DISENTANGLING STRATEGIC CONSENSUS: STRATEGIC CONSENSUS TYPES, PSYCHOLOGICAL BONDS, AND THEIR EFFECTS ON STRATEGIC CLIMATE
战略共识的厘清：战略共识类型、心理纽带及其对战略氛围的影响
NATHAN A. BRAGAW University of Delaware NATHAN A. BRAGAW 特拉华大学
VILMOS F. MISANGYI The Pennsylvania State University VILMOS F. MISANGYI 宾夕法尼亚州立大学
Strategic consensus has long been held by academics and managers alike as crucial for organizational effectiveness. Yet, studies have failed to consistently demonstrate this importance. These equivocal findings have been attributed to the lack of clarity of the strategic consensus construct. We contend that current notions of strategic consensus have broadened the construct to the point that it has become indistinguishable from organizational strategic climate, which is a distinct, but related, construct. Moreover, we depart from past studies that have essentially treated commitment as an element of strategic consensus. Instead, we suggest that commitment is but one of several possible psychological bonds generated by strategic consensus. We therefore reconceptualize strategic consensus, disentangling it from commitment and strategic climate, and theorize how these three distinct constructs are interrelated. Specifically, we suggest that a strategic consensus influences strategic climate through both symbolic and substantive means, and that the latter occurs through a relationship mediated by the psychological bond that the strategic decision-makers hold toward the strategic decision. In so doing, our theorization paves the way for future research to explore how this constellation of constructs works together to affect more distal organizational outcomes such as strategic implementation, and ultimately, firm performance. 学术界和管理者长期以来都认为战略共识对组织效能至关重要。然而，相关研究未能持续证明这种重要性。这些模棱两可的发现被归因于战略共识构念缺乏清晰度。我们认为，当前对战略共识的概念化已经过度宽泛，以至于它与组织战略氛围（一个不同但相关的构念）难以区分。此外，我们与过去研究存在分歧，那些研究实质上将承诺视为战略共识的一个要素。相反，我们建议承诺只是战略共识产生的多种心理纽带之一。因此，我们重新概念化战略共识，将其与承诺和战略氛围区分开来，并理论化这三个不同构念之间的相互关系。具体而言，我们认为战略共识通过象征性和实质性两种方式影响战略氛围，后者通过战略决策者对战略决策所持有的心理纽带这一中介关系实现。通过这样做，我们的理论为未来研究铺平了道路，以探索这些构念的组合如何共同影响更长远的组织成果，如战略执行，并最终影响企业绩效。
Strategic consensus, which has typically been defined as the agreement among top managers on decisions about the organization’s goals (Bourgeois, 1980, 1985; Dess, 1987; Walter, Kellermanns, Floyd, Veiga, & Matherne, 2013; West & Meyer, 1998; West & Schwenk, 1996) or the means to achieve them (Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997; Grinyer & Norburn, 1975; Homburg, Krohmer, & Workman, 1999; Ramos-Garza, 2009; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990), is presumed to engender commitment to such strategic decisions, and thus is considered to be critical to organizational effectiveness (Amason, 1996; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989). Such strategic decisions are thought to require at least some level of commitment because they are often highly complex and involve a myriad of options, are fraught with risk and uncertainty, and have a connection and impact on organizational performance that is causally ambiguous. Moreover, strategic decisions are difficult to reverse without considerable financial and reputational cost to the firm as they involve the allocation of scarce resources and take longer time frames to implement than do operational decisions. Strategic consensus among the top management team (TMT) has therefore long been considered as foundational to strategy formulation (Ansoff, 1965; Bower & Doz, 1979; Simon, 1957). 战略共识通常被定义为高层管理者就组织目标（Bourgeois, 1980, 1985; Dess, 1987; Walter, Kellermanns, Floyd, Veiga, & Matherne, 2013; West & Meyer, 1998; West & Schwenk, 1996）或实现这些目标的手段（Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997; Grinyer & Norburn, 1975; Homburg, Krohmer, & Workman, 1999; Ramos-Garza, 2009; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990）达成的一致意见，据推测这种共识会催生对这些战略决策的承诺，因此被认为对组织效能至关重要（Amason, 1996; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989）。这类战略决策被认为至少需要一定程度的承诺，因为它们往往高度复杂，涉及无数选项，充满风险和不确定性，并且与组织绩效的联系和影响具有因果模糊性。此外，战略决策一旦做出，若要逆转将给企业带来巨大的财务和声誉成本，因为它们涉及稀缺资源的分配，且实施所需时间框架比运营决策更长。因此，高层管理团队（TMT）的战略共识长期以来被视为战略制定的基础（Ansoff, 1965; Bower & Doz, 1979; Simon, 1957）。
Despite its fundamental role in strategic management, a comprehensive review of the body of theory and research on strategic consensus by Kellermanns, Walter, Lechner, and Floyd (2005) revealed a vast inconsistency across existing work in how the construct has been both defined and measured. As Kellermanns et al. (2005) noted, the extant definitional confusion is undoubtedly the reason for the lack of consistency in empirical findings between strategic consensus and firm outcomes. For instance, studies have reported positive relationships (Dess, 1987; Dess & Keats, 1987; Dooley, Fryxell, & Judge, 2000; Hrebiniak & Snow, 1982; Iaquinto & Fredrickson, 1997; Walter et al., 2013), negative relationships (Bourgeois, 1985), or null relationships between strategic consensus and firm performance (Grinyer & Norburn, 1975; West & Meyer, 1998; West & Schwenk, 1996; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990), and similarly mixed results with respect to the specific content of the consensus (Bourgeois, 1980; González-Benito, Aguinis, Boyd, & Suárez-González, 2012; Homburg et al., 1999; Kellermanns, Walter, Floyd, Lechner, & Shaw, 2011; Ramos-Garza, 2009). This lack of definitional clarity provides a clear threat to the validity of the construct (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002), making it difficult for researchers to develop valid measures of it (e.g., Schwab, 2005), and at the very least, it inhibits a coherent integration of past theory and findings. In an attempt to synthesize the prior research and spur future research, Kellermanns et al. (2005: 721) offered the following broad definition of strategic consensus: “the shared understanding of strategic priorities among managers at the top, middle, or operating levels of the organization.” 尽管战略共识在战略管理中具有基础性作用，但Kellermanns、Walter、Lechner和Floyd（2005）对战略共识的理论和研究文献进行的全面回顾显示，现有研究在该构念的定义和测量方式上存在巨大不一致。正如Kellermanns等人（2005）所指出的，现有的定义混乱无疑是战略共识与企业成果之间实证结果缺乏一致性的原因。例如，研究报告了战略共识与企业绩效之间的正相关关系（Dess, 1987；Dess & Keats, 1987；Dooley, Fryxell, & Judge, 2000；Hrebiniak & Snow, 1982；Iaquinto & Fredrickson, 1997；Walter et al., 2013）、负相关关系（Bourgeois, 1985）或无显著关系（Grinyer & Norburn, 1975；West & Meyer, 1998；West & Schwenk, 1996；Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990），并且在共识的具体内容方面也有类似的混合结果（Bourgeois, 1980；González-Benito, Aguinis, Boyd, & Suárez-González, 2012；Homburg et al., 1999；Kellermanns, Walter, Floyd, Lechner, & Shaw, 2011；Ramos-Garza, 2009）。这种定义上的不清晰对该构念的有效性构成了明确威胁（Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002），使得研究者难以开发出有效的测量方法（例如，Schwab, 2005），并且至少阻碍了对过去理论和研究结果的连贯整合。为了综合先前的研究并推动未来的研究，Kellermanns等人（2005: 721）提出了战略共识的以下广泛定义：“组织高层、中层或运营层面管理者对战略优先级的共同理解。”
We contend that this synthesizing definition of strategic consensus contaminates the construct by broadening its content (i.e., strategic priorities) and scope (i.e., among all managers) to the point that it has become indistinguishable from organizational strategic climate, a construct that is distinct from, but related, to strategic consensus (cf., Zohar & Hofmann, 2012). Furthermore, we contend that two problematic assumptions have conventionally underpinned the vast majority of past research on strategic consensus: (a) that strategic consensus is defined by agreement among managers, implying that all strategic decisions result in some degree of consensus; and (b) that strategic consensus always generates commitment to the strategic decision, which essentially confounds it with this psychological bond that is itself a separate construct (see Klein, Molloy, & Brinsfield, 2012). We suggest that these assumptions have masked complex relationships that strategic consensus has with both commitment and strategic climate. 我们认为，这种对战略共识的综合定义通过扩大其内容（即战略优先级）和范围（即所有管理者之间），使得该概念与组织战略氛围难以区分。后者虽然与战略共识不同，但与之相关（Zohar & Hofmann, 2012）。此外，我们认为过去绝大多数关于战略共识的研究通常基于两个有问题的假设：(a) 战略共识被定义为管理者之间的一致意见，这意味着所有战略决策都会在某种程度上达成共识；(b) 战略共识总是会产生对战略决策的承诺，这本质上混淆了战略共识与这种本身是独立概念的心理纽带（Klein, Molloy, & Brinsfield, 2012）。我们认为这些假设掩盖了战略共识与承诺及战略氛围之间的复杂关系。
We therefore challenge these assumptions and conceptualize strategic consensus in a manner that more accurately treats it as a separate construct from the psychological bonds it generates and from strategic climate. First, we reconceptualize the content of strategic consensus as pertaining to strategic decisions and limit its scope to only those participants directly involved in making the decisions, and we draw upon extant scholarship on decisionmaking (e.g., Davis, 1973; Graham, 1970) to suggest that a strategic consensus fundamentally represents a decision outcome in which the decision-makers accept the settled-upon strategic decision. We discuss how this fundamentally alters conventional thinking that strategic consensus is constituted by agreement: rather than simply assuming that some degree of consensus (i.e., level of agreement) exists, we suggest that future research must instead focus on whether a consensual strategic decision outcome occurred (i.e., a difference in kind), and, if so, then what type of strategic consensus was achieved. In the current manuscript, we broadly classify strategic consensuses as being either natural or negotiated, and identify four ideal types of strategic consensus: a natural strategic consensus occurs as either aligned or discovered, while a negotiated strategic consensus occurs as calculated or acquiesced. This reconceptualization allows for problematization of the psychological bonds that strategic consensus generates toward the strategic decision, and thereby affords a deeper understanding of the type of psychological involvement the strategic decision-making participants (i.e., TMT members) hold toward the strategic decision. 因此，我们挑战这些假设，并以一种更准确地将战略共识视为与它所产生的心理纽带以及战略氛围相分离的独立结构的方式来概念化战略共识。首先，我们重新将战略共识的内容概念化为与战略决策相关，并将其范围限制在仅直接参与决策的参与者范围内，我们借鉴现有的关于决策的学术研究（例如，Davis，1973；Graham，1970），认为战略共识本质上代表一种决策结果，即决策者接受已确定的战略决策。我们讨论这如何从根本上改变了认为战略共识由一致意见构成的传统思维：我们不只是假设存在某种程度的共识（即一致程度），而是建议未来的研究必须转而关注是否发生了共识性的战略决策结果（即本质上的差异），如果发生了，那么实现的是哪种类型的战略共识。在本手稿中，我们将战略共识广泛地分为自然型或协商型，并确定四种理想的战略共识类型：自然战略共识可分为一致型或发现型，而协商战略共识可分为算计型或默许型。这种重新概念化使得能够对战略共识对战略决策产生的心理纽带进行质疑，从而更深入地理解战略决策参与者（即高层管理团队成员）对战略决策的心理参与类型。
Second, we draw upon recent developments in the commitment literature (e.g., Klein et al., 2012) to suggest that commitment is only one of several types of psychological bond that can result toward the strategic decision when a strategic consensus is achieved. In so doing, we develop propositions with respect to the different types of psychological bonds that are generated toward the strategic decision based on the different strategic consensus types. Specifically, we propose that only the two natural types of strategic consensus generate a psychological involvement commensurate with commitment— and may even involve identification—to the strategic decision, whereas the two types of negotiated strategic consensus generate psychological bond types that essentially entail compliance. As such, our theorization importantly departs from past studies that have conventionally presumed that commitment is an element of strategic consensus itself (for a notable exception, see Dooley et al., 2000) and our problematization of the relationship that exists between strategic consensus and the different types of psychological bonds paves the way for understanding this relationship in all its complexity. Each type of strategic consensus generates a different type of psychological bond to the strategic decision. That these various bonds differ in their substantive enactments—that is, they differ in their psychological involvement, effort and resource allocations, and continuation—toward the strategic decision, this has major implications for how the strategic priorities of the firm are enacted and perceived. Thus our theorization also disentangles how strategic consensus relates to the other key construct with which it has become conflated: strategic climate. 其次，我们借鉴承诺研究领域的最新进展（例如，Klein等人，2012），提出承诺只是几种心理纽带类型之一，当达成战略共识时，这些心理纽带可能会对战略决策产生影响。在此过程中，我们基于不同的战略共识类型，提出了与针对战略决策产生的不同类型心理纽带相关的命题。具体而言，我们认为只有两种自然类型的战略共识会产生与承诺相当的心理投入（甚至可能涉及认同），而两种协商型战略共识产生的心理纽带类型本质上意味着顺从。因此，我们的理论化与以往研究存在重要差异，以往研究通常假定承诺本身就是战略共识的一个要素（一个显著例外，见Dooley等人，2000），而我们对战略共识与不同类型心理纽带之间关系的质疑，为全面理解这种关系的复杂性铺平了道路。每种类型的战略共识都会对战略决策产生不同类型的心理纽带。这些不同的纽带在其实质性表现上存在差异——即它们在心理投入、努力和资源分配以及持续投入方面存在差异——这对企业战略优先级的制定和认知具有重大影响。因此，我们的理论化还厘清了战略共识与另一个与之混淆的关键构念（即战略氛围）之间的关系。
Third, then, we posit that a strategic consensus by top decision-makers is likely to have a positive symbolical influence on the organization’s strategic climate, as the achievement of a strategic consensus— regardless of its type—on any given strategic decision contributes to a shared awareness of the decision’s strategic priority. But, nevertheless, because each of the different strategic consensus types have differing substantive effects, through the different psychological bonds that the decision-makers hold toward the strategic decision, this means that a strategic consensus can work to not only strengthen the strategic climate but also maintain or even weaken it. Our reconceptualization and theorization thus reveals an asymmetrical effect of strategic consensus on strategic climate that has been previously masked by a broad definition of strategic consensus as shared awareness (i.e., perceived agreement) among all managers. Indeed, the past conflation of strategic consensus and strategic climate has inherently only resided in the symbolic aspects of the construct and has stopped short of considering the substantive effects of strategic consensus—and, as we discuss below, this shortfall was also enabled by the assumption that strategic consensus necessarily results in commitment. 第三，接下来，我们假设高层决策者达成的战略共识可能会对组织的战略氛围产生积极的象征性影响，因为无论战略共识的类型如何，在任何特定战略决策上达成的共识都有助于形成对该决策战略优先级的共同认知。然而，尽管如此，由于不同类型的战略共识具有不同的实质性影响，通过决策者对战略决策持有的不同心理联系，这意味着战略共识不仅可以加强战略氛围，还可能维持甚至削弱它。因此，我们的重新概念化和理论化揭示了战略共识对战略氛围的非对称影响，而这一点此前因将战略共识宽泛地定义为所有管理者的共同认知（即感知到的一致）而被掩盖。事实上，过去将战略共识与战略氛围混为一谈，本质上只停留在该构念的象征性层面，而没有考虑战略共识的实质性影响——正如我们下面将讨论的，这种不足也源于战略共识必然导致承诺的假设。
In the current manuscript, we therefore reconceptualize strategic consensus, disentangle it from the psychological bond it generates and from strategic climate, and theorize how these distinct constructs are interrelated. In so doing, our theorization provides the definitional clarity needed to enhance the validity of future measurement of the construct. It also importantly provides the foundation for future research to examine how this constellation of constructs works together to enhance (or diminish) more distal organizational outcomes such as strategic implementation, and, ultimately, firm performance. Although our identification and development of the different types of strategic consensus does not delve into the particular decision processes that may lead to the achievement of strategic consensus as a decision outcome, we discuss how our theorization provides the pathway for future research to explore the different antecedents that may lead to the likelihood of observing each particular strategic consensus type. 在当前的手稿中，我们因此重新概念化战略共识，将其从它产生的心理纽带以及战略氛围中剥离出来，并理论化这些不同构念之间的相互关系。通过这样做，我们的理论化提供了定义上的清晰度，有助于提高未来对该构念测量的有效性。它还为未来研究奠定了重要基础，以考察这些构念的集合如何共同作用来增强（或削弱）更远端的组织成果，如战略实施，以及最终的企业绩效。虽然我们对不同类型战略共识的识别和发展并未深入探讨可能导致战略共识作为决策结果实现的特定决策过程，但我们讨论了我们的理论化如何为未来研究探索可能导致观察到每种特定战略共识类型的可能性的不同前因提供路径。
RECONCEPTUALIZING STRATEGIC CONSENSUS
重新概念化战略共识
In their comprehensive review of the strategic consensus literature, Kellermanns and colleagues (2005) detailed how past conceptualizations and treatments of strategic consensus have varied in their definitions of the content, scope and degree of the strategic consensus (see Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989). While early studies have typically conceptualized the content of strategic consensus as pertaining to the firm’s goals and the accompanying strategic policies and initiatives aimed at achieving them, this content in studies over time has come to be more broadly defined as the more general understanding of the firm’s “strategic priorities” (see Kellermanns et al., 2005). This latter broadened definition of the content of strategic consensus parallels the variance in how past studies have conceptualized scope—that is, the breadth of actors involved in the strategic consensus. Extant research differs on whether the scope of strategic consensus pertains to the TMT (e.g., Amason, 1996; Bourgeois, 1985; Dess, 1987), the dominant coalition (Bourgeois, 1980; Dooley et al., 2000), or managers across all levels of the organization (e.g., González-Benito et al., 2012; Homburg et al., 1999; Walter et al., 2013). Finally, extant research has consistently focused upon strategic consensus as a decision outcome (rather than as a decision process), and this decision outcome has been conceptualized as the amount of “agreement” among the actors about the decision (e.g., Dess & Origer, 1987; Dooley et al., 2000; Priem, 1990). The notion of agreement, however, has varied among past studies in tandem with the variance in their content and scope: studies focusing on TMTs have typically defined (and measured) consensus as agreement among the TMT, whereas studies with broader definitions of content and scope have defined consensus as a “shared understanding” among all levels of managers (Kellermanns et al., 2005). This past lack of construct clarity threatens the validity of the construct’s measurement and has resulted in extant equivocal empirical findings. 在对战略共识文献的全面综述中，Kellermanns及其同事（2005）详细阐述了过去对战略共识的概念化和处理方式在内容、范围和程度的定义上存在的差异（见Wooldridge & Floyd，1989）。虽然早期研究通常将战略共识的内容概念化为与公司目标及旨在实现这些目标的相应战略政策和举措相关，但随着时间推移，研究中的这一内容已被更广泛地定义为对公司“战略优先级”的更普遍理解（见Kellermanns et al.，2005）。后者对战略共识内容的拓宽定义，与过去研究对范围（即参与战略共识的参与者的广度）的概念化差异相呼应。现有研究在战略共识的范围是否涉及高层管理团队（TMT，例如Amason，1996；Bourgeois，1985；Dess，1987）、主导联盟（Bourgeois，1980；Dooley et al.，2000）或组织各级管理人员（例如González-Benito et al.，2012；Homburg et al.，1999；Walter et al.，2013）方面存在分歧。最后，现有研究一直将战略共识视为一种决策结果（而非决策过程），而这一决策结果被概念化为参与者对决策的“一致程度”（例如Dess & Origer，1987；Dooley et al.，2000；Priem，1990）。然而，“一致”的概念在过去的研究中随着内容和范围的差异而有所不同：关注TMT的研究通常将共识定义（并衡量）为TMT成员之间的一致，而对内容和范围有更广泛定义的研究则将共识定义为各级管理人员之间的“共同理解”（Kellermanns et al.，2005）。过去对构念清晰度的缺乏威胁到了该构念测量的有效性，并导致现有实证结果存在矛盾。
As we have already outlined above, Kellermanns et al.’s (2005) broad synthesizing definition, while encapsulating the prior literature, conflates strategic consensus with strategic climate. We suggest that strategic consensus is distinct from strategic climate in both its content and its scope: the content of strategic consensus pertains to the particular alternatives weighed in making a strategic decision, and, ultimately, to the selected alternative (i.e., strategic decision outcome), whereas strategic climate embodies the agreement or shared awareness about the firm’s strategic goals and priorities (and, as such, is based upon each particular strategic decision as well as the culmination of preceding strategic decisions). The scope of strategic consensus is limited to the strategic decision-makers (i.e., the TMT), while strategic climate more broadly encompasses all managers (including TMT members) and employees. Moreover, we posit that strategic consensus and strategic climate have very different underlying mechanisms: while strategic consensus is built upon the acceptance of a strategic decision among the decision-makers, strategic climate is built upon the shared perceptions of the firm’s strategic priorities among all organizational members. In short, we suggest that strategic climate is a critically important, but distinct, organizational phenomenon from a strategic consensus, and that it is influenced each time a strategic consensus is reached on any particular strategic decision. 如前所述，Kellermanns等人（2005）的综合定义虽然涵盖了先前的文献，但将战略共识与战略氛围混为一谈。我们认为，战略共识与战略氛围在内容和范围上均存在差异：战略共识的内容涉及制定战略决策时权衡的特定备选方案，最终涉及选定的备选方案（即战略决策结果）；而战略氛围体现了对企业战略目标和优先级的认同或共同认知（因此，它既基于每个特定的战略决策，也基于先前战略决策的累积）。战略共识的范围仅限于战略决策者（即高层管理团队，TMT），而战略氛围则更广泛地涵盖所有管理者（包括TMT成员）和员工。此外，我们假设战略共识和战略氛围具有截然不同的内在机制：战略共识建立在决策者对战略决策的接受基础上，而战略氛围则建立在所有组织成员对企业战略优先级的共同认知基础上。简而言之，我们认为战略氛围是一种极其重要但与战略共识不同的组织现象，并且每次在特定战略决策上达成战略共识时，都会对其产生影响。
We therefore formally disentangle these constructs. To do so, we define strategic consensus in a manner that more accurately captures the construct: Strategic consensus occurs when all the deciding social actors—typically, but not limited to, the TMT—accept the strategic decision. We also build directly upon Zohar and Hofmann (2012) to define strategic climate as the shared understanding among organizational members of the strategic goals and priorities of the organization. This definition of strategic climate is consistent with previous scholarship on organizational climate suggesting that employees’ understandings of the actions that are prioritized and rewarded are a critical component of organizational climates (Schneider, 1975; Schneider & Reichers, 1983). 因此，我们正式厘清这些概念。为此，我们以更准确地捕捉该概念的方式定义战略共识：战略共识发生在所有决策社会行动者（通常但不限于高层管理团队）接受战略决策之时。我们还直接基于佐哈尔和霍夫曼（2012）的研究，将战略氛围定义为组织成员对组织战略目标和优先事项的共同理解。这一战略氛围的定义与先前关于组织氛围的学术研究一致，该研究表明员工对被优先考虑和奖励的行动的理解是组织氛围的关键组成部分（施奈德，1975；施奈德 & 赖歇尔斯，1983）。
Our reconceptualization appropriately bounds the content and scope of strategic consensus and directs the focus on the acceptance of the strategic decision outcome by the decision-makers. This fundamentally alters the way we think about strategic consensus: rather than existing on a continuum, strategic consensus may or may not be achieved, and when it is reached, there are unique types of strategic consensus that differ in their implications for the postdecision psychological involvement and behaviors of the decision-makers. We now discuss each of these elements of strategic consensus in turn. 我们对战略共识的重新概念化恰当地界定了其内容和范围，并将重点引导至决策者对战略决策结果的接受上。这从根本上改变了我们对战略共识的认知：战略共识不再是一个连续体，而是可能实现也可能无法实现；当它达成时，会存在独特类型的战略共识，这些类型在对决策者决策后的心理投入和行为的影响方面各不相同。我们现在依次讨论战略共识的这些要素。
The Content and Scope of Strategic Consensus
战略共识的内容与范围
Our proposed definition of strategic consensus bounds its content to strategic decisions—that is, decisions specific to the setting of organizational goals or the selecting of major courses of actions aimed at goal attainment. As such, this remains consistent with the focus of previous strategic consensus research on the firm’s ends and means (e.g., Bourgeois, 1980, 1985; Dess, 1987; Dess & Origer, 1987; West & Schwenk, 1996), and with the longestablished notion of strategic decisions as being related to the “determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise” or to the major courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals" (Chandler, 1962: 16). Most important, however, is that our definition treats strategic consensus as a strategic decision outcome and does not refer to the strategic decision-making process itself. That is, while consensus can generally refer to either a process of reaching a group decision (e.g., Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986) or to a group decision outcome (e.g., Priem, Harrison, & Muir, 1995), prior research on strategic consensus has clearly demarcated it as a decision outcome regardless of the decision process that led to its achievement (for an exception, see Markoczy, 2001), and thus our definition is aligned in this regard with past research on strategic consensus. 我们提出的战略共识定义将其内容限定在战略决策范围内——即针对组织目标设定或为实现目标而选择主要行动方案的特定决策。因此，这与先前战略共识研究对企业目标与手段的关注一致（例如，Bourgeois, 1980, 1985；Dess, 1987；Dess & Origer, 1987；West & Schwenk, 1996），也与长期以来将战略决策定义为“确定企业基本长期目标和宗旨”或“主要行动方案及实现这些目标所需资源分配”的观念相符（Chandler, 1962: 16）。然而，最重要的是，我们的定义将战略共识视为战略决策的结果，而非战略决策过程本身。也就是说，虽然共识通常可指达成群体决策的过程（例如，Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986）或群体决策结果（例如，Priem, Harrison, & Muir, 1995），但先前关于战略共识的研究已明确将其界定为决策结果，无论导致其达成的决策过程如何（Markoczy, 2001 是一个例外），因此我们的定义在这一点上与以往战略共识研究一致。
Our reconceptualization also puts a boundary on the range of actors involved in the strategic consensus: the scope of strategic consensus includes only those organizational members that make the strategic decision. While this essentially curtails the inclusion of middle- and operational-level managers (see Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997; Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994), it nevertheless still allows for a scope that encompasses any key organizational members beyond the TMT that may be involved in the making of any particular strategic decision. That is, strategic decisions can be made by a dominant coalition (e.g., Amason, 1996; Bourgeois, 1985; Dess, 1987)—a group of organizational members with the authority to direct actions of the firm (Child, 1972). Dominant coalitions are often issue-oriented groups that are not restricted to formal organizational structures (Stevenson, Pearce, & Porter, 1985), and thus may sometimes involve members beyond the TMT, the latter of which is typically limited to certain formal roles within the firm (Finkelstein, Cannella, & Hambrick, 2009). The essential aspect of our definition therefore is that strategic consensus, as a decision outcome, pertains directly to those individuals who make the strategic decision. While this may involve a broader coalition of actors that extends beyond the TMT, we hereafter simply refer to the TMT. 我们的重新概念化也为战略共识所涉及的行动者范围划定了边界：战略共识的范围仅包括做出战略决策的组织成员。虽然这本质上限制了中层和运营级管理者的纳入（见Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997；Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994），但它仍然允许涵盖TMT之外可能参与特定战略决策制定的任何关键组织成员。也就是说，战略决策可以由一个主导联盟（例如Amason, 1996；Bourgeois, 1985；Dess, 1987）做出——这是一个拥有指导公司行动权威的组织成员群体（Child, 1972）。主导联盟通常是面向问题的群体，不受正式组织结构的限制（Stevenson, Pearce, & Porter, 1985），因此有时可能包括TMT之外的成员，而后者通常仅限于公司内的某些正式角色（Finkelstein, Cannella, & Hambrick, 2009）。因此，我们定义的核心方面是，战略共识作为决策结果，直接涉及做出战略决策的个人。虽然这可能涉及一个超出TMT的更广泛行动者联盟，但我们在此后仅提及TMT。
While the content and scope dimensions of the conception of strategic consensus offered here bound the construct, our redefining of the concept as the acceptance of a strategic decision by “all the deciding social actors” fundamentally alters the third dimension of strategic consensus: it shifts it from a matter of degree to that of a difference in kind, and thus types. 虽然此处提出的战略共识概念的内容和范围维度界定了该概念的构建，但我们将其重新定义为“所有决策性社会行为体”对战略决策的接受，这从根本上改变了战略共识的第三个维度：它将战略共识从一个程度问题转变为一种质的差异，进而成为类型上的差异。
From Degree to Types of Strategic Consensus
从学位到战略共识的类型
Our definition of strategic consensus as a group decision outcome that occurs when all the deciding social actors accept the strategic decision adopts the meaning of consensus portrayed in the decisionmaking literature. More specifically, the decisionmaking literature has defined consensus in a manner that emphasizes acceptance rather than agreement: it is viewed as a decision outcome in which “whatever was agreed upon had to be acceptable to all” (Graham, 1970: 88). Or, put another way, consensus is a decision in which “each member of the group must be satisfied as to the ultimate course of action to be taken” (Holder, 1976: 307). As Davis (1973: 99) has highlighted, this also means that consensus is a decision that faces no opposition: 我们对战略共识的定义是，当所有决策社会行为体都接受战略决策时形成的群体决策结果，这采用了决策文献中所描述的共识含义。更具体地说，决策文献对共识的定义强调接受而非一致：它被视为一种决策结果，即“无论达成了什么协议，都必须为所有人所接受”（Graham，1970：88）。或者换句话说，共识是一种决策，其中“群体的每个成员都必须对将要采取的最终行动方案感到满意”（Holder，1976：307）。正如Davis（1973：99）所强调的，这也意味着共识是一种没有反对意见的决策：
Local chapters of the League of Women Voters do not vote on issues before the group, but instead reach “consensus”—a continuing of discussion until the chapter president encounters no opposition [emphasis added] to her summary of the group’s position. League of Women Voters的地方分会不会就团体面前的议题进行投票，而是达成“共识”——即持续讨论，直到分会会长在总结团体立场时未遇到任何反对意见[强调部分]。
Although some previous scholarship on strategic consensus has taken this acceptance perspective (e.g., Dess & Origer, 1987; Dooley et al., 2000; Priem, 1990), the extant views of strategic consensus, and especially the more recent synthesis perspective, instead seem founded upon the more sociological and psychological (and philosophical) conceptions of consensus as being the “shared beliefs,” “shared views,” “shared values,” “mutual understanding,” or “agreement” among individuals within a group or society on an issue, social norms, or public opinion (e.g., Cole & Bedeian, 2007; Kenny, 1991; Kozlowski & Hattrup, 1992; Scheff, 1967). While consensus has generally been treated as individual agreement in these other literatures, some sociological theories have also considered it to be a more collective-level “coorientation” (Newcomb, 1953). Philosophical treatments of consensus, as the basis for understanding knowledge, or truth, as constructed and understood by the public at large, take a similar agreement view of consensus (i.e., Habermas’s “Consensus theory of truth” [see Hesse, 1982]). 尽管一些先前关于战略共识的学术研究采取了这种接受视角（例如，Dess & Origer, 1987；Dooley et al., 2000；Priem, 1990），但现存的战略共识观点，尤其是更近期的综合视角，似乎反而建立在更具社会学和心理学（以及哲学）色彩的共识概念之上——即共识是群体或社会中的个体在某个问题、社会规范或公众舆论上的“共同信念”“共同看法”“共同价值观”“相互理解”或“一致意见”（例如，Cole & Bedeian, 2007；Kenny, 1991；Kozlowski & Hattrup, 1992；Scheff, 1967）。尽管在这些其他文献中，共识通常被视为个体层面的一致，但一些社会学理论也将其视为更具集体层面的“共同导向”（Newcomb, 1953）。作为理解知识或真理（由公众整体建构和理解）的基础的哲学视角，对共识的处理也采取了类似的一致观点（即哈贝马斯的“真理共识论”[见Hesse, 1982]）。
Thus, as our definitions of strategic consensus and strategic climate should make clear, we consider both of these notions of consensus found in the broader literatures as being important and highly relevant to the understanding of how strategic decisions affect organizations and their effectiveness. However, as the organizational climate and decisionmaking literatures have made clear, respectively, the “shared awareness” or “agreement” about a firm’s strategic priorities constitutes the strategic climate while the acceptance of particular strategic decisions by the firm’s decision-makers represents a strategic consensus. Our theorization treats each of these constructs separately and considers how the latter influences the former. 因此，正如我们对战略共识和战略氛围的定义所表明的那样，我们认为在更广泛的文献中发现的这两种共识概念都非常重要，并且与理解战略决策如何影响组织及其效能高度相关。然而，正如组织氛围和决策文献分别明确指出的那样，对公司战略优先事项的“共同认知”或“一致意见”构成了战略氛围，而公司决策者对特定战略决策的接受则代表了战略共识。我们的理论将这些构念分别对待，并考虑后者如何影响前者。
Viewing strategic consensus as the acceptance of a strategic decision requires a fundamental shift from thinking in terms of “degree” to instead thinking in terms of “type.” There are two important aspects to this shift. First, the unanimity of acceptance among the decision participants—consensus decisions must “be acceptable to all” (Graham, 1970: 88) or at least “encounter no opposition” (Davis, 1973: 99)— entails meeting all participants’ minimum preferences. In other words, the decision-makers may differ in their views as to which alternative presents the most preferred course of action and still find an effective solution for the organization that is acceptable to all individual decision-makers. This is very different from the extant approach, which implicitly anchors the degree of agreement on maximum rather than minimum preferences. Second, strategic consensus is a state rather than a continuum. In short, consensual decisions are outcomes in which all decision participants are unified in the sense that the decision outcome met or exceeded each and every participant’s minimum preference threshold—which is qualitatively distinct from nonconsensual decisions. This again stands in stark contrast to the widespread “agreement” view of strategic consensus, which conceptualizes consensus as if it occurs for all strategic decisions—even those wherein some decision participants do not find the decision outcome acceptable at all—and measures consensus as though it ranges from low consensus (absence of agreement) to high consensus (complete agreement) (Dess & Priem, 1995; Priem, 1990). 将战略共识视为对战略决策的接受，需要从“程度”思维根本转变为“类型”思维。这种转变有两个重要方面。首先，决策参与者之间的接受一致性——共识决策必须“为所有人所接受”（Graham，1970：88）或至少“不遇到反对”（Davis，1973：99）——意味着满足所有参与者的最低偏好。换句话说，决策者可能对哪个替代方案是最偏好的行动方案有不同看法，但仍能为组织找到一个所有个体决策者都接受的有效解决方案。这与现有方法截然不同，现有方法隐含地将一致程度锚定在最大偏好而非最小偏好上。其次，战略共识是一种状态而非连续体。简而言之，共识决策是所有决策参与者在决策结果满足或超过每个参与者的最低偏好阈值的意义上达成统一的结果——这在质上与非共识决策不同。这再次与广泛存在的“一致”战略共识观点形成鲜明对比，后者将共识概念化为似乎所有战略决策都存在共识——即使其中一些决策参与者根本不认为决策结果可接受——并且将共识衡量为从低共识（无一致）到高共识（完全一致）的范围（Dess & Priem，1995；Priem，1990）。
We conceptualize strategic consensus as a grouplevel phenomenon that is built upon the minimum preference thresholds of the decision-making participants. While decision alternatives viewed as less effective will generally be less preferred, whether or not they are deemed acceptable is subject to a decision-maker’s “minimum preference threshold.” That is, decision participants have their own unique aspiration levels, which Schneider (1992: 1053) has defined as “the smallest outcome that would be deemed satisfactory by the decision maker, given the current choice situation.” We refer to this as the minimum preference threshold: any alternatives above this threshold are deemed as acceptable by the individual as they are believed to meet some minimum level of effectiveness.1 Those alternatives below the threshold will be viewed by the individual as ineffective, and thus unacceptable. Therefore, for any decision alternative to be acceptable to all participants, it would have to be above each and every participant’s minimum preference threshold. This view of strategic consensus is consistent with Cyert and March’s (1963) suggestion that strategic decisions rely upon minimum-or-better standards, as this provides a means to resolve the intragroup conflict that is sure to arise when the maximization-oriented standards associated with purely rational decisionmaking are applied. 我们将战略共识概念化为一种群体层面的现象，它建立在决策参与者的最低偏好阈值之上。虽然被视为效果较差的决策选项通常会被评价为较低偏好，但它们是否被认为可接受取决于决策者的“最低偏好阈值”。也就是说，决策参与者有自己独特的期望水平，施耐德（1992：1053）将其定义为“在当前选择情境下，决策者认为可接受的最小结果”。我们将此称为最低偏好阈值：任何高于该阈值的选项都会被个人认为可接受，因为它们被认为达到了一定的最低效果水平。¹ 低于阈值的选项将被个人视为无效，因此不可接受。因此，为了使任何决策选项被所有参与者接受，它必须高于每个参与者的最低偏好阈值。这种战略共识的观点与西尔特和马奇（1963）的建议一致，即战略决策依赖于“最低或更好”的标准，因为当应用于纯粹理性决策的最大化导向标准时，这提供了一种解决群体内冲突的方法，而这种冲突在应用此类标准时必然会出现。
It is also worth noting that each participant’s preferences for any particular decision is based upon their attitudes and beliefs about the effectiveness of each of the particular decision alternatives under consideration.2 Each participant’s attitudes and beliefs are a reflection of their own unique roles, 还值得注意的是，每个参与者对任何特定决策的偏好都基于他们对所考虑的每个特定决策方案有效性的态度和信念。2 每个参与者的态度和信念反映了他们自身独特的角色，
2 Effectiveness pertains to whether goals are achieved— it involves “how well the organization is meeting the needs or satisfying the criteria of the evaluator” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 34)and goals can be considered as an amalgam of the participant’s individual goals, the goals of the participant’s subunit that they represent, and the firm’s overarching goals (Cyert & March, 1963). Thus, when we refer to an individual decision participant’s goals, we do so with this amalgam in mind. Moreover, because the firm’s goals themselves are the subject of the strategic decision-making, by definition the goals of the individual and their subunit are paramount to each participant’s preference strength in the strategic decision-making process. 2 有效性指的是目标是否实现——它涉及“组织满足评估者需求或标准的程度”（Pfeffer & Salancik，1978：34），目标可以被视为参与者个人目标、他们所代表的参与者子单元的目标以及公司总体目标的混合体（Cyert & March，1963）。因此，当我们提及个体决策参与者的目标时，我们是在考虑这种混合体。此外，由于公司目标本身是战略决策的主题，根据定义，个体及其子单元的目标在战略决策过程中对每个参与者的偏好强度而言是至关重要的。
$\textcircled{4}$ Decision alternative - Minimum preference threshold $\textcircled{4}$ 决策备选方案 - 最低偏好阈值
Notes: While we depict the minimum threshold as a constant across participants for simplicity, this threshold is assumed to vary across participants. Here, we seek to convey that the acceptability of any given alternative to each decision-maker is subject to the particular individual’s minimum preference threshold. 注：为简化起见，我们将最低阈值描述为所有参与者的常数，但实际上该阈值被假定为在参与者之间存在差异。在此，我们旨在说明，对于每个决策者而言，任何给定替代方案的可接受性取决于该特定个体的最低偏好阈值。
backgrounds, experiences, and personal dispositions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and because strategic decisions are often characterized as inherently risky and uncertain, such individual differences play a heightened role in understanding preferences because they directly affect how the information will be perceived, processed, and made sense of by the decision-makers (e.g., Chattopadhyay, Glick, Miller, & Huber, 1999; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993). In short, when a decisionmaker believes that a specific alternative will be effective, they will have a stronger preference for that decision alternative—and the alternative believed to be most effective will be maximally preferred. 背景、经验和个人特质（Hambrick & Mason，1984），而且由于战略决策通常具有内在的风险和不确定性，这类个体差异在理解偏好方面的作用更为凸显，因为它们直接影响决策者如何感知、处理和理解信息（例如，Chattopadhyay、Glick、Miller & Huber，1999；Hambrick & Mason，1984；Thomas、Clark & Gioia，1993）。简而言之，当决策者认为某个特定方案会有效时，他们会对该决策方案有更强的偏好——而被认为最有效的方案将会是最受青睐的。
To illustrate these notions, we consider a TMT of seven participants who are faced with choosing among three different strategic alternatives. Figure 1 depicts the three decision alternatives in terms of each TMT member’s preferences, subject to each participant’s minimum preference threshold. While the minimum preference threshold is displayed as a constant across participants for simplicity, this does not mean that all participants share a single threshold. Rather, the figure depicts that preferences for the alternatives may vary across the individual decision participants, and that the acceptability of any given alternative to each individual is subject to the particular individual’s minimum preference threshold. 为了说明这些概念，我们考虑一个由七名参与者组成的高层管理团队（TMT），他们需要在三种不同的战略方案中做出选择。图1根据每个TMT成员的偏好（在每个参与者的最低偏好阈值范围内）描绘了这三种决策方案。虽然为简化起见，最低偏好阈值在所有参与者中显示为常数，但这并不意味着所有参与者都共享单一阈值。相反，该图表明，不同决策参与者对各方案的偏好可能存在差异，且每个个体对任一特定方案的可接受性取决于该个体的特定最低偏好阈值。
For example, Figure 1 shows that while the CEO maximally prefers alternative 2, they also consider alternative 1 as being acceptable, as it is above their minimum preference threshold, whereas alternative 3 is unacceptable. Contrast this with the COO, who also considers alternatives 1 and 2 as acceptable (and alternative 3 as unacceptable), but instead maximally prefers alternative 1. An even further contrast is the vice president of operations (VP Ops), who maximally prefers alternative 2, and considers alternatives 1 and 3 as unacceptable. At the TMT (group) level, looking across all the participants, we see that four TMT members maximally prefer alternative 1, and that three TMT members maximally prefer alternative 2 (and five of the seven consider alternative 3 as unacceptable). At the same time, all seven TMT members consider alternative 2 as being acceptable—it is above each and very TMT member’s minimum preference threshold—while alternative 1 is considered as acceptable to only six of the seven participants. Because strategic consensus involves an alternative that is acceptable to all participants, only alternative 2 would naturally provide the potential for strategic consensus here, as it is the only alternative that is considered acceptable to all (and even though it is maximally preferred by only three TMT members). 例如，图1显示，尽管首席执行官（CEO）最偏好方案2，但他们也认为方案1是可接受的，因为它高于其最低偏好阈值，而方案3不可接受。这与首席运营官（COO）形成对比，COO也认为方案1和方案2可接受（方案3不可接受），但最偏好方案1。进一步对比的是运营副总裁（VP Ops），他最偏好方案2，认为方案1和方案3不可接受。在高管团队（TMT）层面，从所有参与者来看，我们发现有4名TMT成员最偏好方案1，3名TMT成员最偏好方案2（且7人中的5人认为方案3不可接受）。同时，所有7名TMT成员都认为方案2是可接受的——它高于每个TMT成员的最低偏好阈值——而方案1仅被7名参与者中的6人认为可接受。由于战略共识需要所有参与者都认为可接受的方案，因此只有方案2在这里自然具有达成战略共识的潜力，因为它是唯一被所有人认为可接受的方案（尽管它仅被3名TMT成员最偏好）。
It is worth further noting that a majority rule decision in this same scenario would yield a different nonconsensual decision outcome: alternative 1 would likely be selected given that a majority of the participants maximally prefer this alternative. Alternative 1 would also arise as the outcome if consensus were conceived and measured as the degree of agreement—more participants agree that it, rather than alternative 2, is the most effective. Note too that while this would not be considered a strategic consensus according to our reconceptualization, if strategic consensus were instead measured as a continuum of agreement (as it typically has been in previous research), alternative 1 would be considered to have a higher “degree” of consensus than would alternative 2 (and, likewise, alternative 2 would have a higher degree of consensus than would alternative 3). This clearly demonstrates that conceiving strategic consensus as the acceptance of a decision outcome that involves minimum preference thresholds presents a very different conceptualization (and potential operationalization) from the conventional “agreement” view built upon maximal preferences. 值得进一步指出的是，在相同场景下，多数决决策会产生不同的非共识决策结果：由于多数参与者最偏好方案1，因此方案1可能会被选中。如果将共识定义并衡量为一致程度——即更多参与者认为方案1而非方案2最有效——那么方案1也会成为结果。同样需要注意的是，根据我们的重新概念化，这并不被视为策略性共识，但如果策略性共识被改为按一致程度（即以往研究中通常采用的连续体方式）来衡量，那么方案1的“共识程度”会被认为高于方案2（同理，方案2的共识程度也会高于方案3）。这清楚地表明，将策略性共识定义为接受涉及最低偏好阈值的决策结果，与基于最大偏好的传统“一致”观点存在截然不同的概念化（及潜在操作化）差异。
In sum, we define strategic consensus as a decision outcome that is accepted by all participants in the decision-making group—or, put another way, it is a decision outcome that encounters no opposition from any of the decision-makers. As we now turn to discussing, this means that strategic consensus may occur along one of several different types. 总之，我们将战略共识定义为决策群体中所有参与者都接受的决策结果——换句话说，是没有任何决策者反对的决策结果。正如我们现在将要讨论的，这意味着战略共识可能以几种不同的类型出现。
TYPES OF STRATEGIC CONSENSUS
战略共识的类型
Before developing the several possible types of strategic consensus, we reemphasize that, consistent with past research, a strategic consensus pertains to the decision outcome regardless of the decisionmaking process taken to achieve this outcome. As already noted above, while consensus outcomes are generally desired with respect to strategic decisions, strategic decision-making processes are rarely structured to formally involve consensus-building processes. Moreover, decision-making research has suggested that a group need not follow a consensus decision-making process in order to achieve a consensus decision; there are a host of group decision-making processes that may lead to consensual outcomes (e.g., dialectical inquiry, the Delphi technique, etc. [Priem & Price, 1991; Schweiger et al., 1986; Schweiger, Sandberg, & Rechner, 1989]). Regardless of the decision process formally used (if any), we propose that strategic consensus outcomes tend to involve four main types, which can be broadly classified as being either natural or negotiated.³3 Figure 2 depicts each of the types of strategic consensus based upon the decision-makers’ minimum preference thresholds (and decision alternative 2 as the decision outcome). 在制定几种可能的战略共识类型之前，我们重申，与以往研究一致，战略共识指的是决策结果，无论为实现这一结果所采取的决策过程如何。如前所述，虽然战略决策通常期望达成共识结果，但战略决策过程很少被结构化以正式纳入共识构建流程。此外，决策研究表明，一个群体无需遵循共识决策过程就能达成共识决策；存在大量群体决策过程可能导致共识结果（例如，辩证探究、德尔菲技术等[Priem & Price, 1991; Schweiger et al., 1986; Schweiger, Sandberg, & Rechner, 1989]）。无论正式使用的决策过程如何（如果有的话），我们认为战略共识结果往往涉及四种主要类型，这些类型可大致分为自然型或协商型。³³ 图2根据决策者的最低偏好阈值（并以决策备选方案2作为决策结果）描绘了每种战略共识类型。
FIGURE 2 Strategic Consensus Types
图2 战略共识类型
Note: In al four strategicconsensus types, decision alternative 2 represents the strategicdecision outcome. 注：在所有四种战略共识类型中，决策方案2代表战略决策结果。
$\textcircled{4}$ Decision alternative - Minimum preference threshold $\textcircled{4}$ 决策备选方案 - 最低偏好阈值
Natural Strategic Consensus: Aligned or Discovered
自然战略共识：是对齐还是发现
The first two strategic consensus types are natural in that they both occur when the strategic decision outcome is in accordance with the preexisting preferences of all decision makers—that is, the selected alternative is at or above the minimum preference threshold of all decision-makers—and thus there is no need to alter any decision-maker’s preferences or minimum preference threshold to arrive at a consensual selection. While a potential consensus naturally exists in both types, the aligned strategic consensus occurs when the decision-makers all share the same maximal preference from the outset, whereas the discovered strategic consensus occurs when the decision-makers naturally share an alternative that is at least minimally acceptable to all and identify that such is the case. 前两种战略共识类型是自然形成的，因为它们都发生在战略决策结果符合所有决策者预先存在的偏好的情况下——也就是说，所选的替代方案处于或高于所有决策者的最低偏好阈值——因此，无需改变任何决策者的偏好或最低偏好阈值就能达成共识性选择。虽然这两种类型都自然存在潜在的共识，但一致战略共识发生在决策者从一开始就都持有相同的最大偏好时，而发现的战略共识发生在决策者自然共享一个对所有人至少具有最低可接受性的替代方案并确认这一情况时。
Aligned strategic consensus. As Figure 2a depicts, an aligned strategic consensus occurs when all decision-makers share the same decision alternative as their maximal preference (see decision alternative 2). 一致的战略共识。如图2a所示，当所有决策者都将相同的决策方案视为其最大偏好时（见决策方案2），就会出现一致的战略共识。
While there are undoubtedly many reasons that this type of consensus may occur, it seems most likely when some type of cognitive homogeneity exists among the TMT that leads to them to have the same beliefs as to which decision alternative is the most effective (and, likewise, those that are deemed as less effective or unacceptable). For instance, this outcome may occur when executives share cognitions, values, and mental models (Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000), or when TMT members have similar past experiences (e.g., from the same industry or functional backgrounds), demographics, or educational backgrounds (Knight et al., 1999; Olson, Parayitam, & Bao, 2007; Priem, 1990). It is also worth noting that this type of consensus most closely resembles the conventional, agreement-based, notion of strategic consensus: in this situation the group can readily agree on the same strategic choice to reach a consensual decision outcome. 虽然这种共识的出现无疑有诸多原因，但最有可能发生在高层管理团队（TMT）中存在某种认知同质性时，这种同质性会使他们对哪种决策方案最有效（以及同样对哪些方案被视为效果较差或不可接受）有相同的信念。例如，当高管们拥有共同的认知、价值观和心智模式时（Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000），或者当TMT成员具有相似的过往经历（例如来自同一行业或职能背景）、人口统计学特征或教育背景时（Knight et al., 1999; Olson, Parayitam, & Bao, 2007; Priem, 1990），可能会出现这种结果。同样值得注意的是，这种类型的共识最接近基于协议的传统战略共识概念：在这种情况下，团队可以很容易地就相同的战略选择达成一致，从而形成共识性决策结果。
Discovered strategic consensus. A natural consensus can also occur when there are one or more decision alternatives that are above the minimum preference threshold of all the decision-makers. Because the decision alternative is not maximally preferred by every decision-maker—and may even not be the most preferred alternative for any—this type of natural consensus decision is discovered. That is, the fact that one of the alternatives (or perhaps even several) are acceptable to all is uncovered. Even though the opportunity for consensus exists when all decision makers share (at least) a minimally acceptable alternative, it is important to note that a consensus decision outcome may not be realized in this situation. Figure 2b (again, see decision alternative 2) depicts a potential discovered strategic consensus. This also represents a replication of Figure 1, and as already mentioned above, a group focused on optimality (maximal preferences)—that is, on agreement as to the most effective alternative—may not discover that an alternative acceptable to all exists, and, thus, a strategic consensus may not be achieved even though it is naturally at hand. 发现了战略共识。当存在一个或多个决策备选方案高于所有决策者的最低偏好阈值时，也可能出现自然共识。由于该决策备选方案并非每个决策者的最大偏好（甚至可能不是任何决策者的最偏好备选方案），因此这种类型的自然共识决策被发现。也就是说，某个（或甚至几个）备选方案为所有人所接受这一事实被揭示出来。尽管当所有决策者都共享（至少）一个最低可接受的备选方案时存在达成共识的机会，但需要注意的是，在这种情况下可能无法实现共识决策结果。图 2b（同样，参见决策备选方案 2）描绘了一种潜在的已发现战略共识。这也代表了图 1 的重复，并且如前所述，一个专注于最优性（最大偏好）——即就最有效的备选方案达成一致——的群体可能不会发现存在一个为所有人所接受的备选方案，因此，即使战略共识自然存在，也可能无法实现。
Negotiated Strategic Consensus: Calculated or Acquiesced
协商战略共识：刻意为之还是默许接受
Both types of a negotiated strategic consensus occur when no single decision alternative is initially above the minimum preference threshold for one or more of the decision-makers. Acceptance of the decision alternative therefore occurs either because one or more of the decision-makers change their initial preference for the particular alternative (calculated strategic consensus) or because one or more of the decision makers cede their preferences to accept the alternative (acquiesced strategic consensus). While we draw upon basic negotiation outcomes—that is, problem-solving (satisfying everyone’s aspirations), yielding (reducing one’s own aspirations), and contending (ceding one’s aspirations to another’s) (Pruitt, 1983)—in developing and labeling these two strategic consensus types, it is ultimately the choices of the decision-makers with regard to the alternatives that is of theoretical concern here, and not the specific process by which these two types of consensus decision outcomes came about. Indeed, the particular decision processes could include, but are not limited to open debating, bargaining, sensegiving, coopting, trust building, behind-the-scenes politicking, reciprocal arrangements, or the forming of an alliance among participants (e.g., Dean & Sharfman, 1996; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995; Thomas et al., 1993). 当没有单一决策方案最初超过一个或多个决策者的最低偏好阈值时，两种类型的协商战略共识都会出现。因此，对决策方案的接受要么是因为一个或多个决策者改变了他们对特定方案的初始偏好（计算出的战略共识），要么是因为一个或多个决策者让步以接受该方案（默许的战略共识）。虽然我们借鉴了基本的谈判结果——即解决问题（满足所有人的愿望）、让步（降低自己的愿望）和对抗（将自己的愿望让给他人）（Pruitt，1983）——来开发和标记这两种战略共识类型，但这里最终需要理论关注的是决策者对方案的选择，而不是这两种共识决策结果形成的具体过程。事实上，特定的决策过程可能包括但不限于公开辩论、讨价还价、意义建构、拉拢、建立信任、幕后政治活动、互惠安排或参与者之间的联盟形成（例如，Dean & Sharfman，1996；Eisenhardt & Bourgeois，1988；Korsgaard，Schweiger，& Sapienza，1995；Thomas等人，1993）。
Calculated strategic consensus. A calculated strategic consensus occurs when one or more of the decision-makers voluntarily change their preference for a particular alternative—while initially the alternative was viewed by the particular decisionmaker(s) as ineffective (i.e., unacceptable; below their minimum preference threshold[s]), the perceived effectiveness of the alternative is revised during the group decision-making process as a calculated change in preferences. Put in negotiation terms, the calculated strategic consensus comes about either (a) through some form of problemsolving in which the focal decision-maker comes to see the particular alternative as effective based upon the information and different perspectives shared by the other decision-makers (e.g., dialectical inquiry, devil’s advocacy, etc. [Liu, Friedman, Barry, Gelfand, & Zhang, 2012; Stagner, 1969]), or (b) through a change in the aspirations of the decision-maker(s) that aligns with the decision alternative—sometimes referred to as “yielding” in the negotiations literature (e.g., Pruitt, 1983). Indeed, research on social influence has suggested that participant preferences can change simply through interacting with or learning the opinions of other group members (for reviews of this literature, see Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010; Wood, 2000). Furthermore, theory and evidence on cognitive dissonance has suggested that individuals can also come to accept a nonpreferred alternative on their own accord—that is, they are not coerced to do so—by adjusting their preferences for the alternative (DeJong, 1979; Dillard, 1991; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Freedman & Fraser, 1966). 计算出的战略共识。计算出的战略共识发生在一个或多个决策者自愿改变其对特定替代方案的偏好时——尽管最初该决策者认为该替代方案无效（即不可接受；低于其最低偏好阈值），但在群体决策过程中，对该替代方案有效性的认知会通过对偏好的计算性改变而得到修正。从谈判角度来看，计算出的战略共识的形成要么是（a）通过某种形式的问题解决，焦点决策者根据其他决策者共享的信息和不同视角，开始认为特定替代方案有效（例如，辩证探究、魔鬼代言人等[Liu, Friedman, Barry, Gelfand, & Zhang, 2012; Stagner, 1969]），要么是（b）决策者的愿望发生变化，与决策替代方案一致——在谈判文献中有时被称为“让步”（例如，Pruitt, 1983）。事实上，关于社会影响的研究表明，参与者的偏好可以仅仅通过与群体其他成员互动或了解其意见而改变（有关该文献的综述，见Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010; Wood, 2000）。此外，关于认知失调的理论和证据表明，个人也可以通过调整对替代方案的偏好，主动接受非偏好的替代方案——即他们并非被迫这样做（DeJong, 1979; Dillard, 1991; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Freedman & Fraser, 1966）。
It is important to note that fundamental to this type of strategic consensus is that the change is based upon the decision-maker’s voluntary embrace of new information or alternative perspectives—that is, the decision-maker accepts the alternative without feeling coerced to do so. As Figure 2c depicts, the particular decision-maker in question—in this scenario the legal counsel—becomes convinced that decision alternative 2 is indeed acceptable even though it was initially perceived as ineffective (i.e., was below the legal counsel’s minimum preference threshold). Given that alternative 2 is acceptable to all other TMT members in this depiction, this change in preference by the legal counsel yields a calculated strategic consensus. 需要注意的是，这种战略共识的核心在于，决策基于决策者自愿接受新信息或替代视角——即决策者在没有被强制的情况下接受替代方案。如图2c所示，特定的决策者（在此场景中为法律顾问）最终确信方案2确实是可接受的，尽管最初它被认为是无效的（即低于法律顾问的最低偏好阈值）。鉴于在该描述中方案2被所有其他TMT成员接受，法律顾问的偏好转变产生了经过审慎考量的战略共识。
Acquiesced strategic consensus. Unlike in the calculated strategic consensus, in which a focal decision-maker’s preference for a specific decision alternative changes, the decision-maker’s preferences remain unchanged in an acquiesced strategic consensus. In this case the decision-maker instead offers no opposition, due to some form of coercion. In going along with the decision, the decision-maker essentially accepts the decision by ceding their goals. This is analogous to “contending” in the negotiations literature (Pruitt, 1983), wherein one accepts another’s position purely due to the power of the latter. This means that the decision-maker suspends their minimum preference threshold for the particular decision, which we illustrate in Figure $2 \mathrm { d }$ as a ceding (or removal) of the particular participant’s (depicted again as the legal counsel) minimum preference threshold (again, with respect to decision alternative 2). 默许的战略共识。与精心策划的战略共识不同，在精心策划的战略共识中，核心决策者对特定决策方案的偏好会发生变化，而在默许的战略共识中，决策者的偏好保持不变。在这种情况下，决策者由于某种形式的胁迫而不表示反对。在接受决策的过程中，决策者本质上通过放弃自己的目标来接受该决策。这类似于谈判文献中的“竞争”（Pruitt，1983），即一方仅因另一方的权力而接受对方的立场。这意味着决策者暂停了对特定决策的最低偏好阈值，我们在图2d中对此进行了说明，即特定参与者（再次表示为法律顾问）的最低偏好阈值的放弃（或移除）（同样针对决策方案2）。
While TMT power differences (e.g., Detert, Burris, Harrison, & Martin, 2013; Morrison & Milliken, 2000) are perhaps the most obvious factor that would produce an acquiesced strategic consensus, there are a variety of other team-level factors, such as structural interdependence between the decision-makers (e.g., Hambrick, Humphrey, & Gupta, 2015) or pluralistic ignorance (e.g., Halbesleben, Wheeler, & Buckley, 2007; Westphal & Bednar, 2005), as well as organization-level factors that may also result in such acquiescence, such as a culture that discourages people from speaking up (e.g., Morrison & Milliken, 2000). In addition to coercion, an acquiesced strategic consensus may also occur when the focal decision-maker does not dissent for reciprocity reasons (i.e., the participant stands aside for a decision important to a colleague who in the past stood aside for a decision important to the participant [Malhotra, 2004; Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2003; Song, 2009]). 虽然技术、媒体和通信（TMT）权力差异（例如，Detert、Burris、Harrison和Martin，2013；Morrison和Milliken，2000）可能是产生默许战略共识的最明显因素，但还有各种其他团队层面的因素，例如决策者之间的结构性相互依赖（例如，Hambrick、Humphrey和Gupta，2015）或多元无知（例如，Halbesleben、Wheeler和Buckley，2007；Westphal和Bednar，2005），以及组织层面的因素也可能导致这种默许，例如一种不鼓励人们发声的文化（例如，Morrison和Milliken，2000）。除了胁迫之外，当焦点决策者出于互惠原因不表示异议时（即，参与者因同事过去为其重要决策退让而在同事的重要决策上退让[Malhotra，2004；Pillutla、Malhotra和Murnighan，2003；Song，2009]），默许的战略共识也可能发生。
In sum, we have proposed four different ideal types of strategic consensus—two of which occur naturally (aligned and discovered) and two that are negotiated (calculated and acquiesced). As we now discuss, these four types of strategic consensus generate different types of psychological bonds that TMT members hold for the strategic decision. 总之，我们提出了四种不同的战略共识理想类型——其中两种是自然形成的（一致型和发现型），另外两种是协商达成的（算计型和默许型）。正如我们现在所讨论的，这四种战略共识类型会产生TMT成员对战略决策持有的不同类型的心理纽带。
STRATEGIC CONSENSUS TYPES AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BONDS THEY GENERATE
战略共识类型及其产生的心理纽带
Past scholarship on strategic consensus has essentially considered commitment to be an inherent dimension of strategic consensus (see Kellermanns et al., 2005). We suggest that this past work incorrectly confounded separate constructs based upon two faulty assumptions. 过去关于战略共识的学术研究基本上认为承诺是战略共识的固有维度（Kellermanns等人，2005）。我们认为，过往的研究基于两个错误假设混淆了不同的建构。
First, while past work clearly had an intended focus on strategic consensus as an outcome, it nonetheless typically used process-oriented reasoning in explaining why strategic consensus inherently involves commitment. The assumption has essentially been that a strategic consensus among the TMT (i.e., consensus as a decision outcome) reflects a consensus-building approach to making the strategic decision (i.e., consensus as a decision process) (see Dooley et al., 2000; Priem et al., 1995). For instance, Dooley et al. (2000: 1240) explained that the relationship between strategic consensus and strategic commitment occurs because “decision consensus reflects the belief among team members that the concerns and problems voiced about a proposed decision were resolved during the decision-making process.” As we have discussed above, our conceptualization of strategic consensus, and its different types, are process agnostic; we do not assume that consensus-building techniques (e.g., open dialogue, information sharing, and mental model convergence [Liu et al., 2012]) were used to arrive at the strategic consensus outcome. Therefore, rather than simply assume that strategic consensus is inherently accompanied by commitment to the strategic decision, we treat the psychological bond that decision-makers hold toward any particular strategic decision as a separate construct, and seek to explain why certain types of bonds are generated by the different strategic consensus types. 首先，虽然过去的研究明确将战略共识作为结果来关注，但在解释战略共识为何本质上涉及承诺时，通常采用以过程为导向的推理。其基本假设是，高管团队（TMT）的战略共识（即作为决策结果的共识）反映了一种构建共识的战略决策方法（即作为决策过程的共识）（见Dooley等人，2000；Priem等人，1995）。例如，Dooley等人（2000：1240）解释说，战略共识与战略承诺之间的关系之所以存在，是因为“决策共识反映了团队成员的信念，即对拟议决策提出的关切和问题在决策过程中得到了解决。”如前所述，我们对战略共识及其不同类型的概念化是不考虑过程的；我们并不假设为达成战略共识结果而使用了构建共识的技术（例如开放对话、信息共享和心智模型趋同[Liu等人，2012]）。因此，我们不简单地假设战略共识本质上必然伴随对战略决策的承诺，而是将决策者对特定战略决策持有的心理纽带视为一个独立的构念，并试图解释为何不同类型的战略共识会产生某些类型的纽带。
Second, just as past research on strategic consensus has assumed that all strategic decisions reflect some degree of consensus (i.e., ranging from low to high agreement), it has also assumed that all strategic decisions will result in some level of commitment— that is, as though this particular psychological bond to the strategic decision will necessarily occur to some degree (i.e., ranging from low to high commitment) (Dess, 1987; Noble, 1999; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989). Yet, recent theory and research on commitment has dispelled the assumption that all workplace bonds involve some degree of commitment (Klein et al., 2012), and has instead suggest that commitment is just one of four types of psychological bond that an individual could develop toward a particular target within organizations: individuals develop acquiescence, instrumental, commitment, or identification bonds, which differ in the psychological involvement, motivation, and efforts they entail toward the target.4 Furthermore, this recent theory emphasizes that such bonds can apply to a host of targets (i.e., to an organization, department, team, project, decision, or task) and not simply to the organization. In short, this extant research on commitment has suggested that it is not conceptually accurate to assume that strategic consensus will induce some degree of commitment as other psychological bonds could also be forged with the strategic decision, and that the strategic decision serves as the target to which any of these bonds apply. 其次，正如过去关于战略共识的研究假设所有战略决策都反映某种程度的共识（即从低到高的一致性）一样，它也假设所有战略决策都会产生某种程度的承诺——即仿佛对战略决策的这种特定心理联系必然会在某种程度上发生（即从低到高的承诺程度）（Dess, 1987; Noble, 1999; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989）。然而，最近关于承诺的理论和研究已经摒弃了所有职场联系都涉及某种程度承诺的假设（Klein et al., 2012），转而提出承诺只是个人在组织中可能对特定目标形成的四种心理联系之一：个人会形成默许、工具性、承诺或认同联系，这些联系在对目标的心理投入、动机和努力方面各不相同。4此外，这一最新理论强调，此类联系可以适用于众多目标（即组织、部门、团队、项目、决策或任务），而不仅仅是组织。简而言之，这一关于承诺的现有研究表明，假设战略共识会引发某种程度的承诺在概念上并不准确，因为还可能与战略决策形成其他心理联系，并且战略决策本身就是所有这些联系所适用的目标。
FIGURE 3 The Relationships Between Strategic Consensus Types, Psychological Bonds, and Strategic Climate 图3 战略共识类型、心理纽带与战略氛围之间的关系
Therefore, we build on this literature to consider how the different types of strategic consensus achieved affect the psychological bonds formed by the decision-making group, as depicted in Figure 3. In brief, Klein et al. (2012) suggested that acquiescence bonds are viewed as compulsory or coerced, and thus entail, at best, compliance involving a minimal effort toward the target, and, at worst, psychological indifference or withdrawal. Instrumental bonds, being transactional by nature, engender a compliance that is “experienced as the calculated acceptance of the bond” based upon the costs or benefits of sticking with the target (Klein et al., 2012: 135). Commitment is considered to be a “volitional psychological bond reflecting dedication to and responsibility for a particular target” (Klein et al., 2012: 137) and thus involves a high level of psychological involvement, caring, and effort toward the target. Finally, identification bonds involve the highest level of psychological investment and effort, as they go beyond commitment to the target to also entail a merger of the target with the self—for instance, in our context, the latter would mean that the strategic goals of the firm are internalized by the TMT. In considering the relation between strategic consensus types and bond types, we limit our theorizing to the post-decision bond type—that is, in the immediate and short term—as there are a host of factors that may impact the type of bond held for a target over time (Klein et al., 2012). 因此，我们基于这一文献来探讨不同类型的战略共识如何影响决策群体形成的心理纽带，如图3所示。简而言之，Klein等人（2012）认为，默许纽带被视为强制性或强迫性的，因此最多意味着对目标的最低努力的顺从，最坏情况下则是心理上的冷漠或退缩。工具性纽带本质上是交易性的，会产生一种“被视为对纽带的刻意接受”的顺从，这种接受基于坚持目标的成本或收益（Klein等人，2012：135）。承诺被认为是一种“反映对特定目标的奉献和责任的意志性心理纽带”（Klein等人，2012：137），因此涉及对目标的高度心理投入、关怀和努力。最后，认同纽带涉及最高水平的心理投入和努力，因为它们超越了对目标的承诺，还意味着将目标与自我融合——例如，在我们的研究背景中，这意味着企业的战略目标被高层管理团队（TMT）内化。在考虑战略共识类型与纽带类型之间的关系时，我们将理论化限制在决策后的纽带类型——即即时和短期——因为存在许多因素可能会随着时间影响对目标持有的纽带类型（Klein等人，2012）。
Regardless of which of these psychological bonds the strategic decision-making group—that is, the TMT—is forged to the strategic decision, we conceive it to be based upon the bond type of the least psychologically involved member. Our assumption is that a lack of psychological involvement and efforts by just one of the TMT members is critically detrimental to enacting the strategic decision (Ansoff, 1965; Bower & Doz, 1979; Simon, 1957). This assumption is based upon the generally interdependent nature of TMTs (Hambrick et al., 2015); the failure by even one TMT member to exert effort or apply sufficient resources toward the strategic decision surely undermines its priority and most likely the achievement of its strategic intent, even if one or more of the other TMT members are highly invested in the decision (Mathieu, Tannenbaum, Donsbach, & Alliger, 2014). For example, consider a strategic decision to maximize revenues, to which the VP of sales holds a commitment bond, but to which the VP of operations only holds an acquiescent bond. In this case, even if the VP of sales dedicates a high degree of effort and resource allocations to generating increased revenues, the VP of operations will only be likely to sufficiently fulfill the orders, if possible, thereby threatening or even undermining achievement of the strategic decision.5 Put in measurement terms, our conception of a group-level bond calls for a conjunctive aggregation method (Steiner, 1972), which in this context essentially reduces the group’s bond to the bond type of the lowest psychologically involved individual TMT member (Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & Mount, 1998; LePine, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, & Hedlund, 1997). Put another way, an additive, correlative, or agreement method of aggregation ignores the deleterious effect that the lowest member of the group has in this context (Chan, 1998). 无论战略决策小组（即高层管理团队，TMT）与战略决策形成何种心理纽带，我们认为这种纽带是基于心理投入最少的成员的纽带类型。我们的假设是，心理投入不足以及仅由一名TMT成员付出努力，会对战略决策的执行造成严重损害（Ansoff, 1965；Bower & Doz, 1979；Simon, 1957）。这一假设基于高层管理团队普遍相互依赖的本质（Hambrick et al., 2015）；即使其他一名或多名TMT成员对决策投入度很高，只要其中一名成员未能为战略决策付出努力或投入足够资源，就必然会削弱该决策的优先级，并且很可能无法实现其战略意图（Mathieu, Tannenbaum, Donsbach, & Alliger, 2014）。例如，考虑一项旨在最大化收入的战略决策，销售副总裁持有承诺型纽带，而运营副总裁仅持有默许型纽带。在这种情况下，即使销售副总裁投入高度的努力和资源分配以增加收入，运营副总裁也可能只是勉强完成必要的指令（如果可能的话），从而威胁甚至破坏战略决策的实现。5从测量的角度来看，我们对群体层面纽带的概念要求采用合取聚合方法（Steiner, 1972），在这种情况下，这本质上会将群体的纽带简化为TMT中心理投入最低的个体成员的纽带类型（Barrick, Stewart, Neubert, & Mount, 1998；LePine, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, & Hedlund, 1997）。换句话说，加法、相关或一致的聚合方法忽略了群体中最低成员在这一背景下的有害影响（Chan, 1998）。
Based on the foregoing, we first contend that an aligned strategic consensus, wherein the decision alternative is the maximal preferred decision outcome for all decision-makers—and thus the lowest member has their maximal preference met—is likely to result in an identification bond to the strategic decision—that is, a bond “defined by the merging of the self with the target” (Klein et al., 2012: 133). The identification bond involves a high level of psychological involvement, continuation, and effort to the strategic decision on the part of the decision-makers that goes beyond commitment as it entails the internalization of the strategic decision. Because strategic decisions pertain to goals and values, and the decision outcome in this type of strategic consensus reflects the maximal preference of the participants— that is, their goals and values—an identification bond with the decision is highly likely (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Formally, we propose the following: 基于上述内容，我们首先认为，存在一种对齐的战略共识，其中决策方案是所有决策者的最大偏好决策结果——因此，地位最低的成员的最大偏好得到满足——这种共识很可能会形成对战略决策的认同纽带，即一种“通过自我与目标融合而定义的纽带”（Klein等人，2012：133）。这种认同纽带涉及决策者对战略决策的高度心理投入、持续参与和努力，这超越了承诺，因为它需要对战略决策进行内化。由于战略决策涉及目标和价值观，且这种战略共识中的决策结果反映了参与者的最大偏好——即他们的目标和价值观——因此与决策形成认同纽带的可能性很高（Ashforth & Mael，1989）。从形式上，我们提出以下建议：
Proposition 1. An aligned strategic consensus generates an identification bond to the strategic decision. 命题1. 一致的战略共识会形成对战略决策的认同纽带。
We next propose that the discovered strategic consensus is the type most likely to result in a commitment bond to the strategic decision. In so doing, we follow Klein et al. (2012) to define commitment as a volitional psychological bond that involves dedication to, and responsibility for, the particular strategic decision. This means that when a commitment bond is formed, not only is the decision accepted but also the TMT member “chooses to accept responsibility for and to dedicate oneself to the target” (Klein et al., 2012: 137). Commitment therefore importantly entails a high level of psychological involvement in the decision, a strong willingness to devote a great deal of effort and resources in support of it, and a high likelihood of “continuation”—or “sticking with the target” (Klein et al., 2012: 143)—both in terms of one’s intentions and behaviors. In short, a TMT with a commitment bond to the strategic decision would mean that the members embrace the choice and exert effort and apply resources to achieve its success; for any particular decision participant, commitment to the strategic decision means that the participant is psychologically “bound by his actions and through these actions to beliefs that sustain the activities and his own involvement” (Salancik, 1977: 62). 我们接下来提出，所发现的战略共识是最有可能形成对战略决策承诺纽带的类型。在这一过程中，我们遵循Klein等人（2012）的定义，将承诺定义为一种意志性心理纽带，涉及对特定战略决策的投入和责任。这意味着，当形成承诺纽带时，不仅会接受该决策，而且高层管理团队（TMT）成员会“选择对目标承担责任并投入自身”（Klein等人，2012：137）。因此，承诺重要地意味着高度的心理投入，强烈愿意投入大量精力和资源支持该决策，以及“持续”或“坚持目标”（Klein等人，2012：143）的高可能性——无论是在意图还是行为层面。简而言之，对战略决策具有承诺纽带的高层管理团队意味着成员会接受该选择，并投入精力和资源以实现其成功；对于任何特定的决策参与者而言，对战略决策的承诺意味着参与者在心理上“受其行动约束，并通过这些行动与支撑活动及自身参与的信念相联系”（Salancik，1977：62）。
When a discovered strategic consensus is achieved, the decision alternative selected is one that each and every member already holds as acceptable (i.e., above their minimum preference threshold). Thus, the three essential criteria for the decision to yield commitment are very likely to be met: not only does every decision participant clearly accept the decision voluntarily, but each member will also very likely take responsibility for, and even be dedicated to, the decision once it is made. Moreover, because the discovered strategic consensus involves one or more decision makers who accept an alternative that is not maximally preferred (and is perhaps even minimally preferred), it is not likely to lead to the highest level of psychological involvement—that is, an identification bond. While the attractiveness of alternatives in decision-making has largely gone unexamined in the management literature, extant evidence from a wide variety of settings, including customer loyalty in marketing (e.g., Ping, 1994; Wu, 2011), partner commitment in professional services (e.g., Sharma & Patterson, 2000; Yim, Chan, & Hung, 2007), player and coach burnout in sports psychology (e.g., Raedeke, 1997; Raedeke & Granzyk, 2000), and interpersonal relationships in social psychology (e.g., Johnson & Rusbult, 1989; Rusbult, 1980) has clearly shown that one’s psychological involvement is strongest when more attractive alternatives do not exist. Formally, we propose the following: 当达成发现的战略共识时，所选择的决策方案是每个成员都已认为可接受的（即高于其最低偏好阈值）。因此，使决策产生承诺的三个基本标准很可能得到满足：不仅每个决策参与者都自愿明确接受该决策，而且一旦决策做出，每个成员也很可能会对其负责，甚至致力于该决策。此外，由于发现的战略共识涉及一个或多个接受非最优（甚至可能是最低偏好）替代方案的决策者，因此不太可能产生最高水平的心理投入——即认同纽带。虽然决策中替代方案的吸引力在管理文献中很大程度上未被研究，但来自各种场景的现有证据，包括营销中的客户忠诚度（例如，Ping，1994；Wu，2011）、专业服务中的合作伙伴承诺（例如，Sharma & Patterson，2000；Yim，Chan，& Hung，2007）、体育心理学中的运动员和教练倦怠（例如，Raedeke，1997；Raedeke & Granzyk，2000）以及社会心理学中的人际关系（例如，Johnson & Rusbult，1989；Rusbult，1980），已明确表明，当不存在更具吸引力的替代方案时，一个人的心理投入最强。我们正式提出以下建议：
Proposition 2. A discovered strategic consensus generates a commitment bond to the strategic decision.
命题2. 一个被发现的战略共识会产生对战略决策的承诺纽带。
In contrast to the high psychological involvement generated by the two types of natural strategic consensus, we posit that the two types of negotiated strategic consensus engender relatively lower levels of psychological involvement which essentially involve varying forms of compliance toward the strategic decision: a calculated strategic consensus yields an instrumental bond while an acquiesced strategic consensus generates an acquiescence bond. According to Klein et al. (2012: 135), instrumental bonds are transactional in nature, as they “are experienced as the calculated acceptance of the bond.” While such bonds are voluntary—that is, they are not coerced—they tend to be a calculation based upon the decision-maker’s perception of the benefits of accepting the target, and the costs of not accepting it. Indeed, Klein et al. (2012) suggested that instrumental bonds are largely defined by the latter, and that these costs can be economical, behavioral, or social in nature. Because this bond entails a TMT member’s compliance with the strategic decision, it manifests in somewhat of a tenuous psychological involvement in the decision, relatively less effort and resource allocations put toward the decision, and a more fragile continuation with it as compared to commitment or identification—given its calculative basis, whether or not the decision participant(s) stick with the decision is open to reevaluation as additional information and performance feedback is incorporated. 与两种自然战略共识所产生的高度心理投入形成对比，我们认为两种协商战略共识会产生相对较低水平的心理投入，而这种心理投入本质上涉及对战略决策的不同形式的服从：一种是算计性战略共识会产生工具性联结，另一种是默许性战略共识会产生默许性联结。根据Klein等人（2012：135）的观点，工具性联结本质上具有交易性质，因为它们“被体验为对联结的算计性接受”。虽然这种联结是自愿的——即并非强迫——但它们往往是基于决策者对接受目标的收益以及不接受目标的成本的感知而进行的计算。事实上，Klein等人（2012）指出，工具性联结在很大程度上由后者定义，而这些成本在本质上可能是经济的、行为的或社会的。由于这种联结需要高层管理团队（TMT）成员服从战略决策，因此与承诺或认同相比，它在决策中表现出某种程度的脆弱心理投入，对决策投入的努力和资源相对较少，且持续性更弱——鉴于其算计性基础，随着更多信息和绩效反馈的纳入，决策参与者是否坚持该决策是可以重新评估的。
We therefore propose that a calculated strategic consensus will result in an instrumental bond with the strategic decision. In a calculated strategic consensus, at least one decision-maker alters their minimum preference for the decision alternative—from ineffective to effective—in a volitional and deliberate manner. This change in preference, and thus acceptance by the decision-maker(s), is a calculative one, and thus likely to remain open to continuing evaluation and scrutiny (e.g., Ping, 1994; Rusbult, 1980; Sharma & Patterson, 2000). While the level of psychological involvement in this situation is likely to be fairly strong, the dedication and responsibility to the strategic decision (i.e., as required for a commitment bond) by the maker(s) that changed their preferences to reach the calculated strategic consensus will remain somewhat tenuous as the efforts, resources, and continuation devoted to the decision will likely be subject to an ongoing evaluation of the perceived costs and benefits of the alternative in the face of new information about it. Formally, we propose the following: 因此，我们认为，经过计算的战略共识将与战略决策形成工具性纽带。在经过计算的战略共识中，至少有一位决策者以自愿且审慎的方式改变了其对决策方案的最低偏好——从无效变为有效。这种偏好的转变以及随之而来的决策者（们）的接受，是一种计算性的转变，因此可能仍会接受持续的评估和审视（例如，Ping, 1994；Rusbult, 1980；Sharma & Patterson, 2000）。虽然在这种情况下的心理投入程度可能相当强烈，但为达成经过计算的战略共识而改变偏好的决策者（们）对战略决策的投入和责任（即承诺纽带所需的责任）仍会有些脆弱，因为投入到该决策中的努力、资源和持续性很可能会在面临关于该方案的新信息时，受到对其感知成本和收益的持续评估。我们正式提出以下建议：
Proposition 3. A calculated strategic consensus generates an instrumental bond to the strategic decision. 命题3. 经过计算的战略共识会产生对战略决策的工具性纽带。
Finally, Klein et al. (2012) suggested that acquiescence bonds are compulsory in nature as they occur when individuals feel coerced to go along with the target, or have no alternative but to accept the target. In other words, acquiescence bonds form when the individual performs subsequent tasks because they have to rather than because they want to. As such, this type of bond at best involves psychological indifference, and at worst may entail psychological withdrawal or even the sabotaging of the decision. As discussed above, this is because volition—that is, individuals’ perceptions that their behaviors are being enacted out of free choice (Kline & Peters, 1991)—is critical for psychological involvement with a target (Klein et al., 2012; Salancik, 1977). Therefore, acquiescence bonds typically manifest in a form of compliance that involves minimal effort toward the target, and the continuation with the target is reliant on the presence of coercive mechanisms such as rewards or threat of punishment. 最后，Klein等人（2012）提出，默认绑定具有强制性，因为当个体感到被迫顺从目标，或别无选择只能接受目标时，就会形成这种绑定。换句话说，默认绑定形成于个体执行后续任务是因为“不得不”而非“想要”。因此，这种绑定在最好的情况下涉及心理上的冷漠，在最坏的情况下可能导致心理退缩甚至对决策的破坏。如前所述，这是因为意志——即个体认为自己的行为是出于自由选择（Kline & Peters，1991）——对于与目标的心理投入至关重要（Klein et al.，2012；Salancik，1977）。因此，默认绑定通常表现为一种顺从形式，对目标的投入程度最低，且对目标的持续参与依赖于奖励或惩罚威胁等强制机制的存在。
We posit that an acquiesced strategic consensus generates an acquiescence bond with the strategic decision. As discussed above, this type of strategic consensus involves at least one TMT member who cedes their aspirations to accept, or at least not oppose, the chosen decision alternative, precisely because they feel coerced (e.g., due to TMT power dynamics, etc.) or obligated (e.g., due to reciprocity reasons) to do so. Moreover, to the extent that the conceding TMT member(s) has (have) unfairness perceptions regarding the achievement of the decision— which is likely if the individual(s) felt that they could not register their dissent or opposition to the decision alternative—then this also heightens the likelihood of an acquiescence bond. This is consistent with meta-analysis findings on perceptions of procedural unfairness (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). Formally, we propose the following: 我们认为，一种默许的战略共识会与战略决策产生默许纽带。如前所述，这种类型的战略共识至少涉及一名高管团队（TMT）成员，该成员放弃自己的愿望以接受（或至少不反对）所选的决策方案，原因恰恰是他们感到受到胁迫（例如，由于高管团队的权力动态等）或有义务（例如，由于互惠原因）这样做。此外，就让步的高管团队成员对决策的达成存在不公平感知而言——如果个人觉得自己无法表达对决策方案的异议或反对，这种情况就很可能发生——这也会增加默许纽带的可能性。这与关于程序不公平感知的元分析结果一致（Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001）。从形式上，我们提出以下假设：
Proposition 4. An acquiesced strategic consensus generates an acquiescence bond to the strategic decision.
命题4. 默许的战略共识会产生对战略决策的默许纽带。
In sum, the type of strategic consensus achieved determines the type of bond that the TMT will hold toward the decision. That bond is determined by, and a reflection of, the least psychologically involved TMT member. Thus, contrary to earlier conceptions, our theorization suggests that not all types of strategic consensus result in commitment to the strategic decision. Only natural types—aligned and discovered—of strategic consensus yield bonds that engender a level of psychological involvement of commitment (or greater) to the strategic decision (i.e., internalization bonds go beyond commitment); the negotiated types—calculated and acquiesced— of strategic consensus generate instrumental and acquiescence bonds, respectively, and therefore essentially result in compliant involvement and behaviors. As we now discuss, these very different types of bonds to the strategic decision generated by the different types of strategic consensus differ in their substantive implications for how the strategic priorities of the firm are perceived—thus, our foregoing theorizing paves the way for examining how strategic consensus influences strategic climate. 总之，达成的战略共识类型决定了管理团队（TMT）对决策的依附类型。这种依附由参与心理最少的TMT成员决定，并反映其特征。因此，与早期观点相反，我们的理论表明，并非所有类型的战略共识都会导致对战略决策的承诺。只有自然型（一致型和发现型）的战略共识会产生心理参与度达到承诺（或更高）水平的依附关系（即内化型依附超越了承诺）；而协商型（算计型和默许型）的战略共识则分别产生工具型和默许型依附，因此本质上导致顺从型参与和行为。正如我们现在讨论的，不同类型的战略共识所产生的对战略决策的依附关系在实质影响上存在差异，这种差异体现在企业战略优先级的认知方式上——因此，我们之前的理论为研究战略共识如何影响战略氛围铺平了道路。
STRATEGIC CONSENSUS AND STRATEGIC CLIMATE
战略共识与战略气候
Strategic climate is a critically important organizational phenomenon that is influenced by strategic consensus, and the past conflation of these two constructs has masked the complex relationship that exists between them. In order to fully unpack this relationship, it is first important to understand that strategic climate—as organizational members’ shared perceptions—is crucially shaped both by the initial achievement of a strategic consensus and by its subsequent enactment by the top management team (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012; Zohar & Luria, 2005). 战略氛围是一种至关重要的组织现象，受战略共识的影响，而过去对这两个概念的混淆掩盖了它们之间存在的复杂关系。为了充分揭示这种关系，首先需要明确的是，战略氛围——作为组织成员的共同认知——既由战略共识的初步达成，也由高层管理团队随后的执行所关键塑造（Zohar & Hofmann, 2012; Zohar & Luria, 2005）。
Our starting premise in this regard is that when a strategic consensus is reached, this has a symbolic influence on strategic climate: when TMTs achieve a strategic consensus on a decision, this conveys a shared belief among top executives that the decision is a strategic priority, which in turn increases the likelihood that all other managers and employees will then similarly view the decision as a strategic priority (Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994). Moreover, this symbolic effect occurs regardless of the type of consensus reached: it is impossible for managers and employees who do not directly participate in the strategic decision-making to know what type of consensus was achieved—they only know that one was reached (see Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997; Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994). This type of symbolism has been noted as a critical component of climate development (e.g., Ashforth, 1985; Zohar & Hofmann, 2012) for two primary reasons. First, symbolic acts by those in power promote what is important and will be rewarded, a key component of climate perceptions. Second, such collective acceptance by the top executives serves as a social influence that unifies other organizational members around similar values and beliefs. 在这方面，我们的起始前提是：当达成战略共识时，这会对战略氛围产生象征性影响。当高层管理团队（TMTs）就某项决策达成战略共识时，这传达了高管团队内部一种共同信念——即该决策是战略优先事项，这反过来又增加了其他所有管理者和员工随后也会将该决策视为战略优先事项的可能性（Gioia, Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994）。此外，这种象征性影响的发生与达成的共识类型无关：那些未直接参与战略决策制定的管理者和员工不可能知道达成了何种类型的共识——他们只知道达成了共识（见Bowman & Ambrosini, 1997；Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994）。这种类型的象征性被认为是氛围发展的关键组成部分（例如，Ashforth, 1985；Zohar & Hofmann, 2012），主要有两个原因。首先，掌权者的象征性行为会凸显重要事项及应受奖励的内容，这是氛围感知的关键组成部分。其次，高管团队的这种集体接受作为一种社会影响，将其他组织成员围绕相似的价值观和信念团结起来。
While we assume that the achievement of a consensus on a strategic decision has this symbolic influence on organizational members’ perception of the priority of the decision, strategic climate is crucially shaped by how well the subsequent enactment of the strategic decision by top management aligns with this initial perception (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012; Zohar & Luria, 2005). In other words, it is ultimately the actions of the top executives that “informs the employees of their behavior-outcome expectancies” (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012: 647). It is when the espoused and enacted strategic priorities of the firm are aligned that strategic climate is strengthened, as consistency between symbol and substance sends a clear message that the strategic decision is in fact a priority of the firm (Simons, 2002; Zohar, 2003). When top managers fail to enact their espoused strategic priorities—that is, symbol and substance are decoupled (Westphal & Zajac, 1994)—this creates confusion or doubt among organizational members about whether the strategic decision is a priority, thereby weakening strategic climate (Zohar & Hofmann, 2012). 虽然我们假设就战略决策达成共识会对组织成员对该决策优先级的认知产生这种象征性影响，但战略氛围的关键塑造因素是高层管理后续对战略决策的执行与这种初始认知的契合程度（Zohar & Hofmann, 2012; Zohar & Luria, 2005）。换句话说，最终是高管的行动“告知员工其行为-结果预期”（Zohar & Hofmann, 2012: 647）。当企业所宣称的战略优先级与其执行情况一致时，战略氛围会得到强化，因为象征与实质的一致性传递了明确信息：该战略决策确实是企业的优先事项（Simons, 2002; Zohar, 2003）。当高层管理者未能执行其宣称的战略优先级——即象征与实质脱节（Westphal & Zajac, 1994）——时，这会在组织成员中造成关于该战略决策是否为优先事项的困惑或疑虑，进而削弱战略氛围（Zohar & Hofmann, 2012）。
Given that our theorization above suggests that each of the different strategic consensus types, through the various psychological bonds that they generate toward the strategic decision, manifest in different substantive enactments of the strategic decision—that is, different levels of psychological involvement, effort and resource allocations, and continuation—this implies that the various types of strategic consensus have differential substantive effects on strategic climate. 鉴于我们上述的理论化分析表明，每一种不同的战略共识类型，通过它们对战略决策产生的各种心理纽带，会在战略决策的不同实质性执行中体现出来——即不同程度的心理投入、努力程度、资源分配以及持续度——这意味着各类战略共识对战略氛围会产生差异化的实质性影响。
Before further developing how and why these effects occur, it is important to note that any given strategic consensus can only serve to strengthen, maintain, or weaken the existing strategic climate (i.e., increase, maintain, or decrease the degree of shared understanding). This is due to two aspects of the nature of the relationship between strategic climate and strategic consensus. First, as alluded to earlier, strategic climate is based upon the culmination of strategic decisions, and thus each strategic decision—whether or not it involves a strategic consensus—is perceived by organizational members among a broader constellation of strategic decisions and actions taken over time (Mintzberg, 1978). Therefore, strategic climate—be it a strong or weak one— exists within an organization prior to any given strategic decision and consensus. Second, strategic climate occurs on a continuum (i.e., it is the degree of shared understanding about strategic priorities), whereas strategic consensus, and the psychological bonds it generates, exist as types. With this in mind, we now develop propositions of how each type of strategic consensus relates to strategic climate, through the respective psychological bonds (see Figure 3). 在进一步探讨这些影响发生的方式和原因之前，需要注意的是，任何特定的战略共识只能起到强化、维持或削弱现有战略氛围（即增加、维持或降低共同理解的程度）的作用。这是由于战略氛围与战略共识之间关系的两个本质方面。首先，如前所述，战略氛围基于战略决策的累积，因此，每一项战略决策——无论是否涉及战略共识——都会被组织成员置于一段时间内采取的更广泛的战略决策和行动的背景下进行感知（明茨伯格，1978）。因此，无论战略氛围是强还是弱，它在任何特定的战略决策和共识之前就已经存在于组织中。其次，战略氛围是一个连续体（即它是关于战略优先级的共同理解的程度），而战略共识及其产生的心理纽带则以类型的形式存在。基于这一点，我们现在将通过各自的心理纽带，阐述每一种战略共识类型如何与战略氛围相关联（见图3）。
Both an aligned and a discovered strategic consensus induce a high level of TMT psychological involvement toward the strategic decision, as they generate identification and commitment bonds, respectively, and thus the TMT’s effort, resource allocations, and intent to continue toward the strategic decision perfectly align with, and work to greatly substantiate, organizational members’ initial perceptions from the strategic consensus that the decision is a priority. Therefore, we argue that when either type of natural strategic consensus (aligned or discovered) is achieved, there is a tight coupling between symbol and substance, which has a strengthening effect on strategic climate. Research on ethical climates which has shown that the involvement of top management teams (i.e., their commitment to acting ethically) directly influences the perceptions of employees about whether ethical behavior is a priority of the firm (Grojean, Resick, Dickson, & Smith, 2004; Mulki, Jaramillo, & Locander, 2009; Shin, 2012)—and, moreover, the findings by these studies that this example-setting behavior by top executives then may also lead to employees engaging in such behaviors—is supportive of our contention. 无论是一致达成的战略共识还是发现的战略共识，都会促使高层管理团队（TMT）对战略决策产生高度的心理投入，因为前者会产生认同纽带，后者会产生承诺纽带，因此TMT的努力、资源分配以及继续推进战略决策的意愿都与组织成员从战略共识中形成的初始认知高度一致，并极大地证实了这一决策是优先事项。因此，我们认为，当任何一种自然形成的战略共识（一致达成或发现的）得以实现时，符号与实质之间就会形成紧密的耦合关系，这会增强战略氛围。关于道德氛围的研究表明，高层管理团队的参与（即他们对道德行为的承诺）直接影响员工对道德行为是否是企业优先事项的认知（Grojean, Resick, Dickson, & Smith, 2004；Mulki, Jaramillo, & Locander, 2009；Shin, 2012）——此外，这些研究的结果还表明，高管的这种榜样行为可能还会促使员工也采取类似行为——这支持了我们的观点。
While both types of natural consensus have a strengthening effect on strategic climate, we expect that this effect will be stronger for an aligned strategic consensus than for a discovered strategic consensus. Climate researchers have long held that leadership actions directly shape the strength of climates in organizations (e.g., Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989), most notably through their informing behaviors (González-Romá, Peiró, & Tordera, 2002) and through their actions (Luria, 2008; Zohar & Luria, 2004), which signal the achievements expected and valued by the leaders (Dragoni, 2005; Dragoni & Kuenzi, 2012). Because an aligned strategic consensus involves a strategic decision that is seen as optimal by all TMT members, and generates an identification bond such that the decision is internalized by the TMT, this type of strategic consensus results in the highest levels of TMT psychological investment and effort (Klein et al., 2012). Therefore, we formally propose not only that both natural types of strategic consensus strengthen the strategic climate, but also that an aligned strategic consensus has a stronger effect on the strategic climate than does a discovered strategic consensus. 虽然两种类型的自然共识都对战略氛围有强化作用，但我们预计，趋同的战略共识比发现的战略共识会产生更强的作用。气候研究人员长期以来认为，领导行为直接塑造组织中氛围的强度（例如，Kozlowski & Doherty, 1989），最显著的是通过其信息性行为（González-Romá, Peiró, & Tordera, 2002）以及其行动（Luria, 2008; Zohar & Luria, 2004），这些行为表明领导者期望和重视的成就（Dragoni, 2005; Dragoni & Kuenzi, 2012）。由于趋同的战略共识涉及一个被所有高管团队（TMT）成员视为最优的战略决策，并形成一种认同纽带，使该决策被TMT内化，因此这种类型的战略共识会带来最高水平的TMT心理投入和努力（Klein et al., 2012）。因此，我们正式提出，不仅两种自然类型的战略共识都会强化战略氛围，而且趋同的战略共识对战略氛围的影响比发现的战略共识更强。
Proposition 5. Both an aligned and a discovered strategic consensus have a strengthening effect on strategic climate through the identification and commitment bonds they generate toward the strategic decision by the TMT, respectively, and this effect is stronger for the aligned strategic consensus. 命题5。一致战略共识和发现的战略共识均通过高层管理团队（TMT）对战略决策产生的认同与承诺纽带，对战略氛围产生强化作用，且一致战略共识的这种作用更强。
Whereas the substantive actions that flow from the two natural types of strategic consensus strengthen the strategic climate, as they clearly align with the initial perceived priority of the strategic decision, the psychological bonds generated by both types of negotiated strategic consensuses (calculated or acquiesced) result in very different substantive effects that are not as well-aligned with initial priority perceptions of the strategic decision. 尽管源于两种自然类型的战略共识的实质性行动会强化战略氛围，因为它们与战略决策最初感知到的优先级明显一致，但两种类型的协商战略共识（经过计算或默许的）所产生的心理纽带会导致截然不同的实质性效果，这些效果与战略决策最初的优先级感知并不十分一致。
First, we suggest that a calculated strategic consensus, at best, maintains the priority perceptions among members of the organization that the strategic consensus creates. As discussed above, this type of strategic consensus yields an instrumental bond, which tends to involve compliant efforts, resource allocations, and continuation toward the strategic decision rather than committed ones. The rather tentative substantive actions, while supportive, simply maintain an organizational shared perception about the priority of the strategic decision to the firm. O’Reilly and Chatman’s (1986) study of intra- and extra-role behaviors offers support for this argument. They found that different levels of psychological involvement predicted extra-role behaviors in individuals, but not intra-role behaviors. Unlike with higher levels of involvement (i.e., commitment), their results showed that compliance was unrelated to extra-role behaviors but had no significant effect on intra-role behaviors. Additional support for our assertion can be found in a more recent study by Moon and colleagues (2003): their findings suggested that individual decision-makers tend to make only incremental investments, or even invest less, into a selected project (i.e., spread resources more evenly across multiple projects rather than focus resources on a given project) when the project chosen by the group is deemed less desirable than the other decision alternatives by the individual decision-makers. 首先，我们认为，即便形成了经过计算的战略共识，也最多只能维持组织成员对该战略共识所创造的优先事项的感知。如前所述，这种类型的战略共识会产生一种工具性纽带，这种纽带往往涉及顺从性努力、资源分配以及持续推进战略决策，而非承诺性行动。这些相当试探性的实质性行动，虽然具有支持作用，却仅仅维持了组织上对于战略决策对企业的优先性的共同认知。奥赖利和查特曼（1986）对角色内和角色外行为的研究为这一论点提供了支持。他们发现，不同程度的心理投入能够预测个体的角色外行为，但无法预测角色内行为。与更高程度的投入（即承诺）不同，他们的研究结果显示，顺从与角色外行为无关，且对角色内行为没有显著影响。后续对于我们主张的额外支持，可见于穆恩及其同事（2003）的一项近期研究：他们的发现表明，当群体选定的项目被个体决策者认为不如其他决策备选方案理想时，个体决策者往往只会对所选项目进行增量投资，甚至会减少投资（即把资源平均分配到多个项目上，而非集中资源于某个特定项目）。
Thus, while the compliant substantive involvement and actions toward the strategic decision that accompany the instrumental bond generated by a calculated strategic consensus are congruent with the initial symbolic effect of the strategic consensus, the calculated and tentative nature of substantiation works to maintain the current level of strategic climate: it neither further enhances nor erodes the shared perceptions of organizational members. 因此，尽管与经过计算的战略共识所产生的工具性纽带相伴的、符合要求的实质性参与和针对战略决策的行动，与战略共识的初始象征效应是一致的，但实质性论证的计算性和试探性本质旨在维持当前的战略氛围水平：它既不会进一步增强，也不会削弱组织成员的共同认知。
Proposition 6. A calculated strategic consensus maintains the strategic climate (neither strengthening nor weakening it) through the instrumental bond it generates toward the strategic decision. 命题6. 经过计算的战略共识通过其对战略决策产生的工具性纽带，维持战略氛围（既不强化也不削弱它）。
Finally, an acquiesced strategic consensus will weaken the strategic climate. This is because this type of strategic consensus yields an acquiescence bond and thus one or more of the TMT members put(s) forward only minimal efforts and resource allocations toward the strategic decision, and likely exhibit(s) no intentions to stay with it. Indeed, to the extent that the TMT member(s) feel psychologically withdrawn from the decision, they are more likely to use ambiguous language when discussing the importance of the strategic decision (Weingart, Behfar, 最后，一种默许的战略共识会削弱战略氛围。这是因为这类战略共识会形成一种默许纽带，因此一个或多个TMT成员（高管团队成员）在战略决策上仅投入最少的努力和资源分配，并且可能没有坚持该决策的意愿。事实上，当TMT成员在心理上感到从决策中抽离时，他们在讨论战略决策的重要性时更有可能使用模棱两可的语言（Weingart, Behfar,
Bendersky, Todorova, & Jehn, 2015), downplay or delay any efforts or resource allocations specific to the decision (Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002; Rook, 1984), or possibly undermine other TMT member efforts through sabotage (Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002; Bennett, 1998). Because such TMT members’ minimal substantive actions are decoupled from the initial perceptions of consensus, this at the very least creates confusion among the lower-level managers and employees that observe them. It more likely creates the perception, at least among such TMT members’ direct reports, that this particular strategic decision is not truly a strategic priority. Therefore, the lack of substantive involvement and actions that accompany an acquiesced strategic consensus, through the acquiescence bond it generates, work to erode the shared perceptions of the firm’s strategic priorities, and thereby weaken strategic climate. Bendersky, Todorova, & Jehn, 2015），淡化或推迟任何与决策相关的具体努力或资源分配（Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002；Rook, 1984），或者可能通过破坏行为破坏其他高层管理团队（TMT）成员的努力（Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002；Bennett, 1998）。由于这类TMT成员的实质性行动极少，且与最初的共识感知脱节，这至少会在观察他们的低层管理者和员工中造成困惑。更有可能的是，至少在这些TMT成员的直接下属中，会产生这种特定战略决策并非真正战略重点的看法。因此，通过默许的战略共识所产生的默许纽带，缺乏实质性参与和行动，会侵蚀对公司战略重点的共同认知，从而削弱战略氛围。
Proposition 7. An acquiesced strategic consensus weakens strategic climate through the acquiescence bond it generates toward the strategic decision by the TMT. 命题7. 一种默许的战略共识通过高管团队（TMT）对战略决策产生的默许纽带，削弱了战略氛围。
DISCUSSION
讨论
The extant literature on strategic consensus reflects a vast inconsistency in how the construct has been defined and measured, and this lack of conceptual clarity has resulted in an accumulation of empirical evidence over the past four decades that lacks coherence and is highly equivocal (Kellermanns et al., 2005). We contend that recent attempts to reconcile the various construct definitions have culminated in a broad view of strategic consensus that conflates it with strategic climate—which in itself is a distinct construct. We posit that this past conflation is a result of two flawed assumptions that underlie the extant literature: that all strategic decisions result in some degree of consensus, and that strategic consensus necessarily implies commitment to the decision. We challenge these assumptions and draw upon the relevant respective literatures on decision-making and commitment to offer a reconceptualization of strategic consensus that more accurately defines it, distinguishes it from strategic climate and commitment, and thereby allows for a fuller understanding of the complex and asymmetrical relationships that strategic consensus has with each of these two separate constructs. 关于战略共识的现有文献反映出，该构念在定义和测量方式上存在巨大不一致性，这种概念上的不清晰导致过去四十年来积累的实证证据缺乏连贯性且高度模棱两可（Kellermanns等人，2005）。我们认为，近期试图调和各种构念定义的努力，最终形成了一种将战略共识与战略氛围混为一谈的广义观点——而战略氛围本身是一个截然不同的构念。我们假设，这种过去的混淆源于现有文献中两个有缺陷的假设：一是所有战略决策都会在某种程度上达成共识，二是战略共识必然意味着对决策的承诺。我们对这些假设提出挑战，并借鉴决策和承诺相关领域的文献，对战略共识进行重新概念化，以更准确地定义它，将其与战略氛围和承诺区分开来，从而更全面地理解战略共识与这两个独立构念之间复杂且不对称的关系。
Based upon the extant decision-making literature, we suggest that strategic consensus is a group decision outcome in which all deciding social actors—typically, but not limited to, the TMT— accept (or at least do not oppose) the particular strategic decision alternative (Davis, 1973). As such, it exists as a state, and we identify and develop four ideal types of strategic consensus—aligned, discovered, calculated, and acquiesced—which, as a matter of acceptance, are built upon the minimum preference thresholds of the decision makers. Rather than presuming that a strategic consensus necessarily yields commitment toward the strategic decision, we posit that only the aligned and discovered strategic consensuses—as two types of natural strategic consensus—result in identification and commitment bonds, respectively, and thus in a strong psychological involvement with the strategic decision. On the other hand, the calculated or acquiesced strategic consensuses, or two types of negotiated strategic consensus, result in instrumental or acquiesced psychological bonds to the strategic decision, respectively, that, at best, involve a compliant psychological involvement. This, then, has major implications for the organization’s strategic climate. While the achievement of a strategic consensus, regardless of its type, conveys a unified message to the rest of the organization that symbolically affects the shared awareness of strategic priorities, our theorization suggests that the differing substantive actions taken toward the strategic decision generated by the different types of strategic consensus may either strengthen, maintain, or weaken strategic climate. 基于现有的决策文献，我们认为战略共识是一种群体决策结果，其中所有决策社会行动者——通常但不限于高层管理团队（TMT）——接受（或至少不反对）特定的战略决策方案（Davis，1973）。因此，它是一种状态，我们识别并构建了四种理想类型的战略共识——一致型、发现型、计算型和默许型——这些类型作为接受的问题，建立在决策者的最低偏好阈值之上。我们不假设战略共识必然会产生对战略决策的承诺，而是认为只有一致型和发现型战略共识（作为两种自然的战略共识）分别导致认同和承诺纽带，并因此产生对战略决策的强烈心理投入。另一方面，计算型或默许型战略共识（或两种协商型战略共识）分别导致对战略决策的工具性或默许性心理纽带，至多涉及一种顺从的心理投入。这对组织的战略氛围具有重大影响。虽然无论类型如何，战略共识的达成都会向组织其他成员传达一个统一的信息，象征性地影响战略优先事项的共同认知，但我们的理论化表明，不同类型的战略共识对战略决策采取的不同实质性行动可能会加强、维持或削弱战略氛围。
Indeed, we believe that one of the most intriguing avenues for future research spurred by our theorization pertains to the investigation of this asymmetrical relationship that strategic consensus is proposed to have with strategic climate—as mediated through the psychological bond types generated by the strategic consensus types. First, it would be of great interest to examine our assumption that the achievement of a strategic consensus—regardless of the type—has a symbolic effect on lower-level managers and employees’ perceptions of the strategic priorities of the firm. That is, future research could examine whether strategic climate perceptions strengthen immediately after a strategic consensus is reached. Second, research that examines the psychological bonds generated by the strategic consensus is critical to providing further insights. For instance, studies could measure the resource allocations put forth toward the strategic decision by each of the TMT members (and their functional areas or units) and evaluate how these allocations affect the shared awareness of the firm’s strategic priorities. 事实上，我们认为，由我们的理论化所激发的未来研究中，最引人入胜的方向之一涉及对这种非对称关系的探究——即战略共识与战略氛围之间的关系，这种关系是通过战略共识类型所产生的心理纽带类型来调节的。首先，研究我们的假设——即无论类型如何，战略共识的达成对低层管理者和员工对公司战略优先级的认知具有象征意义——将极具价值。也就是说，未来的研究可以考察在达成战略共识后，战略氛围的认知是否会立即增强。其次，研究战略共识所产生的心理纽带对于提供进一步的见解至关重要。例如，研究可以衡量每个高层管理团队（TMT）成员（及其职能领域或单位）为战略决策投入的资源分配，并评估这些分配如何影响公司战略优先级的共同认知。
Developing an understanding of how these substantive enactments affect the relationship between a strategic consensus and strategic climate is a crucial first step toward investigating how strategic consensus may potentially influence the effectiveness of the strategic decision’s implementation, and, ultimately, organizational performance. To the extent that natural types of strategic consensus essentially generate commitment, whereas the negotiated types generate compliance, the different strategic consensus types can no longer be treated as though they produce similar effects on these more distal outcomes (as past research has done). 理解这些实质性法规如何影响战略共识与战略氛围之间的关系，是研究战略共识可能如何潜在地影响战略决策执行效果以及最终组织绩效的关键第一步。在某种程度上，自然形成的战略共识本质上会产生承诺，而协商形成的共识则会产生服从，因此不同类型的战略共识不再能被视为对这些更远期结果产生类似影响（如同过去的研究那样）。
Our theorization clearly has major implications for how future researchers operationalize and measure strategic consensus. The conceptualization of strategic consensus put forward here requires future researchers to focus on specific strategic decisions and focus upon the actual participants involved in making the strategic decision(s) under study. For reasons of parsimony, we focused on TMTs as the decision-makers, as it is typically the case that the TMT is the decision-making group. However, it is important to note that strategic decisions may from time to time be made by a broader dominant coalition. While the TMT of a company represents formal roles, usually identified by either title (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) or reporting structure (e.g., Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), dominant coalitions tend to be issue-oriented and thus its members likely extend beyond the TMT. In any case, because the decision-making group can vary from decision to decision within the same firm, researchers should take steps to ensure that those people included in any study of strategic consensus are actual decision-makers and not just named executives of the firm (for specific examples of this, see Dess, 1987; Dooley et al., 2000). 我们的理论化显然对未来研究者如何实施和度量战略共识具有重大意义。本文提出的战略共识概念化要求未来研究者关注特定的战略决策，并聚焦于参与研究中（某项或某些）战略决策的实际参与者。为了简洁起见，我们将高层管理团队（TMT）视为决策者，因为通常情况下，TMT是决策群体。然而，需要注意的是，战略决策有时可能由更广泛的主导联盟做出。虽然公司的TMT代表正式角色，通常通过头衔（例如，Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990）或汇报结构（例如，Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001；Wiersema & Bantel, 1992）来确定，但主导联盟往往以问题为导向，因此其成员可能远超TMT范围。无论如何，由于同一公司内的决策群体可能因决策而异，研究者应采取措施确保任何战略共识研究中包含的人员都是实际决策者，而不仅仅是公司中的名义高管（具体例子参见Dess, 1987；Dooley等人, 2000）。
Beyond identifying the specific strategic decisions and participants, perhaps the biggest challenge facing future researchers is in determining which of the strategic consensus types was achieved for the decision. This would involve assessments such as the following: (a) the initial preferences of each of the decision-makers must be established for the set of decision alternatives under consideration (i.e., a ranking of each decision-maker’s preferences for each alternative); (b) as part of ranking each decision-maker’s preferences, the researcher must identify which, if any, of the decision alternatives are deemed as ineffective, and thus unacceptable, by each participant (i.e., such alternatives would be below the minimum preference threshold of the participant); 除了确定具体的战略决策和参与者外，未来研究人员面临的最大挑战可能是确定决策达成了哪种战略共识类型。这将涉及以下评估：(a) 必须确定每个决策者对所考虑的决策备选方案的初始偏好（即每个决策者对每个备选方案的偏好排序）；(b) 在对每个决策者的偏好进行排序的过程中，研究人员必须确定每个参与者认为哪些（如果有的话）决策备选方案无效，因此不可接受（即这些备选方案将低于该参与者的最低偏好阈值）；
(c) the researcher must establish whether all decisionmakers accepted the decision—if so, determination of the type of strategic consensus achieved will be based upon comparing the initial preferences with the final decided upon alternative; and (d) an assessment must be made with respect to the decision-makers who initially found the selected alternative to be unacceptable but ultimately accepted (or chose not to oppose) the selection: did they do so because they were convinced the selection was more preferable than initially assessed, or did they feel compelled to remain silent and thereby cede their preferences? While a participantobserver ethnographic approach may prove most beneficial to initially developing an empirical understanding of the strategic consensus types, future studies using a surveyoriented approach will undoubtedly also prove to be fruitful. (c) 研究人员必须确定所有决策者是否接受了该决定——如果是，将通过比较初始偏好与最终选定的替代方案来确定达成的战略共识类型；(d) 必须对最初认为选定的替代方案不可接受但最终接受（或选择不反对）该选择的决策者进行评估：他们这样做是因为他们确信该选择比最初评估的更可取，还是因为他们感到被迫保持沉默从而放弃了自己的偏好？虽然参与者观察式民族志方法可能对最初发展对战略共识类型的实证理解最有帮助，但未来使用以调查为导向的方法的研究无疑也会富有成效。
Another potentially promising area of future inquiry would be to examine whether and how the industry environment combines with the various strategic consensus types to affect strategic climate, implementation effectiveness, and even firm performance. For instance, previous strategic consensus research has had a particular focus on how uncertain and dynamic environments moderate the relationship between strategic consensus and firm performance (Homburg et al., 1999; Kellermanns et al., 2011; Priem, 1990; West & Schwenk, 1996), and it would seem that future research that examines whether and how environmental uncertainty influences the type of strategic consensus achieved would be especially promising: under highly uncertain conditions, TMT members’ preferences for the decision alternatives may be less clear and thus such environments may be most conducive to decision-makers having more malleable preferences—therefore, such environments may lend more to a calculated strategic consensus (and its corresponding instrumental bond to the decision). Along these lines, we have bounded our theorizing to the post-decision psychological bond generated by each strategic consensus type, but past research has suggested that the psychological bond developed toward a particular target (i.e., strategic decision) may change over time (Klein et al., 2012)—and thus future research could consider, for instance, how industry dynamism affects the durability of the psychological bonds generated by a particular strategic consensus type. More generally, future studies could also examine whether the psychological bonds generated by the different strategic consensus types change over time. While it seems likely that the identification bond generated by an aligned strategic consensus is quite durable, it may be, for instance, that while a calculated strategic consensus initially generates an instrumental bond, if the actions and involvement toward the decision prove fruitful over time, then a commitment bond may develop. 未来研究的另一个潜在有前景的方向是考察行业环境如何与各种战略共识类型相结合，以影响战略氛围、实施效果乃至企业绩效。例如，以往的战略共识研究特别关注不确定和动态环境如何调节战略共识与企业绩效之间的关系（Homburg等人，1999；Kellermanns等人，2011；Priem，1990；West & Schwenk，1996），而未来研究若考察环境不确定性如何影响所达成的战略共识类型，似乎会特别有前景：在高度不确定的条件下，高管团队成员对决策备选方案的偏好可能不太明确，因此这类环境可能最有利于决策者拥有更具可塑性的偏好——因此，这类环境可能更倾向于形成一种经过计算的战略共识（以及与其对应的对决策的工具性联结）。在这方面，我们将理论化范围限定在每种战略共识类型所产生的决策后心理联结上，但以往研究表明，针对特定目标（即战略决策）形成的心理联结可能会随时间变化（Klein等人，2012）——因此，未来研究可以考虑，例如，行业动态性如何影响特定战略共识类型所产生的心理联结的持久性。更广泛地说，未来研究还可以考察不同战略共识类型所产生的心理联结是否会随时间变化。虽然与一致战略共识相关的认同联结似乎相当持久，但例如，经过计算的战略共识最初可能会产生工具性联结，如果针对决策的行动和参与随着时间推移被证明富有成效，那么承诺联结可能会形成。
This points to another important implication of our theorizing for future research: while our idealtype approach to the theoretical development of strategic consensus allowed us to unpack the complex interrelations that strategic consensus has with the psychological bonds it generates and with strategic climate, ideal types simplify the complexity that potentially underlies the different strategic consensus types themselves, as well as the different types of psychological bonds that they generate. For instance, Klein et al. (2012) suggested that while the psychological bonds reflect discrete types, the strength of the psychological involvement within each bond type can vary. Thus, while we suggest that the psychological bond type generated by each strategic consensus type is firmly anchored by the least psychologically involved decision-maker, the level of psychological involvement and efforts put forth within each of the bond types generated will undoubtedly vary. Moreover, this variance within each bond type could derive from multiple sources. For example, while an instrumental bond is generated when one or more decision-makers change their beliefs about a decision alternative, such that it moves from being below to above the decisionmaker’s minimum preference threshold, the strength of this instrumental bond could lay anywhere from being a weak instrumental bond that is quite tenuous and open to constant reevaluation, to a strong instrumental bond that is less tenuous and not as open to reevaluation. Indeed, because individuals seek to behave in a manner consistent with their previous choices, especially when choices are volitional and publicly declared (Salancik, 1977), it is quite possible that the strong instrumental bond that emerges when a decision-maker changes their beliefs about the effectiveness of a decision alternative may operate similarly to a weak commitment bond—as Klein et al. (2012: 135) have emphasized (and as we noted earlier), the boundaries between bond types “are not clean demarcations but zones of overlap.” 这指向了我们的理论构建对未来研究的另一个重要启示：虽然我们采用理想类型方法来发展关于战略共识的理论，从而能够剖析战略共识与其所产生的心理纽带以及战略氛围之间的复杂关系，但理想类型简化了不同战略共识类型本身以及它们所产生的不同心理纽带类型潜在的复杂性。例如，Klein等人（2012）提出，虽然心理纽带反映了离散的类型，但每种纽带类型内的心理投入强度可能不同。因此，尽管我们认为每种战略共识类型所产生的心理纽带类型由心理投入最少的决策者牢固锚定，但每种纽带类型内的心理投入水平和所付出的努力无疑会有所不同。此外，每种纽带类型内的这种差异可能源于多种来源。例如，当一个或多个决策者改变其对决策备选方案的信念，使其从低于决策者的最低偏好阈值变为高于该阈值时，就会产生工具性纽带，而这种工具性纽带的强度可能从非常脆弱且容易不断重新评估的弱工具性纽带，到不那么脆弱且不那么容易重新评估的强工具性纽带不等。事实上，由于个体倾向于以与他们先前选择一致的方式行事，尤其是在选择是自愿且公开声明的情况下（Salancik，1977），当决策者改变其对决策备选方案有效性的信念时出现的强工具性纽带，可能会表现得与弱承诺纽带类似——正如Klein等人（2012：135）所强调的（以及我们之前所指出的），纽带类型之间的界限“并非清晰的分界，而是重叠的区域”。
Another potential source of this complexity worth mentioning is based upon the number of decision participants whose minimum thresholds were changed to arrive at the consensus. That is, although for reasons of simplicity our illustrations depicted each strategic consensus type as a function of just one decision participant’s minimum threshold, it is entirely possible that each strategic consensus type (with the exception of the aligned strategic consensus) is a function of the minimum preferences of multiple decision participants; for example, more than one participant may deliberately change their preference for the given alternative (calculated strategic consensus) or more than one participant may cede their preferences (acquiesced strategic consensus). Therefore, to the extent that such a multiplicity underlays any given strategic consensus type, it would potentially affect the strength of the particular psychological bond type generated. For instance, while a calculated strategic consensus yields an instrumental bond to the strategic decision, regardless of whether one or multiple decision participants change their minimum preference threshold, the instrumental bond generated will be stronger when only one participant changes their minimum preference threshold (as this means that the “weakest link” is comprised of only this decision participant who holds an instrumental bond to the decision) than when multiple decision participants change their minimum preference thresholds (as there will be several “weak links” here that hold an instrumental bond to the decision). Future research investigating this complexity is therefore necessary to fully understand the relationship between strategic consensus types and the strength of the psychological bonds they generate. 另一个值得提及的复杂性潜在来源是基于决策参与者的数量，这些参与者的最低阈值被改变以达成共识。也就是说，尽管为了简化，我们的示例将每种战略共识类型描述为仅一个决策参与者的最低阈值的函数，但完全有可能的是，每种战略共识类型（除了一致战略共识外）都是多个决策参与者的最低偏好的函数；例如，不止一个参与者可能会故意改变他们对给定替代方案的偏好（计算出的战略共识），或者不止一个参与者可能会放弃他们的偏好（默许的战略共识）。因此，只要这种多样性构成任何特定战略共识类型的基础，就可能影响所产生的特定心理纽带类型的强度。例如，虽然计算出的战略共识会产生对战略决策的工具性纽带，无论一个还是多个决策参与者改变他们的最低偏好阈值，当只有一个参与者改变其最低偏好阈值时（这意味着“最弱环节”仅由这个对决策持有工具性纽带的决策参与者组成），产生的工具性纽带会比当多个决策参与者改变其最低偏好阈值时（此时会有几个对决策持有工具性纽带的“薄弱环节”）更强。因此，未来的研究有必要调查这种复杂性，以充分理解战略共识类型与其产生的心理纽带强度之间的关系。
Another boundary condition to our theorizing pertains to the selection phase of the decision-making process (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976). Strategic decision-making processes typically involve three phases (Mintzberg et al., 1976): the identification of decision alternatives, the development of participants’ preferences for the alternatives, and the selection of an alternative by the decisionmakers (i.e., the strategic decision). Our theorization is placed in the last of these phases, and presumes that the decision-makers have predeveloped preference levels toward a preidentified set of decision alternatives. Future research could therefore delve into how the identification and development phases of the decision-making process affect whether a strategic consensus is achieved, and, if so, its type. For example, CEO power would seem to be an important factor that could potentially shape both the identification of alternatives (e.g., Finkelstein & D’aveni, 1994) as well as the development of the preferences of the TMT toward the alternatives (Finkelstein et al., 2009). With respect to the latter, it would seem that CEO power may be most impactful on the negotiated types of strategic consensus, as the mere disclosure of the CEO’s preference could alter the preferences of others in the group (e.g., Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010), or perhaps even make TMT members feel it necessary to cede their preferences to the CEO’s preferences. In short, researchers interested in understanding the strategic decision-making process itself can conduct inquiries into the identification of alternatives and development of preferences. 我们理论化的另一个边界条件涉及决策过程的选择阶段（Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976）。战略决策过程通常涉及三个阶段（Mintzberg et al., 1976）：决策备选方案的识别、参与者对这些备选方案偏好的形成，以及决策者对某一备选方案的选择（即战略决策）。我们的理论化置于这些阶段中的最后一个阶段，并假定决策者对预先确定的一组决策备选方案已预先形成了偏好水平。因此，未来的研究可以深入探讨决策过程的识别和形成阶段如何影响战略共识是否达成，以及如果达成，其类型如何。例如，CEO权力似乎是一个重要因素，可能影响备选方案的识别（例如，Finkelstein & D’aveni, 1994）以及管理团队（TMT）对备选方案偏好的形成（Finkelstein et al., 2009）。至于后者，CEO权力似乎对协商型战略共识的类型影响最大，因为仅仅披露CEO的偏好就可能改变团队中其他人的偏好（例如，Guadagno & Cialdini, 2010），或者甚至可能让管理团队成员觉得有必要将自己的偏好让位于CEO的偏好。简而言之，对理解战略决策过程本身感兴趣的研究人员可以对备选方案的识别和偏好的形成进行探究。
Finally, while our focus is specific to the strategic context, the conceptualization of consensus we have developed here—and thus the different consensus types—potentially generalizes to other contexts involving interdependent decision-makers. Future research studying consensus (as a decision outcome) in such settings should concern itself with acceptance, rather than agreement, and the minimum preference thresholds of the decision-makers. We also expect that the psychological bonds generated by each type of consensus will generalize to other settings; thus, researchers in other contexts should likewise not simply presume that a consensus decision outcome automatically means that the decisionmakers are committed to the decision, and should focus attention toward the least psychologically involved decision-maker. 最后，尽管我们的研究重点特定于战略背景，但我们在此提出的共识概念化——以及由此产生的不同共识类型——有可能推广到其他涉及相互依赖决策者的情境中。未来在这类情境下研究共识（作为决策结果）的研究，应关注接受度而非一致性，以及决策者的最低偏好阈值。我们还预期，每种共识类型所产生的心理纽带也会推广到其他情境中；因此，其他领域的研究者也不应简单地认为共识决策结果自动意味着决策者对决策是认同的，而应将注意力集中在心理参与度最低的决策者身上。
In conclusion, our theorization about the relationship that strategic consensus has with strategic climate, as mediated through the psychological bonds it generates, advances theory particular to the strategic context. Our theorization importantly recognizes and appropriately incorporates the two different notions of consensus that exist in the broader literatures. That is, our definition of strategic consensus as acceptance among decision-makers draws upon the construal of consensus in the decision-making literature, while our definition of strategic climate as the broad agreement of strategic priorities draws upon the sociological and psychological notions of consensus as shared understandings. In so doing, we disentangle how a consensus decision outcome (i.e., strategic consensus) influences the more broadly held shared perceptions of the decision and its priorities (i.e., strategic climate) and thereby open the pathway for future research to investigate how both of these important, but separate, phenomena may ultimately affect organizational effectiveness. 总之，我们对战略共识与战略氛围之间关系的理论化研究（该关系通过心理纽带产生），推进了针对战略情境的特定理论。我们的理论化研究重要地认识并恰当地整合了更广泛文献中存在的两种不同的共识概念。也就是说，我们将战略共识定义为决策者之间的认同，这借鉴了决策文献中对共识的解读；而我们将战略氛围定义为战略优先级的广泛一致，则借鉴了社会学和心理学中作为共同理解的共识概念。通过这样做，我们厘清了共识决策结果（即战略共识）如何影响对决策及其优先级更广泛持有的共同认知（即战略氛围），从而为未来研究开辟了路径，以探究这两种重要但相互独立的现象最终可能如何影响组织效能。
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Nathan A. Bragaw (nbragaw@udel.edu) is an assistant professor of management in the Alfred Lerner College of Business & Economics, University of Delaware. His PhD is from The Pennsylvania State University. His research explores strategic leadership, with a specific focus on the decision-making and actions of top executives and organizations. 内森·A·布拉加沃（nbragaw@udel.edu）是特拉华大学阿尔弗雷德·勒纳商学院的管理学助理教授。他的博士学位来自宾夕法尼亚州立大学。他的研究探索战略领导力，特别关注高层管理人员和组织的决策及行动。
Vilmos F. Misangyi $\mathrm { \Delta v f m 1 0 @ \omega }$ psu.edu) is professor of strategic management, BNY Mellon Fellow, and M&O Department Chair in the Smeal College of Business, Penn State University. His PhD is from the University of Florida. His research examines the behavioral, cognitive, and social underpinnings of top executive and organizational actions and influence. Vilmos F. Misangyi $\mathrm { \Delta v f m 1 0 @ \omega }$ psu.edu) 是宾夕法尼亚州立大学斯梅尔商学院的战略管理教授、纽约梅隆银行研究员以及管理与组织系主任。他的博士学位来自佛罗里达大学。他的研究考察高层管理人员和组织行动及影响力的行为、认知和社会基础。
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