FIGHTING WITH THE FOURTH ESTATE:A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OFORGANIZATION-MEDIA RIVALRY FOR NARRATIVECONTROL FOLLOWING A TRANSGRESSION

与第四权力的博弈：越界后组织与媒体竞争叙事控制权的理论框架

MATT C. HERSEL Clemson University MATT C. HERSEL 克莱姆森大学

In this article, I develop a theoretical framework to explain rivalry for narrative control between members of the media and transgressing organizations. I do so by integrating and advancing key insights from competitive dynamics and crisis management research. The first part of this framework conceptualizes the unique tensions, actions, and reactions that characterize rivalry for narrative control following organizational transgressions and distinguish it from other forms of rivalry. The second part of the framework conceptualizes the role of both journalists’ and organizational leaders’ perceptions in shaping actions and reactions during rivalry for narrative control. This framework contributes to competitive dynamics research by further conceptualizing how rivalries between dissimilar actors materialize. This framework also broadens research on crisis management following transgressions to account for the potentially rivalrous nature of organizationmedia relations. 在本文中，我构建了一个理论框架来解释媒体成员与违规组织之间争夺叙事控制权的竞争。我通过整合并推进竞争动态和危机管理研究中的关键见解来实现这一点。该框架的第一部分概念化了组织违规后争夺叙事控制权的独特紧张关系、行动和反应，并将其与其他形式的竞争区分开来。框架的第二部分概念化了记者和组织领导者的感知在争夺叙事控制权过程中如何塑造行动和反应。该框架通过进一步概念化不同行为体之间的竞争如何形成，为竞争动态研究做出了贡献。该框架还拓宽了关于违规后危机管理的研究，以解释组织与媒体关系中潜在的竞争性本质。

When organizations transgress and their legitimacy is threatened, they often wrestle with media outlets to control the narrative about their transgression. Narratives about transgressions develop over time to shape stakeholders’ (i.e., audiences’) understanding of what happened (i.e., plot and context), who was involved (i.e., characters), and what should be done (i.e., moral of the story) (Barry & Elmes, 1997; Mitchell, 1981; Scholes, 1980; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, & Reger, 2017). For example, when CNN released the Blackfish documentary in 2013, it began a seven-year battle with SeaWorld to control the narrative about the theme park’s training practices and treatment of marine animals. Such rivalry carries significant consequences for transgressing organizations and the media outlets that engage with them. For organizations, it may influence the effectiveness of their reintegration efforts and provoke changes to policies, practices, and personnel (Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). In the example above, Sea-World replaced its CEO, implemented costly policy changes, and its stock price dropped by $4 5 %$ —all during the year following the documentary’s release (Solomon, 2014). Likewise, wins or losses may enhance or erode a journalist’s status, while the audience engagement generated by the rivalry may boost an outlet’s revenues (Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2008). 当组织犯错且其合法性受到威胁时，它们往往会与媒体机构争夺对其违规行为相关叙述的控制权。违规行为的叙述会随着时间发展，以塑造利益相关者（即受众）对事件经过（即情节和背景）、涉事人员（即角色）以及应采取何种行动（即故事寓意）的理解（Barry & Elmes, 1997; Mitchell, 1981; Scholes, 1980; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, & Reger, 2017）。例如，2013年美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）发布《黑鲸》（Blackfish）纪录片后，便与海洋世界（SeaWorld）展开了长达七年的较量，以争夺对该主题公园训练方式及海洋动物待遇相关叙述的控制权。这种竞争对违规组织及其参与其中的媒体机构都带来了重大影响。对组织而言，它可能影响其重新融入社会的努力成效，并引发政策、实践和人员的调整（Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008）。以上述案例为例，海洋世界更换了首席执行官，实施了代价高昂的政策变更，其股价在纪录片发布后的一年内下跌了45%（Solomon, 2014）。同样，胜负可能会提升或削弱记者的地位，而竞争引发的受众参与度可能会增加媒体机构的收入（Core, Guay, & Larcker, 2008）。

Competitive dynamics research has recently begun to explore rivalries between dissimilar actors for nonmarket ends (Markman, Waldron, & Panagopoulos, 2016; Pacheco & Dean, 2015). The objectives of this framework are to reconceptualize organization— media relations as potentially rivalrous, distinguish organization-media rivalry from other forms of rivalry, and inform richer exploration of organization media interplay following transgressions. To do so, I conceptualize the unique tensions, actions, and reactions that characterize organization—media rivalry following transgressions and consider the factors that trigger and sustain this latent form of rivalry between dissimilar actors. The importance of developing this framework rests on the importance of managing the narrative in post-transgression contexts (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Pfarrer et al., 2008; Wang, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2021; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012), as well as calls for competitive dynamics research into unique forms of rivalry between dissimilar actors (Chen & Miller, 2012; Waldron, Navis, Aronson, York, & Pacheco, 2019). 竞争动态研究最近开始探索不同类型行为体为非市场目标展开的竞争（Markman, Waldron, & Panagopoulos, 2016; Pacheco & Dean, 2015）。本框架的目标是重新将组织-媒体关系概念化为潜在具有竞争性的关系，区分组织-媒体竞争与其他形式的竞争，并在违规事件后更深入地探究组织与媒体之间的互动。为此，我将概念化违规事件后组织-媒体竞争的独特张力、行动和反应，并考虑触发和维持不同类型行为体之间这种潜在竞争形式的因素。构建这一框架的重要性在于，在违规事件后的情境中管理叙事至关重要（Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Pfarrer et al., 2008; Wang, Reger, & Pfarrer, 2021; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012），同时也呼应了竞争动态研究对不同类型行为体之间独特竞争形式的探索需求（Chen & Miller, 2012; Waldron, Navis, Aronson, York, & Pacheco, 2019）。

The theoretical framework developed here, consisting of two parts, integrates advances in nonmarket competitive dynamics (Markman et al., 2016; Waldron et al., 2019) with research on posttransgression crisis management and media coverage (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012). The first part characterizes the tensions, actions, and reactions that typify rivalry between media outlets and organizations following transgressions (Chen & Miller, 2012). I posit that media outlets and transgressing organizations alike may desire to control the narrative presented to stakeholders, but often seek to steer the narrative in opposite directions, creating tension. These tensions may give rise to critical media coverage and crisis response strategies, which represent rivalrous actions and reactions. 本文构建的理论框架由两部分组成，整合了非市场竞争动态领域的研究进展（Markman等人，2016；Waldron等人，2019）与越界后危机管理及媒体报道的研究（Pfarrer等人，2008；Zavyalova等人，2012）。第一部分描述了媒体机构与组织在越界事件后典型的紧张关系、行动及反应（Chen & Miller，2012）。我认为，媒体机构和越界组织都可能希望控制向利益相关者呈现的叙事，但往往试图将叙事引向相反方向，从而产生张力。这些张力可能引发批判性媒体报道和危机应对策略，这代表了竞争性的行动与反应。

The second part of the framework draws upon journalism and crisis management research to conceptualize a multistage model of rivalry for narrative control. Within this model, I consider the perceptions of journalists and organizational leaders that may catalyze those tensions into rivalrous actions and reactions, thereby initiating or sustaining a battle for narrative control about a transgression. To aid in my conceptualization, I draw upon well-known examples of post-transgression organization—media rivalry for narrative control. In Table 1, I provide a selection of Pulitzer Prize-winning stories that exhibit the effects of post-transgression rivalry on commercial and noncommercial organizations. Throughout this article, I reference stories from Table 1 along with other examples of organization— media exchanges to demonstrate the relationships outlined in the framework. Of note, I use the terms “organizations” and “leaders,” instead of “firms” and “managers,” to expand this framework beyond the commercial entities that competitive dynamics research typically examines. Noncommercial entities such as governments, public agencies, nonprofits, charitable organizations, and other loosely organized activist or interest groups also commonly engage with the media about their transgressions, and therefore fall within the scope of this framework. Leaders in these organizations may include executives and board members from commercial organizations, government officials in governmental or public agencies, and even directors or organizers in other noncommercial entities. 该框架的第二部分借鉴了新闻业和危机管理研究，构建了一个关于叙事控制权竞争的多阶段模型。在这个模型中，我考虑了记者和组织领导者的认知，这些认知可能会将那些紧张局势催化为竞争性行动和反应，从而引发或维持一场关于违规行为的叙事控制权争夺。为了辅助我的概念化，我借鉴了后违规组织的著名案例——媒体间的叙事控制权竞争。在表1中，我提供了一些普利策奖获奖报道，这些报道展示了后违规竞争对商业和非商业组织的影响。在整篇文章中，我参考了表1中的报道以及其他组织与媒体互动的例子，以展示框架中概述的关系。值得注意的是，我使用“组织”和“领导者”这两个术语，而不是“企业”和“管理者”，以将这个框架扩展到竞争动态研究通常考察的商业实体之外。政府、公共机构、非营利组织、慈善组织以及其他松散组织的活动家或利益集团等非商业实体也经常就其违规行为与媒体互动，因此也属于本框架的范畴。这些组织中的领导者可能包括商业组织的高管和董事会成员、政府机构或公共机构的政府官员，甚至是非商业实体中的董事或组织者。

In reconceptualizing organizations and the media as potential rivals following transgressions, this theoretical framework contributes to competitive dynamics research in two primary ways and makes a noteworthy contribution to crisis management research. First, this framework recognizes that latent rivalries between dissimilar actors may materialize when situational conditions create temporary tensions between the two parties. Specifically, it suggests that organization-media rivalry might arise over a sociocognitive resource (i.e., narrative control) that manifests only in certain situations (e.g., following an organizational transgression). Second, this framework enriches competitive dynamics research by establishing that organizations engage in rhetorical battles to influence stakeholder perceptions about their legitimacy. This adds to the expanding literature on alternative competitive actions that involve persuasive communication (Gao, Yu, & Cannella, 2017; Rindova, Becerra, & Contardo, 2004). Lastly, in terms of the crisis management literature, this framework broadens the investigation of organization-media interplay following transgressions by developing an alternative theoretical mechanism to account for previously underconceptualized behaviors. I propose that competing for control of the narrative about a transgression might be a motivation for organizations’ crisis management efforts, which represents a deviation from stakeholder theory-focused frameworks that dominate the crisis management literature (Bundy, Pfarrer, Short, & Coombs, 2017). As a result, this framework may account for additional variance in crisis response strategies beyond that of existing crisis management frameworks. 在将组织和媒体重新概念化为违规后的潜在对手时，这一理论框架从两个主要方面为竞争动态研究做出了贡献，并为危机管理研究带来了显著贡献。首先，该框架认识到，当情境条件在双方之间造成暂时紧张时，不同行为体之间的潜在竞争可能会显现。具体而言，它表明组织与媒体之间的竞争可能源于一种社会认知资源（即叙事控制权），这种资源仅在特定情况下（例如，在组织违规之后）才会显现。其次，该框架通过确立组织会进行修辞性博弈以影响利益相关者对其合法性的看法，丰富了竞争动态研究。这为关于涉及有说服力沟通的替代性竞争行动的不断扩展的文献增添了内容（Gao, Yu, & Cannella, 2017; Rindova, Becerra, & Contardo, 2004）。最后，就危机管理文献而言，该框架通过开发一种替代性理论机制来解释先前概念化不足的行为，拓宽了对违规后组织与媒体互动的研究。我认为，争夺对违规事件叙事的控制权可能是组织危机管理努力的一个动机，这与主导危机管理文献的以利益相关者理论为中心的框架有所不同（Bundy, Pfarrer, Short, & Coombs, 2017）。因此，该框架可能能够解释危机应对策略中除现有危机管理框架之外的额外差异。

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

理论背景

Prior research on competitive dynamics largely examines rivalrous activities between two firms in a particular market (Chen & Miller, 2015). Early competitive dynamics research studied the interplay of competing firms’ rivalrous actions as they pursued market advantage (Chen & Miller, 2012) both in consumer markets and resource markets (Capron & Chatain, 2008; Chen, 1996; Markman, Gianiodis, & Buchholtz, 2009). This work recognizes that firm attributes influence rivalry between competing firms as they pursue market advantages (Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 2012; Silverman & Baum, 2002). For instance, larger firms tend to take more significant visible actions against rivals than smaller firms (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). 先前关于竞争动态的研究主要考察特定市场中两家企业之间的竞争性活动（Chen & Miller, 2015）。早期的竞争动态研究探讨了竞争企业为追求市场优势而采取的竞争性行动之间的相互作用（Chen & Miller, 2012），这些行动既发生在消费市场，也发生在资源市场（Capron & Chatain, 2008; Chen, 1996; Markman, Gianiodis, & Buchholtz, 2009）。这项研究认识到，企业属性会影响竞争企业在追求市场优势过程中的竞争关系（Baum & Korn, 1996; Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 2012; Silverman & Baum, 2002）。例如，与小企业相比，大企业往往会对竞争对手采取更显著、更显眼的行动（Chen & Hambrick, 1995）。

A parallel stream of competitive dynamics research has emerged that explores how the actions and responses of firms engaged in rivalry are influenced by their managers’ perceptions (Chen, 1996). Researchers have recognized the tension that managers perceive to exist as an antecedent of their firms’ responses to rivals’ actions, uncovering a positive association between tension and response likelihood (Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007). “Tension” in this context refers to the “strain between a focal firm and a given rival that is likely to result in the firm taking action against the rival” (Chen et al., 2007: 101). An “action” represents a “specific and detectable market move initiated by a firm, such as introducing a new product or entering a new market, to erode a rival’s market share or reduce its anticipated returns” (Chen & Miller, 2012: 141). Tensions, actions, and subsequent reactions constitute core constructs related to rivalry and are of central interest in this framework. 竞争动态研究的一个平行流派已经出现，该流派探讨了参与竞争的企业的行动和反应如何受到其管理者感知的影响（Chen，1996）。研究人员认识到管理者感知到的紧张关系是企业对竞争对手行动做出反应的一个前因，并揭示了紧张关系与反应可能性之间的正相关关系（Chen，Su，& Tsai，2007）。在这一背景下，“紧张”指的是“焦点企业与特定竞争对手之间的张力，这种张力可能导致企业对竞争对手采取行动”（Chen et al.，2007：101）。“行动”代表“企业发起的具体且可察觉的市场举措，例如推出新产品或进入新市场，以侵蚀竞争对手的市场份额或降低其预期回报”（Chen & Miller，2012：141）。紧张关系、行动以及随后的反应构成了与竞争相关的核心概念，并且是本框架中最受关注的内容。

TABLE 1 Selection of Recent Pulitzer Prize-Winning Stories About Transgressions by Organizations
表1 近期普利策奖获奖的组织违规相关故事精选

Tensions are a necessary, but not sufficient on their own, condition for competitive action and reaction. Researchers in this area argue that the conversion of tension into action and reaction may be predicated on motivating factors (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007; Waldron et al., 2019). Managers are more likely to act or react when they perceive instrumentality and valence in reacting (Chen, 1996). When considering possible actions or reactions, factors that heighten managers’ motivation to engage with rivals serve to catalyze tension into response. For instance, prior findings indicate that rivals’ similarities and prior rivalrous interactions increase the likelihood of further rivalry, as do competitors’ motivations to achieve supremacy (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010). 紧张是竞争性行动与反应的必要条件，但仅靠紧张本身并不充分。该领域的研究者认为，紧张转化为行动与反应可能取决于激励因素（Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007; Waldron et al., 2019）。当管理者感知到反应的工具性和效价时，他们更有可能采取行动或做出反应（Chen, 1996）。在考虑可能的行动或反应时，那些增强管理者与对手互动动机的因素会促使紧张转化为回应。例如，先前的研究结果表明，对手的相似性和先前的竞争性互动会增加进一步竞争的可能性，竞争对手追求优势的动机也会产生同样的效果（Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010）。

Departing from research concerning rivalry between firms, scholars have begun to explore rivalry between firms and dissimilar actors for nonmarket ends, which overlaps conceptually with the framework developed here (Markman et al., 2016; Waldron et al., 2019). To date, this research has largely focused on firm—activist interplay, wherein the two parties engage in a form of sociocognitive rivalry conceptualized as “valuesbased rivalry” (Waldron et al., 2019: 801). “Valuesbased rivalry” involves activists and firms each attempting to establish their preferred set of values as supreme in order to exercise control over the firms’ practices. This research suggests that attributes of activists, their arguments, or the context in which the activism takes place can determine the effectiveness of activists’ claims (Pacheco & Dean, 2015). In a similar vein, following transgressions, organizations and members of the media may engage in a similar form of sociocognitive rivalry: rivalry to control the narrative accepted by stakeholders about the organization’s transgression. 从关于企业间竞争的研究出发，学者们已开始探索企业与不同行为体为非市场目标展开的竞争，这在概念上与本文构建的框架存在重叠（Markman等人，2016；Waldron等人，2019）。迄今为止，这一研究主要聚焦于企业与活动人士的互动，其中双方会进行一种被概念化为“基于价值观的竞争”的社会认知型竞争（Waldron等人，2019：801）。“基于价值观的竞争”涉及活动人士和企业各自试图将自身偏好的价值观体系确立为至高无上，以对企业的实践施加控制。这项研究表明，活动人士的特质、其论点或活动发生的背景可能会决定活动人士主张的有效性（Pacheco & Dean，2015）。同样，在发生违规行为后，组织和媒体成员可能会参与类似形式的社会认知型竞争：即争夺对利益相关者所接受的组织违规行为叙事的控制权。

Although competitive dynamics research has considered rivalry between dissimilar actors, it has not yet fully captured the process whereby these rivalries emerge and terminate. The potentially adversarial nature of the organizationmedia relationship following transgressions (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Pfarrer et al., 2008) suggests that using a competitive dynamics lens could help researchers understand the two parties’ rivalrous behaviors. Furthermore, because organizations and media outlets only engage one another under certain circumstances (Clayman, Heritage, Elliott, & McDonald, 2007), considering organizationmedia rivalry might advance our understanding about how latent rivalries between dissimilar actors transpire. Dissimilar rivals do not tend to have longstanding rivalrous relationships, and their rivalries do not tend to continue in perpetuity like commercial rivalries do (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Rindova et al., 2004). Therefore, conceptualizing the process whereby contests between dissimilar parties emerge and conclude might further our understanding of these types of rivalries. My objective is to develop a framework that resolves these conceptual and explanatory constraints and establishes a theoretical foundation for rivalry between organizations and the media following transgressions. 尽管竞争动态研究已经考虑了不同参与者之间的竞争，但尚未完全捕捉到这些竞争出现和终止的过程。违规行为后组织与媒体关系的潜在对抗性（Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015; Pfarrer et al., 2008）表明，使用竞争动态视角可以帮助研究者理解双方的竞争行为。此外，由于组织和媒体机构仅在特定情况下相互互动（Clayman, Heritage, Elliott, & McDonald, 2007），考虑组织与媒体的竞争可能会增进我们对不同参与者之间潜在竞争如何发生的理解。不同的竞争对手往往不会有长期的竞争关系，而且他们的竞争不会像商业竞争那样永久持续（Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Rindova et al., 2004）。因此，将不同方之间的竞争出现和结束的过程概念化，可能会进一步加深我们对这类竞争的理解。我的目标是构建一个框架，解决这些概念和解释上的限制，并为违规行为后组织与媒体之间的竞争建立理论基础。

CONCEPTUALIZING RIVALRY BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MEDIA

组织与媒体之间竞争关系的概念化

The first part of this framework reconceptualizes tensions, actions, and reactions (Chen & Miller, 2012) to describe the unique rivalry between organizations and media outlets following transgressions. I establish that these core concepts of rivalry take different forms during post-transgression organization media rivalry than they do during market-based rivalry between two firms. In doing so, I contrast the forms of control sought during market-based rivalry with the forms of control sought by organizations and the media following transgressions, which create unique sources of tension. I also compare the distinctive forms of action and reaction that organizations and the media take following transgressions to those taken by firms engaged in market-based rivalry. In developing this theory, I draw upon research from various domains that have traditionally examined post-transgression stakeholder-management strategies (e.g., crisis communication, corrective actions, rhetorical strategies, organizational accounts, and public relations) described henceforth as “crisis management research.” Drawing on crisis management research to enrich the competitive dynamics literature bolsters the ability of both domains to explain the interplay between media outlets and organizations seeking to control narratives about transgressions, thereby fulfilling calls for interdisciplinary theory development (Durand, Grant, & Madsen, 2017). 该框架的第一部分重新概念化了紧张关系、行动和反应（Chen & Miller，2012），以描述组织和媒体机构在违规行为后形成的独特竞争关系。我认为，在违规后的组织-媒体竞争中，竞争的这些核心概念呈现出与两家企业之间基于市场的竞争不同的形式。在此过程中，我对比了基于市场的竞争中寻求的控制形式，与组织和媒体在违规后寻求的控制形式，这些形式产生了独特的紧张来源。我还比较了组织和媒体在违规后采取的独特行动和反应形式，与从事基于市场竞争的企业所采取的行动和反应形式。在构建这一理论时，我借鉴了来自各个领域的研究，这些领域传统上研究违规后的利益相关者管理策略（例如危机沟通、纠正措施、修辞策略、组织说明和公共关系），以下统称为“危机管理研究”。利用危机管理研究来丰富竞争动态文献，增强了两个领域解释媒体机构和组织之间寻求控制违规叙事的相互作用的能力，从而满足了跨学科理论发展的需求（Durand, Grant, & Madsen, 2017）。

Sources of Tension Between the Media and Organizations Following a Transgression

违规后媒体与机构之间的紧张来源

A core tenet of the conceptualization of tension in competitive dynamics research is that it exists when firms seek control of the same share of a market or resources (Chen et al., 2007). Implicit in this conceptualization are the potential consequences of winning or losing control over the market for consumers or resources, which involve substantial gains or losses to overall firm performance. Similarly, crisis management research indicates that, following transgressions, media outlets and organizations seek to control the message that is presented to stakeholders (Zavyalova et al., 2012). Following a transgression, organizations and media outlets may experience temporary rivalrous tensions with one another, due to the reciprocal implications of winning or losing control over the message presented to stakeholders. When this occurs, the organization’s transgression creates the necessary situational conditions for a latent rivalry between the two dissimilar parties to materialize. Thus, a transgression expands the competitive landscapes for transgressing organizations and media outlets such that they temporarily overlap (Withers, Ireland, Miller, Harrison, & Boss, 2018). 竞争动态研究中，张力概念化的一个核心原则是：当企业寻求对同一市场份额或资源的控制权时，张力便会产生（Chen et al., 2007）。这一概念化隐含了在消费者或资源市场中，获得或失去控制权可能带来的潜在后果，这些后果涉及企业整体绩效的重大收益或损失。同样，危机管理研究表明，在发生违规行为后，媒体机构和组织会试图控制向利益相关者传递的信息（Zavyalova et al., 2012）。违规行为发生后，由于在向利益相关者传递的信息控制权上的得失相互影响，组织和媒体机构之间可能会出现暂时的竞争性张力。当这种情况发生时，组织的违规行为为两个不同主体之间潜在的竞争关系形成必要的情境条件。因此，违规行为会扩大违规组织和媒体机构的竞争格局，使它们在短期内产生重叠（Withers, Ireland, Miller, Harrison, & Boss, 2018）。

Whereas rival firms seek control over common objects (e.g., market share and resources), members of the media and transgressing organizations seek to control the narrative, which plays a large role in shaping stakeholders’ perceptions. A “narrative” is an account of a series of related events that communicates noteworthy information to an audience, such as what happened, why it happened, when it happened, who was involved, and what should be done (Barry & Elmes, 1997; Mitchell, 1981; Scholes, 1980). To the extent that an audience accepts a narrative, the information the narrative presents can shape a wide array of audience perceptions about the events, characters, and prescriptions the narrative describes (Bishop, Treviño, Gioia, & Kreiner, 2020; Boje, 2014; Davis, 2002; Klein & Amis, 2021; Zavyalova et al., 2017). Both parties ultimately seek to reshape elements of the narrative to persuade stakeholders whether they should pay attention to the transgression, and whether they should revoke or restore the organization’s legitimacy (Heath, 2000; Pfarrer et al., 2008). However, multiple competing versions of a narrative can exist simultaneously, and a narrative can change as events unfold and new information is presented to the audience by various parties (Benford, 2002; Jones, Shanahan, & McBeth, 2014). 而竞争对手企业寻求对共同资源（如市场份额和资源）的控制权，媒体成员和违规组织则试图控制叙事，因为叙事在塑造利益相关者的认知方面发挥着重要作用。“叙事”是对一系列相关事件的描述，它向受众传达重要信息，例如发生了什么、为什么发生、何时发生、谁参与其中以及应该采取什么行动（Barry & Elmes, 1997；Mitchell, 1981；Scholes, 1980）。只要受众接受该叙事，叙事所呈现的信息就可以广泛影响受众对叙事所描述的事件、人物和建议的认知（Bishop, Treviño, Gioia, & Kreiner, 2020；Boje, 2014；Davis, 2002；Klein & Amis, 2021；Zavyalova et al., 2017）。双方最终都试图重塑叙事的要素，以说服利益相关者是否应该关注违规行为，以及是否应该撤销或恢复组织的合法性（Heath, 2000；Pfarrer et al., 2008）。然而，对同一叙事可能存在多个相互竞争的版本，并且随着事件的发展以及各方向受众呈现新信息，叙事也可能发生变化（Benford, 2002；Jones, Shanahan, & McBeth, 2014）。

Media outlets may seek control of the narrative for both economic and institutional reasons (Graf-Vlachy, Oliver, Banfield, König, & Bundy, 2020; Roulet & Clemente, 2018), which may motivate them to steer the narrative toward an unflattering storyline for the transgressing organization. First, media outlets are economically incentivized to attract public attention, and controlling the narrative may give them the ability to generate public interest. A narrative that downplays the impropriety of an organization’s transgression and minimizes stakeholder concern (i.e., the transgressing organization’s preferred narrative) may be less likely to attract public attention than a scandalous story that highlights impropriety and maximizes stakeholder concern (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2013; Trussler & Soroka, 2014). Thus, journalists may seek to control the narrative because it allows them to generate public interest and increase engagement, whereas failure to control the narrative might be a missed opportunity to increase engagement. 媒体机构可能出于经济和制度原因寻求对叙事的控制权（Graf-Vlachy, Oliver, Banfield, König, & Bundy, 2020; Roulet & Clemente, 2018），这可能促使它们将叙事引向对违规组织不利的情节。首先，媒体机构在经济上有动力吸引公众关注，而控制叙事可能使它们能够激发公众兴趣。淡化组织违规不当行为并减轻利益相关者担忧的叙事（即违规组织偏好的叙事），可能不如突出不当行为并加剧利益相关者担忧的丑闻性报道那样吸引公众关注（McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 2013; Trussler & Soroka, 2014）。因此，记者可能会寻求控制叙事，因为这能让他们激发公众兴趣并提高参与度，而未能控制叙事可能会错失提高参与度的机会。

Second, the media plays an institutional watchdog role with an obligation to fact-check and provide their audience with accurate information (Hanitzsch, 2011; Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017). If journalists do not believe that information provided by an organization is accurate, then their watchdog role identity may oblige them to step in and attempt to seize control of the narrative to ensure stakeholders receive truthful and reliable information (Livengood & Reger, 2010; Márquez-Ramírez et al., 2020). For example, in the NSA surveillance story from Table 1, the government agency explicitly claimed that they were not engaged in widespread data collection on American citizens, but journalists at Guardian US and The Washington Post were able to uncover and present information demonstrating that the NSA was, in fact, doing so. When members of the media expose misinformation about a transgression, their audience often confers status to them in return (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013). 其次，媒体扮演着机构监督者的角色，有义务进行事实核查并为受众提供准确信息（Hanitzsch, 2011; Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017）。如果记者认为某个组织提供的信息不准确，那么其监督者身份可能会促使他们介入并试图掌控叙事，以确保利益相关者获得真实可靠的信息（Livengood & Reger, 2010; Márquez-Ramírez et al., 2020）。例如，在表1中的美国国家安全局（NSA）监控故事中，政府机构明确声称他们没有对美国公民进行大规模数据收集，但《卫报》美国版和《华盛顿邮报》的记者却能够发现并呈现信息，证明NSA实际上确实在这么做。当媒体成员揭露关于违规行为的虚假信息时，他们的受众往往会因此赋予他们相应的地位（Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013）。

In addition to their role as watchdogs, media outlets often play the institutional change agent (or interventionist) role by affecting positive changes in transgressing organizations (Hanitzsch, 2011; Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017; Márquez-Ramírez et al., 2020). When stakeholders revoke legitimacy, it creates social pressure on the organization to realign its behavior with social norms and expectations (Deephouse, 2000). Media outlets can amplify this process by highlighting the organization’s behaviors that conflict with social norms and exposing those inconsistencies to a broader audience, thereby intensifying the transgression’s delegitimizing effect (Deephouse, 2000; Desai, 2014; McDonnell & King, 2013). The media can often intensify delegitimization to the extent that transgressing organizations change practices, policies, and personnel in ways that they would not have otherwise (Desai, 2011). When this occurs, stakeholders, the media outlet’s audience, and the general public often credit the outlet with goodwill, bestowing status and awards upon those outlets or specific journalists for their efforts (Deephouse, 200o; Durand & Vergne, 2015; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013). 除了作为监督者的角色外，媒体机构还经常扮演制度变革推动者（或干预者）的角色，通过促使违规组织发生积极变革来实现这一目标（Hanitzsch, 2011；Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017；Márquez-Ramírez等人，2020）。当利益相关者撤销合法性时，会给组织带来社会压力，迫使其调整行为以符合社会规范和期望（Deephouse, 2000）。媒体机构可以通过突出报道组织中与社会规范相冲突的行为，并将这些不一致之处暴露给更广泛的受众，从而加剧违规行为的去合法化效应（Deephouse, 2000；Desai, 2014；McDonnell & King, 2013）。媒体往往能将去合法化效应强化到这样的程度：违规组织会以其他方式不会采取的方式改变实践、政策和人员（Desai, 2011）。当这种情况发生时，利益相关者、媒体机构的受众以及公众通常会将善意归功于该媒体机构，并授予这些媒体或特定记者地位和奖项以表彰其努力（Deephouse, 2000；Durand & Vergne, 2015；Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013）。

A transgressing organization’s desire to control the narrative stems from its motivation to minimize or reverse damage to its legitimacy (Bundy et al., 2017; Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009; Elsbach, 1994; Pfarrer et al., 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012). When organizations lose legitimacy, not only is their institutional status threatened, but stakeholders may also withdraw from the organization, which can negatively impact economic performance and access to resources (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Frooman, 1999; Suchman, 1995). To avoid delegitimization, organizations often attempt to influence the narrative through the use of rhetoric, which is a means of inducing stakeholder cooperation by manipulating their perceptions about legitimacy (Burke, 1969; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Importantly, organizations’ rhetorical strategies comprise persuasive speech or arguments as well as any substantive actions that supplement the persuasive communication (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). 一个违规组织试图控制叙事的愿望源于其减少或扭转对自身合法性损害的动机（Bundy et al., 2017; Dirks, Lewicki, & Zaheer, 2009; Elsbach, 1994; Pfarrer et al., 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012）。当组织失去合法性时，不仅其制度地位受到威胁，利益相关者也可能退出该组织，这会对经济表现和资源获取产生负面影响（Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Frooman, 1999; Suchman, 1995）。为避免失去合法性，组织通常试图通过运用修辞来影响叙事，而修辞是通过操纵利益相关者对合法性的认知来诱导其合作的手段（Burke, 1969; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005）。重要的是，组织的修辞策略包括有说服力的言语或论点，以及任何补充这种有说服力沟通的实质性行动（Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005）。

Although rivalry for narrative control does not always conclude with a clear, widely accepted narrative about the transgression, organizations or adversarial media outlets may achieve supremacy when a collective audience accepts the narrative that they promote. Oftentimes, media outlets and organizations exchange rivalrous actions and reactions that leave the collective audience confused (or split) about which version of the narrative they accept. In these cases, there is no clear “winner” in the rivalry. In other cases, one side achieves control over the narrative and the collective audience comes to accept their version of what happened, who was involved, and what should be done. When this occurs, the side that defines the widely accepted narrative has “won” the exchange. Importantly, even if an organization or media outlet has facts and evidence on their side, it may not guarantee their victory. In considering an organization’s legitimacy and the penalties that stakeholders might impose on it following a transgression, objective facts about the transgression only matter to the degree that they factor into the widely accepted narrative about the transgression. 尽管对叙事控制权的争夺并不总是以一个清晰、被广泛接受的关于违规行为的叙事告终，但当集体受众接受他们所宣扬的叙事时，组织或对抗性媒体机构可能会占据主导地位。通常，媒体机构和组织会进行对抗性的行动和反应，这会让集体受众对他们接受哪个版本的叙事感到困惑（或分裂）。在这些情况下，竞争中没有明显的“赢家”。在其他情况下，一方会控制叙事，集体受众会接受他们对所发生事情、涉事人员以及应采取何种行动的描述。当这种情况发生时，定义了被广泛接受的叙事的一方在这场交锋中“获胜”。重要的是，即使一个组织或媒体机构掌握事实和证据，也不一定能保证其胜利。在考虑一个组织的合法性以及利益相关者在违规行为后可能对其施加的惩罚时，关于违规行为的客观事实只有在它们被纳入关于该违规行为的广泛接受的叙事中时才会起作用。

Rivalrous Actions by Media Outlets and Organizations

媒体机构和组织的竞争行为

Competitive dynamics research contends that actions and reactions between rival firms involve tactics for controlling the consumers and resources necessary to attain advantage in a shared market (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). Without explicitly recognizing narrative control as the outcome of interest, crisis management research describes a number of tactics used by organizations as well as attributes of media coverage that influence stakeholder perceptions. This research may help elucidate the unique nature of actions and reactions taken by media outlets and organizations to control the narrative about a transgression. 竞争动态研究认为，竞争对手之间的行动与反应涉及控制消费者和共享市场中获取优势所必需资源的策略（Chen & MacMillan，1992）。危机管理研究在未明确将叙事控制视为关注结果的情况下，描述了组织使用的多种策略以及影响利益相关者认知的媒体报道特征。本研究可能有助于阐明媒体机构和组织为控制关于违规行为的叙事而采取的行动与反应的独特性质。

Rivalrous media actions. Scholars have recognized several important attributes of media coverage about organizational transgressions that contribute to its rivalrousness. Media coverage might take the form of articles in newspapers, segments on broadcast media, or media stories (i.e., multiple articles or segments over time). Foremost, for the media coverage to be rivalrous, its tone must be critical of the organization or its behavior. “Tone” refers to “the level of support for an organization” expressed by the media (Carroll & Deephouse, 2014: 84). Media coverage that portrays an organization favorably serves to influence the narrative about the organization’s transgression in a way that is consistent with the organization’s objectives. Such coverage is cooperative instead of competitive, and therefore outside the scope of this framework. Thus, if considered on a continuum of negative $( - 1 )$ to neutral (0) to favorable (1), only media coverage that falls on the neutral-to-negative side of the continuum would qualify as a rivalrous. Moreover, as media coverage moves further along the negative end of the continuum, the more rivalrous it becomes (Vergne, Wernicke, & Brenner, 2018). 竞争性媒体行为。学者们已经认识到，关于组织违规行为的媒体报道有几个重要特征，这些特征会使其具有竞争性。媒体报道可能采取报纸文章、广播媒体的片段或媒体故事（即随时间推移的多篇文章或片段）的形式。首先，要使媒体报道具有竞争性，其基调必须是批评该组织或其行为的。“基调”指的是媒体表达的“对组织的支持程度”（Carroll & Deephouse, 2014: 84）。对组织进行正面报道的媒体报道，会以与组织目标一致的方式影响关于该组织违规行为的叙述。这类报道是合作性的而非竞争性的，因此不在本框架的范围内。因此，如果将媒体报道放在从负面（-1）到中性（0）再到正面（1）的连续体上，只有落在连续体中性到负面一侧的媒体报道才符合竞争性的定义。此外，随着媒体报道在连续体的负面端进一步延伸，其竞争性会变得更强（Vergne, Wernicke, & Brenner, 2018）。

In addition to tone, content is an important attribute that may determine the rivalrousness of media coverage (Carroll & Deephouse, 2014). Given the form of rivalry examined within this framework (i.e., narrative control), specific narrative-shaping content within the media coverage of a transgression may also contribute to the coverage’s rivalrousness (Ettema & Glasser, 1988). Media coverage that makes specific claims about what happened, who was involved, and what should be done aims to shape the narrative about the transgression and, in doing so, shape stakeholders’ perceptions of the organization. For example, in the 2018 Pulitzer Prizewinning story about sexual abuse of women in the entertainment industry (see Table 1), articles in The New Yorker and The New York Times documented harmful behaviors of well-known individuals at specific entertainment production companies. If the story had not contained this narrative-shaping content, and instead simply highlighted the mistreatment of women in society or show business in general, then it would not be considered rivalrous for the purpose of narrative control about an organization’s transgression. 除了语气之外，内容是一个重要属性，可能决定媒体报道的竞争性（Carroll & Deephouse，2014）。鉴于本框架内考察的竞争形式（即叙事控制权），对违规行为的媒体报道中特定的叙事塑造内容也可能导致报道的竞争性（Ettema & Glasser，1988）。对发生了什么、谁参与其中以及应该采取什么措施提出具体主张的媒体报道旨在塑造关于违规行为的叙事，并在此过程中塑造利益相关者对该组织的看法。例如，在2018年普利策获奖的关于娱乐行业女性遭受性虐待的报道中（见表1），《纽约客》和《纽约时报》的文章记录了知名人士在特定娱乐制作公司的有害行为。如果该报道没有包含这种叙事塑造内容，而是仅仅强调社会或演艺界女性遭受的普遍虐待，那么从对组织违规行为的叙事控制权角度来看，它就不会被视为具有竞争性。

Rivalrous organizational reactions. Crisis management research recognizes that organizations often take extreme measures to present themselves favorably to stakeholders following a transgression. These measures comprise two broad rhetorical strategies (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Waldron, Fisher, & Navis, 2015) that organizations use to influence narratives about transgressions. Using the first type of rhetorical strategy, organizations attempt to combat an unfavorable narrative by convincing stakeholders that the transgression does not warrant delegitimization, a strategy hereafter referred to as “defensive rhetoric.” Using defensive rhetoric, organizations may attempt to persuade stakeholders that the transgression was not so bad and does not warrant penalties to the organization’s legitimacy (Elsbach, 1994). By creating this narrative, the organization makes stakeholders doubt the severity of the transgression and whether the organization deserves penalties at all (Benoit, 1995). 竞争性的组织反应。危机管理研究表明，组织在犯错后往往会采取极端措施，以在利益相关者面前塑造自身良好形象。这些措施包含两种广泛的修辞策略（Suddaby & Greenwood，2005；Waldron，Fisher，& Navis，2015），组织通过这些策略来影响关于违规行为的叙事。使用第一种修辞策略时，组织试图通过说服利益相关者，让他们相信该违规行为不值得被剥夺合法性，这种策略此后被称为“防御性修辞”。通过使用防御性修辞，组织可能会试图说服利益相关者，认为该违规行为并不那么严重，不值得对组织的合法性进行惩罚（Elsbach，1994）。通过构建这种叙事，组织会让利益相关者怀疑违规行为的严重性，以及组织是否根本值得受到惩罚（Benoit，1995）。

Organizations tend to rely solely on crisis communication when they seek to combat an unfavorable narrative using a defensive rhetorical strategy (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). Prior crisis management research has thoroughly considered organizations’ accounts of their transgressions as a crisis communication mechanism, which can be powerful in conveying that the transgression does not warrant delegitimization (Elsbach, 1994). Within their communications, organizations may express sentiments ranging from justification, denial, and explanation, to obfuscation (Benoit, 1995; Elsbach, 1994). Each of these sentiments serves to influence stakeholders’ perceptions and convince them that delegitimization is not warranted (Elsbach, 1994). Similarly, organizations may use crisis communication tactics such as blaming an external party, attacking the accuser, or portraying themselves as a victim within the narrative to elicit a sympathetic response from stakeholders (Coombs, 2014; Holladay, 2010; Park, Park, & Ramanujam, 2018). Such was the case in November of 2019 when Frederick Smith, chairman and CEO of FedEx, issued a statement attacking The New York Times in response to an article it published about FedEx’s lobbying for and use of federal corporate tax breaks. In his statement, which is displayed in Figure 1, Mr. Smith cultivated a counternarrative to the article by attacking the accuser, denying any wrongdoing, and attempting to change the conversation to capital investment and economic development, all of which served to shift the narrative in a way that was favorable for FedEx (FedEx Newsroom, 2019). 当组织试图通过防御性修辞策略来对抗不利叙事时，往往会仅仅依赖危机沟通（Coombs & Holladay，2010）。以往的危机管理研究充分考虑了组织将自身违规行为的陈述作为危机沟通机制的情况，这种机制在传达违规行为不应被剥夺合法性方面可能非常有效（Elsbach，1994）。在沟通中，组织可能表达从辩解、否认、解释到混淆视听等各种态度（Benoit，1995；Elsbach，1994）。这些态度中的每一种都旨在影响利益相关者的看法，并让他们相信剥夺合法性是没有必要的（Elsbach，1994）。同样，组织可能会使用危机沟通策略，例如指责外部方、攻击指控者，或在叙事中把自己塑造为受害者，以引发利益相关者的同情（Coombs，2014；Holladay，2010；Park，Park，& Ramanujam，2018）。2019年11月，联邦快递董事长兼首席执行官弗雷德里克·史密斯（Frederick Smith）就是这样做的。当时，《纽约时报》发表了一篇关于联邦快递游说并使用联邦企业税收减免的文章，史密斯先生对此发表声明，攻击《纽约时报》。在他的声明（如图1所示）中，史密斯先生通过攻击指控者、否认任何不当行为，并试图将话题转向资本投资和经济发展，从而构建了一个与该文章相对立的叙事，所有这些都以一种对联邦快递有利的方式转移了叙事方向（FedEx Newsroom，2019）。

Alternatively, organizations may use a second type of rhetorical strategy, which I refer to as “conciliatory rhetoric,” in their attempts to redirect an unfavorable narrative. Using this strategy, an organization accepts that a delegitimizing problem did exist, but, because of substantive corrective actions that the organization has taken, the problem has been fixed and their legitimacy should be restored (Hersel, Helmuth, Zorn, Shropshire, & Ridge, 2019). Transgressing organizations may take corrective actions such as changing policies and practices, or removing problematic leaders and employees (Gangloff, Connelly, & Shook, 2016; Vlad, Sallot, & Reber, 2006). Alternatively, organizations may offer various forms of recompense to stakeholder groups affected by their transgression to demonstrate that Alternatively, organizations may use a second type of rhetorical strategy, which I refer to as “conciliatory rhetoric,” in their attempts to redirect an unfavorable narrative. Using this strategy, an organization accepts that a delegitimizing problem did exist, but, because of substantive corrective actions that the organization has taken, the problem has been fixed and their legitimacy should be restored (Hersel, Helmuth, Zorn, Shropshire, & Ridge, 2019). Transgressing organizations may take corrective actions such as changing policies and practices, or removing problematic leaders and employees (Gangloff, Connelly, & Shook, 2016; Vlad, Sallot, & Reber, 2006). Alternatively, organizations may offer various forms of recompense to stakeholder groups affected by their transgression to demonstrate that

November 17, 2019

2019年11月17日

The New York Times published a distorted and factually incorrect story
《纽约时报》发表了一篇歪曲事实、内容错误的报道

on the front page of the Sunday, November 17 edition concerning FedEx
在11月17日星期日版的头版上，关于联邦快递的内容

and our billions of dollars of tax payments and billions of dollars of
以及我们数十亿美元的税款和数十亿美元的

investments in the U.S. economy. Pertinent to this outrageous distortion
对美国经济的投资。这与这种离谱的扭曲现象相关

of the truth is the fact that unlike FedEx, the New York Times
of the truth is the fact that unlike FedEx, the New York Times

paid zero federal income tax in 2017 on earnings of $111 million, and
2017年收入1.11亿美元，但缴纳的联邦所得税为零，并且

only $$ 30$ million in $2 0 1 8 - 1 8 %$ of their pretax book income. Also in 2018
仅在2018年就有3000万美元——占其税前账面利润的18%。同样在2018年

the New York Times cut their capital investments nearly in half to $$ 57$ million, which equates to a rounding error when compared to the $6 bllion of capital that FedEx invested inthe U.. economy during that same year. 《纽约时报》将其资本投资削减近一半，降至5700万美元，而这一数字与联邦快递同年在美国经济中投入的60亿美元相比，几乎可以忽略不计。

I hereby challenge A.G. Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times and the business section editor to a public debate in Washington, DC with me and the FedEx corporate vice president of tax.The focus o the debate should be federal tax policy and the relative societal benefits of business investments and the enormous intended benefits to the United States economy, especially lower and middle class wage earners. 我在此向《纽约时报》发行人兼商业版编辑A.G.苏尔茨伯格以及联邦快递公司税务副总裁发起公开辩论挑战，地点设在华盛顿特区。辩论的焦点应是联邦税收政策，以及商业投资对社会的相对益处，特别是对美国经济（尤其是中低收入工薪阶层）的巨大预期益处。

I look forward to proptlyhearig fom M. Sulzbergerand schedulng his open event o bring frther public awareness of the facts related to these important issues. I look forward to promptly hearing from M. Sulzberger and scheduling his open event to bring further public awareness of the facts related to these important issues.

they have paid a price for their transgression (Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2009). Notably, when utilizing a conciliatory rhetorical strategy, organizations tend to supplement their corrective actions with crisis communication to convey to their audience of stakeholders that they are fixing the underlying problem (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). For instance, organizations may attempt to reconcile with stakeholders by apologizing, repenting, and offering sympathy (Holladay, 2010; Verhoeven, Van Hoof, Ter Keurs, & van Vuuren, 2012). 他们为自己的违规行为付出了代价（Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2009）。值得注意的是，当采用和解性修辞策略时，组织往往会通过危机沟通来补充其纠正措施，向利益相关者受众传达他们正在解决根本问题（Coombs & Holladay, 2010）。例如，组织可能会试图通过道歉、忏悔和表达同情来与利益相关者和解（Holladay, 2010; Verhoeven, Van Hoof, Ter Keurs, & van Vuuren, 2012）。

A key difference between defensive and conciliatory rhetorical strategies lies in the resource outlays required for crisis communication versus corrective action. Corrective actions tend to involve a considerable resource commitment, whereas crisis communication does not. The typical cost of crisis communication mediums (e.g., issuing a press release or holding a call to investors) is negligible compared to the cost of corrective actions (e.g., replacing a leader, devising or implementing policy changes, or issuing a product recall) (Beneish, Marshall, & Yang, 2017; Colak & Bray, 2016). Even the cost of a comprehensive public relations campaign, which might involve marketing, rebranding, and endorsements, typically does not exceed the cost of corrective actions (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). As a result, leaders of transgressing organizations may prefer to avoid conciliatory rhetorical strategies, which involve substantive corrective action, in favor of defensive rhetorical strategies when possible (Kim, Avery, & Lariscy, 2009). Moreover, pursuing a conciliatory rhetorical strategy either signals or explicitly conveys to stakeholders that the organization did, in fact, engage in illegitimate behavior. Thus, unless stakeholders already firmly believe that the organization’s behavior was illegitimate, pursuing a conciliatory strategy may introduce liability for the organization (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). 防御性修辞策略与和解性修辞策略的一个关键区别在于危机沟通与纠正行动所需的资源投入。纠正行动往往需要大量的资源投入，而危机沟通则不需要。危机沟通媒介（例如发布新闻稿或召开投资者电话会议）的典型成本与纠正行动（例如更换领导者、制定或实施政策变更或发布产品召回）的成本相比微不足道（Beneish, Marshall, & Yang, 2017；Colak & Bray, 2016）。即使是涉及营销、品牌重塑和代言的全面公关活动，其成本通常也不会超过纠正行动的成本（Coombs & Holladay, 2010）。因此，违规组织的领导者在可能的情况下可能会避免采用涉及实质性纠正行动的和解性修辞策略，转而选择防御性修辞策略（Kim, Avery, & Lariscy, 2009）。此外，采用和解性修辞策略要么向利益相关者暗示，要么明确传达该组织确实存在非法行为。因此，除非利益相关者已经坚信该组织的行为是非法的，否则采用和解策略可能会给该组织带来责任（Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990）。

Importantly, the rhetorical strategies discussed above are not necessarily related to defending against or accommodating specific stakeholder claims. Prior stakeholder theory-focused research largely considers whether an organization’s crisis response strategy accommodates stakeholder claims or defends the organization against stakeholder claims (Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013; Hersel et al., 2019). The rhetorical strategies considered here, on the other hand, serve to defend the organization and its behavior in the court of public opinion (i.e., defensive rhetoric) or demonstrate that the organization has fixed any underlying problems so legitimacy should be restored (i.e., conciliatory rhetoric). Whether the rhetorical strategy accommodates or defends against specific stakeholder claims is immaterial under this framework, unless doing so is essential for the organization to gain control over the narrative about the transgression. In fact, by shaping the narrative about the transgression, either of these rhetorical strategies might serve to prevent stakeholders from making claims altogether or direct their claims toward the organization’s preferred course of action. 重要的是，上述讨论的修辞策略不一定与防御或迎合特定利益相关者的诉求相关。此前以利益相关者理论为焦点的研究主要探讨组织的危机应对策略是迎合利益相关者诉求还是为组织抵御利益相关者诉求（Bundy, Shropshire, & Buchholtz, 2013；Hersel et al., 2019）。然而，此处考虑的修辞策略旨在为组织及其行为在公众舆论的“法庭”上进行辩护（即防御性修辞），或表明组织已解决所有根本问题，因此应恢复合法性（即和解性修辞）。在这一框架下，修辞策略是否迎合或抵御特定利益相关者的诉求并不重要，除非这样做是组织控制关于违规行为叙述的关键。事实上，通过塑造关于违规行为的叙述，这些修辞策略中的任何一种都可能阻止利益相关者提出诉求，或将其诉求引导至组织偏好的行动方向。

THE INFLUENCE OF JOURNALISTS’ AND LEADERS’ PERCEPTIONS

记者和领导者认知的影响

The second part of this framework conceptualizes the role of journalists’ and leaders’ perceptions— their subjective assessments of the rivalry (Chen & Miller, 1994; Chen et al., 2007)—in shaping their actions and reactions. In a multistage conceptual model, I specify perceptual catalysts that convert the latent tensions between organizations and media outlets following a transgression into rivalrous actions and reactions for narrative control. I begin by identifying key perceptions of journalists when they are considering whether to initiate rivalry for narrative control via their initial critical coverage of an organizational transgression. I then consider leaders’ perceptions about the transgression and the preceding critical media coverage, which I argue determines whether the organization will respond via crisis management as well as the rhetorical strategy they use in their response. Lastly, I consider the conditions necessary for the rivalry to continue or conclude. I illustrate the stages of rivalry for narrative control in Figure 2. I also provide a selection of longitudinal examples of well-known and recent organization—media rivalries in Table 2, which I use along with the stories from Table 1 to demonstrate how the stages of rivalry for narrative control played out in actual cases. 该框架的第二部分将记者和领导者的认知——即他们对竞争的主观评估（Chen & Miller，1994；Chen et al.，2007）——在塑造其行动和反应中的作用概念化。在一个多阶段概念模型中，我明确了感知催化剂，这些催化剂将组织与媒体机构之间因违规行为产生的潜在紧张关系转化为争夺叙事控制权的敌对行动和反应。我首先确定记者在考虑是否通过对组织违规行为的初步批评性报道来引发争夺叙事控制权的竞争时的关键认知。然后，我考虑领导者对违规行为及之前的批评性媒体报道的看法，我认为这决定了组织是否会通过危机管理做出回应，以及他们在回应中使用的修辞策略。最后，我考虑了竞争继续或结束所需的条件。我在图2中说明了争夺叙事控制权的各个阶段。我还在表2中提供了一些知名且近期的组织—媒体竞争的纵向示例，我将这些示例与表1中的案例一起使用，以展示争夺叙事控制权的各个阶段在实际案例中是如何展开的。

Stage 1: Journalists’ Perceptions That Initiate Rivalry for Narrative Control

阶段1：引发叙事控制权竞争的记者认知

（注：此处“Journalists’ Perceptions That Initiate Rivalry for Narrative Control”是标题，按中文标题规范调整语序，确保流畅性，核心语义不变。）

Unlike traditional competitive dynamics wherein any competitor can initiate a competitive exchange, a member of the media must initiate a rivalry for narrative control. In cases where they publish a critical story about a previously unknown organizational transgression, it is evident that the journalist has attacked the organization and initiated rivalry for narrative control (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The journalist’s breaking news story establishes the preliminary narrative about the transgression and attempts to damage the organization’s legitimacy. In other cases, organizations might disclose a transgression, attempt to frame it in a favorable way, or even take corrective actions before journalists have the opportunity to report on the transgression. However, rivalry for narrative control has not materialized in such cases at that point in time. If an organization’s version of the narrative about their transgression goes unchallenged by the media, then a rivalrous exchange for narrative control never materializes. While an organization’s preemptive crisis management efforts may attempt to shape the narrative about a transgression, crisis management efforts cannot be rivalrous until a media outlet engages the organization by attempting to establish an alternative narrative about the transgression. There are three primary motivating journalist perceptions that may catalyze the latent tensions media outlets experience with transgressing organizations into action and rivalry for narrative control: scandalousness, misinformation, and transgressor susceptibility. 与传统竞争动态不同，在传统竞争动态中任何竞争对手都可以发起竞争互动，而媒体成员必须主动争夺叙事控制权。当他们发表关于某个此前未知的组织违规行为的批判性报道时，显然记者已经攻击了该组织并发起了叙事控制权的争夺（Shoemaker & Reese，1996）。记者的突发新闻报道确立了关于该违规行为的初步叙事，并试图损害该组织的合法性。在其他情况下，组织可能会主动披露违规行为，试图以有利的方式进行框架构建，甚至在记者有机会报道该违规行为之前就采取纠正措施。然而，在这种情况下，叙事控制权的争夺在当时并未形成。如果组织对其违规行为的叙事版本未受到媒体的质疑，那么争夺叙事控制权的竞争性互动就永远不会形成。虽然组织的先发制人危机管理努力可能试图塑造关于违规行为的叙事，但在媒体机构通过试图建立关于该违规行为的替代叙事来与组织互动之前，危机管理努力无法构成竞争性互动。有三种主要的促使记者产生感知的因素，这些因素可能会将媒体机构与违规组织之间存在的潜在紧张关系转化为行动和对叙事控制权的争夺：丑闻性、错误信息和违规者易感性。

FIGURE 2 Multistage Conceptual Model of OrganizationMedia Rivalry for Narrative Control Following a Transgression 图2 组织媒体在越界后争夺叙事控制权的多阶段概念模型

Perception of scandalousness. Journalists’ perception of a transgression’s scandalousness, or its ability to attract attention from an audience, may stimulate journalists to initiate critical coverage. Various factors associated with the transgression and the organization might influence journalists’ perception of scandalousness. In terms of the transgression, media consumers are generally attracted to stories that involve injustice or highlight unsettled, unfolding problems and situations (Roulet, 2019; Trussler & Soroka, 2014; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013). In the story about natural gas royalties in Virginia from Table 1, journalists at the Bristol Herald Courier became aware that landowners were not receiving royalty payments from natural gas producers (i.e., stakeholder harm) and that a state-overseen escrow account was not making disbursements, though no one knew why (i.e., unresolved uncertainty). An organization’s characteristics might also influence journalists’ perception of scandalousness. 对丑闻性的认知。记者对违规行为是否具有丑闻性（即是否能吸引受众关注的能力）的认知，可能会促使记者开展批判性报道。与违规行为及所属机构相关的各种因素可能会影响记者对丑闻性的认知。就违规行为而言，媒体受众通常会被涉及不公或凸显未解决、正在发展的问题和情况的报道所吸引（Roulet, 2019；Trussler & Soroka, 2014；Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013）。从表1中关于弗吉尼亚州天然气特许权使用费的报道来看，布里斯托尔先驱报的记者意识到土地所有者未从天然气生产商处获得特许权使用费（即利益相关者受损），且由州监管的托管账户未进行支付，尽管无人知晓原因（即未解决的不确定性）。机构的特征也可能影响记者对丑闻性的认知。

TABLE 2 A Selection of Exemplary Organization-Media Rivalries for Narrative Control Following a Transgression
表2 违规后为争夺叙事控制权的典型组织-媒体对抗案例选

For instance, in industries or contexts where behavioral and ethical norms are stringently enforced, journalists may believe that their reporting has the potential to generate attention. Along these lines, in the Washington State Pharmacy and Therapeutics (P&T) Committee story from both Tables 1 and 2, a committee composed primarily of health care professionals was overseeing and implementing policies that reduced the effectiveness of pain management regimens and caused patients to die prematurely. Perhaps not surprisingly, this combination of plot and characters grabbed the attention of The Seattle Times’s reporters and, ultimately, their audience. 例如，在行为和道德规范被严格执行的行业或环境中，记者可能认为他们的报道有可能引起关注。同样，在华盛顿州药剂与治疗（P&T）委员会的报道中，该委员会主要由医疗专业人员组成，他们监督并实施了降低疼痛管理方案有效性的政策，导致患者过早死亡。或许并不令人惊讶的是，这种情节和人物的组合引起了《西雅图时报》记者的注意，并最终吸引了他们的读者。

When journalists perceive that critical coverage can generate audience engagement, it may catalyze the economic-driven tension they experience with transgressing organizations into action. As journalists become increasingly motivated vis-à-vis their perception of scandalousness, they become increasingly likely to initiate rivalry for narrative control and cover the transgression critically. 当记者认为批判性报道能够引发受众参与时，这可能会将他们在与违规组织产生的经济驱动型紧张感转化为行动。随着记者对事件的丑闻性质的认知增强，他们发起叙事控制权争夺并对违规行为进行批判性报道的可能性也会增加。

Proposition 1. Journalists’ perception of scandalousness positively relates to their engagement in rivalry for narrative control via critical coverage of the transgression. 命题1. 记者对丑闻性的感知与其通过对违规行为的批判性报道争夺叙事控制权的参与度呈正相关。

Perception of misinformation. Journalists may become motivated to pursue critical coverage when they believe the transgressing organization is misinforming its stakeholders. Given the economic and legitimacy penalties that organizations might incur following a transgression, they may be particularly inclined to misinform their stakeholders (Miller, 2006; Zavyalova et al., 2012). When journalists perceive that an organization is misinforming its stakeholders, they may scrutinize the organization’s claims or seek out evidence that contradicts the organization’s narrative (Clayman et al., 2007). For instance, when an orca killed its trainer during a show in 2010, SeaWorld publicly claimed that the incident was purely the result of trainer error and was not due to problems with the orca or the park’s safety policies. The director of CNN’s Blackfish documentary publicly asserted that she believed this claim to be conjecture, and that debunking it was a primary motivation for the documentary (Kohn, 2013). In the documentary, she scrutinized Sea-World’s claim by interviewing senior SeaWorld trainers who denied trainer error during the incident, comparing videos of the incident to training sessions, and exposing records that documented a history of aggression in the orca that attacked its trainer. 错误信息的认知。当记者认为违规组织在向利益相关者传播错误信息时，他们可能会更有动力进行批判性报道。考虑到组织在违规后可能面临经济和合法性方面的处罚，这些组织可能特别倾向于向利益相关者传播错误信息（Miller, 2006；Zavyalova等人，2012）。当记者察觉到某组织在向利益相关者传播错误信息时，他们可能会仔细审查该组织的声明，或寻找与该组织叙述相矛盾的证据（Clayman等人，2007）。例如，2010年一头虎鲸在表演中杀死驯兽师后，海洋世界（SeaWorld）公开声称这一事件纯粹是驯兽师的失误，并非虎鲸或公园安全政策的问题。美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）纪录片《黑鲸》（Blackfish）的导演公开表示，她认为这一说法是推测，而揭露这一说法的虚假性是制作该纪录片的主要动机（Kohn, 2013）。在纪录片中，她通过采访海洋世界的资深驯兽师（这些驯兽师否认事件中存在驯兽师失误）、对比事件视频与训练课程视频，以及披露记录显示袭击驯兽师的虎鲸有过攻击性历史等方式，仔细审查了海洋世界的声明。

When journalists perceive that organizations are misinforming stakeholders, it may catalyze the institutional tensions they experience with transgressing organizations, due to their role as watchdogs, into action. As journalists become increasingly motivated by this perception, they become increasingly likely to engage in rivalry for narrative control and cover the transgression critically. 当记者认为组织在向利益相关者传递错误信息时，由于其作为监督者的角色，这可能会将他们与违规组织之间的体制内紧张关系转化为行动。随着记者对此种看法的动机日益增强，他们就越来越有可能为争夺叙事控制权而展开竞争，并批判性地报道该违规行为。

Proposition 2. Journalists’ perception of misinformation positively relates to their engagement in rivalry for narrative control via critical coverage of the transgression. 命题2. 记者对虚假信息的认知与其通过对违规行为的批判性报道参与叙事控制权争夺的程度呈正相关。

Perception of transgressor susceptibility. Journalists may be stimulated to pursue critical coverage by the possibility of effecting positive change within the transgressing organization. The media’s institutional role as a critical change agent (or interventionist) creates a source of tension between journalists and organizations following transgressions (Clayman et al., 2007; Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017, 2018) and motivates journalists to shape narratives about transgressions in ways that prompt re-legitimizing changes in delegitimized organizations (Bednar, 2012; Hanitzsch, 2011; Norris, 2014; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). For example, if journalists can identify a particular person or policy that, if removed or changed, might help to re-legitimize the organization, then they may become increasingly motivated to take action (Gomulya & Boeker, 2014; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Such was the case in the story about Wal-Mart’s Latin American operations from Table 1, in which journalists uncovered a widespread bribery scheme to eliminate competition in Mexico. The New York Times journalists who published the story likely believed that Wal-Mart would be forced to adjust its policies, practices, and personnel to achieve re-legitimization, for which stakeholders would credit the journalists as change agents. Journalists may also believe that an organization is likely to make re-legitimizing changes in response to critical coverage if stakeholder discontent is high (Bundy et al., 2013; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) or the organization has a history of responding to pressure from the media (Bednar, Boivie, & Prince, 2013; Durand & Vergne, 2015). 对违规者易感性的认知。记者可能会因有可能在违规组织内促成积极变革而受到刺激，从而进行批判性报道。媒体作为关键变革推动者（或干预者）的制度性角色，在违规事件后会在记者与组织之间产生紧张关系（Clayman等人，2007；Hanitzsch & Vos，2017，2018），并促使记者以能够促使被剥夺合法性的组织重新合法化的方式来构建关于违规事件的叙述（Bednar，2012；Hanitzsch，2011；Norris，2014；Shoemaker & Reese，1996）。例如，如果记者能够确定某个特定的人或政策，若将其移除或改变，可能有助于组织重新合法化，那么他们可能会越来越有动力采取行动（Gomulya & Boeker，2014；Zavyalova等人，2012）。表1中关于沃尔玛拉丁美洲业务的报道就是这种情况，记者揭露了在墨西哥为消除竞争而广泛存在的贿赂计划。发表该报道的《纽约时报》记者可能认为，沃尔玛将被迫调整其政策、做法和人员以实现重新合法化，利益相关者会将记者视为变革推动者而认可他们。记者还可能认为，如果利益相关者不满情绪高涨（Bundy等人，2013；Mitchell，Agle，& Wood，1997），或者该组织有应对媒体压力的历史（Bednar，Boivie，& Prince，2013；Durand & Vergne，2015），那么该组织可能会在受到批判性报道后做出重新合法化的改变。

Given the media’s institutional role as a critical change agent, if journalists perceive that a transgressing organization is susceptible to critical coverage and is likely to make substantive changes when attacked, then it may catalyze the change promoting tensions that they experience with organizations into action. As this perception increases journalists’ motivation to produce changes in transgressing organizations, they become increasingly likely to initiate rivalry for narrative control and cover the transgression critically. 考虑到媒体作为关键变革推动者的制度性角色，如果记者认为违规组织容易受到批评性报道的影响，并且在受到攻击时可能做出实质性改变，那么这可能会将他们与这些组织之间的紧张关系转化为行动。随着这种认知增强了记者促使违规组织发生改变的动机，他们越来越有可能发起叙事控制权的争夺，并对违规行为进行批判性报道。

Proposition 3. Journalists’ perception of transgressor susceptibility positively relates to their engagement in rivalry for narrative control via critical coverage of the transgression. 命题3. 记者对违规者易感性的认知与其通过对违规行为的批判性报道参与叙事控制权竞争的程度呈正相关。

Stage 2: Leaders’ Perceptions That Influence a Crisis Management Reaction

第二阶段：影响危机管理反应的领导者认知

（注：此处“Stage 2”和“Leaders’ Perceptions That Influence a Crisis Management Reaction”为标题，按要求保留结构并翻译核心内容，确保标题准确传达原意。）

Following a media attack, an organization’s leaders must consider not only whether they will engage with the outlet in an attempt to control the narrative about the transgression, but also how they will do so. I consider the interaction of two leader perceptions—the severity of the transgression (i.e., perceptual assessment of the transgression) and the effect of coverage on the narrative (i.e., a perceptual assessment of the preceding rivalrous action)—that likely play central roles in determining both the likelihood of an organization reacting to critical media coverage and the rhetorical strategy they pursue. Various other perceptions may influence leaders’ sensemaking at this stage; however, for the development of this framework, I focus on these two fundamental explanatory mechanisms for catalyzing the tensions organizations experience with media outlets into action. 在媒体攻击之后，一个组织的领导者不仅必须考虑是否会与该媒体机构互动以试图控制关于违规行为的叙述，还必须考虑如何进行这种互动。我认为两种领导者认知的相互作用——违规行为的严重程度（即对违规行为的感知评估）以及报道对叙述的影响（即对先前竞争性行动的感知评估）——可能在很大程度上决定了组织对关键媒体报道做出反应的可能性以及他们所采取的修辞策略。在这一阶段，其他各种认知可能会影响领导者的意义建构；然而，为了该框架的发展，我将重点放在这两种基本解释机制上，它们能将组织与媒体机构之间的紧张关系转化为行动。

In light of critical media coverage about their organization’s transgression, leaders must assess the severity of the transgression as they consider whether and how to respond. To assess the severity of the transgression, an organization’s leaders must consider characteristics of the transgression to evaluate whether they believe the transgression is sufficiently severe to provoke stakeholders to dissociate from the organization. For example, harm caused to stakeholders or illegal conduct are common transgression-related characteristics that stakeholders are likely to consider highly illegitimate; therefore, these characteristics might heighten leaders’ concerns about the severity of the transgression. Regarding The Seattle Times’s story about the Washington State P&T Committee methadone policy from Tables 1 and 2, the committee’s leaders likely realized the severity of the transgression was high as a result of the media coverage, which depicted their pain management policies as promoting Medicaid cost savings at the expense of patient safety (i.e., stakeholder harm). Leaders may expect that, if stakeholders revoke legitimacy and withdraw from the organization, it could impede their organization’s ability to perform or may represent an existential threat to the organization (Baum, 1999; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). In this case, The Seattle Times reported that, following its initial three-part series, state lawmakers began considering whether the legislature should reabsorb the P&T Committee’s decision-making authority. 鉴于媒体对其组织违规行为的批判性报道，领导者必须在考虑是否以及如何回应时，评估违规行为的严重程度。为评估违规行为的严重程度，组织领导者必须考虑违规行为的特征，以判断他们是否认为该违规行为严重到足以促使利益相关者与组织脱离。例如，对利益相关者造成的伤害或非法行为是利益相关者可能认为极具合法性问题的常见违规相关特征；因此，这些特征可能会加剧领导者对违规行为严重性的担忧。关于《西雅图时报》报道的华盛顿州药剂与治疗委员会（P&T Committee）美沙酮政策（基于表1和表2），委员会领导者可能意识到，由于媒体报道将其疼痛管理政策描述为以牺牲患者安全为代价来节省医疗补助费用（即对利益相关者造成伤害），因此违规行为的严重程度很高。领导者可能认为，如果利益相关者撤销合法性并退出组织，这可能会阻碍组织的运作能力，或对组织构成生存威胁（Baum, 1999；Hannan & Freeman, 1989）。在这种情况下，《西雅图时报》报道称，在其最初的三部分系列报道之后，州立法者开始考虑立法机构是否应该重新收回药剂与治疗委员会的决策权。

Beyond assessing the severity of the transgression, leaders may also consider the extent to which critical coverage has affected the narrative about their organization’s transgression. Leaders perceive a strong effect if they believe that coverage has shifted the narrative in a way that has meaningfully changed their audience’s beliefs about what happened, who was involved, and what should be done (Hoefer & Green, 2016). For example, CNN’s Blackfish documentary sparked widespread public interest in Sea-World’s handling of incidents that endangered orca trainers. Moreover, in interviews presented within the documentary itself, senior orca trainers claimed the documents uncovered by the journalists contradicted SeaWorld’s internal communications about the incidents, which changed the trainers’ outlook about their employer’s culpability for the transgression. Given these stakeholder reactions, it is likely SeaWorld executives perceived the documentary as having a strong effect on the narrative about the organization’s transgression. 除了评估违规行为的严重程度外，领导者还可能考虑关键报道对其组织违规事件相关叙述的影响程度。如果领导者认为报道改变了受众对事件经过、涉事人员以及应采取何种措施的看法，并且这种改变具有实质性意义，那么他们就会认为报道产生了强烈影响（Hoefer & Green，2016）。例如，美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）的纪录片《黑鲸》引发了公众对海洋世界（Sea - World）处理虎鲸训练师受威胁事件方式的广泛关注。此外，在纪录片自身呈现的采访中，资深虎鲸训练师声称，记者发现的文件与海洋世界内部关于这些事件的沟通内容相矛盾，这改变了训练师对其雇主在违规行为中责任的看法。考虑到这些利益相关者的反应，海洋世界的高管很可能认为这部纪录片对该组织违规事件的叙述产生了强烈影响。

In other cases, critical media coverage does not heighten organization leaders’ concerns. Following The Intercept’s 2018 story claiming that Facebook and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency were working together to track undocumented immigrants (see Table 2), the leaders of Facebook and ICE were unlikely to perceive the coverage as having a strong effect. This was due to the correction The Intercept issued shortly after the article’s publication, citing editorial errors surrounding the article’s primary claims. This correction concerning primary claims in the article undoubtedly made stakeholders wary of accepting The Intercept’s narrative. While major reporting errors are sure to diminish a story’s ability to affect the narrative about a transgression, leaders may perceive coverage as having a weak effect for other reasons as well, such as coverage that presents unconvincing evidence or fails to attract stakeholder attention (Barber & Odean, 2008; Ben-Rephael, Da, & Israelsen, 2017). 在其他情况下，关键媒体报道并不会加剧组织领导者的担忧。在《拦截报》2018年报道称Facebook与美国移民与海关执法局（ICE）合作追踪非法移民（见表2）之后，Facebook和ICE的领导者不太可能认为该报道会产生强烈影响。这是因为《拦截报》在文章发表后不久就发布了更正声明，指出该文章主要主张存在编辑错误。这一关于文章主要主张的更正无疑让利益相关者对接受《拦截报》的叙述持谨慎态度。虽然重大报道错误肯定会削弱一篇报道影响关于越界行为叙述的能力，但领导者也可能因其他原因认为报道效果微弱，例如报道呈现的证据缺乏说服力或未能引起利益相关者的关注（Barber & Odean, 2008; Ben-Rephael, Da, & Israelsen, 2017）。

Together, leaders’ perceptions of the severity of the transgression and the effect of coverage on the narrative allow leaders to consider the overall threat of delegitimization. I classify leaders’ perceptions of threat of delegitimization into three categories: imminent threat, potential threat, and nonthreat. Below, I develop propositions about organizations’ crisis management responses according to leaders’ perceptions of these three types of threats. 领导人对违规行为严重性的认知以及报道对叙事的影响，共同使领导人能够考虑去合法化的整体威胁。我将领导人对去合法化威胁的认知分为三类：迫在眉睫的威胁、潜在威胁和无威胁。下文，我将根据领导人对这三种威胁的认知，提出关于组织危机管理应对的假设。

Imminent threat of delegitimization. Leaders sense an “imminent threat” of delegitimization when they perceive that the severity of the transgression is high and that critical coverage has had a strong effect on the narrative. In this scenario, all of the conditions are present for leaders to expect impending stakeholder withdrawal: the characteristics of the transgression are sufficiently illicit as to warrant delegitimization, and adversarial media coverage has created a narrative that is convincing stakeholders of such. Thus, leaders are likely to anticipate that stakeholders will revoke legitimacy and withdraw unless the organization can gain control over the narrative and recraft it to be favorable (Miller & Chen, 1994). Furthermore, when leaders sense an imminent threat, they may expect stakeholders to interpret nonresponse as being dismissive about a severe transgression, thereby increasing the likelihood of stakeholder withdrawal. As a result, leaders are compelled to react because they wish to avoid the negative effects of withdrawal, which they believe is impending under the circumstances. 合法性被否定的迫在眉睫威胁。当领导者认为违规行为的严重性很高，且关键报道对叙事产生了强烈影响时，他们会感觉到“合法性被否定”的迫在眉睫威胁。在这种情况下，所有条件都满足，领导者会预期利益相关者即将撤离：违规行为的特征足够不正当，足以引发合法性否定，而敌对媒体的报道则营造了一种让利益相关者相信这一点的叙事。因此，领导者可能会预期利益相关者会撤销合法性并撤离，除非组织能够控制叙事并将其重新塑造为有利的方向（Miller & Chen，1994）。此外，当领导者感觉到迫在眉睫的威胁时，他们可能会认为利益相关者会将无回应解读为对严重违规行为的漠视，从而增加利益相关者撤离的可能性。因此，领导者被迫做出反应，因为他们希望避免撤离带来的负面影响，而他们认为在这种情况下撤离是迫在眉睫的。

Proposition 4a. Leaders’ perception of an imminent threat of delegitimization positively relates to the likelihood of a crisis management reaction to critical media coverage. 命题4a。领导人对合法性即将被削弱的威胁的感知，与针对重要媒体报道采取危机管理反应的可能性呈正相关。

When leaders sense an imminent threat of delegitimization, they are more likely to use a conciliatory rhetorical strategy than a defensive rhetorical strategy. To reverse a strong media-driven narrative about a severe transgression using defensive rhetoric, the organization must convince stakeholders that the transgression does not warrant delegitimization. But, under these conditions, the leaders themselves believe that the transgression does warrant delegitimization. Thus, reversing the momentum of a strong, media-driven narrative about a severe transgression may seem futile to leaders (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). Moreover, if they believe stakeholders have already accepted the media’s version of the narrative, leaders may anticipate that stakeholders will view a defensive response by the organization as an attempt to minimize a grievous transgression, thereby intensifying the stakeholders’ desire to punish the organization (Elsbach, 1994). 当领导者察觉到合法性受到威胁迫在眉睫时，他们更倾向于采用和解性的修辞策略，而非防御性的修辞策略。要通过防御性修辞扭转媒体驱动的关于严重违规行为的强势叙事，组织必须让利益相关者相信该违规行为并不足以导致合法性丧失。然而，在这种情况下，领导者自身却认为该违规行为确实足以导致合法性丧失。因此，领导者可能会觉得扭转媒体驱动的关于严重违规行为的强势叙事势头似乎是徒劳的（Coombs & Holladay，2010）。此外，如果他们认为利益相关者已经接受了媒体版本的叙事，领导者可能会预料到利益相关者会将组织的防御性回应视为试图淡化严重违规行为的行为，从而加剧利益相关者惩罚组织的意愿（Elsbach，1994）。

If leaders pursue a conciliatory strategy, on the other hand, they embrace the narrative the media has established by acknowledging that the transgression warrants delegitimization. Then, leaders can attempt to steer the narrative in a way that is favorable for the organization by claiming they have eliminated any underlying problems through their use of substantive corrective action and, as such, legitimacy should be restored. As a result, leaders might believe that a conciliatory approach maximizes the likelihood of mitigating an imminent threat of delegitimization. 另一方面，如果领导者采取和解策略，他们会接受媒体塑造的叙事，承认这种违规行为确实需要去合法化。然后，领导者可以通过声称他们已通过实质性的纠正措施消除了任何根本问题，并因此应该恢复合法性，来试图将叙事引导到对组织有利的方向。因此，领导者可能会认为和解方法能最大程度降低即将到来的去合法化威胁的可能性。

Proposition 4b. Leaders’ perception of an imminent threat of delegitimization positively relates to their preference for a conciliatory rhetorical strategy as the form of crisis management they pursue when reacting to critical media coverage. 命题4b。领导人对非合法化威胁迫在眉睫的感知，与其在应对批判性媒体报道时所采用的危机管理形式中对和解性修辞策略的偏好呈正相关。

Potential threat of delegitimization. Leaders sense a “potential threat” of delegitimization when they perceive that the severity of the transgression and the effect of the coverage on the narrative are either high and weak or low and strong, respectively. Unlike an imminent threat, where stakeholder withdrawal is looming, a potential threat involves the risk of stakeholder withdrawal in the future. A severe transgression combined with a weak effect of coverage on the narrative represents a potential threat because additional coverage may, if left unchecked, sufficiently strengthen the unfavorable narrative to the extent that it ultimately convinces stakeholders to withdraw from the organization. A potential threat also exists in scenarios wherein leaders believe that the transgression was not severe, yet media coverage is having a strong effect on the narrative about the transgression. For example, in The New York Times versus FedEx rivalry concerning federal corporate tax breaks (see Table 2), FedEx’s leaders perceived the severity of their transgression (i.e., lobbying for and using federal tax breaks—a ubiquitous practice among commercial organizations) as low, which the CEO communicated in his press release following the article’s publication (see Figure 1). However, The New York Times’s appeal to pathos, which involved depicting FedEx as avoiding federal taxes thanks to the organization’s political connections, strongly stimulated the audience’s sense of injustice and likely made some stakeholders question whether the practices were acceptable (Tankersley, Eavis, & Casselman, 2019; see public comments). Thus, even though FedEx’s leaders perceived the transgression to be trivial, they may have sensed a potential threat of delegitimization in light of the coverage’s strong effect on the narrative. 合法性质疑的潜在威胁。当领导者认为违规行为的严重性与报道对叙事的影响程度分别为“高且弱”或“低且强”时，他们会察觉到合法性质疑的“潜在威胁”。与迫在眉睫的威胁（利益相关者撤离迫在眉睫）不同，潜在威胁涉及未来利益相关者撤离的风险。严重的违规行为加上报道对叙事影响微弱，构成潜在威胁，因为若不加以控制，进一步的报道可能会充分强化不利叙事，最终促使利益相关者退出该组织。在另一种场景中，领导者认为违规行为并不严重，但媒体报道对违规行为的叙事产生了强烈影响，这也构成潜在威胁。例如，在《纽约时报》与联邦快递关于联邦企业税收减免的竞争中（见表2），联邦快递的领导者认为其违规行为的严重性较低（即游说并使用联邦税收减免——这在商业组织中是普遍做法），这一点由其首席执行官在文章发表后的新闻稿中传达（见图1）。然而，《纽约时报》诉诸悲情，将联邦快递描绘为利用政治关系逃避联邦税收，这极大地激发了受众的不公感，并可能让一些利益相关者质疑这些做法是否可接受（Tankersley, Eavis, & Casselman, 2019；见公众评论）。因此，尽管联邦快递的领导者认为违规行为微不足道，但鉴于报道对叙事的强烈影响，他们可能察觉到了合法性质疑的潜在威胁。

Sensing a potential threat tends to provoke a reaction from leaders. Leaders might expect that stakeholders will eventually revoke legitimacy and withdraw from the organization if an adversarial media outlet is left unchecked and continues to strengthen its version of the narrative about what the leaders perceive to be a severe transgression. Under these conditions, leaders might think it a matter of time before critical media coverage convinces stakeholders of what the leaders themselves already know—the transgression is sufficiently severe to warrant delegitimization. Leaders are also likely to react when they perceive media coverage is having a strong effect about what they believe to be a trivial transgression. This is because a strong mediadriven narrative may stir intense emotional reactions from stakeholders when they might otherwise be apathetic (Deephouse, 2000; Zavyalova et al., 2017). As a result, leaders tend to react to critical coverage when it presents a potential threat, rather than ignore it, because they want to eliminate the risk of experiencing delegitimization and stakeholder withdrawal in the future (Miller & Chen, 1994). 感知到潜在威胁往往会引发领导者的反应。领导者可能会认为，如果一个敌对的媒体机构不受约束，并继续强化其对领导者认为是严重越界行为的叙述，利益相关者最终会撤销其合法性并退出组织。在这种情况下，领导者可能会认为，关键的媒体报道迟早会让利益相关者相信他们自己已经知道的事实——即该越界行为严重到足以被剥夺合法性。当领导者认为媒体报道对他们认为是微不足道的越界行为产生强烈影响时，他们也可能会做出反应。这是因为，在其他情况下可能无动于衷的利益相关者，可能会因强烈的媒体驱动的叙述而产生强烈的情绪反应（Deephouse, 2000；Zavyalova等人，2017）。因此，领导者往往会对潜在威胁性的批评性报道做出反应，而不是忽视它，因为他们希望消除未来面临合法性被剥夺和利益相关者退出的风险（Miller & Chen, 1994）。

Proposition 5a. Leaders’ perception of a potential threat of delegitimization positively relates to the likelihood of a crisis management reaction to critical media coverage. 命题5a。领导者对潜在去合法化威胁的感知与对重要媒体报道做出危机管理反应的可能性呈正相关。

As they consider how to react, leaders may believe that a defensive rhetorical strategy is a preferential option for combatting the media-driven narrative under these circumstances. If leaders perceive the transgression to be severe and the effect of media coverage to be weak, they may believe they can take control of the narrative and reverse it—without incurring the outsized cost of pursuing substantive corrective action (Beneish et al., 2017; Colak & Bray, 2016). Moreover, pursuing a conciliatory rhetorical strategy under these circumstances might signal the severity of the transgression to stakeholders (Gomulya & Boeker, 2014), thereby corroborating the media outlet’s narrative that had thus far been unconvincing. If leaders perceive the severity of the transgression to be low but the effect of media coverage on the narrative to be strong, they will likely endeavor to combat the narrative by convincing stakeholders that the transgression is not grievous. Such was the case when FedEx’s leaders attempted to convey the acceptability of their behavior and combat The New York Times’s narrative. FedEx took a defensive approach by attacking The New York Times for using tax breaks in a similar way and by highlighting the positive economic impact of FedEx’s capital investments—made possible by the federal tax breaks. 当考虑如何应对时，领导者可能认为在这种情况下，防御性的修辞策略是对抗媒体驱动的叙事的优先选择。如果领导者认为违规行为严重且媒体报道的影响较弱，他们可能会相信自己能够掌控叙事并扭转局面——而无需承担采取实质性纠正行动的巨大成本（Beneish et al., 2017；Colak & Bray, 2016）。此外，在这种情况下采取和解性的修辞策略可能会向利益相关者传达违规行为的严重性（Gomulya & Boeker, 2014），从而证实媒体机构迄今为止尚未令人信服的叙事。如果领导者认为违规行为的严重性较低，但媒体报道对叙事的影响较强，他们可能会努力通过让利益相关者相信违规行为并不严重来对抗该叙事。联邦快递（FedEx）的领导者试图传达其行为的可接受性并对抗《纽约时报》的叙事时就出现了这种情况。联邦快递采取了防御性策略，攻击《纽约时报》以类似方式利用税收减免，并强调联邦税收减免使联邦快递的资本投资带来的积极经济影响。

Under these circumstances, leaders are likely to prefer a defensive strategy because conciliation would involve admitting that the organization’s behavior was improper even though the leaders do not believe it to be so. 在这种情况下，领导者可能会倾向于采取防御策略，因为和解意味着要承认组织的行为不当，尽管领导者并不认为情况是这样。

Proposition 5b. Leaders’ perception of a potential threat of delegitimization positively relates to their preference for defensive rhetorical strategies as the form of crisis management they pursue when reacting to critical media coverage. 命题5b. 领导者对非合法化潜在威胁的感知与其在应对关键媒体报道时所采用的防御性修辞策略（作为危机管理形式）的偏好呈正相关。

Nonthreat. When leaders perceive that the severity of the transgression is low and media coverage has had a weak effect on the narrative about the transgression, they are likely to believe the coverage is a “nonthreat” and not respond (Andrevski & Miller, 2022; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Miller & Chen, 1994). Leaders might simply be unconcerned with a nonthreat because it is unlikely to produce delegitimization and stakeholder withdrawal. Furthermore, they may not want to draw unnecessary attention to a nonthreatening piece of critical coverage or to give the impression that the claim is legitimate by responding. When The Intercept published and then quickly corrected its factually distorted story about Facebook and ICE working together to track and detain undocumented workers, leaders at the two organizations likely perceived the coverage as a nonthreat—partly because the story lost its ability to influence the narrative when the outlet issued the correction (Barkin & Levy, 1983; Karlsson, Clerwall, & Nord, 2017). In addition, the author of the story later confirmed that the organizations were actually working together to fulfill a court-issued subpoena to track an active child predator, which leaders at the two organizations were unlikely to view as a transgression at all, much less a severe one. Under these conditions, leaders are likely to believe that engaging in crisis management to control the narrative is unnecessary or that it might constitute a strategic misstep (Andrevski & Miller, 2022; Miller & Chen, 1994). 无威胁。当领导者认为违规行为的严重性较低，且媒体报道对违规行为相关叙事的影响较弱时，他们可能会认为此类报道是“无威胁”的，从而不采取回应措施（Andrevski & Miller, 2022；Chen & MacMillan, 1992；Miller & Chen, 1994）。领导者可能根本不关心这种无威胁的情况，因为它不太可能导致合法性丧失和利益相关者退出。此外，他们可能不想为这种非威胁性的批评性报道不必要地吸引注意力，或者不想通过回应给人一种该说法是合理的印象。当《拦截报》（The Intercept）发表并迅速纠正了关于Facebook和美国移民与海关执法局（ICE）合作追踪和拘留无证工人的事实性歪曲报道后，这两个组织的领导者可能认为该报道是无威胁的——部分原因是该媒体在发布更正后，其故事已失去影响叙事的能力（Barkin & Levy, 1983；Karlsson, Clerwall, & Nord, 2017）。此外，该报道的作者后来证实，这两个组织实际上是在合作履行法院签发的传票，以追踪一名在逃的儿童性犯罪者，而这两个组织的领导者不太可能将其视为违规行为，更不用说严重的违规行为了。在这种情况下，领导者可能认为开展危机管理以控制叙事是不必要的，或者认为这可能构成战略失误（Andrevski & Miller, 2022；Miller & Chen, 1994）。

Proposition 6. Leaders’ perception of a nonthreat negatively relates to the likelihood of a crisis management reaction to critical media coverage. 命题6. 领导者对非威胁的感知与针对关键媒体报道采取危机管理反应的可能性呈负相关。

Redux: Continuation of Rivalry for Narrative Control

Redux：叙事控制权竞争的延续

After the organization has reacted or not reacted to media coverage, journalists must decide if they will reengage with the organization by pursuing additional critical coverage or allow the rivalry to terminate. At this stage, journalists’ perceptions of scandalousness, misinformation, and transgressor susceptibility remain the primary motivating factors, which may again catalyze the tensions into reaction. However, these perceptions can change following an organization’s reaction or lack thereof. Thus, journalists must reevaluate and consider whether scandal, misinformation, and transgressor susceptibility have decreased, increased, or remain the same as when they initiated critical coverage. For instance, after the Washington State P&T Committee issued an advisory to physicians and announced changes to its methadone policy, The Seattle Times published a follow-up piece praising the committee’s decision. Presumably, the journalists’ perceptions about scandal, misinformation, or transgressor susceptibility changed as a result of the committee’s corrective action. 在机构对媒体报道做出回应或未做出回应之后，记者必须决定是通过进一步的批判性报道重新与机构接触，还是任由这种对立关系终止。在这一阶段，记者对丑闻性、虚假信息以及违规者易感性的认知仍然是主要的驱动因素，这些因素可能再次将紧张局势催化为反应。然而，这些认知可能会随着机构的回应或缺乏回应而发生变化。因此，记者必须重新评估并考虑，与他们开始批判性报道时相比，丑闻性、虚假信息以及违规者易感性是有所减少、增加还是保持不变。例如，在华盛顿州公共事务与技术委员会（Washington State P&T Committee）向医生发布咨询意见并宣布调整其美沙酮政策之后，《西雅图时报》（The Seattle Times）发表了一篇后续文章，称赞该委员会的决定。据推测，由于委员会采取了纠正措施，记者对丑闻性、虚假信息或违规者易感性的认知发生了变化。

Rivalry for narrative control can continue for as long as journalists and leaders are sufficiently motivated by the perceptions discussed above to catalyze their mutual tensions into reactions. If either party continues to reengage the other in an attempt to control the narrative about the transgression, it initiates repetition of Stages 1 and 2 discussed above. When journalists perceive that high levels of scandalousness, misinformation, or transgressor susceptibility persist, they are prone to reengage the organization via additional critical coverage. Under these circumstances, journalists likely believe that they can generate additional audience engagement and fulfill their journalistic role identities as watchdogs and critical change agents. An organization’s leaders, similarly, are likely to continue reengaging the media outlet with additional crisis management for as long as they perceive a threat of delegitimization. 只要记者和领导者仍因上述讨论的认知而有足够动力将彼此的紧张关系转化为反应，对叙事控制权的争夺就会持续下去。如果任何一方继续重新与另一方接触，试图控制关于违规行为的叙事，就会引发上述第1阶段和第2阶段的重复。当记者认为丑闻程度、错误信息或违规者易感性持续处于高水平时，他们倾向于通过更多批判性报道重新与该组织接触。在这种情况下，记者可能认为他们能够吸引更多受众参与，并履行作为监督者和批判性变革推动者的新闻角色身份。同样，只要组织领导者认为存在被剥夺合法性的威胁，他们就可能继续通过更多危机管理重新与媒体机构接触。

When either party remains motivated to control the narrative, rivalries can persist and evolve over many years. For example, the rivalry between CNN and SeaWorld continues after seven years of back and forth, with CNN publishing over 40 articles and segments criticizing SeaWorld’s practices. However, journalists and leaders’ perceptions are dynamic— their perceptions may change as they consider each subsequent reaction in the exchange. For instance, although SeaWorld executives likely sensed an imminent threat of delegitimization following CNN’s initial attack, they may have considered the follow-up coverage to only be a potential threat of further delegitimization because it did not “move the needle” the same way the Blackfish documentary did (Shaffer, 2019: 1). As a result, SeaWorld executives shifted their rhetorical strategy from a conciliatory strategy to a defensive strategy when responding to CNN’s follow-up coverage, engaging in several public relations campaigns to combat CNN’s attacks. 当任何一方仍有动力控制叙事时，竞争可能会持续多年并不断演变。例如，美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）与海洋世界（SeaWorld）之间的竞争在七年的来回交锋后仍在继续，CNN发表了40多篇批评海洋世界做法的文章和专题报道。然而，记者和领导者的看法是动态变化的——随着他们考虑交流中后续的每一次反应，他们的看法可能会改变。例如，尽管海洋世界的高管们可能感觉到在CNN最初的抨击后面临着即将到来的合法性丧失威胁，但他们可能认为后续报道只是进一步合法性丧失的潜在威胁，因为它并没有像《黑鲸》纪录片那样“引起轰动”（Shaffer, 2019: 1）。因此，在回应CNN的后续报道时，海洋世界的高管们将其修辞策略从和解策略转向了防御策略，开展了多项公关活动以反击CNN的抨击。

Termination: Rivalry for Narrative Control Concludes

终止：叙事控制权的争夺结束

When journalists and leaders lack motivation to continue reengaging one another, rivalry for narrative control terminates. At this stage, both parties’ perceptions leave them either content with the current prevailing narrative or unwilling to continue reengaging the other party. Depending on how well established either party’s version of the narrative was prior to rivalry termination, the audience may widely accept a version of the narrative, not accept either version of the narrative, or be split on which version of the narrative to accept. 当记者和领导者缺乏继续相互互动的动力时，对叙事控制权的争夺就会终止。在这个阶段，双方的认知会让他们要么满足于当前占主导地位的叙事，要么不愿意继续与对方互动。根据任何一方的叙事版本在争夺终止前建立的程度如何，受众可能会广泛接受某一版本的叙事，不接受任何一个版本的叙事，或者在接受哪个版本的叙事上产生分歧。

DISCUSSION

讨论

The purpose of this study was to conceptualize rivalry for narrative control between members of the media and organizations following a transgression. It integrated and extended competitive dynamics and crisis management research to construct a twopart theoretical framework of rivalry for narrative control. In reconceptualizing organizations and the media as potential rivals following a transgression, this framework makes two primary contributions to competitive dynamics research, as well as a notable contribution to crisis management research. I discuss these contributions below and provide recommendations for future research. 本研究的目的是将媒体成员和组织在违规事件后争夺叙事控制权的竞争概念化。它整合并扩展了竞争动态和危机管理研究，构建了一个两部分的叙事控制权竞争理论框架。在将组织和媒体重新概念化为违规后潜在的竞争对手时，该框架为竞争动态研究做出了两项主要贡献，同时也为危机管理研究做出了显著贡献。我将在下文讨论这些贡献，并为未来研究提供建议。

Conceptualizing Rivalrous Exchanges Between Dissimilar Rivals

概念化不同竞争对手之间的竞争性互动

In conceptualizing rivalry for narrative control, this framework designates transgressing organizations and media outlets as potential rivals, broadening the concept of “rivals” from competitive dynamics research. In doing so, it adds to theory on competitive dynamics by suggesting that media outlets and organizations compete over a unique sociocognitive resource—control of the narrative about a transgression. Not only does this expand the concept of “rivalry” from extant competitive dynamics research, but it also reemphasizes the idea put forth by Waldron and colleagues (2019) that rivalry can take social in addition to commercial forms. 在构思叙事控制权竞争时，该框架将违规组织和媒体机构指定为潜在竞争对手，从而将“竞争对手”的概念从竞争动态研究中拓展出来。通过这样做，它为竞争动态理论增添了新内容，指出媒体机构和组织会争夺一种独特的社会认知资源——对违规事件叙述的控制权。这不仅拓展了现有竞争动态研究中“竞争”的概念，还再次强调了沃尔德伦及其同事（2019）提出的观点，即竞争可以兼具社会和商业形式。

In its conceptualization of organization-media relations, this framework also recognizes that latent rivalries may materialize between dissimilar actors when situation-specific conditions create tensions between the two parties. In this framework, I posit that an event (i.e., an organizational transgression) may create tensions between dissimilar actors that lead them to compete with one another over a resource that only manifests as the result of the event (i.e., control over the narrative about the transgression). This is an important change from traditional ways of thinking about how rivalries emerge and opens the study of competitive dynamics to other latent rivalries between dissimilar actors. Furthermore, this conceptual development might also apply to events that cause competitive landscape shifts (Withers et al., 2018), which create rivalries between commercial organizations that do not otherwise compete with one another. 在对组织与媒体关系的概念化中，该框架还认识到，当特定情境条件在双方之间产生紧张关系时，不同行为体之间可能会出现潜在的竞争。在该框架中，我认为一个事件（即组织违规行为）可能会在不同行为体之间制造紧张关系，促使他们为一种仅因该事件而显现的资源（即对违规行为叙述的控制权）相互竞争。这与传统的竞争关系形成方式有重要区别，并将竞争动态的研究拓展到不同行为体之间的其他潜在竞争。此外，这一概念发展可能也适用于引发竞争格局变化的事件（Withers等人，2018），这类事件会在原本不相互竞争的商业组织之间产生竞争关系。

This framework suggests that a member of the media must initiate rivalry for narrative control, which represents a deviation from existing competitive dynamics theory about how rivalrous exchanges commence. In traditional competitive dynamics, researchers assume the existence of a rivalry between two firms that target the same market, and, as such, either firm has the ability to initiate a rivalrous exchange by taking an action that affects the other (Chen & Miller, 2012; Rindova et al., 2004). However, media outlets and organizations do not inherently compete over the same market, nor do they tend to have longstanding rivalrous relationships predating an exchange about a transgression. As a result, when organizations engage in crisis management prior to a media outlet covering the transgression, rivalry for narrative control has not yet commenced. In fact, if journalists are not motivated by their perceptions of scandalousness, misinformation, and transgressor susceptibility, then the organization’s version of the narrative about the transgression may go unchallenged by the media. In such a case, rivalry for narrative control never materializes. Thus, in this form of rivalry, the onus of initiating a rivalrous exchange rests with one party—the media. This framework suggests that a member of the media must initiate rivalry for narrative control, which represents a deviation from existing competitive dynamics theory about how rivalrous exchanges commence. In traditional competitive dynamics, researchers assume the existence of a rivalry between two firms that target the same market, and, as such, either firm has the ability to initiate a rivalrous exchange by taking an action that affects the other (Chen & Miller, 2012; Rindova et al., 2004). However, media outlets and organizations do not inherently compete over the same market, nor do they tend to have longstanding rivalrous relationships predating an exchange about a transgression. As a result, when organizations engage in crisis management prior to a media outlet covering the transgression, rivalry for narrative control has not yet commenced. In fact, if journalists are not motivated by their perceptions of scandalousness, misinformation, and transgressor susceptibility, then the organization’s version of the narrative about the transgression may go unchallenged by the media. In such a case, rivalry for narrative control never materializes. Thus, in this form of rivalry, the onus of initiating a rivalrous exchange rests with one party—the media.

Considering when rivalry for narrative control might continue or terminate also adds to theory about the conclusion of situational rivalries between dissimilar actors. While commercial rivalries do not conclude per se (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Rindova et al., 2004), prior work on rivalries between dissimilar actors suggests that such rivalries tend to terminate (Markman et al., 2016). Specifically, these studies indicate that rivalries between dissimilar actors conclude when one actor achieves supremacy over the other within their competitive domain (Waldron et al., 2019). I posit that the conclusion of a rivalry between dissimilar actors is not necessarily contingent upon one side achieving supremacy over the other. Instead, this framework claims that rivalry for narrative control ceases when both parties’ perceptions fail to convert their underlying tensions into additional reactions, regardless of whether a party has won control over the narrative. Going further, this framework uncovers a domain in which achieving supremacy does not necessarily lead to a conclusion of the rivalry. Media outlets are particularly likely to continue covering a transgression after they have gained control of the narrative when they perceive that scandalousness, misinformation, or transgressor susceptibility persist. 考虑到叙事控制权的竞争可能会持续或终止，这也有助于形成关于不同行为体之间情境性竞争结局的理论。虽然商业竞争本身不会结束（Chen & MacMillan, 1992；Rindova et al., 2004），但此前关于不同行为体之间竞争的研究表明，此类竞争往往会终止（Markman et al., 2016）。具体而言，这些研究表明，当一方在竞争领域内取得优势地位时，不同行为体之间的竞争会结束（Waldron et al., 2019）。我认为，不同行为体之间竞争的结束不一定取决于一方是否在另一方之上取得优势地位。相反，这一框架认为，当双方的认知未能将其潜在的紧张转化为进一步的反应时，对叙事控制权的争夺就会停止，无论一方是否已获得叙事控制权。进一步而言，这一框架揭示了一个领域，即取得优势地位并不一定会导致竞争的结束。当媒体机构认为丑闻性、错误信息或违规者的易感性持续存在时，它们在获得叙事控制权后，仍特别有可能继续报道违规行为。

Considering Alternative Competitive Actions That Influence Stakeholder Perceptions

考虑影响利益相关者认知的替代竞争行动

This framework enriches competitive dynamics research by establishing that organizations engage in rhetorical battles to influence stakeholder perceptions. Specifically, this framework incorporates critical media coverage and organizations’ use of rhetorical strategies into the portfolio of potentially rivalrous actions, thereby adding to recent research on alternative competitive actions in competitive dynamics. Scholars have previously considered word responses and language games as alternative competitive actions within traditional competitive exchanges (Gao et al., 2017; Rindova et al., 2004). Similarly, I posit that organizations may engage with entities that threaten their legitimacy using rhetorical strategies to influence stakeholder perceptions via control over narratives. Moreover, media coverage is exclusively communicative and aims to shape the perceptions of an organization’s stakeholders. Thus, incorporation of media coverage and rhetorical strategies as potential competitive actions not only reinforces the notion that persuasive communication can constitute a rivalrous action, but also establishes that organizations may engage in rhetorical battles to influence stakeholder perceptions about their legitimacy. This framework enriches competitive dynamics research by establishing that organizations engage in rhetorical battles to influence stakeholder perceptions. Specifically, this framework incorporates critical media coverage and organizations’ use of rhetorical strategies into the portfolio of potentially rivalrous actions, thereby adding to recent research on alternative competitive actions in competitive dynamics. Scholars have previously considered word responses and language games as alternative competitive actions within traditional competitive exchanges (Gao et al., 2017; Rindova et al., 2004). Similarly, I posit that organizations may engage with entities that threaten their legitimacy using rhetorical strategies to influence stakeholder perceptions via control over narratives. Moreover, media coverage is exclusively communicative and aims to shape the perceptions of an organization’s stakeholders. Thus, incorporation of media coverage and rhetorical strategies as potential competitive actions not only reinforces the notion that persuasive communication can constitute a rivalrous action, but also establishes that organizations may engage in rhetorical battles to influence stakeholder perceptions about their legitimacy.

By bringing rhetorical battles into the realm of competitive dynamics, this framework also provides a new lens through which researchers might study the role of rhetoric in other arenas. For example, scholars consider rhetoric and important instrument for generating institutional change (Green, 2004; Harmon, Green, & Goodnight, 2015; Hoefer & Green, 2016; Waldron, Fisher, & Pfarrer, 2016). Ocasio, Loewenstein, and Nigam (2015) argued that communicative events and institutional narratives play an important role in the development of new institutional logics within a field. Moreover, they recognized that multiple competing institutional narratives may exist throughout this process. The conceptual development in the present framework suggests that organizations within a field might utilize persuasive communication to compete with each other for control over institutional narratives. By gaining control over institutional narratives, an organization may be able to promote the adoption or maintenance of their preferred logics. 通过将修辞性博弈纳入竞争动态领域，该框架还为研究者提供了一个新视角，使其能够研究修辞在其他领域中的作用。例如，学者们认为修辞是推动制度变革的重要工具（Green, 2004；Harmon, Green, & Goodnight, 2015；Hoefer & Green, 2016；Waldron, Fisher, & Pfarrer, 2016）。Ocasio、Loewenstein 和 Nigam（2015）认为，传播事件和制度叙事在一个领域内新制度逻辑的发展中发挥着重要作用。此外，他们认识到在这一过程中可能存在多种相互竞争的制度叙事。本框架中的概念发展表明，一个领域内的组织可能会利用有说服力的沟通来相互竞争，以争夺对制度叙事的控制权。通过控制制度叙事，组织或许能够推动其偏好逻辑的采用或维持。

Expanding Crisis Management Research to Include OrganizationMedia Rivalry

扩展危机管理研究以纳入组织媒体竞争

This framework extends crisis management research by considering a novel mechanism that may influence an organization’s crisis response strategy. Much of the prior research on crisis response strategies draws on stakeholder theory to predict and prescribe how organizations might handle stakeholder claims (Bundy et al., 2017). I posit that an organization’s leaders might instead focus their crisis management efforts on competing for and establishing a narrative that alters or minimizes stakeholders’ claims by changing their perceptions about the organization or the transgression. Leaders might pursue different crisis response strategies when competing with a media outlet for control of the narrative than they would if they focused on addressing stakeholder claims. As a result, this framework may account for additional variance in crisis response strategies beyond that of existing crisis management frameworks. This framework extends crisis management research by considering a novel mechanism that may influence an organization’s crisis response strategy. 该框架通过考虑一种可能影响组织危机应对策略的新机制，拓展了危机管理研究。Much of the prior research on crisis response strategies draws on stakeholder theory to predict and prescribe how organizations might handle stakeholder claims (Bundy et al., 2017). 此前关于危机应对策略的研究大多借鉴利益相关者理论，以预测和规定组织如何处理利益相关者诉求（Bundy等人，2017）。I posit that an organization’s leaders might instead focus their crisis management efforts on competing for and establishing a narrative that alters or minimizes stakeholders’ claims by changing their perceptions about the organization or the transgression. 我认为，组织领导者可能转而将危机管理工作重点放在争夺和构建一种叙事上，通过改变利益相关者对组织或违规行为的看法，来改变或减少其诉求。Leaders might pursue different crisis response strategies when competing with a media outlet for control of the narrative than they would if they focused on addressing stakeholder claims. 领导者在与媒体争夺叙事控制权时，可能会采取与专注于回应利益相关者诉求时不同的危机应对策略。As a result, this framework may account for additional variance in crisis response strategies beyond that of existing crisis management frameworks. 因此，该框架可能能够解释危机应对策略中除现有危机管理框架之外的更多差异。

Viewing members of the media as potential rivals to transgressing organizations also advances conceptualizations of the media in crisis management research. Prior crisis management research widely considers the media’s role in post-transgression contexts as that of an institutional “infomediary” (Deephouse & Heugens, 2009; Zavyalova et al., 2012). Such work has presented members of the media as disseminators of unbiased information, thereby depicting media outlets as institutions that serve to keep stakeholders informed. This portrayal of the media holds merit, which is why I incorporated it into this framework by considering the tensions that arise from journalists’ institutional role identities. Yet, this framework also recognizes that members of the media may act out of self-interest, as reflected in the economic tensions that arise from their desire to boost audience engagement and their outlet’s financial performance. This conceptualization not only serves to enhance our understanding of why media outlets cover transgressions, but it may also better represent how leaders of transgressing organizations view adversarial members of the media. And, viewing members of the media as self-serving actors might influence how organizations interact with the media outlets that attempt to influence narratives about them. 将媒体成员视为违规组织的潜在对手，也推动了危机管理研究中对媒体的概念化。此前的危机管理研究广泛将媒体在违规后情境中的角色视为机构性“信息中介”（Deephouse & Heugens, 2009；Zavyalova等人，2012）。这类研究将媒体成员描绘为无偏信息的传播者，从而将媒体机构描述为旨在让利益相关者知情的机构。这种对媒体的描述有其合理性，这也是我将其纳入本框架的原因——通过考虑记者的机构角色身份所产生的张力。然而，本框架也认识到，媒体成员可能出于自身利益行事，这反映在他们为提升受众参与度及其媒体机构财务表现而产生的经济张力中。这种概念化不仅有助于我们理解媒体为何报道违规事件，还可能更好地体现违规组织领导者如何看待媒体中的对立成员。此外，将媒体成员视为自利行为者可能会影响组织与试图影响其相关叙事的媒体机构的互动方式。

This framework also establishes narratives and narrative control as influential factors for organizations’ reintegration efforts following a transgression. Prior research has considered narrative-shaping aspects of organizations’ crisis management efforts and media coverage (Elsbach, 1994; Pfarrer et al., 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012), but has not yet explicitly conceptualized how narratives fit into crisis management and organization-media interplay (Graf-Vlachy et al., 2020). Within the current framework, I propose that narratives play a central role in shaping stakeholders’ perceptions about a transgression, thereby influencing the organization’s reintegration efforts. Moreover, I posit that transgressing organizations and media outlets can shape narratives about transgressions by incorporating information about what happened, who was involved, and what should be done into their crisis management efforts and coverage. By examining the central role narratives play in organizations’ attempts to reintegrate with stakeholders and introducing rivalry for narrative control as a mechanism for influencing narratives, this framework opens numerous opportunities for future research within the crisis management domain. This framework also establishes narratives and narrative control as influential factors for organizations’ reintegration efforts following a transgression. Prior research has considered narrative-shaping aspects of organizations’ crisis management efforts and media coverage (Elsbach, 1994; Pfarrer et al., 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012), but has not yet explicitly conceptualized how narratives fit into crisis management and organization-media interplay (Graf-Vlachy et al., 2020). Within the current framework, I propose that narratives play a central role in shaping stakeholders’ perceptions about a transgression, thereby influencing the organization’s reintegration efforts. Moreover, I posit that transgressing organizations and media outlets can shape narratives about transgressions by incorporating information about what happened, who was involved, and what should be done into their crisis management efforts and coverage. By examining the central role narratives play in organizations’ attempts to reintegrate with stakeholders and introducing rivalry for narrative control as a mechanism for influencing narratives, this framework opens numerous opportunities for future research within the crisis management domain.

Future Research Directions

未来研究方向

This theoretical framework opens opportunities for further inquiry in both competitive dynamics and crisis management research. Recognizing organizations and the media as rivals provides additional momentum to the dissimilar rival movement that is developing within the competitive dynamics literature (Waldron et al., 2019). This framework introduces two novel nonmarket players to this movement: media outlets and noncommercial organizations. Future research might also consider other underexplored forms of rivalry, such as firms versus governments, governments versus activists, or between competing media outlets. This theoretical framework opens opportunities for further inquiry in both competitive dynamics and crisis management research. Recognizing organizations and the media as rivals provides additional momentum to the dissimilar rival movement that is developing within the competitive dynamics literature (Waldron et al., 2019). This framework introduces two novel nonmarket players to this movement: media outlets and noncommercial organizations. Future research might also consider other underexplored forms of rivalry, such as firms versus governments, governments versus activists, or between competing media outlets.

Regarding future research on rivalry for narrative control, one direction that researchers might explore further is related to the nature of organizationmedia rivalrous relationships. One key aspect of this type of relationship that is unaddressed in the present framework is that of power imbalances in the narrative control arena (DeSarbo, Grewal, & Wind, 2006). An outlet or organization’s status, size, and reputation might allow them to gain some asymmetric suasory advantage over their rival (Barnett, 1997; Barnett & Amburgey, 1990; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999). Moreover, media outlets tend to enjoy a stable audience that often seeks to be influenced by the outlet’s coverage and perspective (Martin & Yurukoglu, 2017). Organizations, on the other hand, typically do not have this type of audience. An organization’s stakeholders, while often attentive, may not be as susceptible to the organization’s influence when compared to that of a preferred media outlet. As such, media outlets may have an inherent suasory advantage in controlling a narrative. Additionally, future research might consider potential alternative outcomes of winning or losing a rivalry for narrative control. For instance, researchers might examine outcomes related to the transgressing organization’s subsequent rivalry with traditional rivals or changes to norms within the transgressing organization’s industry or sector related to wins or losses in the narrative control domain. 关于未来对叙事控制权竞争的研究，研究者可能进一步探索的一个方向是组织媒体竞争性关系的本质。这类关系的一个关键方面在当前框架中未被探讨，即叙事控制领域中的权力失衡（DeSarbo, Grewal, & Wind, 2006）。一个媒体渠道或组织的地位、规模和声誉可能使其在与对手的竞争中获得某种不对称的说服优势（Barnett, 1997; Barnett & Amburgey, 1990; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999）。此外，媒体渠道往往拥有稳定的受众，这些受众常常希望受到该渠道报道和观点的影响（Martin & Yurukoglu, 2017）。相比之下，组织通常没有这类受众。组织的利益相关者虽然通常会关注，但与受青睐的媒体渠道相比，他们可能不太容易受到组织的影响。因此，媒体渠道在控制叙事方面可能具有内在的说服优势。此外，未来的研究可能需要考虑在叙事控制权竞争中获胜或失败的潜在替代结果。例如，研究者可能会考察违规组织随后与传统对手的竞争结果，或与叙事控制领域中的胜负相关的违规组织所在行业或部门的规范变化。

Future research might explore the specific factors that influence journalists and leaders’ perceptions identified in the framework. For example, in Stage 1 of the model, journalists who have experience covering the transgressing organization’s beat may be better able to recognize scandalousness, misinformation, and transgressor susceptibility; thus, they may be more likely to cover the transgression than other journalists (Mellado & Van Dalen, 2014). In Stage 2 of the model, a range of personality traits (e.g., overconfidence, narcissism, and aggression) or experiences (e.g., prior crisis management or past media rivalries) may influence leaders’ perceptions about the transgression itself as well as the critical coverage (Gamache & McNamara, 2019; König, Graf-Vlachy, Bundy, & Short, 2020). 未来的研究可能会探索影响框架中确定的记者和领导者认知的具体因素。例如，在模型的第一阶段，有报道过违规组织领域经验的记者可能能更敏锐地识别出丑闻性质、虚假信息和违规者的易感性；因此，他们可能比其他记者更有可能报道该违规事件（Mellado & Van Dalen，2014）。在模型的第二阶段，一系列人格特质（如过度自信、自恋和攻击性）或经历（如之前的危机管理或过去的媒体竞争）可能会影响领导者对违规行为本身以及关键报道的认知（Gamache & McNamara，2019；König, Graf-Vlachy, Bundy, & Short，2020）。

Lastly, while this framework is descriptive in nature, future research might explore normative implications for transgressing organizational leaders and the journalists covering them by studying specific effects of either party’s actions on their counterpart’s perceptions. For instance, future crisis management research might consider the effects of specific narrative-constructing components or rhetorical devices used to influence narratives and subsequent stakeholder perceptions. Doing so could provide suggestions to journalists or leaders about how to most effectively develop and shape narratives about transgressions for their own specific purposes. Can journalists build intrigue and capture additional stakeholder attention by highlighting uncertainty and unexplained behaviors related to a transgression, before exposing scandalous deeds (Le Masurier, 2015)? Can organizations combat media outlets’ narrativebuilding efforts by preemptively providing a clear and rational account of the transgression (Arpan & Pompper, 2003)? What specific rhetorical devices or tactics should either party use for overcoming a media- or organization-driven narrative (Waldron et al., 2015)? Should organizations attack the credibility of the journalists or media outlets who cover them to minimize the likelihood of a response (Koch, Denner, Viererbl, & Himmelreich, 2019)? Research questions related to prescribing narrative-controlling tactics such as these may represent lines of future inquiry. 最后，尽管该框架本质上具有描述性，但未来的研究可能会通过研究双方行动对对方感知的具体影响，探索违背组织领导者及其报道他们的记者的规范含义。例如，未来的危机管理研究可能会考虑特定叙事构建要素或用于影响叙事及后续利益相关者感知的修辞手段的效果。这样做可以为记者或领导者提供关于如何为自身特定目的最有效地发展和塑造关于违规行为的叙事的建议。记者能否在揭露丑闻行为之前，通过强调与违规行为相关的不确定性和无法解释的行为来引起兴趣并吸引更多利益相关者的关注（Le Masurier, 2015）？组织能否通过预先提供对违规行为的清晰合理的说明来对抗媒体机构的叙事构建努力（Arpan & Pompper, 2003）？双方应使用哪些特定的修辞手段或策略来克服由媒体或组织主导的叙事（Waldron et al., 2015）？组织是否应该攻击报道它们的记者或媒体机构的可信度以降低回应的可能性（Koch, Denner, Viererbl, & Himmelreich, 2019）？与规定此类控制叙事策略相关的研究问题可能代表未来研究的方向。

CONCLUSION

结论

Organizations and media outlets regularly battle to influence stakeholders’ perceptions about the many organizational transgressions littering the popular press. The framework developed here conceptualizes the unique tensions, actions, and perceptions at play during rivalry for narrative control following transgressions by organizations. It explores journalists and leaders’ sensemaking efforts as they consider whether and how they might attempt to shape the narrative about a transgression. This framework also expands theory about rivalry between dissimilar actors within the competitive dynamics domain. Moreover, it represents an important advance in the conceptualization of organization-media interplay following transgressions. My hope is that this framework will promote further examination of this form of rivalry and encourage competitive dynamics researchers to consider other underexplored forms of rivalry. 组织和媒体机构经常争夺影响力，以影响利益相关者对大众媒体中充斥的众多组织违规行为的看法。本文开发的框架概念化了组织发生违规行为后，争夺叙事控制权过程中存在的独特张力、行动和认知。它探讨了记者和领导者在考虑是否以及如何试图塑造关于违规行为的叙事时的意义建构努力。该框架还拓展了竞争动态领域中不同行动者之间竞争的理论。此外，它在概念化组织-媒体互动（在违规行为发生后）方面代表了重要进展。我希望该框架能促进对这种竞争形式的进一步研究，并鼓励竞争动态领域的研究者考虑其他尚未充分探索的竞争形式。

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Matt C. Hersel (mhersel@clemson.edu) is an assistant professor of strategic management at the Wilbur O. and Ann Powers College of Business, Clemson University. He received his PhD in strategic management from the Raymond J. Harbert College of Business, Auburn University. His current research focuses on how organizations manage stakeholder perceptions following misconduct. Matt C. Hersel（mhersel@clemson.edu）是克莱姆森大学威尔伯·O·安·鲍尔斯商学院战略管理助理教授。他拥有奥本大学雷蒙德·J·哈伯特商学院战略管理博士学位。他目前的研究重点是组织在发生不当行为后如何管理利益相关者的看法。

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