontal inequalities on conflict in the broader societal network, as well as the potential benefits of collective approaches by groups of companies or in concert with civil society actors (Kolk & Lenfant, 2016; Miller et al., 2019), are left for future research. 虽然我们认为这些理论意义是实质性的，但我们也承认理论发展存在局限性以及未来研究的方向。我们没有考虑促进关系形成、维持或破裂的机制，也没有比较各种机制在这方面的相对有效性。我们也没有明确比较在财务或人力资源方面的相对成本、追求这些策略的机会成本，或者影响这些成本的情境偶然性或调节因素。我们也没有提供比较本文中考察的关系策略的有效性或累积影响的方法。此外，我们考虑了这四种关系策略，但也承认它们既非排他性的也非全面的。更根本的是，我们关注企业的选择，同时也承认公民社会和公共部门行为体也拥有能动性。他们也会采取关系策略，这些策略对横向不平等、冲突与合作产生重要影响，而这些影响与企业的决策相互作用，其方式尚待探索。特别是，正式和非正式机构在调节横向不平等对更广泛社会网络中冲突的影响方面的作用，以及公司群体通过集体方式行事或与公民社会行为体合作的潜在好处（Kolk & Lenfant, 2016；Miller et al., 2019），这些都留待未来研究。

Our theoretical implications, though bounded by the aforementioned limitations, have important and actionable practical counterparts. The first of these focuses on specific recommendations for conflict-sensitive business practices. Managers in conflict-affected areas should presumptively tilt their stakeholder relational strategies toward the convening of network subcomponents; the bridging of members from different identity groups; the eroding of faultlines within the firm’s stakeholder network; and the support of helpful brokers in the broader societal network. Absent such intentional relational strategies, business-generated prosperity is more likely to have perverse consequences through the exacerbation of grievances and marginalization of certain identity group members, thereby enhancing conflict rather than peace at the societal level. By extension, managers attending to stakeholder, employee, customer, supplier, alliance, network, or ecosystem relations must further expand their field of vision to the relations between identity groups at the broader societal level in which their stakeholders are embedded. Similar analysis is required by investors, creditors, and philanthropists seeking to address grand societal challenges of climate risk, racial and immigrant justice, human rights, and inequality. 尽管我们的理论意义受到上述局限性的制约，但它具有重要且可操作的实际对应意义。首先，这一对应意义聚焦于针对冲突敏感型商业实践的具体建议。处于受冲突影响地区的管理者应假定其利益相关者关系策略倾向于召集网络子组件；弥合不同身份群体成员之间的隔阂；削弱企业利益相关者网络内的断层线；以及支持更广泛社会网络中有益的中间人。如果缺乏这种刻意的关系策略，商业创造的繁荣更有可能产生适得其反的后果，因为它会加剧不满情绪，并使某些身份群体成员边缘化，从而在社会层面加剧冲突而非促进和平。由此类推，管理者在处理利益相关者、员工、客户、供应商、联盟、网络或生态系统关系时，必须进一步拓宽视野，关注其利益相关者所处的更广泛社会层面上身份群体之间的关系。投资者、债权人及慈善家在寻求应对气候风险、种族与移民公正、人权及不平等这些重大社会挑战时，也需要进行类似的分析。

Turning to civil society, the public sector, and international organizations, our work provides a point of convergence for those who promote accelerated private sector growth as a pathway for economic development and thus for conflict risk mitigation, and those who focus on restraint and regulation of private sector actors to reduce conflict and injustice. Instead of debating the net impact of the private sector in the abstract, one can, instead, assess it contingently by considering how firms’ relational strategies (and, by extension, other managerial decisions) impact conflict risk between identity groups. Particularly in the presence of substantial horizontal inequalities, the societal benefits of incentives that support efforts by firms to enhance intergroup cooperation and that penalize actions that sustain or exacerbate intergroup conflict may be substantial. 转向公民社会、公共部门和国际组织，我们的工作为那些推动私营部门加速增长以实现经济发展并进而缓解冲突风险的人和那些专注于约束和规范私营部门行为体以减少冲突和不公的人提供了一个交汇点。与其抽象地争论私营部门的净影响，不如通过考虑企业的关系策略（以及由此延伸的其他管理决策）如何影响身份群体之间的冲突风险来有条件地评估其影响。特别是在存在大量横向不平等的情况下，支持企业努力加强群体间合作并惩罚维持或加剧群体间冲突的行为的激励措施可能会带来巨大的社会收益。

This perspective may increase the possibilities for, and mix of, positive engagement. Approaches might include unilateral actions by economic, political, or social actors, such as the acknowledgment and support of helpful local brokers to better manage conflict across network subcomponents; government mandates to companies, such as requiring the mediation of environmental and social impact assessments and the inclusion of marginalized identity groups; or the establishment of observatories through the support of international agencies that increase the density of networks and act as third parties that bridge faultlines. Such strategies are also available to meso-level players such as investors, project finance lenders, and insurers as they take cognizance not only of vertical inequality across strata of income but also of horizontal inequalities across identity groups. Together with managerial choices that strengthen intergroup cooperation, such interventions may help to reduce conflict risk within the broader societal network in ways beneficial to the market-based economic system in which firms, stakeholders, governments, and civil society are all embedded. 这种观点可能会增加积极参与的可能性和多样性。方法可能包括经济、政治或社会行为体的单方面行动，例如认可和支持有帮助的地方中间人，以更好地管理网络子组件之间的冲突；政府对公司的指令，例如要求进行环境和社会影响评估的调解，并纳入边缘化身份群体；或者通过国际机构的支持建立观测站，这些观测站能增加网络密度并充当弥合断层线的第三方。中层参与者（如投资者、项目融资贷方和保险公司）也可以采用此类策略，因为他们不仅认识到收入阶层之间的纵向不平等，还认识到身份群体之间的横向不平等。结合加强群体间合作的管理选择，此类干预措施可能有助于减少更广泛的社会网络内的冲突风险，从而有利于公司、利益相关者、政府和公民社会都嵌入其中的基于市场的经济体系。

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Brian Ganson (BGanson@SUN.ac.za) is professor and head of the Africa Centre for Dispute Settlement at the Stellenbosch University Business School. He received his JD from Harvard Law School. His research explores the positive and negative impacts of the private sector on peace and development in conflict-prone environments. 布莱恩·甘森（BGanson@SUN.ac.za）是斯坦陵布什大学商学院非洲争端解决中心的教授兼主任。他获得了哈佛大学法学院的法学博士学位。他的研究探讨了私营部门在易发生冲突的环境中对和平与发展的积极和消极影响。

Tony L. He (tonyhe@wharton.upenn.edu) is completing a doctorate at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and will be joining the faculty of Rutgers Business School - Newark and New Brunswick as an assistant professor. His research examines the firm, industry, and societal impacts of corporate political strategies and corporate social responsibility. 托尼·L·何（tonyhe@wharton.upenn.edu）正在宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院攻读博士学位，之后将加入罗格斯商学院纽瓦克与新布伦瑞克分校担任助理教授。他的研究考察企业政治策略和企业社会责任对企业、行业及社会的影响。

Witold J. Henisz (henisz@wharton.upenn.edu) is the Deloitte & Touche professor of management at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. He received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley. His research analyzes corporate diplomacy (i.e., efforts to win the hearts and minds of external stakeholders in support of an organizational mission). 维托尔德·J·亨尼兹（henisz@wharton.upenn.edu）是宾夕法尼亚大学沃顿商学院的德勤会计师事务所管理教授。他拥有加州大学伯克利分校的博士学位。他的研究分析企业外交（即努力争取外部利益相关者的支持以实现组织使命的行为）。

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